Altruistic behavior and cooperation: The role of intrinsic expectation when reputational information is incomplete

Altruistic behavior is known to be conditional on the level of altruism of others. However, people often have no information, or incomplete information, about the altruistic reputation of others, for example when the reputation was obtained in a different social or economic context. As a consequence, they have to estimate the other's altruistic intentions. Using an economic game, we showed that without reputational information people have intrinsic expectations about the altruistic behavior of others, which largely explained their own altruistic behavior. This implies that when no information is available, intrinsic expectations can be as powerful a driver of altruistic behavior as actual knowledge about other people's reputation. Two strategies appeared to co-exist in our study population: participants who expected others to be altruistic and acted even more altruistically themselves, while other participants had low expected altruism scores and acted even less altruistically than they expected others to do. We also found evidence that generosity in economic games translates into benefits for other social contexts: a reputation of financial generosity increased the attractiveness of partners in a social cooperative game. This result implies that in situations with incomplete information, the fitness effects of indirect reciprocity are cumulative across different social contexts.     

Representing others' actions: just like one's own?

Previous research has shown that observing others' actions can affect individual performance of the same actions. In the present study, we developed a new paradigm to investigate whether and how complementary actions at the disposal of another agent are represented and influence one's own actions. A spatial compatibility task was distributed among two people so that each participant took care of one of two responses. The identical task was performed alone and alongside another participant. There was a spatial compatibility effect in the group setting only. It was similar to the effect obtained when one person took care of both responses. This result suggests that one's own actions and others' actions are represented in a functionally equivalent way.     

作弊为什么会传染?社会损失和作弊态度的中介作用

为了解释考试作弊的"传染"现象,研究探讨大学考试情境中他人作弊对观察者将来作弊意向的效应,假设他人作弊通过社会损失和作弊态度的链式中介作用对观察者将来作弊意向产生效应。研究采用他人作弊问卷、社会损失问卷、作弊态度问卷、将来作弊意向问卷,对765名在校大学生进行调查。在控制了性别、年级、第一次作弊的时间和经常作弊的开始时间之后,研究发现：（1）他人作弊正向预测观察者将来作弊意向;（2）社会损失在他人作弊和观察者将来作弊意向之间起中介作用;（3）社会损失与作弊态度在他人作弊与观察者将来作弊意向之间起链式中介作用。研究为理解考试作弊的"传染"现象及其内在机制提供了有价值的视角。     

Tell me who you are and I tell you how you feel: expected emotional reactions to success and failure are influenced by knowledge about a person's personality

The present research investigated the influence of knowledge about a person's modesty or arrogance on people's expectations regarding that person's emotional reactions to success and failure. Arrogance and modesty reflect the extent to which someone is likely to publicize their ability. Accordingly, we predicted that observers' expectations regarding a person's tendency to publicize their ability should inform expectations about the person's emotional reactions to success and failure. In two vignette studies, observers predicted the emotional state of a protagonist, as well as the probability that s/he will actually express that emotion and share the experience with others. For success, participants predicted a protagonist's pride, happiness, schadenfreude, and embarrassment if praised for a positive outcome. For failure, participants predicted anger, shame, guilt, sadness, and fear reactions. Across studies, personality information explained more variance than did gender or status. Results showed that the expectations for an arrogant person matched modal expectations for success, whereas for failure the expectations for the modest individual were closest to the modal expectations. Specifically, both modest and arrogant individuals were expected to suppress emotions that do not fit their self-presentational styles rather than to exaggerate expressions that do. This paper adds to our understanding of the information that people use to predict others' emotional reactions.     

Moral Outrage: Territoriality in Human Guise

Moral outrage is a response to the behavior of others, never one's own. It is a response to infringements or transgressions on what people perceive to be the immunities they, or others with whom they identify, can expect on the basis of their rights and privileges and what they understand to be their reasonable expectations regarding the behavior of others. A person's culturally defined social identities and the rights and privileges that go with them in relationships to which those identities can be party make up the contents of that person's social persona and also constitute that person's social territory. Infringements of rights and privileges in the social and symbolic worlds in which humans live are the equivalent of encroachments on territory among animals, and moral outrage can be understood as the human expression of what we perceive as territorial behavior in animals. As emotion, outrage is affected by such clinical processes as displacement, rationalization, projection, and reaction formation. Outrage has an essential role in the maintenance of viable social groups, but it also exacerbates conflict among people who perceive one another as "others."     

同伴特点如何影响人们的合作与冲突行为?

人类的生存繁衍依赖于人们之间的相互合作,合作与冲突行为的研究近年来成为心理学的研究热点。本研究通过实验程序操纵Chicken Game中博弈同伴的特点,考察个体在社会困境中面对不同特点同伴时的合作行为。结果发现：(1)同伴道义论组和功利论组总和解率没有显著差异,同伴竞争组和合作组的总和解率也没有显著差异。(2)在与道义论以及合作型的同伴互动时,个体的行为没有明显受到上次博弈反馈的影响。(3)当同伴为功利论时,相比于上次博弈个体选择和解而同伴选择进攻,双方都选择和解时个体在当前博弈中更倾向于和解;(4)在同伴竞争组中,相比于上次博弈个体选择进攻而同伴选择和解,双方都选择和解时被试在当前博弈中会更倾向于和解。实验结果表明个体在博弈任务中会受到同伴特点的影响,并且同伴在博弈中的行为特点的影响更为显著。本研究从同伴特点来考察个体的合作行为,揭示了影响个体博弈行为的一种因素。     

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.     

句子阅读的内隐自尊研究

本研究尝试通过22名被试在阅读自我成败句子及他／她成败句子时的眼动数据来探讨内隐自尊,结果发现阅读主语人称为“我”的句子时．自我成功句子与自我失败句子的第二次注视时间及瞳孔大小存在差异,这提示内隐自尊存在,个体会无意识地对自我积极信息进行深度加工。     

道德情绪：道德行为的中介调节

道德情绪是心理学的一个重要研究主题。道德情绪是个体根据一定的道德标准评价自己或他人的行为和思想时所产生的一种情绪体验。它是一种复合情绪, 主要包括厌恶、移情、内疚, 羞耻等。道德情绪影响下人类会产生某些典型行为, 这主要包括道德洁净行为和道德补偿行为。心理学研究道德情绪的实验范式很多, 主要有行为回忆范式、实物或图片刺激范式、情境设置范式等。有关道德情绪的未来研究主要应注重于探讨正性道德情绪在道德发展中的作用, 探讨道德情绪对群体行为的影响, 以及探讨道德情绪在不同文化背景下的价值意义。     

Social value orientation and intelligence: A test of the goal prescribes rationality principle

The present study examines the influence of pre-existing individual differences in social value orentations, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to oneself and others (McClintock, 1978), on perceptions of rationality in a social dilemma. In Experiment 1 conducted in Groningen (the Netherlands), it was found that people with pro-social orientations expected more cooperation from another described as intelligent than from another described as unintelligent, whereas individualists and competitors expected relatively more cooperation from another described as unintelligent. The cross-cultural generalizability of this finding was examined and supported in Experiment 2 which was conducted in Santa Barbara (U.S.A.). Results from both studies are consistent with the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle (Van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990) which assumes that people with pro-social (cooperative) orientations would perceive rationality in social dilemmas primarily from the collective perspective, whereas individualists and competitors would take a strong egocentric perspective on rationality. In addition, we found a strong relationship between expectations of other's cooperation and own cooperative behaviour when the other was described as intelligent. The strength of this relationship was reduced, particularly for individualists and competitors, when the other person was described as unintelligent.     

Self-observation of social behavior and metaperception.

In 3 experiments (Ns = 68, 72, and 101) the authors tested the hypothesis that the opportunity to observe oneself in social interaction increases the accuracy of metaperception (prediction of others' social judgments of oneself). Small groups were videotaped during a decision-making task, after which group members judged each other's social anxiety. Participants watched either the videotape of their group's interaction or a videotape of another group's interaction. After watching the videotape, participants predicted how they were judged by each member of the group. Results from the 3 experiments confirmed the hypothesis that self-observation increases the accuracy of metaperception. Presumably, self-observation provides objective information about one's behavior, which increases the ability to determine how one is judged by others, assuming self and others share meaning systems.     

Error and bias in comparative judgment: on being both better and worse than we think we are

People believe that they are better than others on easy tasks and worse than others on difficult tasks. In previous attempts to explain these better-than-average and worse-than-average effects, researchers have invoked bias and motivation as causes. In this article, the authors develop a more parsimonious account, the differential information explanation, in which it is assumed only that people typically have better information about themselves than they do about others. When one's own performance is exceptional (either good or bad), it is often reasonable to assume others' will be less so. Consequently, people estimate the performance of others as less extreme (more regressive) than their own. The result is that people believe they are above average on easy tasks and below average on difficult tasks. These effects are exacerbated when people have accurate information about their performances, increasing the natural discrepancy between knowledge of the self and knowledge of others. The effects are attenuated when people obtain accurate information about the performances of others.     

Political polarization projection: social projection of partisan attitude extremity and attitudinal processes

What influences perceptions of political polarization? The authors examine the polarization of people's own political attitudes as a source of perceived polarization: Individuals with more extreme partisan attitudes perceive greater polarization than individuals with less extreme partisan attitudes. This "polarization projection" was demonstrated in 3 studies in which people estimated the distribution of others' political attitudes: one study with a nationally representative sample concerning the 2008 presidential election, and 2 studies concerning university students evaluating a policy regarding scarce resource allocation. These studies demonstrate that polarization projection occurs simultaneously with and independently of simple projection, the tendency to assume that others share one's partisan political attitudes. Polarization projection may occur partly because people assume that others engage in similar attitudinal processes as the self, such as extensive thought and emotional arousal. The projection of various attitudinal processes was demonstrated in a study concerning health care reform policies. Further supporting this explanation, polarization projection increased when people introspected about their own attitudinal processes, which increased the accessibility of those processes. Implications for perceptions of partisanship, social judgment, and civic behavior are discussed.     

社会场景下联合表征的整合机制

人们在交互过程中会同时表征自我和他人相关的信息,形成社会性联合表征.然而,自我和他人相关信息是以整合还是分离的形式存在,这一问题尚未厘清.本研究以工作记忆蓬佐错觉为指标展开了探讨.实验中要求两名被试分别记忆部分构成蓬佐错觉的线段并回忆.结果发现,竞争和合作场景下的个体不仅表征了他人相关的信息,还将其和自身相关的信息进行了整合,形成工作记忆蓬佐错觉效应,表明社会交互条件下会自动整合成社会性共同表征.     

What we think we do (to each other): how personality can bias behavior schemas through the projection of if-then profiles

People's knowledge about others includes not only person schemas about the typical traits of others but also behavior schemas about the likely interpersonal consequences of different behaviors. In this article, it is argued that perceiver effects can be interactive at the level of behavior schemas. A person's own personality configuration of if-then responses in social interactions (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) may contribute to that person's beliefs about the meaning and impact of relational behaviors more generally. In consequence, people who experience strong (or weak) responses to behaviors that vary along a particular trait dimension, such as warmth-coldness, may expect others to experience similarly strong (or weak) responses to those same kinds of behaviors. In 3 studies, people who were high in trait communion expected others to respond more strongly to behaviors that varied in warmth-coldness than did people who were low in trait communion, and people who were low in trait agency expected others to respond more strongly to behaviors that varied in assertiveness-unassertiveness than did people who were high in trait agency. Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that participants' behavior schemas were based on assumptions derived from their own if-then personality profiles.     

移情对亲社会行为决策的两种功能

移情对亲社会行为决策具有动机功能和信息功能。霍夫曼认为,移情忧伤不仅能够作为亲社会道德动机促进亲社会行为的产生,而且能够激活观察者的道德原则,进而引发亲社会行为。巴特森强调移情不仅能够增强解除他人困境的动机,而且带有重视他人福利和想使他人困境得到解除的程度的信息。移情的动机功能依赖于诱发移情的情境,而信息功能具有稳定的倾向性,比动机功能更持久,两种功能共同作用使移情在亲社会行为决策中具有更强的适应性。移情功能理论对道德教育具有启示作用。     

Moral hypocrisy: appearing moral to oneself without being so.

How can people appear moral to themselves when they fail to act morally? Two self-deception strategies were considered: (a) misperceive one's behavior as moral and (b) avoid comparing one's behavior with moral standards. In Studies 1 and 2 the authors documented the importance of the 2nd strategy but not the 1st. Among participants who flipped a coin to assign themselves and another participant "fairly" to tasks, even a clearly labeled coin that prevented misperception did not produce a fair result (Study 1). Inducing behavior-standard comparison through self-awareness did (Study 2). Study 3 qualified the self-awareness effect: When moral standards were not salient before acting, self-awareness no longer increased alignment of behavior with standards. Instead, it increased alignment of standards with behavior and produced less moral action. Overall, results showed 3 different faces of moral hypocrisy.     

Self and social judgments of ability: beyond distributional information

In a given domain, low-skill individuals typically evaluate the ability level of other people more favorably than high-skill individuals. The current study tests whether this tendency continues to occur even when people have unambiguous distributional information available through which to judge others. Students received distributional information detailing their percentile rank in a statistics course and the percentile rank of another student in the course. Then, students were asked to evaluate their own and the other students' statistics ability. Students evaluated the other person's ability more favorably when their own rank in the course was low rather than high. Therefore, people may use themselves as a standard of comparison when they judge others even when more diagnostic sources of information are available.     

Know yourself and you shall know the other... to a certain extent: multiple paths of influence of self-reflection on mindreading

Social and neurocognitive research suggests that thinking about one's own thinking and thinking about the thinking of others-termed 'mindreading', 'metacognition', 'social cognition' or 'mentalizing' are not identical activities. The ability though to think about thinking in the first person is nevertheless related to the ability to think about other's thoughts in the third person. Unclear is how these phenomena influence one another. In this review, we explore how self-reflection and autobiographical memory influence the capacity to think about the thoughts and emotions of others. We review studies suggesting that the more individuals are able to reflect on and retrieve episodes from their life narratives, the more they are likely to grasp others' thoughts and emotions. We discuss evidence supporting this possibility including studies of the neurocognitive bases of empathy and self-awareness and how different aspects of self-reflection may impact on mindreading. We also draw from clinical reports how improved self-reflection may result in a more nuanced mindreading, namely persons suffering from schizophrenia and narcissistic personality disorder. We finally discuss the implications for research and practice and consider whether there are conditions in which the reverse is true, where self-reflection might impair mindreading or in which mindreading may facilitate self-reflection.