共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Kirsten Jacobson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):355-373
Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home”
is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar
notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity
that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially
an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for
our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way
of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature
of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. 相似文献
2.
Ernest W. Adams 《Synthese》2005,146(1-2):129-138
Syllogisms like Barbara, “If all S is M and all M is P, then all S is P”, are here analyzed not in terms of the truth of their categorical constituents, “all S is M”, etc., but rather in terms of the corresponding proportions, e.g., of Ss that are Ms. This allows us to consider the inferences’ approximate validity, and whether the fact that most Ss are Ms and most Ms are Ps guarantees that most Ss are Ps. It turns out that no standard syllogism is universally valid in this sense, but special ‘default rules’ govern approximate reasoning of this kind. Special attention is paid to
inferences involving existential propositions of the “Some S is M” form, where it is does not make sense to say “Almost some S is M”, but where it is important that in
everyday speech, “Some” does not mean “At least one”, but rather “A not insignificant number”. 相似文献
3.
Robert Eamon Briscoe 《Synthese》2006,152(1):95-128
Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims
about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning
of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of it. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first
claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally
constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding. I begin by trying to show that it is possible to
disentangle anti-internalist and anti-individualist strands of argument in Hilary Putnam’s well-known and widely influential
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Having once argued that the latter strand of argument is not cogent, I then try to show that individualism
(in the sense above) can be reconciled with perhaps the most plausible reconstruction of Putnam’s well-known and widely accepted
“indexical” theory of natural kind terms. Integral to my defense of the possibility of an individualist externalism about
idiolectical meaning are my efforts to demonstrate that, pace Putnam, there is no “division of linguistic labor” when it comes to the fixing the meanings of such terms in a speaker’s
idiolect. The fact that average speakers sometimes need defer to experts shows that not reference, but only reliable recognition of what belongs in the extension of a natural kind term is a “social phenomenon.”
相似文献Wittgenstein (1958, 14).
4.
Aaron Rizzieri 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(3):217-229
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument
against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of
epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant
propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.” 相似文献
5.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(1):45-60
Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution
falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in
this case, “if x, then I am awake,” x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we
can know that the antecedent holds, and as such can infer the consequent, i.e., “I am awake.” Sosa’s second solution, in terms
of so-called reflective knowledge, is shown to land him in the dilemma of either facing yet another conditionality problem,
or violating an internalist constraint that he explicitly grants the skeptic with respect to what kind of factors can be legitimately
invoked in our account of how we may know the relevant antecedent. For these reasons, I conclude that Sosa has not solved
the problem of dream skepticism. 相似文献
6.
Joseph LaPorte 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):321-336
Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s
interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect
to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual
properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of
designation, or rigid designation. Third, I argue that my position does not founder by way of failing to assign rigidity the
work of grounding a posteriori necessity.
I thank Steve Schwartz and Bernard Linsky for helpful feedback on this
paper 相似文献
7.
Heikki Kirjavainen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):75-88
In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term
‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this
presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and
Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification
and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus
two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices
and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory.
The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes. 相似文献
8.
Benjamin S. Cordry 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(1):61-83
While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was
a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper,
I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess.
His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive.
I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing
on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that
his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft”
and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces
a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several
ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions. 相似文献
9.
Thomas Heyd 《Knowledge, Technology, and Policy》1995,8(1):63-73
Recently indigenous knowledge has received increasing academic (see, e.g., Warren et al., 1993; Brokensha et al., 1980; Gómez-Pompa
and Kaus, 1992) and institutional (see World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987;Agenda 21, 1992) attention. The study, application, and recording of indigenous knowledge, viewed as indigenous technologies for living
with natural environments, has become a field of great interest and promise to nonindigenous and indigenous people; the ways
in which the present interest is expressed, however, could also become a source of disappointment for the latter. I begin
by considering the meaning of the expression “indigenous knowledge.” Next, I examine whether indigenous knowledge is fundamentally
different from scientific knowledge. Finally I discuss the potential for emancipation, but also for alienation, resulting
from the current ways of focussing on indigenous knowledge.
He has published on the conception “sustainable development,” on technological rationality andAgenda 21, and on the significance of aboriginal boulder structures, as well as on issues in the history of modern philosophy and philosophy
of art. He is the Chair of the Canadian Society for the Study of European Ideas for which he is coordinating workshops on
“Ideas of Nature and Land” and “Constructed Space” at its June 1995 Conference in Montreal. 相似文献
10.
In this article I argue against Chad Hansen’s version of the “White Horse Dialogue” (Baimalun) of Gongsun Longzi as intelligible through writings of the later Moists. Hansen regards the Baimalun as an attempt to demonstrate how the compound baima, “white horse,” is correctly analyzed in one of the Moist ways of analyzing compound term semantics but not the other. I
present an alternative reading in which the Baimalun arguments point out, via reductio, the failure of either Moist analysis; in particular they point out how neither analysis accounts for ordinary, acceptable
inferences like “There is a white horse; therefore there is a horse.” At issue for Gongsun Longzi is a fundamental problem
with atomic terms: none of them seems capable of referring to a particular, “stand-alone” individual. 相似文献
11.
Søren Overgaard 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):307-330
In various publications, Stanley Cavell and Stanley Rosen have emphasized the philosophical importance of what they both call
“the ordinary.” They both contrast their recovery of “the ordinary” with traditional philosophy, including the phenomenological
philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In this paper, I address Rosen’s claims in particular. I argue that Rosen turns the real situation
on its head. Contra Rosen, it is not the case that the employment of Husserl’s epoché distorts the authentic voice of “the” ordinary—a voice
that is clearly audible only from within everyday life. For (pace both Cavell and Rosen) there is no single “voice” of the ordinary: There are many such “voices,” not all of which are to be relied upon. Therefore, if we want to achieve
an adequate grasp of ordinary experience, and Rosen does want this, we precisely need the epoché to curtail the misleading
messages of certain other “voices of the ordinary.” Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, this positive evaluation of the Husserlian
epoché finds support in Heidegger’s writings from the twenties. I argue that Heidegger, too, believed that the epoché was
an indispensable tool for the philosophical attempt to capture ordinary experience. 相似文献
12.
Patrick Stokes 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(4):485-507
The ancient problem of whether our asymmetrical attitudes towards time are justified (or normatively required) remains a live
one in contemporary philosophy. Drawing on themes in the work of McTaggart, Parfit, and Heidegger, I argue that this problem
is also a key concern of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or (1843). Part I of Either/Or presents the “aesthete” as living a temporally volatilized form of life, devoid of temporal location, sequence and direction.
Like Parfit’s character “Timeless,” these aesthetes are indifferent to the direction of time and seemingly do not experience
McTaggart’s “A-Series” mode of temporality. The “ethical” conception of time that Judge William offers in Part II contains
an attempt to normativize the direction of time, by re-orienting the aesthete towards an awareness of time’s finitude. However,
the form of life Judge William articulates gives time sequentiality but not necessarily the robust directionality necessary to justify (and make normative) our asymmetrical attitudes to time. Hence while Either/Or raises this problem it remains unanswered until The Concept of Anxiety (1844). Only with the eschatological understanding of time developed in The Concept of Anxiety does Kierkegaard answer the question of why directional and asymmetrical conative and affective attitudes towards time are
normative. 相似文献
13.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
14.
This study investigated whether preservice teachers’ attitudes surrounding school grade labels influenced interpretations
and recall of children’s classroom behavior using the automatic attitude activation model (Fazio, In R. M. Sorrentino & E.
T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior, 1986) as a theoretical framework. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: The expectation of viewing
a video of children in schools labeled as “A,” “F,” or “typical” as a result of the school’s aggregated student performance
on standardized tests. Results indicated that participants who believed that they were viewing a video of an “F” classroom
recalled more negative and fewer positive behaviors compared to the “typical” classroom. Likewise, there was a trend for participants
to recall more negative and fewer positive behaviors when viewing a video of an “F” compared to an “A” school. Therefore,
negative attitudes about a school label of “F” biased preservice teachers’ perceptions and memories of children’s classroom
behaviors.
相似文献
Tracy LinderholmEmail: |
15.
Xiaoqiang Han 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):157-167
Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed
to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam
employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the
existence of myself, but from the meaning of some particular assertion I make. In this paper, I argue, however, that Putnam’s argument fails to deliver on the promise of showing the self-refuting
nature of the skeptical hypothesis, as it relies on a double use of “I”, a fallacy of equivocation, reflecting an unsolved
tension between the argument’s general premise, which is rather Zhuangzian in spirit, and his unwitting adoption of that unwarranted
notion about “I”. I try to show further that the skepticism in Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream not only can be used to refute the
proofs of the existence of the empirical I, but also is effective against accounts concerning the existence of the transcendental I. 相似文献
16.
John J. Furedy 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2002,38(1):3-16
This paper offers an interpretation of the relation between Pavlov’s life and work and the missions of the Pavlovian Society,
both past (“observation and observation”) and present (“interdisciplinary research on the integrated organism”). I begin with
an acount of Pavlov's life and his influence on contemporary thought. I then indicate the relation of some of Pavlov's attitudes
(e.g., his motto, his epistemological stance) to the Society's past mission. In the concluding and most controversial section,
I argue for six guiding principles derived from Pavlov, to be applied to the Society’s mission. These are: (a) a confident
methodological behaviorism; (b) a significant role assigned to both physiological and psychological factors in the prediction
and control of the integrated organism; (c) approximately equal taxonomic precision of physiological and psychological explanatory concepts; (d) distrust of toleological
explanatory concepts; (e) rejection of psychology’s instrumentalist “cognitive paradigm shift”; and (f) rejection of the representational
theory of knowledge. 相似文献
17.
Tomasz Szkudlarek 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):113-125
In this text I concentrate on semiotic aspects of the theory of political identity in the work of Ernesto Laclau, and especially
on the connection between metaphors, metonymies, catachreses and synecdoches. Those tropes are of ontological status, and
therefore they are of key importance in understanding the discursive “production” of identity in political and educational
practices. I use the conceptions of both Laclau and Eco to elucidate the operation of this structure, and illustrate it with
an example of the emergence of the “Solidarność” movement in Poland, expanding its analysis provided by Laclau. I focus on
the moment when one of particular demands assumes the representation of totality, which, in Laclau, is left to “circumstantial”
determination. This moment inspires several questions and needs to be given special attention if Laclau’s theory is to be
used in theory of education. It is so because theory of education cannot remain on the level of the ontological (which is
the core of Laclau’s achievement), but has to theorize “non-ontological” dimensions as well, that is the ontic (i.e. “content”
of education), the deontic (duty, obligation, and the normative in general), as well as what I call the deontological—the very relation between “what there is” and “what there is not” (including that which should be) as the locus of education. 相似文献
18.
王树人 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(1):1-12
To grasp the truth in traditional Chinese classics, we need to uncover the long obscured “xiang” 象 (image) thinking, which has long been overshadowed by Occidentalism. “xiang thinking” is the most fundamental thought of human beings. The logic of linguistics all comes from “xiang thinking”. Through conceptual thinking, people can understand Western classics on metaphysics, yet they may not completely
understand the various schools of Chinese classics. The difference between Chinese and Western ways of thinking originated
in the difference of the basic views developed in the “Axial period”. Since Aristotle, Western metaphysical ideas have all
been manifested in substantiality, objectivity, and being ready-made, whereas Chinese Taiji, Dao, Xin-xing, and Zen were manifested in the non-substantiality, non-objectivity, and non-ready-made-ness of a dynamic whole. To grasp
substance, rational and logical thinking such as definition, judgment, and reasoning is necessary. On the other hand, to grasp
Taiji, Dao, etc., which is a dynamic whole or non-substances, “xiang thinking”, which is related to perception and rich in poetic association, is essential. History has taught us a lesson, i.e.,
when we opened the window to logical thought, we closed that of “xiang thinking”. We should remember the words of Xu Guangqi, i.e., “To mingle harmoniously and understand thoroughly so as to excel”.
Translated by Zhang Lin from Hebei xuekan 河北学刊 (Hebei Academic Journal), 2007, (5): 21–25 相似文献
19.
De Houwer J 《Psychonomic bulletin & review》2004,11(1):49-53
Recent studies have shown that spatial Simon effects can be modulated by short-term associations that are set up as a result
of task instructions. I examined whether spatial Simon effects can also be produced by short-term associations even when the
responses are unrelated to spatial position. Participants were to say “cale” or “cole” on the basis of the direction of arrows
(i.e., left or right), the meaning of words (i.e.,left orright), and the color of squares presented left or right of the screen center. Responses to squares were faster when the correct
response was associated with the same position as the irrelevant position of the square (e.g., say “cale” to a square on the
left when “cale” was assigned to the wordleft and the left arrow). This new type of stimulus-response compatibility effect provides the first evidence for short-term associations
that involve mode-independent representations. 相似文献
20.
David Bittner 《Journal of religion and health》2010,49(4):603-619
In this article, David Bittner explodes the myth, restated in Brideshead
Revisited (1945), that Polynesians are “happy and harmless.” He does so for the same reason that Evelyn Waugh does: “the grim invasion of
trader, administrator, missionary, and tourist” has changed all that (p. 174). Touring Hawaii in July of ’09, Bittner was
interested to discover some unusual bits of American heritage, but saddened to see how “civilization” and “Americanization”
actually seem to have eroded the Hawaiian people’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Bittner’s dual religious
heritage—Judaism by birth and upbringing and Catholicism by choice in mid-life—has given him the perspective to apply the
lessons of Hawaiian history to his own personal issues, particularly forgiveness. 相似文献