朴素物理观和朴素心理观--进化心理学视角

人类在进化过程中解决生存与繁衍问题需要适应物理环境和社会环境。进化心理学认为人类适应物理环境与社会环境的心理机制分别称为朴素物理观和朴素心理观。文章首先阐述了朴素物理观和朴素心理观的有关内容,并指出两性差异的一个重要方面在于移情和系统化的不同组合,同时对其进化意义做了分析。     

Dangers of Transpersonal Psychology: A Reply to Ken Wilber

This article is a reply to Ken Wilber's critique of Albert Ellis's “Fanatacism that may lead to a nuclear holocaust,” which outlines some of the dangers of transpersonal psychology and psychotherapy.     

The Philosophical Foundations of Humanistic Psychology: A Reply to McMullen

McMullen (1982) attempted in his critique of humanistic psychology to attack its philosophical foundations, taking these to be phenomenology and a doctrine of self determination. In this paper we argue that McMullen has misrepresented the philosophical position of the humanists, then we examine McMullen's own philosophical assumptions. We show that he has assumed the philosophy of empirical realism which we argue is inadequate as a foundation for science. It is shown that it is the inadequacy of McMullen's assumptions which underlies his failure to comprehend the position of the humanists. We then present a version of theoretical realism and show how, in terms of this, a conception of being can be justified which allows for the emergence of hierarchical order. On the basis of this conception of being we reassess the nature of self-determination and motivation, showing how, in opposition to both the empirical realism of McMullen and the philosophical dualism of conventional humanistic psychology, a naturalistic form of humanistic psychology is justified.     

Understanding Happiness: A Look into the Chinese Folk Psychology

This qualitative study using a folk psychology approach explored what Chinese people think about happiness. One hundred and forty-two undergraduate students wrote free-format essays in response to a simple open-ended question, “What is happiness?” Using thematic analysis, four main themes were found. (1) Happiness can be defined in terms of (a) a mental state of satisfaction and contentment; (b) positive feelings/emotions; (c) a harmonious homeostasis; (d) achievement and hope; and (e) freedom from ill-being. (2) Happiness is a harmonious state of existence, under the following conditions: (a) the individual is satisfied or content; (b) the individual is the agent of his own happiness; (c) spiritual enrichment is emphasized more than material satisfaction; and (d) the individual maintains a positive outlook for the future. (3) The relationship between happiness and unhappiness is dialectical. These two distinct entities are locked in a never-ending relationship of interdependence: each depends on the other for contrast and meaning. Moreover, this relationship between the two opposites is also dynamic and constantly changing. (4) Happiness can be achieved, provided that one has the following abilities: (a) the wisdom of discovery; (b) the wisdom of contentment and gratitude; (c) the wisdom of giving; and (d)the wisdom of self-cultivation. These themes were discussed in the contexts of Chinese philosophical and folk views of happiness.     

On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels

Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the ??Standard View of Ignorance?? according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.     

Midlife in the 1980s: Philosophy,Economy, and Psychology

America's current economic and cultural crisis is the environmental context within which the middle-aged must face the added challenges of their own special developmental issues.     

On Future Ontology: A Reply to Longenecker

Axiomathes - The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better...     

On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson

Howson's critique of my essay on Hume's problem of induction levels two main charges. First, Howson claims that I have attributed to him an error that he never made, and in fact which he warned against in the very text that I cite. Secondly, Howson argues that my proposed solution to Hume's problem is flawed on technical and philosophical grounds. In response to the first charge, I explain how Howson's text justifies attributing to him the claim that the principle of induction is shown to be inconsistent by Goodman's riddle. In regards to the second, I show that Howson's objections rest on misunderstandings of formal learning theory and on conflating the problem of induction with the problem of unconceived alternatives.     

Computer Modeling and the Fate of Folk Psychology

Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory – the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior – they disagree strongly about FP's fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psychology. Fodor, however, wagers that FP will be largely preserved and vindicated by scientific investigations of behavior. Recent findings by developmental psychologists, I argue, will push both Churchlandians and Fodorians toward the pessimistic view that FP is a misguided theory that will never be displaced, because it is, so to speak, built into our cognitive systems. I explore the possibility of preserving optimism by rejecting the theory-theory and adopting the simulation theory , a competing view developed by Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman, and Jane Heal. According to simulationists, common-sense interpretation of behavior is accomplished by means of pretense-like operations that deploy the cognitive system's own reasoning capabilities in a disengaged manner. Since on this view no theory-like set of principles would be needed, the simulation theory seems to enjoy a simplicity advantage over the theory-theory. Steven Stich and Shawn Nichols, however, contend that as the cognitive system would require special mechanisms for disengaged operation, the simplicity question cannot be resolved until suitable computational models are developed. I describe a set of models I have constructed to meet this need, and I discuss the contribution such models can make to determining FP's fate.