Action–effect anticipation in infant action control

There is increasing evidence that action effects play a crucial role in action understanding and action control not only in adults but also in infants. Most of the research in infants focused on the learning of action-effect contingencies or how action effects help infants to infer goals in other persons' actions. In contrast, the present research aimed at demonstrating that infants control their own actions by action-effect anticipation once they know about specific action-effect relations. About 7 and 9-month olds observed an experimenter demonstrating two actions that differed regarding the action-effect assignment. Either a red-button press or a blue-button press or no button press elicited interesting acoustical and visual effects. The 9-month olds produced the effect action at first, with shorter latency and longer duration sustaining a direct impact of action-effect anticipation on action control. In 7-month olds the differences due to action-effect manipulation were less profound indicating developmental changes at this age.     

Can imagery facilitate improvements in anticipation behavior?

ObjectivesWe examined the effectiveness of interventions involving imagery, video, and outcome feedback in improving anticipation in skilled junior cricket batters.Design/methodParticipants (N = 34, Mean age = 14.9 years, SD = 0.75) were allocated to one of three groups matched on imagery ability or a no practice control. The experimental groups received a four-week, film-based training intervention.ResultsAll experimental groups improved anticipation performance during training. Pre to posttest improvements were greater for the group that received outcome Knowledge of Results (KR) compared to groups that also received a video replay of the bowler's action or imaged the previously seen action. All experimental groups improved visual imagery ability, measured by the VMIQ-2, but only the imagery intervention group improved in the kinesthetic dimension.ConclusionOur findings show that all three interventions are effective in improving anticipation and benefit imagery ability.     

Does anticipation training affect drivers' risk taking?

Skill and risk taking are argued to be independent and to require different remedial programs. However, it is possible to contend that skill-based training could be associated with an increase, a decrease, or no change in risk-taking behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors examined the influence of a skill-based training program (hazard perception) on the risk-taking behavior of car drivers (using video-based driving simulations). Experiment 1 demonstrated a decrease in risk taking for novice drivers. In Experiment 2, the authors examined the possibilities that the skills training might operate through either a nonspecific reduction in risk taking or a specific improvement in hazard perception. Evidence supported the latter. These findings were replicated in a more ecological context in Experiment 3, which compared advanced and nonadvanced police drivers.     

Explaining action∗

This paper is an attempt to re‐interpret some of the results of contemporary studies of action and explanation by philosophers who may loosely be called ‘post‐Wittgensteinian’, e.g. G. E. M. Anscombe, A. Kenny, A. I. Melden. One of the themes which recurs in these’ discussions is that of the non‐contingent connection between desires, intentions, etc., and the actions which we explain by them — although not all the authors concerned understand this in the same way, and many would not accept the term ‘non‐contingent connection’. The thesis that there is a non‐contingent connection between, e.g., desire and action is strongly contested, and I attempt in this paper to show (a) that our language for the factors which we cite in explaining action, desires, intentions (Sect. II), feelings (Sect. III), sensations (Sect. IV), etc. is inescapably dispositional in a strong sense, i.e. that it characterizes these factors as disposing us to act in certain ways. But I argue (b) that this does nothing to show that these factors are not causes of the actions they explain (Sect. I). The seeming oddity of causes which are non‐contingently linked with their consequences is explained when we see (c) that the account of action embedded in our ordinary language is teleological, i.e. refers us ultimately to the inclinations of the subject, and intentional (Sects. V and VI).     

The role of action effects in infants’ action control

In adults, the selection and the planning of actions are influenced by the anticipation of desired action effects. However, the role of action effects for action control in infants is still an unresolved issue. One important prerequisite for infants action control is that infants are able to relate certain movements to certain effects. To test this assumption, it was investigated how infants action control is affected by action effects. By applying an imitation paradigm, we studied 12- and 18-month-old infants who first observed an adult experimenter demonstrating a three-step action sequence on a toy bear. In three experimental groups, the second action step, the third action step, or no action step elicited an arbitrary sound as an additional acoustic action effect. It was coded how often each of the target actions was performed by the infant in a subsequent 90-s test phase. As predicted, the frequency of the infants target action varied depending on which action step elicited the action effect. In both age groups, the target action that was combined with an acoustical effect was not only produced more often but also occurred with lower latency and was in most cases the first target action shown by the infants. These results are interpreted as evidence of the important role of action effects in infants action control.     

Testosterone intake and aggressiveness: Real effect or anticipation?

In a double-blind experiment, human males (n = 27) were given either testosterone (40 mg/day), placebo, or no treatment, over a one week period. Subjective and observer assessed mood estimations were conducted before and after treatment. Testosterone levels in saliva were measured with radioimmunoassay. The results revealed a significant placebo effect [c. f. Medicine and Science in Sports 4: 124–126]: After treatment, the placebo group scored higher than both the testosterone and the control group on self-estimated anger, irritation, impulsivity, and frustration. Observer-estimated mood yielded similar results. The lack of a placebo effect in the testosterone group is intriguing, and may be due to secondary effects caused by suppression of the body's own testosterone production, since recorded non-protein bound testosterone did not significantly rise due to treatment. The resultss suggest that androgen usage causes expectations, rather than an actual increase of aggressiveness. © 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Thinking ahead or not? Natural aging and anticipation during reading

Despite growing evidence of young adults neurally pre-activating word features during sentence comprehension, less clear is the degree to which this generalizes to older adults. Using ERPs, we tested for linguistic prediction in younger and older readers by means of indefinite articles (a’s and an’s) preceding more and less probable noun continuations. Although both groups exhibited cloze probability-graded noun N400s, only the young showed significant article effects, indicating probabilistic sensitivity to the phonology of anticipated upcoming nouns. Additionally, both age groups exhibited prolonged increased frontal positivities to less probable nouns, although in older adults this effect was prominent only in a subset with high verbal fluency (VF). This ERP positivity to contextual constraint violations offers additional support for prediction in the young. For high VF older adults, the positivity may indicate they, too, engage in some form of linguistic pre-processing when implicitly cued, as may have occurred via the articles.     

Is thinking an action?

I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it.     

Schema anticipation in recall: memory process or report strategy?

Summary This article reports an experimental investigation testing the hypothesis that recall reports are systematically biased by the recaller's knowledge about who is to receive the recall report, while that bias is absent from a recognition test. Subjects listened to one of two versions of a story recounting John's visit to the doctor. After the story was read, subjects were asked to recall the story either with standard-recall instructions or with instructions to recall for peers, for Martians, or for a contest. In a fifth condition, subjects performed a filler activity, viz., the recall of a personal experience. After the recall test subjects were administered a recognition test. Between the groups no systematic differences in memory performance were observed in the recognition test. Recall for peers appeared to be poorer than recall in the other conditions. Subjects in the recall for a contest condition scored higher than the subjects in the other groups. Not only did groups differ with respect to bias, but there were also systematic differences in the memory or discrimination scores. The findings are discussed within the framework of schema theory.     

Movements or targets: What makes an action in action–effect learning?

According to ideomotor theory, actions become linked to the sensory feedback they contingently produce, so that anticipating the feedback automatically evokes the action it typically results from. Numerous recent studies have provided evidence in favour of such action–effect learning but left an important issue unresolved. It remains unspecified to what extent action–effect learning is based on associating effect-representations to representations of the performed movements or to representations of the targets at which the behaviour aimed at. Two experiments were designed to clarify this issue. In an acquisition phase, participants learned the contingency between key presses and effect tones. In a following test phase, key–effect and movement–effect relations were orthogonally assessed by changing the hand–key mapping for one half of the participants. Experiment 1 showed precedence for target–effect over movement–effect learning in a forced-choice RT task. In Experiment 2, target–effect learning was also shown to influence the outcome of response selection in a free-choice task. Altogether, the data indicate that both movement–effect and target–effect associations contribute to the formation of action–effect linkages—provided that movements and targets are likewise contingently related to the effects.     

is affirmative action still necessary?

The influences of socio‐race, racial identity development, gender, educational level, and age on promotion and compensation decisions by midlevel supervisors in industry were examined in this analogue study of 74 midlevel business and industry supervisors. The participants varied in socio‐racial classifications, gender, educational levels, and age. Results of this study indicated statistically significant differences in promotion rates of female analogue employees, rates of promotion between White male and Black male supervisors, and the rate of promotion when comparing older versus younger supervisors.     

No anticipation without intention: Response–effect compatibility in effect-based and stimulus-based actions

Goal-directed behavior is characterized by the anticipation of the resulting effect during response selection. Such anticipations can be contextualized in the sense that response–effect relationships in one stimulus context are inverted in another stimulus context. The primary study aim was to test the hypothesis that contextualized effect anticipation might depend on whether subjects adopt either an effect-based action control style or a stimulus-based control style. Importantly, we hypothesized that the choice of control styles depends on explicit instruction. Effect anticipation during response selection was determined by assessing the behavioral impact of spatial compatibility between the required response and an additional task-irrelevant spatial feature attached to the anticipated effect that would be produced by that response in a given context. In two experiments we found a compatibility effect exclusively in blocks with effect-based instruction but not in stimulus-based blocks. Furthermore, subjects could quickly switch between styles without one strategy dominating the others. Together, this shows that contextualized anticipation of distal visual effects is not an automatic process but depends on the intention to produce an effect.     

What is ‘mental action’?

There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.     

Too much anticipation? Large anticipatory adjustments of grasping movements to minimal object manipulations

When humans grasp objects, the grasps foreshadow the intended object manipulation. It has been suggested that grasps are selected that lead to medial arm postures, which facilitate movement speed and precision, during critical phases of the object manipulation. In Experiment 1, it has been tested whether grasp selections lead to medial postures during rotations of a dial. Participants twisted their arms considerably before grasping the dial, even when the upcoming dial rotation was minimal (5°). Participants neither assumed a medial posture at any point during a short rotation, nor did they assume any of the postures involved in short rotations in the opposite direction. Thus, grasp selections did not necessarily lead to specific postures at any point of the object manipulation. Experiment 2 examined the effect of various grasps on the speed of dial rotations. A medial initial grasp resulted in the fastest dial rotations for most rotation angles. Spontaneously selected grasps were more excursed than necessary to maximize dial rotation speed. This apparent overshot might be explained by participants’ sensitive to the variability of their grasps and is in line with the assumption that grasps facilitate control over the grasped object.     

Do action systems resist visual illusions?

Arguments about the relative independence of visual modules in the primate brain are not new. Recently, though, these debates have resurfaced in the form of arguments about the extent to which visuomotor reaching and grasping systems are insensitive to visual illusions that dramatically bias visual perception. The first wave of studies of illusory effects on perception and action have supported the idea of independence of motor systems, but recent findings have been more critical. In this article, I review several of these studies, most of which (but not all) can be reconciled with the two-visual-systems model.     

Topics on the bordergrounds of action∗

The psychological conceptualization of phenomena involves characteristic explanations of animal movement. Conscientious attention to this fact results in a kind of behaviorism I call ‘conceptual epiphenomenalism’. This doctrine at once explains the characteristic ‘opacity’ of psychological predicables and helps to show the way around difficulties opacity is felt to create, and it also frees our thinking from the tyranny of the distinction between necessity and contingency, too often misapplied to facts rather than to things said or thought. An important challenge to conceptual epiphenomenalism is to account for the facts of introspective certainty and privileged testimony. This challenge can be met by identifying the nature of and displaying the behavioral conditions for the various grades of self‐consciousness or reflective knowledge. The methodology of conceptual epiphenomenalism is schematically applied to elucidate first the general conception of animal action and then a variety of phenomena plausibly thought to be exponible by reference to the conception of action, specifically the broader category of animal behavior, intention, and hoping and wishing.     

Do muscles matter for coordinated action?

This article investigates coordination stability when 2 fingers of each hand periodically tap together. The main question concerns the functional origin of the symmetry tendency, which has widely been conceived as a bias toward coactivation of homologous fingers and homologous muscular portions. In Experiment 1, the symmetry tendency was independent of finger combination. In Experiment 2, virtually identical stability characteristics were revealed under full vision and no vision. In Experiment 3, symmetrical and parallel visual labels on the fingers neither stabilized nor destabilized symmetrical and parallel tapping patterns. In Experiment 4, in which the relative position of the hands was varied, it revealed that the observed stability characteristics are to be defined in a hand-centered reference frame. Because the symmetry tendency was always independent of finger combination, the authors suggest that it is not a bias toward coactivation of homologous muscle portions but instead originates on a more abstract, functional level.