The emotional impact of faces (but not names): Face specific changes in skin conductance responses to familiar and unfamiliar people

Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) to familiar and unfamiliar names and faces were recorded from independent groups of subjects, using two different presentation designs: the first employing fewer familiar than unfamiliar items (Tranel, Fowles, and Damasio, 1985) and the second employing equal numbers of familiar and unfamiliar items. In both designs, familiar faces were responded to significantly more strongly than unfamiliar faces, whereas for names there was no difference in responses to familiar and unfamiliar stimuli. Faces produced significantly larger overall SCRs than names in the unequal familiar/unfamiliar ratio design, but this effect was not observed in the equal ratio design. The results are discussed with particular reference to those previously published by Tranel et al. (1985) and in relation to work both on covert recognition in prosopagnosia and on one of the delusional misidentification syndromes known as the Capgras delusion. This study was carried out with generous support from the EJLB Foundation (Canada) and the Wellcome Trust.     

The emotional impact of faces (but not names): Face specific changes in skin conductance responses to familiar and unfamiliar people

Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) to familiar and unfamiliar names and faces were recorded from independent groups of subjects, using two different presentation designs: the first employing fewer familiar than unfamiliar items (Tranel, Fowles, and Damasio, 1985) and the second employing equal numbers of familiar and unfamiliar items. In both designs, familiar faces were responded to significantly more strongly than unfamiliar faces, whereas for names there was no difference in responses to familiar and unfamiliar stimuli. Faces produced significantly larger overall SCRs than names in the unequal familiar/unfamiliar ratio design, but this effect was not observed in the equal ratio design. The results are discussed with particular reference to those previously published by Tranel et al. (1985) and in relation to work both on covert recognition in prosopagnosia and on one of the delusional misidentification syndromes known as the Capgras delusion. This study was carried out with generous support from the EJLB Foundation (Canada) and the Wellcome Trust.     

Can we learn from the clinically significant face processing deficits,prosopagnosia and capgras delusion?

This review describes two clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion, and provides new knowledge about the face recognition process by a convergence of empirical findings. These empirical findings are structured around two questions that are viewed from the perspectives of the two deficits. First is the question of hemispheric specificity, which inquires into the degree of each hemisphere's contribution to the face recognition process. Second is the question of dual neural pathways, which addresses the possibility that the face recognition process proceeds along two parallel pathways in the brain. Findings from the hemispheric specificity studies reinforce the current view that right hemisphere involvement is necessary for face recognition while left hemisphere involvement is minimal. Findings from the dual neural pathways studies reinforce the plausible but yet unproven hypothesis that two neural pathways pass information from the visual association cortex in the occipital lobe toward the temporal lobes and limbic system when faces are seen and recognized. These findings, which also indicate that each of the dual neural pathways carries different, nonredundant information, could be instrumental in showing that the pathways play different roles in the manifestations of the clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion.     

What is Overt and what is Covert in Congenital Prosopagnosia?

The term covert recognition refers to recognition without awareness. In the context of face recognition, it refers to the fact that some individuals show behavioural, electrophysiological or autonomic indices of recognition in the absence of overt, conscious recognition. Originally described in cases of people that have lost their ability to overtly recognize faces (acquired prosopagnosia, AP), covert face recognition has more recently also been described in cases of congenital prosopagnosia (CP), who never develop typical overt face recognition skills. The presence of covert processing in a developmental disorder such as CP is a particularly intriguing phenomenon, and its investigation is relevant for a variety of reasons. From a theoretical point of view, it is useful to help shed light on the cognitive and neural underpinnings of face recognition deficits. From a clinical point of view, it has the potential to aid the design of rehabilitation protocols aimed at improving face recognition skills in this population. In the current review we selectively summarize the recent literature on covert face recognition in CP, highlight its main findings, and provide a theoretical interpretation for them.     

The phenomenological role of affect in the Capgras delusion

This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate the role played by ‘affective relatedness’ in constituting (a) a sense of who a particular person is and (b) a sense of others as people rather than impersonal objects. I draw on the phenomenological concept of horizon to offer an interpretation of the Capgras experience that shows how the content ‘this entity is not my spouse but an impostor’ can be part of the experience, rather than something that is inferred from a strange experience.

The Capgras delusion: an integrated approach

Delusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an analytic, cognitive neuropsychological two-factor account of the Capgras delusion and the phenomenological view of delusions might be integrated.     

Covert detection of attractiveness among the neurologically intact: evidence from skin-conductance responses

Several studies have shown that participants, without a deficit in face recognition, give an increased skin conductance response (SCR) to familiar faces when presented subliminally, hence suggesting covert recognition of these faces. In the experiment presented here we manipulated familiarity and attractiveness and tested whether participants distinguished between faces for these variables when presented too fast to allow conscious recognition. Three sets of faces were presented: famous attractive; unfamiliar attractive; and unfamiliar less attractive. SCRs were the same for each category of faces whether presented subliminally or supraliminally, and were the same for attractive faces, whether famous or unfamiliar; however, SCRs differed between the attractive and less attractive faces. The findings support those of Stone et al (2001 Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 1 183-191) and suggest that higher SCRs to famous faces are not necessarily due to covert recognition, but may be a response to the positive affective valence of the stimuli.     

Prosopagnosia: A reclassification

We report a quantitative investigation of three patients who presented with a profound prosopagnosia. They were tested on a series of tests of face perception, face recognition, and paired associate learning using faces. A patient with marked perceptual difficulties but no difficulty whatever in recognizing faces was tested as a control. The control patient's performance was as bad or worse on the tests of perception of faces, and it is concluded that impaired performance on tests of face perception does not contribute to difficulties in recognizing familiar faces. The major difference between the three prosopagnosic patients was the evidence of covert recognition in two of these cases but not in the third. We use this evidence to argue that the perceptual/mnestic distinction is an inappropriate classification and would suggest instead that the two types may be described in terms either of a disconnection of the face recognition units or of damage to the units themselves.     

Implicit familiarity processing in congenital prosopagnosia

A particularly interesting and somewhat puzzling finding in the face‐processing literature is that, despite the absence of overt recognition of most faces, many patients with acquired prosopagnosia (AP) exhibit evidence of intact covert face recognition of the very same faces. This phenomenon has important implications for the understanding of the mechanism underlying AP and, by extension, the mechanism underlying normal face processing. Here, we set out to examine whether individuals with congenital prosopagnosia (CP) exhibit a similar dissociation between overt and covert face recognition. We first confirmed that all six of our CP individuals were significantly impaired in face recognition in comparison with controls. Participants then completed a matching task with both famous and unknown faces in which they decided whether two consecutive images have the same identity or not. Critically, the level of face familiarity was orthogonal to the task at hand and this enabled us to examine whether the familiarity of a face enhanced identity matching, a finding which would implicate implicit face processing. As expected, the CP individuals were slower and less accurate than the control participants. More importantly, like the controls, the CP individuals were faster and more accurate at matching famous compared with unknown faces. Also, for both groups, matching performance on unrecognized famous faces fell at an intermediate level between performance on explicitly recognized famous faces and faces which are unknown. These results provide the first solid evidence for the existence of implicit familiarity processing in CP and suggest that, despite the marked impairment in explicit face recognition, these individuals still have some familiarity representation which manifests in the form of covert recognition. We discuss possible models to account for the apparent dissociation of overt and covert face processing in CP.     

Neuropsychological Impairment of Face Recognition Units

Despite the absence of “conscious”, overt identification, some patients with face recognition impairments continue covertly to process information regarding face familiarity. The fact that by no means all patients show these covert effects has led to the suggestion that indirect recogntion tasks may help in identifying different types of face recognition impairment. The present report describes a number of experiments with the patient NR, who, after a closed head injury, has been severely impaired at recognizing familiar faces. Investigations mostly failed to show overt or covert face recognition, but NR performed at an above-chance level in selecting the familiar face on a task requiring a forced-choice between a familiar and an unfamiliar face. This discrepancy between a degree of rudimentary overt recognition and absence of covert effects on most indirect tests was addressed using a cross-domaim identity priming paradigm. This examined separately the possibility of preserved recognition for faces that NR consistently chose correctly in a forced-choice familiarity decision and those on which he performed at chance level. Priming effects were apparent only for the faces that were consistently chosen as “familiar” in forced-choice. We suggest that NR's stored representations of familiar faces are degraded, so that face recognition is possible only via a limited set of relatively preserved representations able to support a rudimentary form of overt recognition and to facilitate performance in matching and priming tasks.     

OVERT AND COVERT RECOGNITION OF FACES IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS

Abstract— There has been considerable recent interest in covert face-recognition effects. In Experiment 1, we adapted a paradigm, previously shown to produce covert recognition effects, to test 5-year-old children. Classmates' photographs served as the familiar faces. Children showed effects of familiarity on face matching similar to the effect normal adults and prosopagnosics had previously shown for famous faces In Experiment 2, we investigated whether brief familiarization with the photographs used in Experiment 1 would suffice to produce the effects, in children and adults. It did not, even though the exposure did lead to above-chance overt recognition. Taken together with previous studies, the data suggest that covert recognition may be doubly dissociable from overt recognition. Finding a double dissociation would place constraints on models of face recognition.     

Emotional memories are not all created equal: evidence for selective memory enhancement

Human brain imaging studies have shown that greater amygdala activation to emotional relative to neutral events leads to enhanced episodic memory. Other studies have shown that fearful faces also elicit greater amygdala activation relative to neutral faces. To the extent that amygdala recruitment is sufficient to enhance recollection, these separate lines of evidence predict that recognition memory should be greater for fearful relative to neutral faces. Experiment 1 demonstrated enhanced memory for emotionally negative relative to neutral scenes; however, fearful faces were not subject to enhanced recognition across a variety of delays (15 min to 2 wk). Experiment 2 demonstrated that enhanced delayed recognition for emotional scenes was associated with increased sympathetic autonomic arousal, indexed by the galvanic skin response, relative to fearful faces. These results suggest that while amygdala activation may be necessary, it alone is insufficient to enhance episodic memory formation. It is proposed that a sufficient level of systemic arousal is required to alter memory consolidation resulting in enhanced recollection of emotional events.     

Understanding covert recognition

An implementation of Bruce and Young's (1986) functional model of face recognition is used to examine patterns of covert face recognition previously reported in a prosopagnosic patient, PH. Although PH is unable to recognize overly the faces of people known to him, he shows normal patterns of face processing when tested indirectly. A simple manipulation of one set of connections in the implemented model induces behaviour consistent with patterns of results from PH obtained in semantic priming and interference tasks. We compare this account with previous explanations of covert recognition and demonstrate that the implemented model provides the most natural and parsimonious account available. Two further patients are discussed who show deficits in person perception. The first (MS) is prosopagnosic but shows no covert recognition. The second (ME) is not prosopagnosic, but cannot access semantic information relating to familiar people. The model provides an account of recognition impairments which is sufficiently general also to be useful in describing these patients.     

Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion

In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined, emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed.

Dream experience and a revisionist account of delusions of misidentification

Standard accounts of delusion explain them as responses to experience. Cognitive models of feature binding in the face recognition systems explain how experiences of mismatch between feelings of "familiarity" and faces can arise. Similar mismatches arise in phenomena such as déjà and jamais vu in which places and scenes are mismatched to feelings of familiarity. These cognitive models also explain similarities between the phenomenology of these delusions and some dream states which involve mismatch between faces, feelings of familiarity and identities. Given these similarities it makes sense to retain that aspect of the standard account in the face of revisionist arguments that feature binding anomalies which lead to delusions of misidentification are not consciously experienced.     

Covert processing of faces in prosopagnosia is restricted to facial expressions: evidence from cross-modal bias

We present a single case study of a brain-damaged patient, AD, suffering from visual face and object agnosia, with impaired visual perception and preserved mental imagery. She is severely impaired in all aspects of overt recognition of faces as well as in covert recognition of familiar faces. She shows a complete loss of processing facial expressions in recognition as well as in matching tasks. Nevertheless, when presented with a task where face and voice expressions were presented concurrently, there was a clear impact of face expressions on her ratings of the voice. The cross-modal paradigm used here and validated previously with normal subjects (de Gelder & Vroomen, 1995, 2000), appears as a useful tool in investigating spared covert face processing in a neuropsychological perspective, especially with prosopagnosic patients. These findings are discussed against the background of different models of the covert recognition of face expressions.     

Long-term effects of covert face recognition

Covert face recognition has previously been thought to produce only very short-lasting effects. In this study we demonstrate that manipulating subjects' attentional load affects explicit, but not implicit memory for faces, and that implicit effects can persist over much longer intervals than is normally reported. Subjects performed letter-string tasks of high vs. low perceptual load (Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfomance. 21, 451-468.), while ignoring task-irrelevant celebrity faces. Memory for the faces was then assessed using (a) a surprise recognition test for the celebrities' names, and (b) repetition priming in a face familiarity task. The load manipulation strongly influenced explicit recognition memory, but had no effect on repetition priming from the same items. Moreover, faces from the high load condition produced the same amount of priming whether they were explicitly remembered or not. This result resolves a long-standing anomaly in the face recognition literature, and is discussed in relation to covert processing in prosopagnosia.     

Childhood prosopagnosia

K.D. has been unable to recognize people's faces since sustaining cerebral injury in infancy. Investigation of this disorder carried out when K.D. was aged 8 to 11 years showed that although her basic visual abilities were impaired, they were no poorer than those of other children who recognized faces without difficulty. K.D. had learned to read, but had not regained ability to recognize people's faces; instead she relied primarily on voices as a cue to person recognition. There was no evidence of any degree of overt or covert recognition of familiar faces, and K.D. also experienced problems in visual object recognition. She could, however, classify a visual input as a face, was able to perceive and imitate facial expressions, and was able to perform face matching tasks to an extent limited by her use of a feature by feature matching strategy. It is suggested that K.D.'s impairment affected higher order perceptual abilities, and is in a number of respects comparable to the impairments found in adult prosopagnosic patients.