‘You Could Call It Magic’: What Parents and Siblings Tell Preschoolers About Unobservable Entities

How can we explain children's understanding of the unseen world? Young children are generally able to distinguish between real unobservable entities and fantastical ones, but they attribute different characteristics to and show less confidence in their decisions about fantastical entities generally endorsed by adults, such as Santa Claus. One explanation for these conceptual differences is that the testimony children hear from others about unobservable entities varies in meaningful ways. Although this theory has some experimental support, its viability in actual conversation has yet to be investigated. Study 1 sought to examine this question in parent–child conversation and showed that parents provide similar types of content information when talking to children about both real entities and entities that they generally endorse. However, parents use different pragmatic cues when they communicate about endorsed entities than they do when talking about real ones. Study 2 showed that older siblings used discourse strategies similar to those used by parents when talking to young children about unobservable entities. These studies indicate that the types of cues children use to form their conceptions of unobservable entities are present in naturalistic conversations with others, supporting a role for testimony in children's early beliefs.     

Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist?

Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one to avoid positing strange ‘negative’ entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago’s dilemma.     

Dealing with conflicting information: young children's reliance on what they see versus what they are told

Children often learn about the world through direct observation. However, much of children's knowledge is acquired through the testimony of others. This research investigates how preschoolers weigh these two sources of information when they are in conflict. Children watched as an adult hid a toy in one location. Then the adult told children that the toy was in a different location (i.e. false testimony). When retrieving the toy, 4- and 5-year-olds relied on what they had seen and disregarded the adult's false testimony. However, most 3-year-olds deferred to the false testimony, despite what they had directly observed. Importantly, with a positive searching experience based on what they saw, or with a single prior experience with an adult as unreliable, 3-year-olds subsequently relied on their first-hand observation and disregarded the adult's false testimony. Thus, young children may initially be credulous toward others' false testimony that contradicts their direct observation, but skepticism can develop quickly through experience.     

Concepts of God and Germs: Social Mechanisms and Cognitive Heuristics

Previous research has shown that the more individuals view observable entities as animate, the more those entities are associated with having psychological and physiological experiences. This study examined the relationship between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for concepts of unobservable scientific (i.e., germ) and religious (i.e., God) entities. This study further explored how children's conceptions vary according to the social learning opportunities (i.e., discourse, rituals) parents reportedly create. Parent–child dyads with young children from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated. Three central findings emerged. First, children readily associated God with psychobiological characteristics but did not do so to the same extent for germs. Second, children applied more psychobiological properties to both entity types when they believed that the entity was animate. Third, engaging in rituals and discourse with parents was indirectly related to children's concepts of God but not related to their concepts of germs. Overall, this study presented support for a connection between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for unobservable entities, and an indirect effect of cultural input on this reasoning. The implications of these findings will be discussed.     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

The impact of informant gender on children’s endorsement of scientific and non-scientific information

By roughly 6 years of age, children acquire the stereotype that men are more competent than women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), potentially leading to greater trust in scientific information provided by men. This study tested whether 3- to 8-year-old children differentially endorsed conflicting information about science and toys presented by male and female informants depicted as a ‘man’ and ‘woman’ (Exp1) or ‘scientists’ (Exp2). Children were expected to endorse toy testimony from gender-matched informants; thus, the key question concerned endorsement of science testimony. In Exp1 (N = 149), boys and girls showed a same-gender informant preference for toy testimony; however, girls endorsed the male informant's testimony more for science than for toys – but only when tested by a male experimenter. In Exp2 (N = 264), boys and girls showed a same-gender preference, irrespective of content. Findings suggest that STEM-related gender stereotypes might lead girls to trust scientific information presented by men over women in certain contexts.     

Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent

Children ages 3-9 years were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help them play a forced-choice game by "telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box," whereas a matched control group of children were not given this supernatural prime. On 2 unexpected event trials, an experimenter triggered a simulated unexpected event (i.e., a light turning on/off; a picture falling), and children's behavioral response to these events (i.e., moving their hand to the opposite box) was coded. Results showed a significant Age GroupxExperimental Condition interaction; the only children to reliably alter their behavior in response to the unexpected events were the oldest children (M=7 years 4 months), who were primed with the invisible agent concept. For children's posttest verbal explanations, also, only these children saw the unexpected events as being referential and declarative (e.g., "Princess Alice did it because I chose the wrong box"). Together, these data suggest that children may not regularly begin to see communicative signs as embedded in unexpected events until they are around 7 years of age.     

Three Kinds of Social Kinds

Could some social kinds be natural kinds? In this paper, I argue that there are three kinds of social kinds: 1) social kinds whose existence does not depend on human beings having any beliefs or other propositional attitudes towards them (e.g. recession, racism); 2) social kinds whose existence depends in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them, though attitudes need not be manifested towards their particular instances (e.g. money, war); 3) social kinds whose existence and that of their instances depend in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them (e.g. permanent resident, prime minister). Although all three kinds of social kinds are mind‐dependent, this does not make them ontologically subjective or preclude them from being natural kinds. Rather, what prevents the third kind of social kinds from being natural kinds is that their properties are conventionally rather than causally linked.     

Preschoolers' understanding of germs as invisible mechanisms

Recent studies have presented conflicting claims regarding whether young children's reasoning about biological content involves a unique set of causal mechanisms and theoretical entities. Three studies examined preschoolers' understanding of nonobservable causal mechanisms in causes of illness. According to traditional accounts, these children know that certain behaviors lead to illness but have no idea why or how. Many of the behaviors children cite as causes are actually mediated by the action of germs (e.g., contamination and contagion). Do children recognize that germs (nonobvious, invisible particles) are the mechanisms involved in some cases of illness causation? Study 1 demonstrates that 4- and 5-year-olds' predictions of who will get sick in cases of contamination and contagion are based on the presence or absence of germs. Study 2 serves as a control and further tests how children generalize this mechanism: Which causes do children think are mediated by germs? Data suggest that preschoolers understand but undergeneralize the role of germs. A final study indicates that younger preschoolers (3-year-olds) recognize that appearances may be deceiving when it comes to judging causes of illness. This understanding would seem to be a precursor to beliefs about specific mechanisms. Results are discussed in terms of commonsense theories and early conceptions of biology.     

Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant earlier intuitions

When students learn scientific theories that conflict with their earlier, naïve theories, what happens to the earlier theories? Are they overwritten or merely suppressed? We investigated this question by devising and implementing a novel speeded-reasoning task. Adults with many years of science education verified two types of statements as quickly as possible: statements whose truth value was the same across both naïve and scientific theories of a particular phenomenon (e.g., “The moon revolves around the Earth”) and statements involving the same conceptual relations but whose truth value differed across those theories (e.g., “The Earth revolves around the sun”). Participants verified the latter significantly more slowly and less accurately than the former across 10 domains of knowledge (astronomy, evolution, fractions, genetics, germs, matter, mechanics, physiology, thermodynamics, and waves), suggesting that naïve theories survive the acquisition of a mutually incompatible scientific theory, coexisting with that theory for many years to follow.     

Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms

The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, encounters difficulties, but with suitable refinements it can be salvaged. Two other options for a formal semantics of multiply signifying terms are also presented, and I discuss the relative merits of the three semantics briefly. Finally, possible modifications to the standard logical regimentation of the notion of existence are considered.     

Children's trust in unexpected oral versus printed suggestions: Limitations of the power of print

Children have a bias to trust spoken testimony, yet early readers have an even stronger bias to trust print. Here, we ask how enduring is the influence of printed testimony: Can the learning be applied to new scenarios? Using hybrid pictures more dominant in one animal species (e.g., squirrel) than another (e.g., rabbit), we examined 3–6‐year‐olds' (N = 130) acceptance of an unexpected, non‐dominant label suggested only orally or via print. Consistent with previous findings, early readers, but not pre‐readers, accepted printed labels more frequently than when spoken. Children were then presented with identical but unlabelled hybrid exemplars and frequently applied the non‐dominant labels to these. Despite early readers' prior greater acceptance of text, when oral suggestions were accepted they retained a greater influence. Findings highlight potential implications for educators regarding knowledge being applied to new scenarios: For early readers, unexpected information from text may be fragile, while a greater confidence might be placed in such information gained from spoken testimony.     

Eyewitness testimony: tracing the beliefs of Swedish legal professionals

This paper examines beliefs held by Swedish legal professionals about eyewitness testimony. In a survey including questions about 13 key issues of eyewitness testimony, three groups were investigated: police officers (n = 104), prosecutors (n = 158), and judges (n = 251). The response rate was 74%. Examples of findings are that the beliefs were in line with scientific findings concerning the weapon focus effect, but were not in line for simultaneous vs. sequential lineups. Between-group differences were found for seven items. Judges were much more sceptical than police officers about the reliability and completeness of children's testimonies. The groups seldom agreed about one answer alternative, and they reported not being up to date about scientific research on eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that some important research findings have reached those working on the field. However, they hold many wrongful beliefs about eyewitness testimony, beliefs that might compromise the accuracy of legal decisions.     

Children's theories of intelligence: beliefs, goals, and motivation in the elementary years

The authors tested a developmental model of children's theories about intelligence in kindergarten, second grade, and fourth grade children by using paper-and-pencil maze tasks. Older children were more likely than younger children to espouse learning goals (e.g., that they preferred difficult mazes to improve their skill), and less likely to espouse performance goals (e.g., that they preferred easy mazes to be successful). Children in all 3 age groups reported stronger beliefs in the malleability of intelligence than the stability of intelligence. In general, the results supported the authors' hypotheses about developmental change in children's theory-like conceptions of intelligence: Beliefs, goals, and motivation were related in expected ways for second and fourth graders more than for kindergartners. The authors discussed contextual influences on children's beliefs and the development of children's conceptualizations of intelligence.     

Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world

ABSTRACT

This paper distinguishes between the theoretical scientific image (of the posits of the successful sciences) and the practical scientific image (which, besides explanatory posits, includes everything presupposed by the practices of doing science (e.g. scientists, funding agencies, laboratories, chairs and other artifacts, linguistic communication, a just and democratic ethos). The popular idea that there is a conceptual clash between the scientific and manifest images of the world is revealed as largely illusory. From the perspective of a liberal naturalism, the placement problem for ‘problematic’ entities or truths is not solved but dissolved. Persons, say, are not posits of any explanatory science, but beings acknowledged as rational agencies in second-personal space. Core elements of the manifest image (e.g. persons) are more deeply rooted in our conceptual scheme than any version of the scientific image.     

Children's perceptions of gender differences in social approval for playing electronic games

Gender differences characterize children's commitment to playing electronic games. These gender differences are consistent with common stereotypes that may be triggered by the context and content of electronic games. If conforming to gender stereotypes in electronic game playing maintains social approval, then those children who choose alternate playing patterns risk social sanction. The present study was designed to characterize children's views of gender differences in social approval for electronic game playing. A questionnaire was administered to 364 fourth- and fifth-grade students (203 females) in a midwestern suburban school district. Approximately 12% of the students represented minorities, and the majority were African-American. Children responded to fourteen statements describing the social acceptability by gender of certain playing habits. Chi-square analyses identified important gender and grade differences. Many children endorsed statements indicating that social approval for game playing is consistent with common gender stereotypes. The most striking gender differences in perceived social approval were found in statements referencing fighting games. Children whose game playing deviates from approved patterns may represent a group of high-risk electronic game players.     

Children's beliefs about the fantasy/reality status of hypothesized machines

Four-year-olds, 6-year-olds, and adults were asked to make judgments about the reality status of four different types of machines: real machines that children and adults interact with on a daily basis, real machines that children and adults interact with rarely (if at all), and impossible machines that violated a real-world physical or biological causal law. Adults generally categorized all of the machines accurately. Both groups of children categorized familiar possible machines as real, but were agnostic as to the fantasy status of unfamiliar possible machines. Children generally responded that both kinds of impossible machines were make-believe, but 4-year-olds were more likely to make these accurate judgments for the physical than biological items, different from the older children and adults (whose responses were similar). These data suggest that children's judgments about the possibility of machines are not strictly limited by first-hand experience. Young children's domain-specific causal knowledge interacts with their understanding of the fantasy/reality distinction to constrain their inferences in a rational way.     

Binding actions and scenes in visual long-term memory

How does visual long-term memory store representations of different entities (e.g., objects, actions, and scenes) that are present in the same visual event? Are the different entities stored as an integrated representation in memory, or are they stored separately? To address this question, we asked observers to view a large number of events; in each event, an action was performed within a scene. Afterward, the participants were shown pairs of action–scene sets and indicated which of the two they had seen. When the task required recognizing the individual actions and scenes, performance was high (80 %). Conversely, when the task required remembering which actions had occurred within which scenes, performance was significantly lower (59 %). We observed this dissociation between memory for individual entities and memory for entity bindings across multiple testing conditions and presentation durations. These experiments indicate that visual long-term memory stores information about actions and information about scenes separately from one another, even when an action and scene were observed together in the same visual event. These findings also highlight an important limitation of human memory: Situations that require remembering actions and scenes as integrated events (e.g., eyewitness testimony) may be particularly vulnerable to memory errors.     

Cognitive-behavioral approaches to children's problems

Selected issues in theory, research, methodology, assessment, and outcome are briefly discussed in the context of cognitive-behavioral approaches to children's problems. Distinctions between rationalistic and developmental varieties of cognitive approaches are delineated. Different assumptions are explored regarding the function and nature of cognitive processes, the nature and mechanisms of psychological change, and the relationship between cognitive and emotional processes. It is concluded that the empirical status of cognitive-behavioral approaches to children's problems is equivocal. The theoretical status of traditional (rationalistic) cognitive treatments is also challenged, and developmental, process-oriented conceptualizations and research are endorsed as more adequate and promising perspectives in this area.