Mythos and Logos in Losev's Absolute Mythology

The paper analyses A.F. Losev's argument forthe identity of dialectical and mythicalthinking which forms the key part of his theoryof absolute mythology. Losev claims thatdialectical thinking is limited byphenomenological intuition. He fails torecognise, however, that this intuition itselfis a product of thinking. The same is true ofLosev's concept of `life' that is designed tolimit intellectual reflection. The mystery ofthe Absolute is, contrary to Losev's claim, nota threshold that dialectical thinking cannotcross, but it is, in fact, realised only bysuch thinking. This has a bearing on theChristian Neoplatonist doctrine of energisticsymbolism, which also plays a crucial part inLosev's philosophy of myth. Under the pressureof the Neoplatonist tradition Losev violatesthe demands of dialectical thinking in favourof myth's essential mysticism. And yet, becauseof the dialectical relation between rationalismand mysticism, Losev's attempt was not afailure, but a valuable contribution to thetask of illuminating this relation.     

Religion without Metaphysics1

In this paper I will argue for a conception of religion that does not presuppose metaphysics in the traditional sense of the word. In a trivial sense we always have ideas of what is given and are all realists, living by our realist intuitions. But the philosophically crucial question is what conclusions can be reasonably drawn from this. In Part I, I will argue against metaphysical realism in general. In Part II, I will argue against its materialist challenge by showing in what sense it too can be conceived of as an example of metaphysical realism. In Part III, I will show why there is no point in defending or in arguing against religion en bloc. Finally in Part IV, I will argue for a conception of religion without metaphysics in the traditional sense by taking account of the existential function religion actually has in human life.     

Chapter 2: Sex and the Elderly: No Laughing Matter in Religion

SUMMARY

This article provides a brief background for the study of sex and older persons. It examines the prevailing attitudes among older persons and society in general. A number of critical issues regarding sexuality in the latter years of life is addressed.     

Escaping Religion: As Content,Yes; As Process,No

The author states that, although psychology may dismiss religious contents as better suited to other areas of scholarship, it cannot go on dismissing the predicational process that brings religious manifestations about in all known human societies. He suggests that religion is the highest manifestation of the teleological capacity that all humans possess and which motivates human behavior.     

“科学没有宗教是跛足的“什么意思?

把某些科学家信仰宗教,当成科学可以容纳有神论而大加渲染,是现今推行鬼神论常用的一种伎俩. 　　爱因斯坦无疑是20世纪科学发展中的一座丰碑,将永远为人们所景仰;他同纳粹的斗争和推动反原子战争的和平运动,至今还有非常现实的意义.他得到崇高的荣誉和普遍的尊敬,是理所当然的.但也正因为如此,他也有了被鬼神论者随意涂抹的特别价值.近来,在宗教研究领域,通行的是引用他的这两句话:“科学没有宗教,是跛足的;宗教没有科学,则是盲目的.“……     

Definition and Power: Toward Authority without Privilege

Feminists have urged women to take semantic authority. I explain what such authority is, how it depends upon community recognition, and how it differs from privilege and from authority as usually conceived under patriarchy. Understanding its nature and limits is an important part of attaining it. Understanding the role of community explains why separatism is the logical conclusion of this project and why separatism is valuable even to those who do not separate.     

No Justificatory Closure without Truth

It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the following three principles are jointly inconsistent: (Sufficiency) very probable propositions are justifiably believable; (Conjunction Closure) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction; (No Contradictions) propositions known to be contradictory are not justifiably believable. This paper shows that there is a hybrid of the lottery and preface paradoxes that does not require Sufficiency to arise, but only Conjunction Closure and No Contradictions; and it argues that, given any plausible solution to this paradox, if one is not ready to deny Conjunction Closure (and analogous consistency principles), then one must endorse the thesis that justified believability is factive.     

No two entities without identity

In a naïve realist approach to reading an ontology off the models of a physical theory, the invariance of a given theory under permutations of its property-bearing objects entails the existence of distinct possible worlds from amongst which the theory cannot choose. A brand of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) attempts to avoid this consequence by denying that objects possess primitive identity, and thus worlds with property values permuted amongst those objects are really one and the same world. Assuming that any successful ontology of objects is able to describe a universe containing a determinate number of them, I argue that no version of OSR which both retains objects and understands ‘structure’ in terms of relations can be successful. This follows from the fact that no set of relational facts is sufficient to fix the cardinality of the collection of objects implied by those facts. More broadly, I offer reasons to believe that no version of OSR is compatible with the existence of objects, no matter how ontologically derivative they are taken to be. Any such account would have to attribute a definite cardinality to a collection of objects while denying that those objects are possessed of a primitive identity. With no compelling reason to abandon the classical conception of cardinality, such an attribution is incoherent.     

David Ray Griffin,Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Mythos and Mental Illness: Psychopathy, Fantasy, and Contemporary Moral Life

Medical accounts of the absence of conscience are intriguing for the way they seem disposed to drift away from the ideal of scientific objectivity and towards fictional representations of the subject. I examine here several contemporary accounts of psychopathy by Robert Hare and Paul Babiak. I first note how they locate the truth about their subject in fiction, then go on to contend that their accounts ought to be thought of as a "mythos," for they betray a telling uncertainty about where "fact" ends and "fantasy" begins, as well as the means of distinguishing mental health from mental illness in regard to some social roles.