Transcendentality and the Gift: On Gunton,Milbank, and Trinitarian Metaphysics

This article considers the compatibility between the doctrine of the Trinity and the theory of the transcendental properties by offering an account of the notion of the ‘gift’ as a transcendental term. In particular, this article presents a re-reading of John Milbank’s influential theology of the gift through Colin Gunton’s project of developing ‘trinitarian transcendentals’. Showing how Milbank’s notion of the gift could be systematically understood in terms of what Gunton calls a ‘trinitarianly developed transcendental’ which nonetheless avoids many of the problems found in Gunton’s original project, this article argues that understanding ‘gift’ as a transcendental term not only provides new ways of conceiving the relationship between the philosophy of transcendental properties and various traditional doctrines, it can moreover demonstrate how the traditional and biblical names of the Holy Spirit as ‘the Gift’ and the Son as ‘the Word’ can offer new ways of developing distinctively trinitarian accounts of metaphysics.     

Human dignity and the logic of the gift

This paper seeks to bring together the notions of human dignity and gift exchange in a mutually enriching relation. Two interpretations of the gift and of gift exchange are investigated, and in each case brought to bear on the understanding of human dignity. To start, dignity understood as the gift of uniqueness in relation is considered, followed by a consideration of dignity as the gift of absolute responsibility. The conclusion reached at the end of the paper is that an understanding of human dignity in terms of gift exchange will allow for the irreducibly social aspects inherent in the notion to be appreciated complementary to the more objective, factual and individual elements usually associated with human rights. The paper argues for a plurivocal interpretation of dignity as gift that allows for both the relational and the absolute elements gathered together in this conception to be appreciated.     

Process‐orientated psychoanalytic work in initial interviews and the importance of the opening scene

From the very first moment of the initial interview to the end of a long course of psychoanalysis, the unconscious exchange between analysand and analyst, and the analysis of the relationship between transference and countertransference, are at the heart of psychoanalytic work. Drawing on initial interviews with a psychosomatically and depressively ill student, a psychoanalytic understanding of initial encounters is worked out. The opening scene of the first interview already condenses the central psychopathology – a clinging to the primary object because it was never securely experienced as present by the patient. The author outlines the development of some psychoanalytic theories concerning the initial interview and demonstrates their specific importance as background knowledge for the clinical situation in the following domains: the ‘diagnostic position’, the ‘therapeutic position’, the ‘opening scene’, the ‘countertransference’ and the ‘analyst's free‐floating introspectiveness’. More recent investigations refer to ‘process qualities’ of the analytic relationship, such as ‘synchronization’ and ‘self‐efficacy’. The latter seeks to describe after how much time between the interview sessions constructive or destructive inner processes gain ground in the patient and what significance this may have for the decision about the treatment that follows. All these factors combined can lead to establishing a differential process‐orientated indication that also takes account of the fact that being confronted with the fear of unconscious processes of exchange is specific to the psychoanalytic profession.     

The Continuity of Consciousness

Abstract: In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as ‘continuous’. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of ‘continuity’ to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought that some of the brain processes underlying consciousness do not exhibit continuity. I argue that these problems can be solved by distinguishing between three possible bearers of the property of ‘continuity’—(1) the State of Consciousness, (2) the Stream of Experience, and (3) what is represented by experience—and two different senses of ‘continuity’—‘strict’ and ‘extreme’ continuity. I conclude by providing a positive account of the continuity of consciousness, according to which the State of Consciousness exhibits ‘strict’ continuity, and the Stream of Experience exhibits ‘extreme’ continuity.     

The Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Communion: ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'?

Christians in the West often have become so accustomed to naming the Holy Spirit ‘Love’ and ‘Gift’ – or at least to associating the Holy Spirit particularly with these two dynamisms – that it can come as a surprise that Scripture nowhere explicitly names the Holy Spirit either ‘love’ or ‘gift’. Indeed, as Hans Urs von Balthasar points out, the Spirit is much more clearly associated with truth, knowledge and power. How then does Augustine arrive at the view that the Holy Spirit should be named ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'? I examine and evaluate the complex exegetical steps by which Augustine draws out these names.     

The arms of the chimeras

This article seeks to compare the approach developed in 1974 by Michel de M'Uzan to the concept of the ‘chimera’ with Thomas Ogden's ( 1995 , 2005 ) reflections on ‘the analytic third’. This comparison shows that in spite of the different theoretical approaches, unconscious to unconscious communication – a subject of interest in contemporary psychoanalytic research – makes it possible to grasp the intersubjective data deployed in the field of the session. After reviewing M. de M'Uzan's conception of the ‘chimera’ – a product of the unconsciouses of patient and analyst alike, and which emerges during a process of depersonalization in the analyst – the author proposes her hypothesis of the chimera as a particular intersubjective third whose creation, in a hallucinatory state, makes it possible to gain access to the bodily and emotional basis of the trauma. The author describes the chimera as a mental ‘squiggle’ between the two members of the pair which finds expression in different forms; further, she considers that the chimera that seizes the analyst is underpinned by the unconscious affinities of traumatic zones in both protagonists, which permit the grounding, configuration and sharing of the territories of suffering, as apprehended in this paper.     

Kierkegaard on the (un)happiness of faith

Hegel famously accuses Christianity of ‘unhappy consciousness’: it has a normative goal – union with the divine – that it cannot, in principle, satisfy. Kierkegaard was intimately aware of this criticism and, unlike some of Hegel’s other accusations, takes it seriously. In this paper my co-author and I investigate the way in which Kierkegaard addresses this issue in two texts published in 1843: Fear and Trembling and ‘The Expectancy of Faith’. We are especially interested in how the two texts describe faith’s relationship to finitude: for instance, whether the person of faith is permitted to expect that God will bless her in particular and concrete ways. My co-author and I offer competing interpretations. I argue that there is a deep tension in the way faith is described in the two texts; my co-author argues that there is consonance.     

How Should We Remember Vatican II?

What happened at Vatican II and the significance of its decisions is strongly contested in the Church today. There is a struggle over the memory of the Council. It is suggested that two hermeneutics are in use, continuity versus discontinuity. On the one hand, it is said that privileging the 'event' of the Council as the interpretative key for reading its documents leads to an ideological distortion and introduces discontinuity with tradition. On the other hand, it is held that the continuity thesis plays down the real changes the Council introduced and, while unexceptional as a theological principle, it is being deployed as a polemical ideology, restricting necessary change. This article distinguishes between theological principle and experience in relation to continuity/discontinuity. It argues that the event of the Council is to be found as much in its effects in the Church at large as what took place in Rome. It analyses the phenomenology of change at both levels and concludes that the tensions between the need for continuity and the impulses of discontinuity need to be recognised and worked with rather than repressed.     

Initiating the creation of a procedurally secular society through dialogic RE. The three realms

ABSTRACT

The interim report of the Commission on Religious Education drew attention to the use of ‘safe space’ within schools to encourage the exchange of differing world-views. The doctoral research discussed herein builds upon previous action research that analysed the development of dialogic skills within a school’s safe space. This new research examines two types of talk – cumulative (building consensus) and exploratory (constructive criticism) – that are held to be at the heart of human reasoning. Sixty-five students from 10 different secondary schools in the UK undertook paired conversations that were analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Additionally, the students completed questionnaire surveys with respect to deep learning and these were analysed by means of a Chi-Square Test for statistical significance. The positive findings indicate that dialogic RE within a school’s safe space is an appropriate pedagogy for the creation of a procedurally secular society, such as the three realms model, that envisages a renewed public sphere in which citizens are encouraged to exchange world-views through reasoning.     

Freudian modalities of disbelief

This article can be characterized as a ‘rediscovery’ of a notion of psychoanalysis that had disappeared or had been confused by later operations. The authors explore a Freudian notion that has been unjustly misunderstood, especially because of the multiple ways in which ‘Unglaube’ – disbelief – has been translated. We shall establish the archaeology of this term in Freud by extracting its three significant modes. Firstly, paranoiac disbelief designates an unconscious process of the rejection of belief in the subject's first encounter with a sexual reality that is always traumatic. Secondly, the obsessional neurotic's disbelief, which we shall call ‘incredulity’, is a secondary, less radical refusal of belief, one that is different from its paranoiac counterpart. Finally, we shall envision a third – dialectical – type of disbelief, which Freud called ‘act of disbelief’ and which will enable us to approach the fundamental epistemic and ethical stakes for psychoanalysis.     

Misreadings,Clarifications and Reminders: A Reply to Hutchinson and Read

ABSTRACT

Analytic philosophy is often associated with a physicalistic naturalism that privileges natural-scientific modes of explanation. Nevertheless there has since the 1980s been a heterodox, somewhat subterranean trend within analytic philosophy that seeks to articulate a more expansive, ‘non-reductive‘ conception of nature. This trend can be traced back to P.F. Strawson’s 1985 book Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. However, Strawson has long been ignored in the literature around ‘soft naturalism’ – especially in comparison to John McDowell. One of the reasons for this is that Strawson’s account of soft naturalism is not often viewed as particularly plausible – it has come in for heavy criticism from the likes of Sebastian Gardner (2007) and Robert Stern (2003). In this paper, I argue that Strawson’s soft naturalism ought to be re-assessed: that his critics can be refuted, and that his naturalism remains a compelling alternative to the likes of McDowell’s. I attempt this through a ‘radicalisation’ of the modest Strawson’s position, demonstrating that his naturalism has implicit in it something like Marx’s conception of human ‘species-being’.     

Continuity and/or Discontinuity at Vatican II? Examining the Council in the Context of the ‘Long Nineteenth Century’

This article explores recent questions regarding the interpretation of Vatican II by examining the council's theological and historical relation to what John O'Malley has called ‘the long nineteenth century’. This period, which O'Malley dates from the French Revolution until the end of the pontificate of Pius XII (1958), connotes a time when political and philosophical developments ‘traumatized’ the Church. This sustained trauma left the Church in a defensive position which deeply informed its view of itself and its relation to the world. While a great deal of attention has been directed at examining the council's degree of continuity or discontinuity with the conciliar tradition, not enough has been done to understand its relationship to developments within this more immediate setting. This study argues that a more contextualized appreciation of the Church's efforts to respond to the challenges of the long nineteenth century, expressed especially in the teachings of Vatican I, can illumine key elements of the meaning of Vatican II's documents and the continuity and/or discontinuity that they represent.     

Paradigm shift in religious education: a reply to Jackson,or why religious education goes to war

This article provides a defence of my theoretical analysis of paradigm shift in contemporary religious education, particularly in light of Robert Jackson’s (2015) article published in this journal: ‘Misrepresenting religious education’s past and present in looking forward: Gearon using Kuhn’s concepts of paradigm, paradigm shift and incommensurability’. The core of Jackson’s concerns is my adaptation of Kuhn’s concepts of paradigm, paradigm shift and incommensurability to religious education. Defending in turn my use of these concepts – of paradigm, paradigm shift and incommensurability – I conclude that Jackson’s critique is in and of itself an apt demonstration of the position he seeks to attack. Drawing wider parallels with the methodological ‘paradigm wars’ in the social sciences I argue that the paradigms are why religious education too goes to ‘war’.     

Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard,Meaning and Normativity

In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard’s preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving ‘oughts’. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis – a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.     

Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision

This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed ‘the mutually entailing thesis’, admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual—corresponding to the distinction between the state and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism. Some potential relationships between the causal reading of the mutually entailing thesis and psychological research in this area are also briefly discussed.     

‘THEY KNOW HIM BY HIS VOICE’: NEWMAN ON THE IMAGINATION,CHRISTOLOGY, AND THE THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS

Newman's gift to Catholic theology is the gift of ‘wisdom’: an ability to discern the shape of the whole, not by way of ‘generalized laws or metaphysical conjectures’ but through the ‘concrete’ and ‘living’ soil of the religious imagination. Newman's elemental trust in the religious sensibilities of non‐Christians and the revelatory roots of ‘natural religion’ proceeds from his view of the religious imagination as the experiential, pre‐verbal, and pre‐conceptual realm of contact between God and human persons always and everywhere. Above all Newman recognizes the salvific character of a life of personal holiness. In this respect the life of Christ exemplifies continuity and not radical interruption with countless human beings outside our usual ken who quietly lead lives of sacramental holiness. Bringing Newman into dialogue with contemporary theologians such as Jacques Dupuis, Roger Haight, Terrence Merrigan, and Thomas Merton, the author proposes four lessons for a theology of religions cast ‘under the light of Wisdom’.     

The Holy Trinity: Between Mystery and Analysis

Two significant strands of trinitarian theology, the analytic and the apophatic, emphasize considerations of logical consistency and divine incomprehensibility respectively. This article seeks to mediate between these two seemingly opposed lines of thought by arguing for a fuller awareness of the particular mystery associated with the trinitarian notion of ‘person’. By specifying more closely this mystery of divine personhood, I qualify an overzealous apophaticism and also open up some scope for analytic approaches. I then highlight an implication of the mystery of divine personhood that any proposition linking together person‐language and nature‐language (e.g. ‘the Son is God’) necessarily contains its own mystery and cannot be understood in analytic terms.