Are people really more patient than other animals? Evidence from human discounting of real liquid rewards

In previous studies, researchers have found that humans discount delayed rewards orders of magnitude less steeply than do other animals. Humans also discount smaller delayed reward amounts more steeply than larger amounts, whereas animals apparently do not. These differences between humans and animals might reflect differences in the types of rewards studied and/or the fact that animals actually had to wait for their rewards. In the present article, we report the results of three experiments in which people made choices involving liquid rewards delivered and consumed after actual delays, thereby bridging the gap between animal and human studies. Under these circumstances, humans, like animals, discounted the value of rewards delayed by seconds; however, unlike animals, they still showed an effect of reward amount. Human discounting was well described by the same hyperboloid function that has previously been shown to describe animal discounting of delayed food and water rewards, as well as human discounting of real and hypothetical monetary rewards.     

Metacognitive monkeys or associative animals? Simple reinforcement learning explains uncertainty in nonhuman animals

Monkeys will selectively and adaptively learn to avoid the most difficult trials of a perceptual discrimination learning task. Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, and Smith (2010) have recently demonstrated that this pattern of responding does not depend on animals receiving trial-by-trial feedback for their responses; it also obtains if experience of the most difficult trials occurs only under conditions of deferred feedback. Couchman et al. argued that this ruled out accounts based on low-level processes of associative learning and instead required explanation in terms of metacognitive processes of decision monitoring. Contrary to this argument, a simple associative model of reinforcement learning is shown to account for the key findings of Couchman et al.'s empirical study, along with several other findings that have previously been claimed to challenge associative models.     

Theistic or secular grounding of human rights?

The philosophical debate on human rights and their core notion of “human dignity” is marked by controversy, not least regarding the relevance of a religious perspective. This article addresses two markedly different approaches to human rights: Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs (2008) and George Kateb's Human Dignity (2011). While Wolterstorff argues for a theistic grounding of human rights, Kateb is highly critical towards theology and sets out to achieve a strictly secular account of what makes a human being unique. After two sections outlining their respective positions, the article moves into a comparative discussion and concludes that instead of the rigid alternative “theistic” or “secular” what we need in order to understand and defend human dignity and human rights may be a more open and broad-minded perspective on religion.     

Human reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models, or both?

A good deal of energy is currently being expended into discovering the fundamental machinery underlying deductive reasoning. Is it based upon mental models (arrays) or deduction rules (propositions)? The appeal of finding a “grand unified theory” of reasoning is obvious, but the likelihood of achieving this must also be considered.

This paper discusses the use of experimental psychology in attempts to discover the processes associated with the fundamental reasoning mechanism. One particular problem is that individuals can use different strategies to solve reasoning problems. The consequences of this are assessed in relation to: (1) the assumptions underlying the experiments, (2) the choice of tasks and task presentations intended to enable the fundamental reasoning processes to be viewed directly, and (3) the power status of the theories and the nature of the evidence required to show that either theory is superior. Under close scrutiny the debate appears to be unresolvable by using empirical techniques. However, although the main conclusions are negative, it is suggested that approaches that directly investigate individual differences are likely to be useful alternatives.     

Fallen or Unfallen? Christ's Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness

Abstract: Because Christ's sinlessness is a matter of virtual consensus among Christians, debates over whether the human nature he assumed was fallen or unfallen turn on the ontological conditions of his being ‘without sin’ (Heb. 4:15). The claim that Christ assumed a fallen nature can be defended by distinguishing between fallenness and sinfulness as properties of nature and hypostasis, respectively. Moreover, by highlighting the peculiar place of the will in human nature, this christological analysis helps counter the charge that an Augustinian understanding of original sin entails a dualism inconsistent with belief in the goodness of creation and human moral accountability.     

Do animals dream?

The understanding of biological functions of sleep has improved recently, including an understanding of the deep evolutionary roots of sleep among animals. However, dreaming as an element of sleep may be particularly difficult to address in non-human animals because in humans dreaming involves a non-wakeful form of awareness typically identified through verbal report. Here, we argue that parallels that exist between the phenomenology, physiology, and sleep behaviors during human dreaming provide an avenue to investigate dreaming in non-human animals. We review three alternative measurements of human dreaming – neural correlates of dreaming, ‘replay’ of newly-acquired memories, and dream-enacting behaviors – and consider how these may be applied to non-human animal models. We suggest that while animals close in brain structure to humans (such as mammals and birds) may be optimal models for the first two of these measurements, cephalopods, especially octopuses, may be particularly good candidates for the third.     

Don't mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption

Many people like eating meat, but most are reluctant to harm things that have minds. The current three studies show that this dissonance motivates people to deny minds to animals. Study 1 demonstrates that animals considered appropriate for human consumption are ascribed diminished mental capacities. Study 2 shows that meat eaters are motivated to deny minds to food animals when they are reminded of the link between meat and animal suffering. Finally, Study 3 provides direct support for our dissonance hypothesis, showing that expectations regarding the immediate consumption of meat increase mind denial. Moreover, this mind denial in turn reduces negative affect associated with dissonance. The findings highlight the role of dissonance reduction in facilitating the practice of meat eating and protecting cultural commitments.     

Do animals have rights?

A right, unlike an interest, is a valid claim, or potential claim, made by a moral agent, under principles that govern both the claimant and the target of the claim. Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in and has force within a human moral world.     

Beneficiary or benefactor: are people more prosocial when they reflect on receiving or giving?

Research shows that reflecting on benefits received can make people happier, but it is unclear whether or not such reflection makes them more helpful. Receiving benefits can promote prosocial behavior through reciprocity and positive affect, but these effects are often relationship-specific, short-lived, and complicated by ambivalent reactions. We propose that prosocial behavior is more likely when people reflect on being a benefactor to others, rather than a beneficiary. The experience of giving benefits may encourage prosocial behavior by increasing the salience and strength of one's identity as a capable, caring contributor. In field and laboratory experiments, we found that participants who reflected about giving benefits voluntarily contributed more time to their university, and were more likely to donate money to natural-disaster victims, than were participants who reflected about receiving benefits. When it comes to reflection, giving may be more powerful than receiving as a driver of prosocial behavior.     

Mental time travel in animals?

Are humans alone in their ability to reminisce about the past and imagine the future? Recent evidence suggests that food-storing birds (scrub jays) have access to information about what they have stored where and when. This has raised the possibility of mental time travel (MTT) in animals and sparked similar research with other species. Here we caution that such data do not provide convincing evidence for MTT. Examination of characteristics of human MTT (e.g. non-verbal declaration, generativity, developmental prerequisites) points to other avenues as to how a case for animal MTT could be made. In light of the current lack of evidence, however, we maintain that MTT is a uniquely human characteristic.     

Are animals stuck in time?

People can time travel cognitively because they can remember events having occurred at particular times in the past (episodic memory) and because they can anticipate new events occurring at particular times in the future. The ability to assign points in time to events arises from human development of a sense of time and its accompanying time-keeping technology. The hypothesis is advanced that animals are cognitively stuck in time: that is, they have no sense of time and thus have no episodic memory or ability to anticipate long-range future events. Research on animals' abilities to detect time of day, track short time intervals, remember the order of a sequence of events, and anticipate future events are considered, and it is concluded that the stuck-in-time hypothesis is largely supported by the current evidence.     

For love or money? What motivates people to know the minds of others?

Mood affects social cognition and "theory of mind", such that people in a persistent negative mood (i.e., dysphoria) have enhanced abilities at making subtle judgements about others' mental states. Theorists have argued that this hypersensitivity to subtle social cues may have adaptive significance in terms of solving interpersonal problems and/or minimising social risk. We tested whether increasing the social salience of a theory of mind task would preferentially increase dyspshoric individuals' performance on the task. Forty-four dysphoric and 51 non-dysphoric undergraduate women participated in a theory of mind decoding task following one of three motivational manipulations: (i) social motivation (ii) monetary motivation, or (iii) no motivation. Social motivation was associated with the greatest accuracy of mental state decoding for the dysphoric group, whereas the non-dysphoric group showed the highest accuracy in the monetary motivation condition. These results suggest that dysphoric individuals may be especially, and preferentially, motivated to understand the mental states of others.     

Improved standards for laboratory animals?

In February 1993, Judge Charles R. Richey of the United States District Court issued a summary judgment in the case of Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. The Secretary of Agriculture, et al. The decision, which was in favor of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, requires the U.S. Department of Agriculture to withdraw its current regulations governing exercise for dogs and the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates used for biomedical research and to issue new regulations containing only minimum, measurable standards. Both plaintiffs and defendants contended that they were seeking the best interests of the laboratory animals. The issue at stake is whether animals are better protected if the government establishes limited minimal standards or is allowed to require institutions to provide additional standards, which will be judged on the basis of their effectiveness in maintaining healthy animals. The Court avoided this dispute, however, by placing primary emphasis on applying the Administrative Procedures Act and stating that it was merely interpreting the "plain meaning" of the Animal Welfare Act, as amended. In this article, arguments are presented for interpreting the law in a far more flexible way than Judge Richey did. The conclusion is also reached that there were no winners in the Animal Legal Defense Fund case and that the real losers are the laboratory animals.     

Homo imitans or homo provocans? Human imprinting model of neonatal imitation

Searching for the mechanism of neonatal imitation resulted in the discovery of neonatal initiative capacity, here called “provocation”. Newborns spontaneously produced previously imitated gestures while waiting for the experimenter’s response. A psychophysiological analysis revealed that imitation was accompanied by heart rate increase while gesture initiation was accompanied by heart rate deceleration, suggesting different underlying mechanisms. Results imply that infants are not only capable of responding to a model movement by imitating, but that they also have the capacity to provoke an imitative response, thus sustaining an interaction. These findings may constitute a laboratory demonstration of the first dialogue and, according to our hypothetical model, they represent how human imprinting begins.