Paving the Way? Penalty and Atonement in Thomas Aquinas's Soteriology

This article explores the soteriology of Thomas Aquinas. In particular, it considers recent debates over whether Thomas altered Anselm's satisfaction theory in a way which opened the door to the later theory of penal substitution. The article argues that Thomas did indeed alter Anselm's atonement theory in this way insofar as he incorporates punishment within his concept of satisfaction; however, it further contends that his use of ‘placation’ or ‘appeasement’ language does not contribute to such an alteration.     

Jonathan Edwards,Anselmic Satisfaction and God's Moral Government

Jonathan Edwards' doctrine of atonement has recently become a source of interest amongst some contemporary systematic theologians. This article sets out to redress two longstanding and historically strident claims regarding Edwards' doctrine of the nature of atonement: first, that Edwards espoused an Anselmic satisfaction theory of atonement; second, that Edwards also laid the theological foundation for the moral government theory of atonement, popularized in nineteenth‐century America by those of his intellectual tradition. In this article, I lay out the conceptual core of both Anselm's satisfaction theory and the moral government theory of atonement. I argue that the claims noted above lack the explanatory resources needed to account accurately for Edwards' understanding of the nature of the atonement.     

Effects of Different Instructions on Consistency of Personality Inventory Responses

A novel feature of the Edwards Personality Inventory (EPI) is that the S responds to the items as he believes those who know him best would answer if asked to describe him. This study tested Edwards' hypothesis that reliability would be higher for these instructions vs. the more conventional ones to describe yourself directly as you see yourself. 180 Ss were tested with approximately one-third in each of three conditions: Booklet IA (test-retest), Booklet IB (test-retest), and Booklets IA and IB (alternate forms reliability). Within each condition, approximately half responded under Edwards' novel instructions, and half responded under conventional instructions. Directly contrary to Edwards' prediction, it was found that the proportion of conventional instruction correlations which were higher than the corresponding Edwards' instruction correlations was significantly greater than chance (p <.01).     

Paul,Luther, and the Cross: In Dialog with Karl Donfried

In response to the articles appearing in Dialog 46:1 (Spring 2007), David Brondos defends his position that in Paul's thought Christ's death did not “effect” human salvation, over against Karl Donfried's critique of that position. While Brondos and Donfried agree that Luther got the essence of Paul's gospel right and that Paul did not understand Jesus' death in terms of satisfaction or penal substitution, Brondos argues that the idea of “inclusive substitution” defended by Donfried and characteristic of the “new perspective on Paul” is foreign to the thought of both Paul and Luther.     

THE ROLE OF PERCEPTION IN JONATHAN EDWARDS'S MORAL THOUGHT: The Nature of True Virtue Reconsidered

This essay provides an interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's moral thought that calls attention to the motif of perception in his conception of true virtue. The aim is to illumine the extent to which Edwards's virtue ethics can be included in and contribute to prevailing approaches to virtue in contemporary theological ethics. To advance this proposal, this essay attends to the question of moral agency that Edwards's reflections on charity, the new spiritual sense, and religious affections raise. This procedure offers an acute sense of the significance of perception for Edwards's virtue ethics, which in turn allows for a constructive Edwardsean entry into current theological discussions on the narrative character of virtue.     

The Meno's Metaphilosophical Examples

I propose that an ill‐appreciated contrast between the examples Socrates gives Meno, to show him how he ought to philosophize, is the key to understanding the Meno. I contend that Socrates prefers his definitions of shape to his account of color because the former are concerned with what shape is, while the latter is concerned with how color comes to be. This contrast suggests that Plato intends an analogous contrast between the (properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' definition of knowledge as “true belief tied down with an account” and the (not properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' account of how knowledge comes to be, that is, the “theory of recollection.”     

For the Common Good: The Church of England,Christian–Muslim Relations and A Common Word

This paper seeks to explore some of the dynamics of Christian–Muslim relations today, particularly in England, and asks what might be the relationship between such dynamics and current Anglican theology, belief and practice. It explores the lecture of 7 February 2008 given by Archbishop Rowan Williams to the Royal Courts of Justice in London, and suggests that the Archbishop's remarks on this occasion are consonant with his understanding of Anglican ecclesiology. Finally the paper concludes by looking at the Archbishop's response to the document A Common Word and draws links between the Archbishop's interest in this document and his more domestic concerns.     

Peirce on Truth as the Predestinate Opinion

Abstract: In 1878's ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce states that truth is the predestinate opinion, or that which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate. Later in his life, though, he would claim both (i) that truth is what would be believed if we could figure out the right method of inquiry and (ii) that, instead of affirming that truth is the predestinate opinion in 1878, he ought to have affirmed that truth is what would be believed if inquiry were carried sufficiently far. The aim of this paper is to provide an account of why the early Peirce endorses the claim that truth is the predestinate opinion and why the late Peirce is compelled to modify that position. I argue that Peirce's early statement that truth is the predestinate opinion is motivated by his theory that all mental action is of the nature of a valid inference and that the later modification of his view is partly motivated by his rejection of that theory.     

The “Grand Medium”: An Edwardsean Modification of Thomas Aquinas on the Beatific Vision

Jonathan Edwards's understanding of the beatific vision, which draws on Neoplatonist metaphysics, marks a modification of views that became dominant in the Western Church through the rise of Aristotelian anthropology as articulated in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Edwards's account treats the resurrection of the body as significant, even indispensable for the deifying vision of God. It is also an account that regards Christ—the “grand medium” of the visio dei—as the consummate theophanic appearance of God. And it is, finally, an account that takes seriously the infinite progress of the vision of God, beginning in this life, continuing in the intermediate state, and on into the eternity of the resurrection.     

Review Essay: Constructivism with a Human Face

Irwin Hoffman's book Ritual and Spontaneity includes, but goes well beyond, his series of seminal papers—written over the past several decades—developing a psychoanalytic, constructivist perspective. A new, existential framework depicts what Hoffman calls the “psychobiological bedrock” at the core of the human process of constructing meaning—the lifelong effort to create a livable, subjective world in face of our ever present sense of loss, suffering, and, ultimately, mortality.

This review describes Hoffman's encompassing, existential perspective and discusses how, within this framework, he uses his dialectical sensibility to frame our understanding of both parenting and analysis as “semisacred” activities. The “dialectic of ritual and spontaneity”—the vital clash between disciplined adherence to the analytic frame and personally expressive deviations from it—represents the creative tension between the “magical” dimension of analytic authority and the healing influence of a genuinely expressive human relationship. Hoffman's perspective on the self-interested, “dark side” of the analytic relationship is compared with Winnicott's views on the vital, therapeutic role of “hate” and the paradoxical process by which the patient comes to “use” the analyst.

Unlike most postmodernist “constructivists,” Hoffman openly reveals his underlying belief in certain “transcultural, transhistorical universals”—his “psychobiological bedrock.” In acknowledging these “essentials” (assumptions about human nature) that in some form are integral, yet often hidden, elements of any system of thought, Hoffman saves his own dialectical constructivism from falling into dichotomous (constructivist vs. essentialist) thinking.     

Sober on Intelligent Design

This response to Sober's (2008) Evidence and Evolution draws out and criticizes some consequences of his analysis because of its reliance on a likelihood framework for adjucating the dispute between (Intelligent Design) creationism and evolution. In particular, Sober's analysis does not allow it to be formally claimed that evolutionary theory better explains living phenomena than Intelligent Design and makes irrelevant the contribution of the theory of evolution by natural selection to assessments of the status of the argument from design. Finally, a rudimentary alternative framework for theory confirmation is presented here which avoids these conclusions by rejecting likelihoodism and deploying multiple criteria to the problem of scientific theory choice.     

The Aesthetic Collision: Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Trinity and the Cross

The relationship envisioned by Hans Urs von Balthasar between the Trinity and the events of Christ's passion and death has elicited concern from various theologians that he has muddled the important distinction between God's eternal life ad intra and his interaction with the world through the economy of his actions. This article argues that such a reading of Balthasar's theology is ultimately a serious misconstrual of his work since it overlooks the aesthetic categories established early in The Glory of the Lord through which his narration of the cross‐event must ultimately be interpreted. By interpreting Balthasar in this manner, this article clarifies the content of what is perhaps Balthasar's most important theological contribution, and provides a creative alternative for how best to situate the relationship (oft‐discussed in twentieth‐century theology) between the Trinity and the crucifixion.     

Discourse theory trumps discourse theory: Wouter Hanegraaff's Esotericism and the Academy

This review article argues that Wouter Hanegraaff's Esotericism and the Academy is deeply influenced by a methodological cluster usually referred to as ‘discourse theory.’ That the author is not willing to classify his own approach as such is explained with recourse to his dispute with Kocku von Stuckrad, who, according to Hanegraaff, would embody discourse theory, whereas Hanegraaff would embody history. A comparison of Hanegraaff's Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and von Stuckrad's Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric Discourse and Western Identities (Leiden: Brill, 2010) reveals that this is a misleading classification and that Hanegraaff's study comes closer to what discourse theory is all about. As a consequence, Esotericism and the Academy is the very first study on ‘Western esotericism’ that offers a convincing justification of this particular label as an overarching discursive category.     

The Role of Structural Reasoning in the Genesis of Graph Theory

The concept of quantity (Größe) plays a key role in Frege's theory of real numbers. Typically enough, he refers to this theory as ‘theory of quantity’ (‘Größenlehre’) in the second volume of his opus magnum Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege 1903). In this essay, I deal, in a critical way, with Frege's treatment of the concept of quantity and his approach to analysis from the beginning of his academic career until Frege 1903. I begin with a few introductory remarks. In Section 2, I first analyze Frege's use of the term ‘source of knowledge’ (‘Erkenntnisquelle’) with particular emphasis on the logical source of knowledge. The analysis includes a brief comparison between Frege and Kant's conceptions of logic and the logical source of knowledge. In a second step, I examine Frege's theory of quantity in Rechnungsmethoden, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Größenbegriffes gründen (Frege 1874). Section 3 contains a couple of critical observations on Frege's comments on Hankel's theory of real numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege 1884). In Section 4, I consider Frege's discussion of the concept of quantity in Frege 1903. Section 5 is devoted to Cantor's theory of irrational numbers and the critique deployed by Frege. In Section 6, I return to Frege's own constructive treatment of analysis in Frege 1903 and succinctly describe what I take to be the quintessence of his account.     

Election in Bonhoeffer's Ethics: Discerning a Late Revision

Evidence that Bonhoeffer incorporates and responds to portions of Barth's Church Dogmatics II/2 in chapters thought to have been produced without access to Barth's fresh treatment of election mandate a revaluation of Bonhoeffer's controversial ethic and a reconsideration of the hermeneutic proper to his Ethics. Bonhoeffer's conception of election underwent a development from his public academic genesis in Sanctorum Communio to his posthumously published Ethics. His treatment of election in ‘God's Love and the Disintegration of the World’ demonstrates the doctrine's prominent role in his final attempts at reforming Christian ethics and his critique of all previous ethics. Attending to the influence of election illuminates developments in Bonhoeffer's thinking about two of the primary concepts associated with his Ethics–Stellvertretung and Schuldübernahme.     

“AFTER THE EVENT”: FREUD'S UNCANNY AND THE ANXIETY OF ORIGINS

This essay aims to revise Freud's theory of the uncanny by rereading his own essay of that name along with the key material Freud drew on in formulating his theory: E. T. A. Hoffmann's short story “The Sandman” (1816a) and Ernst Jentsch's essay “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906a). While arguing, initially, both that Jentsch's work is fundamentally misconstrued by Freud and that it offers a better account of what happens in Hoffmann's story, the essay moves beyond Jentsch's account to offer a more philosophically oriented theory of the uncanny, one more in line with Freud's ideas in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920a).     

What the Wise Ought Believe: A Voluntarist Interpretation of Hume's General Rules

This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called ‘the general rules’: natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be augmented via reflection. According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. In this paper, I argue that for Hume being wise must therefore be, to some degree, voluntary. Hume faced a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his epistemic normativity, i.e. his claims about what we ought to believe, with his largely involuntarist theory of the mind. Reflection on the General Rules, and an interpretation of that reflection as voluntary, helps explain not only Hume's theory of belief, but also how he hoped to reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental.