On the edge of a paradigm shift: Quantum nonlocality and the breakdown of peaceful coexistence

I present a thought experiment in quantum mechanics and tease out some of its implications for the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”, which, following Shimony, I take to be the proposition that quantum mechanics does not force us to revise or abandon the relativistic picture of causality. I criticize the standard arguments in favour of peaceful coexistence on the grounds that they are question‐begging, and suggest that the breakdown of Lorentz‐invariant relativity as a principle theory would be a natural development, given the general trend of physics in this century.     

Do you see what I know? On reasons,perceptual evidence,and epistemic status

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don't necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn't very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don't figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief‐like to provide us with something premise‐like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn't let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don't think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don't seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I've found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don't find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson's (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support.     

THEOLOGY AND PHYSICS FORTY YEARS LATER

Abstract. Almost forty years later I look back on a 1966 article on theology and physics by Sanford Brown and my response published with it. I reflect on his hope that theological seminaries would give attention to the methods used in scientific inquiry. I compare our comments with subsequent thought on three issues: (1) the role of models in science and religion; (2) the relation of wholes to parts in physics and other sciences and the debate over reductionism and emergence; and (3) the implications of quantum physics for theology, including the possibility of divine action at the quantum level.     

Care for one's own future experiences

We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism.     

Cosmic Mind?

This article explores the remote scientific possibility of something like “cosmic mind” or “cosmic minds.” Descartes proposed his famous dualism, res cogitans (mental reality) plus res extensa (physical reality). With Isaac Newton and classical physics, res extensa won in Western science and with it, we lost our minds; we lost our subjective pole. Quantum mechanics has seemed to many, since its formulation in the Schrödinger equation in 1926, to hint beyond physics to a role for the human conscious observer in quantum measurement. At least two interpretations of quantum mechanics, or its extension—the latter by Penrose and Hameroff, and the former by myself—suggest a new panpsychism where conscious awareness and possibly free will occur at quantum measurements anywhere in the universe. If so, then we live in a vastly participatory universe. More: entangled quantum variables may conceivably share some form of consciousness and free will, whether embodied in us, or living forms elsewhere in the universe, or disembodied; hence, something like cosmic mind or minds are not ruled out. If true, life anywhere in the universe will have evolved with mind and free will. Souls are not impossible.     

Hyperdimensional Perspectives in Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences

Recent theories of modern physics predict that the universe has more dimensions than are apparent to us. Many near-death experiencers report the perception that there are more dimensions than we are commonly aware of. These two statements might be related. This article examines the possibility of additional dimensions (hyperdimensions), what they would seem like, and whether they seem to be described by the unusual visual perspectives found in out-of-body and near-death experience accounts. I examine some implications of a hyperdimensional model of the universe.     

The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial Structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics

Wigner famously referred to the `unreasonable effectiveness' of mathematics in its application to science. Using Wigner's own application of group theory to nuclear physics, I hope to indicate that this effectiveness can be seen to be not so unreasonable if attention is paid to the various idealising moves undertaken. The overall framework for analysing this relationship between mathematics and physics is that of da Costa's partial structures programme.     

FROM THE SENSES TO SENSE: THE HERMENEUTICS OF LOVE

Abstract. Drawing on philosophy, theology, comparative religion, spirituality, Holocaust studies, physics, biology, psychology, and personal experience, I argue that continued human existence depends on our willingness to reject nihilism–not as an expedient "noble lie" but because faith in a meaningful cosmos and the power of love is at least as validly grounded in human experience as insistence on cosmic indifference and ultimate futility. I maintain that hope will free us to develop nonimperialistic methods of bridging cultural differences by forming a mutually intelligible vocabulary that celebrates diversity, enters the worlds of others in respectful dialogue, and fosters a postmechanistic, organic, ecological, holistic, dynamic, interactive, open-ended model of reality. I lay the foundation for a "hermeneutics of love" to complement Paul Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of suspicion" and invite speculation on the ways science, technology, and society would be transformed if those "glasses of friendship" were widely applied.     

Does Science Influence the Logic we Ought to Use: A Reflection on the Quantum Logic Controversy

In this article I argue that there is a sense in which logic is empirical, and hence open to influence from science. One of the roles of logic is the modelling and extending of natural language reasoning. It does so by providing a formal system which succeeds in modelling the structure of a paradigmatic set of our natural language inferences and which then permits us to extend this structure to novel cases with relative ease. In choosing the best system of those that succeed in this, we seek certain virtues of such structures such as simplicity and naturalness (which will be explained). Science can influence logic by bringing us, as in the case of quantum mechanics, to make natural language inferences about new kinds of systems and thereby extend the set of paradigmatic cases that our formal logic ought to model as simply and naturally as possible. This can alter which structures ought to be used to provide semantics for such models. I show why such a revolution could have led us to reject one logic for another through explaining why complex claims about quantum mechanical systems failed to lead us to reject classical logic for quantum logic.     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

Explaining away temporal flow – thoughts on Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’

I offer some responses to Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’, one of whose goals is to debunk a view of temporal experience somewhat prevalent in the metaphysics literature, which I call ‘Perceptualism’. According to Perceptualism: (1) it is part of the content of perceptual experience that time passes in a metaphysically strong sense: the present has a metaphysically privileged status, and time passes in virtue of changes in which events this ‘objective present’ highlights, and moreover (2) this gives us evidence in favor of strong passage. Prosser argues that perception cannot be sensitive to whether the strong passage obtains, and therefore cannot represent strong passage in a way that gives us evidence of its truth. Although I accept this conclusion, I argue that Prosser’s argument for it is problematic. It threatens to over-generalize to rule out uncontroversial cases of perceptual knowledge, such as our knowledge that we live in a spatial world. Furthermore, a successful argument ruling out perceptual evidence for strong passage would have to give constraints on the theory/observation distinction of a kind not provided by Prosser’s discussion. I also comment on several other parts of the book.     

Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order

I discuss theories about the way in which we determine the precedence ofperceived events. I examine Mellor's account, which claims that it is thetiming of our perceptions of events that enables us to determine their order,and Dennett's criticism of this. Dennett cites psychological experimentswhich suggest that it is the content of our perceptions, rather than theirtiming, which allows us to determine the order of the events perceived. Iargue that by distinguishing between two different ways of construing'perception' we can see not only that the two accounts are compatible, but that Dennett's account presupposes Mellor's.     

VIRTUE, EMOTION, AND ATTENTION

Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.     

Response to Stuart Kauffman: The Cosmic Mind and NIODA

Non-locality, indeterminacy, the meaning of the Schrödinger equation, and quantum measurements are interpretation issues in quantum mechanics that go beyond our typical view of the world through the classical physics lenses of the mechanistic determinism. In “Cosmic Mind?,” Stuart Kauffman offers an interpretation of the Schrödinger equation and quantum measurements that might support a cosmic mind. Robert John Russell in NIODA uses the indeterminacy to offer a mechanism for God to interact with nature. This response reviews these two interpretations of quantum mechanics with respect to the two-slit and EPR experiments and how these two interpretations of quantum mechanics could solve issues of interpretations.     

(Inadvertently) Instructing Missionaries in (Public University) World Religions Courses: Examining a Pedagogical Dilemma,its Dimensions,and a Course Section Solution

In this article, I explore an ethical and pedagogical dilemma that I encounter each semester in my world religions courses: namely, that a great number of students enroll in the courses as part of their missionary training programs, and come to class understanding successful learning to mean gathering enough information about the world's religious “traditions” so as to effectively seduce people out of them. How should we teach world religions – in public university religious studies courses – with this student constituency? What are/ought to be our student learning goals? What can and should we expect to accomplish? How can we maximize student learning, while also maintaining our disciplinary integrity? In response to these questions, I propose a world religions course module, the goal of which is for students to examine – as objects of inquiry – the lenses through which they understand religion(s). With a recognition of their own lenses, I argue, missionary students become more aware of the biases and presumptions about others that they bring to the table, and they learn to see the ways in which these presumptions inform what they see and know about others, and also what they do not so easily see.     

Reconsidering Relativistic Causality

I discuss the idea of relativistic causality, i.e., the requirement that causal processes or signals can propagate only within the light‐cone. After briefly locating this requirement in the philosophy of causation, my main aim is to draw philosophers’ attention to the fact that it is subtle, indeed problematic, in relativistic quantum physics: there are scenarios in which it seems to fail.

I set aside two such scenarios, which are familiar to philosophers of physics: the pilot‐wave approach, and the Newton–Wigner representation. I instead stress two unfamiliar scenarios: the Drummond–Hathrell and Scharnhorst effects. These effects also illustrate a general moral in the philosophy of geometry: that the mathematical structures, especially the metric tensor, that represent geometry get their geometric significance by dint of detailed physical arguments.     

The mind's best trick: how we experience conscious will

We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however - the mind's way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct perceptions of conscious thought causing action.     

THE VALIDITY OF MORAL THEORIES

Abstract. We can usefully draw an analogy between ethics and science, despite the significant differences between them. We can then see the ways in which moral theories can indeed be "tested," not by empirical experience but by moral experience. This can be expected to lead to rival moral theories, but in science also we have rival theories. I argue that we should demand more than coherence of our moral theories, as we do of our scientific theories. I try to show how the "testing" of moral theories can be carried out and how this can allow us to accept some moral theories as valid.     

Response to Layton: Considering the Sociopolitical Context of Dialectical Constructivism

What is commonly missing from psychoanalytic formulations, including my own, that Lynne Layton rightfully challenges us to correct is the locating of the possible dysfunctionality of the individual and the family within the context, not just of a brutally indifferent universe but also of an arguably brutally indifferent economic, political, and institutional environment. I differ with Layton in that I am more prepared to consider possible universals that bear on human experience and moral standards. For example, I would say that “reflection on the foundations of knowledge” trumps nonreflective fundamentalist thinking in capturing the best attitude to assume towards pursuit of truth. Also, the universality of the human tendency to deny death may underlie many diverse cultural belief systems. Nevertheless, Layton challenges us to reflect on how conventional psychoanalytic practices may collude with aspects of our own culture we would do well to try to combat, in ourselves and in our patients, through owning and proactively exercising our moral influence.