Contingency,Historicity, and Integrity

The author of this paper contends that Kathleen Wallace’s model of the self is a highly original contribution to contemporary thought. He, however, highlights important respects in which Wallace is adumbrating themes highlighted by Justus Buchler’s scattered insights into human selfhood. In addition, the author identifies two possible lines of inquiry rooted in Wallace’s project calling for further pursuit. Questions regarding self-division, ones importantly bearing upon the topic of autonomy, and also questions regarding the somatic mechanisms, processes, and practices by which embodied selves maintain themselves as cumulative networks are ones that, above all else, he tries to throw into sharp relief through the defining features of Wallace’s network model and to underscore the inherent power of Wallace’s nuanced approach to a highly contested and intricately complex topic.     

Grounding,Contingency and Transitivity

Grounding contingentism is the doctrine according to which grounds are not guaranteed to necessitate what they ground. In this paper I will argue that the most plausible version of contingentism (which I will label ‘serious contingentism’) is incompatible with the idea that the grounding relation is transitive, unless either ‘priority monism’ or ‘contrastivism’ are assumed.     

Nanotechnology, Contingency and Finitude

It is argued that the social significance of nanotechnologies should be understood in terms of the politics and ethics of uncertainty. This means that the uncertainties surrounding the present and future development of nanotechnologies should not be interpreted, first and foremost, in terms of concepts of risk. It is argued that risk, as a way of managing uncertain futures, has a particular historical genealogy, and as such implies a specific politics and ethics. It is proposed, instead, that the concepts of contingency and of finitude must be central to any understanding of the ethical significance of nanotechnologies, as these concepts can be used to understand the basis of recent work in science and technology studies, and the sociology of knowledge more widely, which details the multi-dimensional social nature of technological uncertainty.

Contingency, causation, and adaptive inference

In contingency judgment tasks involving 2 event types, individuals weight the a and b cells of a 2 x 2 contingency table more than the c and d cells. Some theorists have argued that they can provide normative justifications for this weighting and that the weighting reflects simple heuristics that are adaptive in the real world. The authors show that, to avoid error, individual judgments about real contingencies should be more subtle than these supposedly adaptive heuristics allow.     

Composition,Contingency, and Local Supervenience

A growing number of philosophers have argued against the orthodoxy that the correct principle of composition will be a metaphysically necessary truth. With contingentism about composition a seemingly viable option, it would appear that would‐be necessitarians shoulder the burden of proof. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the contingentist, too, has a significant burden. I argue that nonbrutal principles of composition satisfy a principle according to which facts about whether or not a collection composes supervene on noncomposition facts that are spatiotemporally local to the collection. I further argue that the contingentist has reason to reject both brutal composition and the supervenience principle. This reveals a significant internal tension in the contingentist's position. Unless this tension can be resolved, there will be (defeasible) reason to prefer necessitarianism about composition.     

The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency

There is a good deal of disagreement about composition. There is first-order disagreement: there are radically different answers to the special composition question—the question of under what circumstances the xs compose a y. There is second-order disagreement: there are different answers to the question of whether first-order disagreement is real or merely semantic. Virtually all disputants with respect to both the first- and second-order issues agree that the answer or answers to the special composition question will take the form of a necessary truth or truths even though, as I will argue, such answers do not appear to be good candidates to be necessary truths. This paper provides an analysis of the concept of <exists> as it pertains to concrete objects, that fulfils two functions. First, it explicates the sense in which claims about composition are contingent and the sense in which they are necessary, and second, it provides a way of understanding when first-order disputes are substantial and when they are merely semantic.     

Contingency, Education, and the Need for Reassurance

This short paper is a response to Richard Smith’s ‘Abstraction and finitude: education, chance and democracy’. In his paper Smith contends that a rationalist agenda dominates education and democracy today, and that this agenda by rendering us insensitive to the tragic dimension of life, breeds a sense of hubris, or arrogance towards fate which is fuelled by an inordinate confidence in our knowledge. In the worlds of education and politics it has led to an obsession with management and transparency, and to students who fear to take risks. As a specific example of this, he takes up the recent fixation in universities with learning how to learn, which he says leads to an over-emphasis on skills in the curriculum, and to an ‘audit’ culture. While sympathising with much of his analysis of the latter, my counter-suggestion is that the contemporary world lacks anything but a sense of the contingency of things, to the contrary, that at the heart of its mangerialist culture and its performatist ethos lies the need for reassurance. My response focuses on the politics of the self-directed learner that lies at the heart of the lifelong learning literature, on learning how to learn, on the notion of transparency and on the transparent society, and on the politics of contingency and scepticism. Prof. Kenneth Wain teaches philosophy of education and courses in ethics and political philosophy at the University of Malta, where he is also involved in teacher education. Last year (2004) he published his most recent book The Learning Society in a Postmodern World with Peter Lang (New York). His earlier books were Philosophy of Lifelong Education (1987) Croom Helm (London), The Maltese National Curriculum: a critical Evaluation (1991) Mireva (Malta) Theories of Teaching (1992) Mireva (Malta) The Value Crisis: an Introduction to Ethics (1995) University of Malta Press. He has also published several articles in international refereed journals.     

The Application of Biological, Evolutionary, and Sociocultural Frameworks to Issues of Gender in Introductory Psychology Textbooks

The purpose of this paper is to explore the application of biological, evolutionary, and sociocultural frameworks to issues of gender in the 10 most popular introductory psychology textbooks in the U.S. The use of these metatheories is of interest to feminist scholars because they have implications for the extent to which students learn that gender and gender differences are fixed and innate or socially constructed. If gender and gender differences are seen as malleable, then efforts at social change to improve women’s status or men’s and women’s abilities or opportunities can be understood as promising endeavors. The relative use of these three frameworks differed dramatically across books, affording all scholars the opportunity to actively select those texts whose prominent frameworks best align with their course goals. The paper concludes with suggestions for which books offer the most thorough coverage of sociocultural frameworks.     

Contingency,arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status-conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude-based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status-holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter.     

Laws,chances and properties

The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher‐order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey‐Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest deductive theory of everything; but because laws are not so defined, simplicity of statement is not a criterion of law‐hood.     

Laws, Regularities and Exceptions

Sentences of the form ' F s are G s' can express laws of nature, weaker Special Science laws, and also regularities which are not a part of any explicit science. These so-called generic sentences express nomic relationships which may have exceptions. I discuss the kinds of regularities expressed by generic sentences and argue that since they play a similar role in determining our ability to categorise and reason about the world, we should look for a unified treatment of them.     

Contingency and behavior analysis

The concept of contingency is central to theoretical discussions of learned behavior and in the application of learning research to problems of social significance. This paper reviews three aspects of the contingency concept as it has been developed by behavior analysts. The first is the empirical analysis of contingency through experimental studies of both human and nonhuman behavior. The second is the synthesis of experimental studies in theoretical and conceptual frameworks to yield a more general account of contingency and to integrate the concept with other behavioral processes. The third aspect is one of practical considerations in the application of the contingency concept in both laboratory and applied settings.     

Necessity and Relative Contingency

The paper introduces a contingential language extended with a propositional constant τ axiomatized in a system named KΔτ , which receives a semantical analysis via relational models. A definition of the necessity operator in terms of Δ and τ allows proving (i) that KΔτ is equivalent to a modal system named K□τ (ii) that both KΔτ and K□τ are tableau-decidable and complete with respect to the defined relational semantics (iii) that the modal τ -free fragment of KΔτ is exactly the deontic system KD. In §4 it is proved that the modal τ -free fragment of a system KΔτw weaker than KΔτ is exactly the minimal normal system K. Presented by Daniele Mundici