A life not worth living?

The work of Dan Brock and Helga Kuhse is typical of the current stream of thought rejecting the validity of sanctity of life appeals to instill objective inviolable worth in human life regardless of the quality of life of the patient. The context of a person's life is supremely important. In their systems life can have high value, yet the value of life can be outweighed by the force of other disvalues. The notion of quality of life has increasingly come to signify the measurement of the worth of a person's life itself. Having a life equals a personal life. Any objectivity to life resides in 'personal', 'biographical', or 'creative' life, not mere biological life. Personal life represents the minimal threshold for any objective worth. In responding to this challenge, John Finnis has argued extensively that life is an intrinsic good--a basic human good. Following from our grasp of human life as a basic incommensurable good, it cannot be practically reasonable both to affirm that (a) 'human life is a basic human good', and (b) that 'human life qua human life can be intentionally acted against to its destruction'. Yet, if the good of human life can be considered self-evident, the self-evidence of the basic human good qua good does not mean that dialectical reasoning cannot be engaged in to indirectly support the practical reasonableness of respecting the good of human life in the deliberative choices that persons make concerning their actions. It is to the use of such dialectical reasoning, supportive of the status of human life as such a basic human good, that the article is primarily concerned to draw out and articulate.     

Is there life without mother?

Clinical and literary materials are presented to illustrate the compulsive need some children (frequently abused and/or deprived ones) continue to feel as they grow up for submission to and identification with the earliest parental figure. Intrapsychic loss is threatened by intense murderous hatred felt toward a parent without whom the child's survival is not possible. Conflicts over sadomasochistic fantasy, feeling, and action are used to hold on to the parent within and without the mind, and these can dominate the child's life.     

Is life of infinite value?

It is possible and necessary to compare stretches of human life with other goods, such as the good of conserving resources for others. A minute of human life is not of infinite value; all else being equal, a minute of life is less valuable than 10 years of the same life. Nevertheless, this ability to evaluate human life does not necessarily lead to total commodification of human life.     

Is there life after enactment? The idea of a patient's proper work

All talking therapies profit from a patient's deliberate work in treatment, for a number of reasons, each of which deserves separate study and reflection. This is as true for psychoanalysis as for other psychotherapies. But in psychoanalysis the idea of a patient's deliberate work is paradoxical and problematic, bringing special overt and covert benefits, but also risking countertransference hazards like those associated with the notion of therapeutic alliance. Many analysts today use the implicit idea of a patient's proper, deliberate work as a contrast in defining an enactment, and the idea of this proper work serves both parties as an image of aspiration when they are trying to climb out of an enactment. As always in these matters, that sort of usefulness carries the hazard of unrealistic and unpsychoanalytic expectations.     

Is there a profession of engineering?

This article examines three common arguments for the claim that engineering is not a profession: 1) that engineering lacks an ideal internal to its practice; 2) that engineering’s ideal, whether internal or not, is merely technical; and 3) that engineering lacks the social arrangements characteristic of a true profession. All three arguments are shown to rely on one or another definition of profession, each of which is inadequate. An alternative to these definition is offered. It has at least two advantages. On the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of professional community, the role of occupation in defining profession, the centrality of a moral ideal, and the necessity for morally binding standards (beyond ordinary morality). On the other hand, the alternative definition is in part independent both of moral theory and sociology. This article concludes by considering what light the alternative definition can throw on the professional status of engineers serving the Nazis.     

Is there an Ethics of Computing?

ABSTRACT  The article constitutes an attempt to answer the question contained in the title, by reference to three example topics: individual privacy, ownership of software, and computer 'hacking'. The ethical question is approached via the legal one of whether special, computer–specific legislation is appropriate. The conclusion is in the affirmative, and rests on the claim that computer technology has brought with it, not so much the potential for committing totally new kinds of crimes, as a distinctive set of linguistic and conceptual apparatus which makes it necessary to describe computer–related activity in special ways.     

Is there a logic of incoherence?

What should we do when we discover that our assessment of probabilities is incoherent? I explore the hypothesis that there is a logic of incoherence—a set of universally valid rules that specify how incoherent probability assessments are to be repaired. I examine a pair of candidate‐rules of incoherence logic that have been employed in philosophical reconstructions of scientific arguments. Despite their intuitive plausibility, both rules turn out to be invalid. There are presently no viable candidate‐rules for an incoherence logic on the table. Other ways of dealing with incoherence are surveyed, and found either to be unsatisfactory or to rely on a logic of incoherence in the end. The resolution of these antagonistic conclusions is left to future researchers.     

Is artefactualness a value-relevant property of living things?

Artefacts are often regarded as being mere things that possess only instrumental value. In contrast, living entities (or some subset of them) are often regarded as possessing some form of intrinsic (or non-instrumental) value. Moreover, in some cases they are thought to possess such value precisely because they are natural (i.e., non-artefactual). However, living artefacts are certainly possible, and they may soon be actual. It is therefore necessary to consider whether such entities should be regarded as mere things (like most non-living artefacts) or as possessing intrinsic value (like many, if not all) living entities. That is, it is necessary to determine whether artefactualness is a value-relevant property with respect to the intrinsic value of living things.     

Is there an evolutionary advantage of schizophrenia?

Schizophrenia is a universal disorder with strongly genetic aetiology. A constant prevalence rate, universally, in the face of reduced fecundity leads to the argument here that an evolutionary advantage exists, but not solely for schizophrenia. Possible areas of advantage are examined and it is argued that schizophrenia exists as a costly trade-off, in the evolution of Homo sapiens, as a by-product of a yet unknown uniquely human quality. The reason it has stayed in existence is due to a combination of advantages bestowed upon the kin, the group and, to a lesser extent, individuals who suffer from the disorder; these all contribute a different type of advantage, each of which alone would not be sufficient. Further, the evidence for the other advantages alone lack the rigour of evidence seen in the by-product theories, which provide as yet unparalleled comprehensive evolutionary evidence.     

Is there anybody there? A psychodynamic view of panic attack

The effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural therapy is frequently cited when adopting this model as treatment of choice for panic attacks and anxiety disorders. However, Frank (1974), in discussing treatment effectiveness and patient compliance, argues that 'the more closely the conceptual framework of therapy fits that of the patient, the more readily he can accept it' (p. 370). In the following process analysis, my client's clear requirement for an exploratory approach meant that it was a psychodynamic understanding of the complex aetiology of her panic attacks that ultimately produced improved coping skills and a subjective sense of improvement for her. Process analysis has been chosen to illustrate the theoretical base, clinical impact and experiential immediacy of psychodynamic work; attention is drawn to the importance of transference and countertransference experiences in the choice of clinical interventions which tally with the client's sense of internal reality.     

Is there a nonverbal period of development?

That the infant lives in a nonverbal sensorimotor world is widely believed. Yet this notion is being challenged by research, in a range of fields, that depicts the young infant as actively attuned to aural speech from birth and able to process and use its sounds and meanings well before the end of the first year. Following a selective review of the research on infant speech processing between birth and age twelve months, three questions are identified that highlight the theoretical and clinical implications of this research for psychoanalytic conceptualizations of infancy, the nature of language, and clinical process. The research, it is concluded, identifies the operation of linguistic and conceptual processes in early life, processes that may intersect with the experiential and emotional processes with which psychoanalysis is already concerned. Moreover, this research raises questions about the view that the nature of infancy is essentially nonverbal.     

Is there room for criticism of studies of psychodynamic psychotherapy?

Comments on the original article, "The efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy," by J. Shedler (see record 2010-02208-012). Shedler declared unequivocally that "empirical evidence supports the efficacy of psychodynamic therapy" (p. 98). He did not mention any specific criticisms that have been made of evidence on psychodynamic psychotherapies or address possible distinctions between evidence for short-term versus long-term psychodynamic psychotherapies. Instead, he attributed dissenting views to biases in evidence dissemination and review, which he suggested are rooted in a "lingering distaste in the mental health professions professions for past psychoanalytic arrogance and authority" related to a "hierarchical medical establishment that denied training to non-MDs and adopted a dismissive stance toward research" (Shedler, 2010, p. 98). Shedler (2010) justified his blanket dismissal of criticisms of evidence supporting psychodynamic psychotherapy on the basis of several published meta-analyses. The validity of conclusions from metaanalyses depends on the quality of the evidence synthesized, the nature of the studies included, and the rigor of the statistical analyses employed. Many meta-analyses, however, are not performed rigorously, which can result in treatment efficacy estimates that obscure important intertrial differences and that are unlikely to be replicated in clinical practice.     

Is there brief temporal buffering of successive visual inputs?

The part-report advantage has been used to identify short-lived forms of visual storage (Sperling, 1960). We adopt the part-report paradigm to test whether visual memory can preserve, for a brief time, successive inputs and their temporal order. In our experiments, two successive arrays, each of 4 digits, were presented on each trial. The two arrays were spatially coincident, and each was followed by a random pattern-mask. In the part-report conditions, an auditory cue indicated whether the participant should report the first array or the second array. The results consistently showed a part-report advantage, which ranged in size from 16% to 37%. Delaying the cue by 500?ms abolished most of this advantage, in that performance was then similar to that in whole-report conditions. Subsequent experiments confirmed that the part-report superiority we measure is not achieved by (a) making eye movements that spatially displace the second array relative to the first; (b) extracting information from a single snapshot containing an integrated representation of the targets and masks; or (c) transferring a subset of material to a phonological store. We propose instead that observers have access to a limited, rapidly decaying representation of successive visual inputs stored in temporal sequence.     

Is there a general factor of preference for complexity?

It has been assumed that preferences for different aspects of complexity in visual patterns are intercorrelated. Evidence purporting to demonstrate this was examined and found to be inconclusive. The preferences of 111 Ss using three sets of patterns showed no correlation between preference for asymmetry, for multiplicity, and for heterogeneity of elements.     

Representing metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition?

What cognitive mechanisms underlie Theory of Mind? Some infer domain-specific Theory of Mind cognition based the pattern of children diagnosed with autism failing the False Belief test but passing the False Photograph test. However, we argue that the False Belief test entails various task demands the False Photograph task does not, including the necessity to represent a higher-order representation (a metarepresentation), thus confounding the inference of domain-specificity. Instead, a general difficulty that affects representations of metarepresentations might account for the seeming domain-specific failure. Here we find that False-Belief failing False-Photograph passing children fail the Meta Photograph test, a new photograph-domain test that requires subjects to represent a metarepresentation. We conclude that people who fail the False Belief test but pass the False Photograph test do not necessarily have a content-specific Theory of Mind deficit. Instead, the general ability to represent representations and metarepresentations might underlie Theory of Mind.