Can designing and selling low-quality products be ethical?

Whereas previous studies have criticized low-quality products for inadequate safety, this paper considers only safe products, and it examines the ethics of designing and selling low-quality products. Product quality is defined as suitability to a general purpose. The duty that companies owe to consumers is summarized in the Consumer-Oriented Process principle: “to place an increase in the consumer’s quality of life as the primary goal for producing products.” This principle is applied in analyzing the primary ethical justifications for low-quality products: availability and applicability. Finally, a low-quality product should be designed afresh, not by altering an existing high-quality product. Supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant CCR-9315696. The views, opinions, and conclusions of this paper are not necessarily those of the University of Illinois or the National Science Foundation. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, St. Louis, Mo., February 29 to March 2, 1996. Willem Bakker is an undergraduate at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is majoring in computer engineering and philosophy. Michael Loui is professor of electrical and computer engineering and associate dean of the Graduate College at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. From 1990 to 1991, he served at the National Science Foundation in Washington, D.C. His scholarly interests include computational complexity theory, theory of parallel and distributed computation, faulttolerant software, and professional ethics.     

Can relativism be reconciled with realism and causalism?

This paper deals with two fundamental assumptions of the Strong programme in the sociology of knowledge and the theoretical (im) possibility of their co‐existence with the general relativist tendency of this programme. The first assumption is the realist thesis introduced into the Strong programme through the materialist presupposition that sense experience is reliable and humans are able to learn about the regularities of the non‐social world in order to survive. The second assumption is the causal principle. Arguments developed in this paper lead to the conclusion that neither realism nor causalism can be reconciled with relativism. In both cases inconsistency is brought about by a tension between scientific perspective and relativism, between an external approach aiming at objective, universal, and causal explanation of what is studied, on the one hand, and the internal, relativist and reflexive, hermeneutical understanding of the human, on the other hand. The belief that the sociology of knowledge can be at the same time scientific, like the natural sciences, and relativist, like certain philosophies but not the natural sciences, is not sufficiently justified in the Strong programme.     

Can Psychoanalysis be a Science?

This essay proposes to examine a limited number of critical assessments regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis with reference to intents and purposes, claims and disclaimers, contrasting views of what constitutes a science and the nature of scientific thinking and how these might apply to psychoanalysis epistemologically. It assumes a certain degree of familiarity with criticisms that have been leveled against psychoanalysis from those who insist on absolutist testing for what some call true science, particularly on the part of those who are not practitioners of the art. It wonders about the concern with scientizing by those who actually practice it, or value it in some way or another. It suggests an open minded approach without premature or even warranted closure on the subject of human beings and of ways of getting to know them, let alone understanding them and perhaps being of help to them.     

Can a space-perception conflict be solved with three sense modalities?

A cross-modal conflict over location was resolved in an unexpected way. When vision and proprioception provide conflicting information, which modality should dominate is ambiguous. A visual-proprioceptive conflict was created with a prism and, to logically disambiguate the problem, auditory information was added that either agreed with vision (group 1), agreed with proprioception (group 2), or was absent (group 3). While a scarcity of research addresses the interaction of three modalities, I predicted error should be attributed to the modality in the minority. Instead, the opposite was found: adaptation consisted of a large change in arm proprioception and a small change affecting vision in group 2, and the reverse in group 1. Group 1 was not different than group 3. Findings suggested adaptation to separate two-way conflicts, possibly influenced by direction of attention, rather than a direct solution to a three-way modality problem.     

Can there be a feature-placing language?

The aim of this article is to argue against the real possibility of languages without subject-predicate structure, so-called feature-placing languages. They were first introduced by Strawson (1959/1990), later given formal expression through Quine's Predicate Functor Logic (Quine, 1960, Quine, 1971/Quine, 1976, Quine, 1992), and further elaboration in (Hawthorne & Cortens, 1995). I argue that, on the presumption that feature-placing languages are not mere notational variants on first-order languages, the idea of such languages is incoherent. The argument for this view rests on two highly plausible views about the conditions for the possibility of sentential meaning in natural languages. If accepted, these two views jointly imply that the sentences of feature-placing languages lack sufficient internal structure to meet the conditions for sentential meaning. Feature-placing languages cannot then count as genuine languages.     

Can logic be combined with probability? Probably

In the nineteen sixties seminal work was done by Gaifman and then Scott and Krauss in adapting the concepts, tools and procedures of the model theory of modern logic to provide a corresponding model theory in which notions of probabilistic consistency and consequence are defined analogously to the way they are defined (semantically) in the deductive case. The present paper proposes a way of extending these ideas beyond the bounds of a formalised language, even the infinitary language of Scott and Krauss, to achieve a logic having the power and expressiveness of the modern mathematical theory of probability.     

Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?

This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.     

Can applied ethics be effective in health care and should it strive to be?

Drawing upon his work in medical centers, Caplan explores the question of how well ethicists function in hospitals. He asks if their use of the "engineering model" of applied ethics, which emphasizes conceptual clarification, mastery of ethical theory, and impartiality, has made any difference in the way medicine is practiced. Noting that ethicists have been more effective in influencing heatlh policy at the national than at the institutional level, Caplan concludes that they have been less successful in teaching medical ethics, working with health personnel, and helping to formulate hospital policies. He attributes their difficulties primarily to the inadequacies of the engineering model of applied ethics for solving problems in a clinical setting. Caplan cautions ethicists to be aware both of the limitations of the engineering model and of the motives of health personnel in asking for help which may have little to do with resolving moral dilemmas.     

Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?

In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees of belief play a role in real agents’ reasoning processes. On the other hand, the philosophical literature on reasoning, which relies much less heavily on idealizing assumptions about reasoners than Bayesianism, is almost exclusively concerned with outright belief. One possible explanation for why no philosopher has yet developed an account of reasoning with degrees of belief is that reasoning with degrees of belief is not possible for humans. In this paper, I will consider three arguments for this claim. I will show why these arguments are flawed, and conclude that, at least as far as these arguments are concerned, it seems like there is no good reason why the topic of reasoning with degrees of belief has received so little attention.     

Can reading ability be measured with tests of memory and processing speed?

The author investigated the possibility of estimating reading ability using tests of memory and processing speed that have significantly reduced reading requirements. Four hundred three air force trainees were given tests of their working memory and long-term memory processes, as well as a standardized reading test. A multiple correlation of .79 indicated that global reading ability is substantially correlated with memory processes. Additional analyses indicated that word knowledge and comprehension, the two major components of reading ability, were both explained by the same set of memory process factors, namely, long-term memory processes, semantic memory retrieval speed, and working memory capacity. These results, which are consistent with the view that memory ability underlies reading ability, support the endeavor of measuring reading ability with memory and processing speed tasks.