What's the Point?*

We present a theory of conversation comprehension in which a line of the conversation is “understood” by relating it to one of seven possible “points”. We define these points, and present examples where it seems plausible that the failure to “get the point” would indeed constitute a failure to understand the conversation. We argue that the recognition of such points must proceed in both a top down and bottom up fashion, and thus is likely to be quite complicated. Finally, we see the processing of information in the conversation to be dependent upon which point classification the user decides upon.     

Executive Selection—What's Right … and What's Wrong

Although recent reviews of executive selection have catalogued much that we as industrial–organizational (I–O) psychologists are doing right in our research and practice, we are confronted with the facts that executive selection decisions are often, if not usually, wrong and that I–O psychologists seldom have a place at the table when these decisions are made. This article suggests that in our thinking we have failed to differentiate executive selection from selection at lower levels and that we have applied the wrong models. Our hope for the future lies not in job analyses, developing new tests, meta-analyses, or seeking psychometric validity, but in viewing executive selection as a judgment and decision-making problem. With the right focus, applying our considerable methodological skills should enable us to contribute toward making better judgments. When we have a better mousetrap, organizations (if not the world) will beat a path to our door.     

What's in a Disorder

Abstract

This paper analyzes the emergence of two FDA-approved products to treat “sexual disorders”: Viagra, a drug prescribed for the treatment of erectile dysfunction, and the Eros, a device prescribed for the treatment of female sexual dysfunction. Through an analysis of advertising and promotional materials for Viagra and the Eros, we argue that these pharmaceutical devices and the discourses they circulate reinforce normative gender ideals by enacting dominant cultural narratives of masculinity, femininity, and male and female sexuality. These cultural narratives of normative gender structure sexuality in such a way that reinforces certain kinds of masculinity, femininity, and (hetero)sexuality, thereby rendering “atypical” gender and sexual expressions, desires, and appearances invisible and marginal. We argue that these constructions reify cultural ideologies about “what counts” as legitimate and appropriate sexuality and that these constructions have profound implication for social actors, sexologists, and therapists.     

What's That Smell?

In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and place them front and center. I ask: What are smells? For many philosophers, the view that colors can be explained in purely physicalistic terms has seemed very appealing. In the case of smells, this kind of nonrelational view has seemed much less appealing. Philosophers have been drawn to versions of relationalism—the view that the nature of smells must be explained (at least in part) in terms of the effects they have on perceivers. In this paper, I consider a contemporary argument for this view. I argue that nonrelationalist views of smell have little to fear from this argument.