The ties that bind what is known to the recall of what is new

Cued recall success varies with what people know and with what they do during an episode. This paper focuses on prior knowledge and disentangles the relative effects of 10 features of words and their relationships on cued recall. Results are reported for correlational and multiple regression analyses of data obtained from free association norms and from 29 experiments. The 10 features were only weakly correlated with each other in the norms and, with notable exceptions, in the experiments. The regression analysis indicated that forward cue-to-target strength explained the most variance, followed by backward target-to-cue strength. Target connectivity and set size explained the next most variance, along with mediated cue-to-target strength. Finally, frequency, concreteness, shared associate strength, and cue set size also contributed significantly to recall. Taken together, indices of prior word knowledge explain 49% of the recall variance. Theoretically driven equations that use free association to predict cued recall were also evaluated. Each equation was designed to condense multiple indices of word interconnectivity into a single predictor.     

The ties that bind what is known to the recognition of what is new

Recognition success varies with how information is encoded (e.g., level of processing) and with what is already known as a result of past learning (e.g., word frequency). This article presents the results of experiments showing that preexisting connections involving the associates of studied words facilitate their recognition regardless of whether the words are intentionally encoded or are incidentally encoded under semantic or nonsemantic conditions. Words are more likely to be recognized when they have either more resonant connections coming back to them from their associates or more connections among their associates. Such results occur even though attention is never drawn to these associates. Regression analyses showed that these connections affect recognition independently of frequency, so the present results add to the literature showing that prior lexical knowledge contributes to episodic recognition. In addition, equations that use free-association data to derive composite strength indices of resonance and connectivity were evaluated. Implications for theories of recognition are discussed.     

The confusion about epistemology and "epistemology"--and what to do about it

The epistemology debates within the field of family therapy have become relatively infrequent in the last year or so, perhaps as a consequence of the confusion they have generated for many family therapists. This article maintains that the primary reason for the confusion is a failure to distinguish clearly between the conventional meaning of the term epistemology, which concerns the nature of knowledge, and the unconventional meaning given the term in family therapy, which concerns the nature of what we know. It is proposed that the confusion can be diminished by understanding the relationship between the two meanings, which are here distinguished as epistemology (meaning 1) and epistemology (meaning 2) respectively. Particular attention is given to the logical consequences of adopting a position on epistemology (meaning 1)—e.g, is the knower capable of knowing an independent reality, or does the act of knowing make its own reality?—or on epistemology (meaning 2)—e.g., is causality linear or nonlinear?. The relevance and implications of these problems for the theory and practice of family therapy are discussed.     

Shareability: The social psychology of epistemology

Psychologists and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of internal representations of human knowledge often use observable regularities or structures to infer what the innate constraints on those representations must be like. It is possible, however, that certain structures might come about only when a group of people share a knowledge domain. Furthermore, it is possible that there are analyzable constraints on knowledge structures that emerge when knowledge is being shared. Such constraints are referred to in this paper as “shareability” constraints. A number of examples of observable structures in human knowledge are discussed in terms of shareability constraints. An attempt is made to determine which sorts of structures are most shareable, and how those structures may differ from the sorts of structures that are easily represented by the individual mind but not easily shared between minds.     

False polarization: debiasing as applied social epistemology

False polarization (FP) is an interpersonal bias on judgement, the effect of which is to lead people in contexts of disagreement to overestimate the differences between their respective views. I propose to treat FP as a problem of applied social epistemology—a barrier to reliable belief-formation in certain social domains—and to ask how best one may debias for FP. This inquiry leads more generally into questions about effective debiasing strategies; on this front, considerable empirical evidence suggests that intuitively attractive strategies for debiasing are not very effective, while more effective strategies are neither intuitive nor likely to be easily implemented. The supports for more effective debiasing seem either to be inherently social and cooperative, or at least to presuppose social efforts to create physical or decision-making infrastructure for mitigating bias. The upshot, I argue, is that becoming a less biased epistemic agent is a thoroughly socialized project.     

On what there is: Representation and history

Premise: our representational system has had a relatively invariant core throughout human history (cf. Sellars's manifest image). Major theses: (i) When philosophical argument establishes the existence of an entity, that entity is a representing, not a represented. (ii) Most of the documents in the history of philosophy are on a par (as dialogical resources) with current philosophical literature for establishing or controverting such existence claims. (iii) The use of mathematics (initially the mathematized neo-Platonism of classical mechanics) allowed modern physical science to break with the perennial system of representation; in consequence, a portion of the representings of modern physical scientists do not belong to the historically invariant core. This limits the dialogical resources of physical science and the applicability of arguments from perennial philosophy to science. It also explains the relative irrelevance of pre-17th century science to contemporary physical scientists in contrast to the relevance of pre-17th century philosophy to contemporary philosophers. It also supports thesis (iv), that logic (broadly conceived) in central to all serious philosophical enterprises, since logic is the central tool for exhibiting and criticizing the rationale(s) of our representational system(s). Support for these theses will be found in the paper.     

On "On what there is"

All sides in the recent debates over the Quine-Putnam Indispensability thesis presuppose Quine's criterion for determining what a discourse is ontologically committed to. I subject the criterion to scrutiny, especially in regard to the available competitor-criteria, asking what means of evaluation there are for comparing alternative criteria against each other. Finding none, the paper concludes that ontological questions, in a certain sense , are philosophically indeterminate.     

On what it is to be in a quandary

A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view.     

A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology

The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. As a remedy, I introduce an alternative (Bayesian) simulation framework, Laputa, inspired by Alvin Goldman’s seminal work on veritistic social epistemology. I show that Christensen’s conciliatory response, reasonably reconstructed and supplemented, gives rise to an increase in epistemic (veritistic) value only if the peers continue to recheck their mental math; else the peers might as well be steadfast. On a meta-level, the study illustrates the power of Goldman’s approach when combined with simulation techniques for handling the computational issues involved.

     

一种有神的信仰是怎样建立起来的(二)

(二)使灌输得以成立的强 化保障机制 1.无质疑的通读学法方式 一个不可避免的问题是,大 部分"法轮功"学员在刚刚开始 看书听讲时,特别对有神论的思 想观念,都会或多或少出现怀 疑、困惑甚至排斥,也会在相互 交流时将心中的疑问提出。包括 学了一段时间以后也仍有部分人 半信半疑。周围也会有议论和反 对的意见。对于这些情况,李洪 志有大量的针对性论述。     

Correction to: Teleological epistemology

Philosophical Studies - In Section 3 of the original version, the Weak Evidentialist Norm is given as follows: ‘For every S, p and t, S’s coming to know p at t is...     

The politics of situating knowledge: An exercise in social epistemology

This essay forges links between Popperians and feminists by considering the connections between Donna Haraway's situated knowledge and Karl R. Popper's situational logic. It is concerned with the political commitments behind methodological issues, with the degree to which there can be a Popperian contribution to the feminist vision of a successor science, and with ways of dealing with, while not resolving, the political differences between socialist feminists and libertarian Popperians.