Developing domain-specific causal-explanatory frameworks: the role of insides and immanence

Two studies investigate children's knowledge of internal parts and their endorsement of immanent causes for the behaviors of living and non-living things. Study 1, involving 48 preschoolers, showed that domain-specific knowledge of internal parts develops between ages 3 and 4. Study 2 included 43 4-year-olds, 30 8-year-olds, and 35 adults and showed that preschoolers do not endorse these internal parts as causally responsible for familiar biological events (e.g., movement, growth). Like adults and older children, however, preschoolers endorse an abstract cause, “its own energy,” for animals but not for machines. The results suggest that children recognize domain-specific internal parts as early as age 4 but that their causal attributions are not yet anchored in a detailed biological theory. Findings are discussed in terms of theory change and an essentialist assumption.     

Developmental "Roots" in Mature Biological Knowledge

ABSTRACT— Young children tend to claim that moving artifacts and nonliving natural kinds are alive, but neglect to ascribe life to plants. This research tested whether adults exhibit similar confusions when verifying life status in a speeded classification task. Experiment 1 showed that undergraduates encounter greater difficulty (reduced accuracy and increased response times) in determining life status for plants, relative to animals, and for natural and moving nonliving things, relative to artifacts and nonmoving things. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in university biology professors. The professors showed a significantly reduced effect size for living things, as compared with the students, but still showed greater difficulty for plants than animals, even as no differences from the students were apparent in their responses to nonliving things. These results suggest that mature biological knowledge relies on a developmental foundation that is not radically overwritten or erased with the profound conceptual changes that accompany mastery of the domain.     

5岁儿童对生物特征的限制性推理的实验研究

本研究用推理法范式研究5岁儿童在不同条件下,对生长、生病、进食、呼吸和排泄等生物特征的限制于生物类别的限制性推理.结果表明,以人为例引入特征及对特征给予生机论的解释,都能提高儿童的限制性类别推理.儿童对生物特征的认识中,存在拟人化的推理模式和生机论的因果关系解释系统.儿童对动物和植物的认识发展是不均衡的,对动物的认识优先发展;对动植物共有的特征已有所认识,但对各个特征的认识发展是不均衡的.     

Children's understandings of the attributes of life

Previous investigations of children's understandings of the life concept have focused on their classifications of the life status of familiar objects. In this study, we attempted to examine more directly the processes by which children infer life status by examining their reasoning about unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were asked to name attributes of living things to establish which attributes they associated most closely with life. Children age 7 and younger most often named attributes true only of animals but not of plants; older children more often named attributes true of both animals and plants. However, movement was the single attribute cited most frequently by children of all ages tested. In Experiment 2, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were presented information about attributes of imaginary objects on a distant planet and were asked to infer if those objects were alive. Again, young children relied relatively heavily on qualities true only of animals but not of plants, whereas older children relied more on attributes true of both plants and animals. Also as before, movement was viewed as indicative of life at all ages tested. In Experiment 3, we examined the hypothesis that children discriminate among different types of motion and that the types of motion they associate with life are in fact typical of living things. Children ranging from age 5 through 11 were found to discriminate among different types of motion and to infer that objects were alive only when they showed the types of motion typical of living beings. The results of Experiment 3 allowed interpretation of seemingly conflicting results that have arisen in previous studies, as well as in Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study.     

The development of biological knowledge: A multi-national study

This study was designed to differentiate between universal and culturally specific aspects of children's biological understanding. Kindergartners, second graders, and fourth graders from Israel, Japan, and the United States were asked whether people, other animals, plants, and inanimate objects possessed each of 16 attributes. The attributes included life, unobservable attributes of animals, sensory capacities, and attributes of all living things. The results indicated that children of all three ages in all three countries knew that people, other animals, plants, and inanimate entities were different types of things, with different properties. Children in all cultures were extremely accurate regarding properties of humans, somewhat less accurate regarding properties of other animals and inanimate entities, and least accurate regarding properties of plants. As predicted from cultural analyses, Israeli children were the most likely to fail to attribute to plants qualities that are shared by all living things. Also as predicted, Japanese children were the most likely to attribute to inanimate entities attributes possessed only by living things. In contrast to many previous findings, U.S. children in the study presented here displayed more accurate scientific knowledge than age peers in Japan or Israel. The results were analyzed in terms of how cultural beliefs and linguistic categories affect knowledge acquisition processes and scientific understandings.     

学前儿童朴素生物学理论及其获得机制

学前儿童朴素生物学理论发展的研究近20年来一直是儿童认知发展研究的热点。Carey等主张学前儿童的生物概念系统是从心理概念系统中分离出来的由一个系统到另一个系统的根本性概念转变,儿童还没有一个包含动植物的整合的生物系统。但另一些研究主张学前儿童能够对生物现象进行本体区分并形成内在一致的生物学因果解释,拥有朴素生物学理论,该理论是在一个概念系统（生物学概念系统）中逐渐的连续性变化过程。目前整合的观点认为儿童朴素生物学理论在童年早期就独立于心理学理论,但在分离一开始的一段时间里还要受心理学的影响。     

“它”是所有者吗？幼儿对所有权主体的理解

所有者是所有权关系的重要组成部分。社会秩序的正常运行也需要我们合理地判断所有者。本研究考查幼儿能否像成人一样,区分可能的所有者和不可能的所有者。研究采用等级评定的方式,考查了3~5岁幼儿和成人对“什么是所有者”的直觉理解。结果发现,无论是成人还是幼儿,均认为能力健全者、能力不健全者是所有者,但不认为人造物可能是所有者。3~5岁幼儿评价动植物是所有者的可能性显著高于成人,表明相对于成人,他们仍存在认为动植物是所有者的倾向。研究提示,幼儿对所有权主体的理解既与成人之间存在一致性也存在差异,成人可以基于幼儿的所有权认知引导儿童正确理解所有权概念,进而提高幼儿在该领域的社会认知。     

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.     

4~7岁儿童依据对繁殖的朴素理解区分植物和非生物的认知发展

以152名4~7岁儿童为被试,采用访谈和判断选择任务探查他们对植物繁殖的认知。结果发现,①4~7岁儿童对植物繁殖的认知可分为不理解、部分理解和确切理解三种水平,儿童在入学后7岁能依据对植物繁殖的朴素理解区分植物与非生物;②通过降低材料难度和任务形式要求的难度,可以有效地发掘年幼儿童的认知潜能,即大部分6岁学前儿童就能够理解植物繁殖;③任务难度的改变对处于部分理解水平的5、6儿童影响更为显著：使他们在选择任务上的认知成绩优于访谈任务,对有明显果实和种子植物的认知优于无明显果实和种子植物的认知     

Naive theory and transfer of learning: When less is more and more is less

In this research, we examine how young children perform induction in the domain of biology. According to the essentialist view, even young children have a priori knowledge that some predictors of biological properties are central, whereas others are peripheral. According to the flexible-learning view, the roles of predictors are not fixed, and young children flexibly learn the predictive value of each predictor. In the experiment reported, 4- to 5-year-olds and 11- to 12-year-old preadolescents were taught the predictive values of features that were (by the essentialist account) either central or peripheral for predicting the biological properties of animals. Retention of the learned predictors was then tested immediately after learning, 1 h after leaning, and 2.5–3.5 months later. The results indicate that 2.5–3.5 months after learning, young children retained learned predictors well regardless of their putative centrality, whereas preadolescents were likely to retain and recall only central, but not peripheral, predictors.     

学前儿童对疾病的认知

通过三个研究分别探查了教育条件不同的两组学前儿童能否以疾病这一生命现象为指标做出生物和非生物的本体区分;他们是否理解疾病的产生和康复不受心理意图控制;以及他们对疾病原因的认识。结果显示,3、4、5岁学前儿童在分类作业中的认知成绩随年龄逐渐提高,他们能够认识疾病不受意图控制。其对疾病原因的解释既不用意图也不用道德准则,而主要是从行为水平,表现出“朴素生物学”的认知,但其认知与成人的认知和科学的生物学概念有明显差距。教育条件影响儿童的疾病认知成绩     

Remote control and children's understanding of robots

Children use goal-directed motion to classify agents as living things from early in infancy. In the current study, we asked whether preschoolers are flexible in their application of this criterion by introducing them to robots that engaged in goal-directed motion. In one case the robot appeared to move fully autonomously, and in the other case it was controlled by a remote. We found that 4- and 5-year-olds attributed fewer living thing properties to the robot after seeing it controlled by a remote, suggesting that they are flexible in their application of the goal-directed motion criterion in the face of conflicting evidence of living thing status. Children can flexibly incorporate internal causes for an agent’s behavior to enrich their understanding of novel agents.     

4~7岁儿童对生物目的指向性的认知发展模式

采用结构式访谈法,通过计算机模拟真实情景的动画方式,系统探查4~7岁儿童在目的指向性维度上的本体区分、因果认知发展模式以及在此维度上的朴素生物学“理论”的形成。结果表明：（1）4~7岁儿童在目的指向性维度上进行本体区分的认知发展模式,经历了从低到高的4个发展水平,即目的论模式——基于动物模式——基于生物模式——基于本体区分模式;（2）4~7岁儿童对目的指向性的因果认知与本体区分表现出一致性发展模式,表明学前儿童在目的指向性维度上逐渐形成了朴素生物学“理论”;（3）5~6岁是儿童对目的指向性认知的快速发展期,领域知识对儿童的认知发展具有明显的促进作用,但是受年龄和领域任务的影响     

Conceptions of objects across categories: Childhood patterns resemble those of adults

Studies of category‐specific disorders have suggested that categories of living and non‐living things vary in the properties that are most salient to recognition. Studies of the object features generated by normal adults have also revealed different patterns of responses to different categories. These adult patterns are likely to originate in childhood, but there are few reports of children's verbal conceptions of objects, and none at present of objects from different categories. This paper investigates the development of object conceptions, in a large group of children, aged 3 years 7 months to 11 years 6 months, in response to ‘What is a — ?’ questions directed to 72 objects, selected from two categories of living things (animals and fruit/vegetables) and two categories of artifacts (implements and vehicles). Proportions of perceptual‐to‐functional features provided by the children to living and non‐living things varied with the range of features defined as functions, just as studies of adults have found. Apart from the distribution of superordinate responses, which were significantly more salient to living than to non‐living categories, no other property separated the two categories. Only the category of implements could be distinguished from the other categories on the basis of the features generated. It is argued that the perceptual‐functional theory of category‐specific disorders receives little support from this study, but that in general the distribution of features generated by young children is similar to that produced by normal adults.     

What do children want to know about animals and artifacts? Domain-specific requests for information

Children's questions may reveal a great deal about the characteristics of objects they consider to be conceptually important. Thirty-two preschool children were given opportunities to ask questions about unfamiliar artifacts and animals. The children asked ambiguous questions such as "What is it?" about artifacts and animals alike. However, they were more likely to ask about the functions of artifacts, but about category membership, food choices, and typical locations of animals. They never asked questions about either artifacts or animals that would be considered inappropriate by adults. The results indicate that children hold different expectations about the types of information important for categorizing living and artifact kinds. Young children conceive of artifacts in terms of functions, but conceive of animals in terms of biologically appropriate characteristics. Such results speak to debates about the role of function in children's biological reasoning and to accounts of children's artifact concepts.     

Can being scared cause tummy aches? Naive theories, ambiguous evidence, and preschoolers' causal inferences

Causal learning requires integrating constraints provided by domain-specific theories with domain-general statistical learning. In order to investigate the interaction between these factors, the authors presented preschoolers with stories pitting their existing theories against statistical evidence. Each child heard 2 stories in which 2 candidate causes co-occurred with an effect. Evidence was presented in the form: AB?E; CA?E; AD?E; and so forth. In 1 story, all variables came from the same domain; in the other, the recurring candidate cause, A, came from a different domain (A was a psychological cause of a biological effect). After receiving this statistical evidence, children were asked to identify the cause of the effect on a new trial. Consistent with the predictions of a Bayesian model, all children were more likely to identify A as the cause within domains than across domains. Whereas 3.5-year-olds learned only from the within-domain evidence, 4- and 5-year-olds learned from the cross-domain evidence and were able to transfer their new expectations about psychosomatic causality to a novel task.     

Differences in preschoolers’ and adults’ use of generics about novel animals and artifacts: A window onto a conceptual divide

Children and adults commonly produce more generic noun phrases (e.g., birds fly) about animals than artifacts. This may reflect differences in participants’ generic knowledge about specific animals/artifacts (e.g., dogs/chairs), or it may reflect a more general distinction. To test this, the current experiments asked adults and preschoolers to generate properties about novel animals and artifacts (Experiment 1: real animals/artifacts; Experiments 2 and 3: matched pairs of maximally similar, novel animals/artifacts). Data demonstrate that even without prior knowledge about these items, the likelihood of producing a generic is significantly greater for animals than artifacts. These results leave open the question of whether this pattern is the product of experience and learned associations or instead a set of early-developing theories about animals and artifacts.     

4～7岁儿童对人的目的指向行为的归因研究

该研究根据人的三种基本生物需要(吃、喝、睡)设计动画故事脚本,通过计算机呈现的方式,探查4~7岁儿童对人的生物需要目的指向行为的归因。结果表明:(1)学前儿童能够对人的生物需要目的指向行为进行非意图的生物学解释,4岁至5岁是一个快速发展期;(2)学前儿童对人的生物需要行为的理解表现出不一致性,其“睡”和“吃”受社会因素影响较大,“喝水”表现为一种纯粹的生物需要(3)学前儿童对人的生物需要行为的满足与否能够采取灵活的多因果解释模式。     

Artifacts and natural kinds: children's judgments about whether objects are owned

People's behavior in relation to objects depends on whether they are owned. But how do people judge whether objects are owned? We propose that people expect human-made objects (artifacts) to be more likely to be owned than naturally occurring objects (natural kinds), and we examine the development of these expectations in young children. Experiment 1 found that when shown pictures of familiar kinds of objects, 3-year-olds expected artifacts to be owned and inanimate natural kinds to be non-owned. In Experiments 2A and 2B, 3-6-year-olds likewise had different expectations about the ownership of unfamiliar artifacts and natural kinds. Children at all ages viewed unfamiliar natural kinds as non-owned, but children younger than 6 years of age only endorsed artifacts as owned at chance rates. In Experiment 3, children saw the same pictures but were also told whether objects were human-made. With this information provided, even 3-year-olds viewed unfamiliar artifacts as owned. Finally, in Experiment 4, 4- and 5-year-olds chose unfamiliar artifacts over natural kinds when judging which object in a pair belongs to a person, but not when judging which the person prefers. These experiments provide first evidence about how children judge whether objects are owned. In contrast to claims that children think about natural kinds as being similar to artifacts, the current findings reveal that children have differing expectations about whether they are owned.     

Can You Do It? How Preschoolers Judge Whether Others Have Learned

Two experiments investigated how preschoolers judge whether learning has occurred. Experiment 1 showed that 3- and 4-year-olds used an individual's ability to demonstrate knowledge to judge whether he/she had learned something, regardless of that individual's claim about whether he/she had learned. Experiment 2 considered whether children responded based on just the character's demonstrative ability or whether children integrate various pieces of mental state knowledge to make a judgment about learning. Using a similar procedure, preschoolers were first told that the character claimed to be ignorant and then that they learned or did not learn a piece of information. In these cases, judgments of learning changed when the characters' claims and demonstrative abilities conflicted. These results suggest that children's understanding of learning involves the integration of various pieces of mental state knowledge. This process starts in the preschool years, but these data also suggest that crucial developments are taking place after age 4.