共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Roger Harris 《Axiomathes》2010,20(4):461-478
There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’.
I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared
by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach:
defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality.
I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my own, I amend his account, proposing that
possession of an extrinsic property consists in a relation to one or more actual or possible distinct concrete objects. Finally I indicate ways to avoid some apparent objections to this account. 相似文献
2.
Ausonio Marras 《Synthese》2006,151(3):561-569
In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists. 相似文献
3.
Stephen Finlay 《Synthese》2010,177(1):67-89
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing ‘detaching problems’ by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine
three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed
to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number
of senses for ‘ought’. The semantics for ‘ought’ that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these
problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for ‘ought’ provides a more satisfactory solution. 相似文献
4.
Joel Kenton Press 《Synthese》2008,161(1):119-139
Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific
application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable,
we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.
Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current
theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids
explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection
fatal to that theory.
My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific
explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’
by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion
of function.
However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant
contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’
must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to
determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function
may in many cases assist them in this task. 相似文献
5.
Ingvar Johansson 《Synthese》2008,163(2):217-225
The paper argues, that a direct formalization of the way common sense thinks about the numerical identity of enduring entities,
requires that traditional predicate logic is developed. If everyday language mirrors the world, then persons, organisms, organs,
cells, and ordinary material things can lose some parts but nonetheless remain numerically exactly the same entity. In order
to formalize this view, two new logical operators are introduced; and they bring with them some non-standard syntax. One of
the operators is called ‘the instantiation operator’; it is needed because the existential quantifier and its traditional relatives cannot do the job required. The other operator
is called ‘the form-on-matter operator’, and it allows an individual (an instance of a form) to stay the same even though some of its parts (its constituting matter)
is taken away from it. Also, a certain kind of predicates, called ‘nature terms’, is needed in order to represent what gives a particular its kind of identity. Both the operators and the nature terms introduced can be used in constructions of formal languages and formal systems,
but no such constructions are made in the paper. The paper is structured as a comment on the philosophical problem called
‘the problem of the cats Tibbles and Tib’. 相似文献
6.
Boudewijn de Bruin 《Synthese》2008,163(1):79-97
Using epistemic logic, we provide a non-probabilistic way to formalise payoff uncertainty, that is, statements such as ‘player
i has approximate knowledge about the utility functions of player j.’ We show that on the basis of this formalisation common knowledge of payoff uncertainty and rationality (in the sense of
excluding weakly dominated strategies, due to Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)) characterises a new solution concept we have called
‘mixed iterated strict weak dominance.’ 相似文献
7.
This paper considers two differenttones of voice in philosophy and theology (‘liberal pluralism’ in contrast to ‘radical orthodoxy’) and relates it to a discussion about
the theology of religions. ‘Tone of voice’ in this context is intended to denote the affective potency (or not) of a theological
perspective as it impacts and influences religious attitudes. In addition, at a related level, ‘tone of voice’ is used when
speaking of first-order or second-order perspectives: for example, a first-orderconfessional tone in contrast to a second-ordernotional tone. The paper proceeds to critically engage with John Hick’s pluralism and John Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy particularly
from the point of view of considering thetone adopted by both perspectives. The conclusion is that both views are inadequate: Hick’s pluralism—as a second-order meta-theory—lacks
the first-order power that is needed to affect ‘hearts and minds’, Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy has rhetorical power but is
an ‘unfounded’ narrative which lacks the ability to rationally engage with thereal world. In the end, the suggestion is that the ‘right tone of voice’, in a religious context, ought to combine a realistic
enquiry concerning the order-of-things with a first-order rhetorical strength. 相似文献
8.
J. Ritola 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):237-244
In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation
18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis
31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis
56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis
57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. 相似文献
9.
Johan van Benthem 《Synthese》2009,167(2):251-270
Issues about information spring up wherever one scratches the surface of logic. Here is a case that raises delicate issues
of ‘factual’ versus ‘procedural’ information, or ‘statics’ versus ‘dynamics’. What does intuitionistic logic, perhaps the earliest source of informational and procedural thinking in contemporary logic, really tell us about information?
How does its view relate to its ‘cousin’ epistemic logic? We discuss connections between intuitionistic models and recent
protocol models for dynamic-epistemic logic, as well as more general issues that emerge. 相似文献
10.
William S. Sax 《International Journal of Hindu Studies》2000,4(1):39-60
Conclusion Our understanding of South Asian society and history is sometimes muddled by the rigid distinctions we make between ‘religion’
and ‘politics.’ The resurgent appeal of Hindu nationalism, the involvement of Hindu renouncers in contemporary Indian politics,
and the continuing relevance of religious issues to political discourse throughout South Asia, show that such a distinction
is of limited utility. In this essay, I have examined the notion of digvijaya in some detail, in an attempt to show that this ‘most important Indian concept with regard to sovereignty’ was always both
a ‘religious’ and a ‘political’ phenomenon. When it was performed by Hindu kings in the classical period, the ‘political’
dimension of digvijaya was foregrounded, while in the medieval and modern periods, when it was associated primarily with Hindu renouncers, its ‘religious’
aspects were paramount. But neither ‘political’ nor ‘religious’ aspects were ever absent from any of the digvijayas discussed here because religion and politics were mutually entailed in the digvijaya at all times, just as kings and renouncers were—and still are—alter-egos of each other. I am tempted to conclude that the
digvijaya melded religious and political domains. Yet perhaps even to speak of ‘melding’ religion and politics is a peculiarly modern
kind of discourse. Perhaps we need to rethink our categories and recognize that politics always has a religious element, while
religion is always a political force. 相似文献
11.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Synthese》2011,178(1):121-130
This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds
of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s
claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of
the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This
latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility
serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and
propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique. 相似文献
12.
The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by
presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis, i.e., the Aristotelian philosopher or contemplator, in the
strict sense, is someone who already possesses all the intellectual virtues (except technē), all the moral virtues (by way of the possession of phronēsis), and considerable other goods. If this thesis is correct, the inclusive and dominant interpretations will converge, for
the philosopher turns out to be the happiest human being both in the inclusive and dominant senses. 相似文献
13.
William H. Hanson 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(3):437-459
The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary
claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not
necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus
independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it
strikes close to the heart of the traditional view. I begin this paper by discussing and refuting Zalta’s argument in the
context of a language for propositional modal logic with an actuality connective (section 1). This involves showing that his
argument in favor of real world validity his preferred explication of logical truth, is fallacious. Next (section 2) I argue
for an alternative explication of logical truth called general validity. Since the rule of necessitation preserves general
validity, the argument of section 2 provides a reason for affirming the traditional view. Finally (section 3) I show that
the intuitive idea behind the discredited notion of real world validity finds legitimate expression in an object language
connective for deep necessity.
Earlier versions of this paper were read at the universities of Graz,
Maribor, and Salzburg, and at a workshop on the philosophy of logic at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. My
thanks to those present at these events for many helpful suggestions. Thanks
are also due to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies. 相似文献
14.
Mark Allen Peterson 《Contemporary Islam》2007,1(3):247-264
The American press began to take notice of the Danish cartoons after they began to circulate outside of Europe. The press
primarily framed the events as a single problem of global interaction: an issue of ‘freedom of speech’ opposed to ‘religious
sensitivity.’ Much of the coverage permitted, within limits, a plurality of voices. Drawing on a case study of stories about
the ‘cartoon controversy’ in the Boston Globe, I argue that U.S. journalism is organized by a logic of objectivity that seeks to produce a ‘perspectiveless perspective
on all perspectives’ (Bourdieu, On television. New York: The New Press, 1998), showing voices on ‘both sides,’ simultaneously masked and contributed to the press’s reifying a series of events into a
single global ‘event,’ one that reflected a clash of Western and Islamic values.
相似文献
Mark Allen PetersonEmail: |
15.
Kai Horsthemke 《Science and engineering ethics》2011,17(2):321-334
In a recent journal article, as well as in a recent book chapter, in which she critiques my position on ‘indigenous knowledge’,
Lesley Green of the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Cape Town argues that ‘diverse epistemologies ought
to be evaluated not on their capacity to express a strict realism but on their ability to advance understanding’. In order
to examine the implications of Green’s arguments, and of Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin’s work in this regard, I apply
them to a well-known controversy between Native American (or First Nations) creationism and archaeology. I argue that issues
in social justice should be distinguished from issues in epistemology. Moreover, in tightening in this paper the link between
knowledge and truth, I attempt to defend science as a ‘privileged way of seeing the world’. The analysis of truth, and of
related concepts like reality and ‘the way the world is’, will assume a central role here. I contend that, ultimately, the
only coherent and consistent position is a realist view of the pertinent issues and ideas. 相似文献
16.
Stephen Pollard 《Synthese》2007,159(1):83-98
Competent speakers of natural languages can borrow reference from one another. You can arrange for your utterances of ‘Kirksville’
to refer to the same thing as my utterances of ‘Kirksville’. We can then talk about the same thing when we discuss Kirksville. In cases like this, you borrow “aboutness” from me by borrowing reference. Now
suppose I wish to initiate a line of reasoning applicable to any prime number. I might signal my intention by saying, “Let
p be any prime.” In this context, I will be using the term ‘p’ to reason about the primes. Although ‘p’ helps me secure the aboutness of my discourse, it may seem wrong to say that ‘p’ refers to anything. Be that as it may, this paper explores what mathematical discourse would be like if mathematicians were
able to borrow freely from one another not just the reference of terms that clearly refer, but, more generally, the sort of
aboutness present in a line of reasoning leading up to a universal generalization. The paper also gives reasons for believing
that aboutness of this sort really is freely transferable. A key implication will be that the concept “set of natural numbers”
suffers from no mathematically significant indeterminacy that can be coherently discussed. 相似文献
17.
Gerald Vision 《Topoi》2010,29(2):109-123
Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform
implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional
with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting
to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising
deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail. 相似文献
18.
Rayner AD 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2011,45(2):161-184
Psychology is not alone in its struggle with conceptualizing the dynamic relationship between space and individual or collective
identity. This general epistemological issue haunts biology where it has a specific focus in evolutionary arguments. It arises
because of the incompatibility between definitive logical systems of ‘contradiction or unity’, which can only apply to inert
material systems, and natural evolutionary processes of cumulative energetic transformation. This incompatibility makes any
attempt to apply definitive logic to evolutionary change unrealistic and paradoxical. It is important to recognise, because
discrete perceptions of self and group, based on the supposition that any distinguishable identity can be completely cut free,
as an ‘independent singleness’, from the space it inescapably includes and is included in, are a profound but unnecessary
source of psychological, social and environmental conflict. These perceptions underlie Darwin’s definition of ‘natural selection’
as ‘the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life’. They result in precedence being given to striving for homogeneous
supremacy, through the competitive suppression of others, instead of seeking sustainable, co-creative evolutionary relationship
in spatially and temporally heterogeneous communities. Here, I show how ‘natural inclusion’, a new, post-dialectic understanding
of evolutionary process, becomes possible through recognising space as a limitless, indivisible, receptive (non-resistive)
‘intangible presence’ vital for movement and communication, not as empty distance between one tangible thing and another.
The fluid boundary logic of natural inclusion as the co-creative, fluid dynamic transformation of all through all in receptive spatial context, allows all form to be understood as flow-form, distinctive but dynamically continuous, not singularly discrete. This simple move from regarding space and boundaries as sources of discontinuity and discrete definition to sources of continuity
and dynamic distinction correspondingly enables self-identity to be understood as a dynamic inclusion of neighbourhood, through the inclusion of
space throughout and beyond all natural figural forms as configurations of energy. Fully to appreciate and communicate the
significance of this move, it is necessary to widen the linguistic, mathematical and imaginative remit of conventional scientific
argument and explication so as to include more poetic, fluid and artistic forms of expression. 相似文献
19.
Jaroslav Peregrin 《Studia Logica》2008,88(2):263-294
The topic of this paper is the question whether there is a logic which could be justly called the logic of inference. It may seem that at least since Prawitz, Dummett and others demonstrated the proof-theoretical prominency
of intuitionistic logic, the forthcoming answer is that it is this logic that is the obvious choice for the accolade. Though there is little
doubt that this choice is correct (provided that inference is construed as inherently single-conclusion and complying with the Gentzenian structural rules), I do not think that the
usual justification of it is satisfactory. Therefore, I will first try to clarify what exactly is meant by the question, and
then sketch a conceptual framework in which it can be reasonably handled. I will introduce the concept of ‘inferentially native’
logical operators (those which explicate inferential properties) and I will show that the axiomatization of these operators
leads to the axiomatic system of intuitionistic logic. Finally, I will discuss what modifications of this answer enter the
picture when more general notions of inference are considered.
Presented by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
20.
John Cantwell 《Synthese》2009,171(1):47-75
The paper presents a non-monotonic inference relation on a language containing a conditional that satisfies the Ramsey Test.
The logic is a weakening of classical logic and preserves many of the ‘paradoxes of implication’ associated with the material
implication. It is argued, however, that once one makes the proper distinction between supposing that something is the case and accepting that it is the case, these ‘paradoxes’ cease to be counterintuitive. A representation theorem is provided where conditionals
are given a non-bivalent semantics and epistemic states are represented via preferential models. 相似文献