民初政治权威的危机与孙中山"党治"思想的形成

以辛亥革命的爆发和中华民国的成立为标志 ,中国开始了政治权威从传统向现代的转变。民国初年 ,虽然建立了中央政权 ,但没有真正建立起中央政治权威。相反 ,由于权威合法性延续的中断导致政治权威的断裂与危机 ,社会走向严重的失序状态 ,各种不同的政治力量试图用不同的方式重建政治权威 ,其中 ,以袁世凯为代表的“强人政治”和以宋教仁为代表的民主政治两种途径较为典型。在袁、宋所主张的方式均遭失败的情况下 ,孙中山提出了“以党治国”的第三种权威模式。作为一种替代性和过渡性模式 ,孙中山探索的“党治”模式回应了社会政治心理需求 ,为解决迷失已久的社会政治权威提供了一种现实的选择     

Philosophy and its children: logic,computation, and the emergence of natural and social science

Philosophical Studies - The middle chapters of Soames’s The World Philosophy Made (comprising his accounts of developments in logic, computation, linguistics, probability and decision theory,...     

Reasoning and logic

Gilbert Harman, in Logic and Reasoning (Synthese 60 (1984), 107–127) describes an unsuccessful attempt ... to develop a theory which would give logic a special role in reasoning. Here reasoning is psychological, a procedure for revising one's beliefs. In the present paper, I construe reasoning sociologically, as a process of linguistic interaction; and show how both reasoning in the psychologistic sense and logic are related to that process.     

Probability and logic

The paper is an attempt to show that the formalism of subjective probability has a logical interpretation of the sort proposed by Frank Ramsey: as a complete set of constraints for consistent distributions of partial belief. Though Ramsey proposed this view, he did not actually establish it in a way that showed an authentically logical character for the probability axioms (he started the current fashion for generating probabilities from suitably constrained preferences over uncertain options). Other people have also sought to provide the probability calculus with a logical character, though also unsuccessfully. The present paper gives a completeness and soundness theorem supporting a logical interpretation: the syntax is the probability axioms, and the semantics is that of fairness (for bets).     

Language Without Linguistics

Synthese - Though Mr. Lin purports to attack “Chomsky's view of language” and to defend the “common sense view of language”, he in fact attacks “views” that...     

Wittgenstein and logic

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental.     

Quantum logic as a dynamic logic

We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the “non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.     

A free IPC is a natural logic: Strong completeness for some intuitionistic free logics

IPC, the intuitionistic predicate calculus, has the property

1. Vc(Γ?A ^c /x) ? Γ??xA.Furthermore, for certain important Γ, IPC has the converse property
2. Γ??xA ? Vc(Γ?A ^c /x).
3. may be given up in various ways, corresponding to different philosophic intuitions and yielding different systems of intuitionistic free logic. The present paper proves the strong completeness of several of these with respect to Kripke style semantics. It also shows that giving up (i) need not force us to abandon the analogue of (ii).