Effect of four aspects of rational statements on expected satisfaction with a close relationship

This study tested whether each of the four main aspects of rational thinking decreased expected relationship dissatisfaction when imagining having a serious disagreement with either a romantic partner or closest friend. The four features, common to cognitive theories of therapy, were the tendency not to exaggerate negative effects, not to demand that one's wishes should always be met, not to globally rate individuals or relationships and not to over-generalise that these experiences always have happened or will happen. Only when combined together did the four aspects significantly decrease expected relationship dissatisfaction in comparison to a control condition in which a serious disagreement was simply reiterated. This combined condition also significantly decreased the irrational tendency to agree that disagreements are destructive.     

Beliefs and inferences—a test of a rational-emotive hypothesis: 3. On expectations about enjoying a party

Ninety-six subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to a party. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational or an irrational belief; (b) that they had jilted or been jilted by a partner with whom they were having an intimate relationship; and (c) that they knew or did not know other friends who would be going to the party. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their enjoyment of the party. The results supported the hypothesis that holding an irrational belief leads to more negatively distorted inferences than holding a rational belief, and that having been jilted by a partner would have a similar effect. There was only limited support for the hypothesis that the second two independent variables would have a moderating or amplifying effect on the negativity of inferences through interaction with the belief variable. The implications of these findings for counselling are discussed, especially with respect to challenging irrational beliefs.     

Personality Traits Predict Irrational Beliefs

Irrational beliefs are the focus of many psychological theories, since research has shown that holding irrational beliefs often leads to unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors, and psychological disturbances. The aim of such therapies as rational emotive behavioral therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy is to dispute irrational beliefs to promote more rational ways of thinking; however they do not take into account individual personality differences. The aim of this study was to determine whether personality traits predict rational and irrational beliefs in a mixed student and clinical sample. It was hypothesized that the domains of the five factor model of personality would predict rational beliefs as well as a range of irrational beliefs. Our findings supported the hypothesis, showing distinct associations between personality traits and each specific irrational belief. Neuroticism predicted rational beliefs as well as six out of the seven types of irrational beliefs measured. Additionally, extraversion predicted rationality and self-downing, openness predicted need for comfort and total irrationality, and conscientiousness predicted need for achievement and demand for fairness. Agreeableness did not predict any type of rational or irrational beliefs. Knowledge of these distinct relationships may increase a clinician’s ability to conceptualize a therapy case and determine the best approach to treatment.     

An experimental test of a core REBT hypothesis: evidence that irrational beliefs lead to physiological as well as psychological arousal

While numerous studies support Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy and Theory (REBT), they tend to be limited by their use of correlational designs, simulated scenarios and self-report measures. This study tested a core REBT hypothesis in an experimental design using multiple physiological as well as psychological measures. Ninety patients from a medical practice were placed in a real-life stressful situation while holding either a rational, an irrational, or an indifference belief. Those holding a rational belief reported the greatest increase in concern whereas those holding an irrational belief reported the greatest increase in anxiety. Of particular significance, those holding a rational belief showed a decrease in systolic blood pressure whereas those holding an irrational belief showed an increase (diastolic blood pressure increased in both conditions). These results not only support the core REBT hypothesis, but also suggest a way to differentiate between beliefs and emotions by measuring physiological as well as psychological changes.     

Irrational Beliefs and Unconditional Self-Acceptance. II. Experimental Evidence for a Causal Link between Two Key Features of REBT

In a test of two key features of REBT, causal relationships between irrational beliefs and unconditional self-acceptance were experimentally investigated in a sample of 106 non-clinical participants using a priming technique. Priming participants with statements of irrational belief resulted in a decrease in unconditional self-acceptance whereas priming participants with statements of rational belief resulted in an increase in unconditional self-acceptance. In contrast, priming participants with statements about unconditional self-acceptance did not result in an increase in rational thinking and priming participants with statements about conditional self-acceptance did not result in an increase in irrational thinking. The present study is the first to provide evidence of a causal link between rational/irrational thinking and unconditional/conditional self-acceptance. The findings have important implications for the core hypothesis of REBT and underscore the advantages of experimental over correlational studies in theory-testing.     

Beliefs and inferences: a test of a rational-emotive hypothesis: 2. On the prospect of seeing a spider

96 subjects were asked to imagine that they were about to enter a room in which there may have been one or more spiders. They were also asked to imagine that (a) they either held a rational or an irrational belief about spiders, (b) they were about to enter the room either alone or with someone, and (c) that the room was either dark or light. Having absorbed their assigned role, the subjects were then asked to make inferences about various elements of their situation. The results supported the hypothesis that holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences. It was also found that the lighting conditions in the room and whether the subject was alone or with someone affected the negativity of the inferences made. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way interactions between the independent variables which indicated that entering a light room or being with someone else tended to moderate the negativity of inferences made by those holding a rational belief rather than the opposite, amplifying the negativity of inferences made by those holding an irrational belief. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B), and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).     

Body dissatisfaction and irrational beliefs

To test the hypothesis that the irrational evaluative beliefs, postulated by Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy, are associated with body dissatisfaction, 94 women (21 diagnosed with an eating disorder, 38 with high body dissatisfaction but without an eating disorder, and 35 with low body dissatisfaction) completed the Survey of Personal Beliefs and the Eating Disorders Inventory. Analysis showed no significant difference in body dissatisfaction between the Eating Disordered and High Body Dissatisfaction subgroups. No significant correlations between body dissatisfaction and irrational beliefs were found for the Eating Disordered subgroup. For the High Body Dissatisfaction subgroup, significant but low correlations were found between scores on body dissatisfaction and irrational standards for self and others and with negative self-rating. In terms of irrational beliefs the Eating Disordered and High Body Dissatisfaction subgroups showed a significantly greater tendency towards Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Negative self-rating, compared to the controls, without any significant difference between the former two groups. The Eating Disordered subgroup but not the High Body Dissatisfaction subgroup differed significantly from the controls in terms of more Self-directed demands.     

Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational-emotive hypothesis 1. Performing in an academic seminar

Subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to present an academic seminar. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational belief or an irrational belief; (b) that they had made or had not made an effort in preparing for the seminar and (c) that their performance counted or did not count towards their final examination grade. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their performance and the responses of others. While the results supported the hypothesis that imagining that one is holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences than holding a rational belief, it was also found that not making an effort in preparing for the siminar led subjects to make more negative inferences than making an effort. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way significant interactions between the independent variables. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B) and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).Windy Dryden PhD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Julia Ferguson is Research Assistant in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Tony Clark was an Undergraduate Student in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. He graduated in 1987.     

REBT and Emotion I. A Role-Play Experiment Using A Shame/Disappointment Scenario to Investigate the Effects of Rational, Irrational and Indifference Beliefs on Inferences and Action Tendencies

This article reports an experiment testing an REBT hypothesis that beliefs affect inferences and action tendencies. Students at Goldsmiths College, University of London, were asked to role play a shame/disappointment scenario with one of three beliefs: rational, irrational or indifference. They were then asked to rate inferences and action tendencies on scales where a high score indicated dysfunctionality. It was predicted that the irrational group would score higher than the rational group, and that the indifference group would score lower than the rational group. From a sample of 89 students, 60 met the criteria for inclusion in the study. A between subjects design, a MANOVA and t-tests were used to analyse the data; the alpha level for all families of tests was 0. 05. The irrational group scored significantly higher than the rational group on both the inference and the action tendency scales. The indifference group scored significantly lower than the rational group on the action tendency scale. There was no significant difference between the rational and indifference group's scores on the inference scale.     

The use of messages in altering risky gambling behavior in experienced gamblers

The present study was an experimental analogue that examined the relationship between gambling-related irrational beliefs and risky gambling behavior. Eighty high-frequency gamblers were randomly assigned to four conditions and played a chance-based computer game in a laboratory setting. Depending on the condition, during the game a pop-up screen repeatedly displayed either accurate or inaccurate messages concerning the game, neutral messages, or no messages. Consistent with a cognitive-behavioral model of gambling, accurate messages that correctly described the random contingencies governing the game decreased risky gambling behavior. Contrary to predictions, inaccurate messages designed to mimic gamblers' irrational beliefs about their abilities to influence chance events did not lead to more risky gambling behavior than exposure to neutral or no messages. Participants in the latter three conditions did not differ significantly from one another and all showed riskier gambling behavior than participants in the accurate message condition. The results suggest that harm minimization strategies that help individuals maintain a rational perspective while gambling may protect them from unreasonable risk-taking.     

Dimensions of perfectionism and irrational thinking

Several authors have suggested that perfectionism is associated with irrational thinking. The purpose of the present research was to test the hypothesis that various dimensions of perfectionism are related significantly to core irrational beliefs. In Study 1, 102 subjects completed the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). The MPS provides assessments of self-oriented, other-oriented, and socially prescribed perfectionism. Analyses revealed that self-oriented perfectionism was correlated positively with the IBT high self-expectations and perfect solutions subscales. Socially prescribed perfectionism was correlated significantly with a variety of irrational beliefs including high self-expectations, demand for social approval, dependency, blame proneness, and anxious overconcern. Other-oriented perfectionism was correlated with few irrational beliefs. In Study 2, 130 subjects completed the MPS and the Survey of Personal Beliefs, a new measure of core irrational beliefs. Analyses confirmed that all three perfectionism dimensions were associated with core irrational beliefs. It is concluded that the results constitute general support for the hypothesis that cognitive aspects are important in both personal and social components of perfectionism and that perfectionists are characterized by increased levels of irrational beliefs that may contribute to maladjustment. The findings are discussed in terms of the associations among perfectionism, irrational beliefs, and maladjustment.Gordon L. Flett, Ph.D is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at York University. Paul L. Hewitt, Ph.D is a clinical psychologist at Brockville Psychiatric Hospital. He is also an assistant professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Ottawa. Kirk R. Blankstein, Ph.D, is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at Erindale College, University of Toronto. Spomenka Koledin is a former student at Erindale College, University of Toronto. Currently, she is a graduate student in the Master of Arts programme at York University.     

Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: the mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs

The authors examined the relationship of belief in good luck with depression and anxiety within the context of a number of cognitive and personality variables used to explain depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students (46 men, 98 women) were administered measures of belief in good luck, depression, anxiety, optimism, neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem, and irrational beliefs. The results showed that belief in good luck was significantly related to optimism and irrational beliefs. A number of models were tested to determine whether irrational beliefs or optimism mediated the relationship between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety. The findings suggested that negative relationships between belief in good luck and both depression and anxiety are best addressed by the theory that belief in good luck engenders optimistic traits and a reduced level of irrational beliefs.     

Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test

Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey??s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to think of anyone as infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief. It is important to understand the nature of this supposition.     

Dealing with the Intellectual-Insight Problem in Cognitive and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy

A client is said to have intellectual, but not emotional, insight when he or she acknowledges that holding a particular belief is irrational, but says that he or she still does not believe, or cannot accept, that fact. The intellectual-insight problem may arise because the client's negative core or irrational belief is embedded in a broader belief system that must be explored before the client will be able to surrender the negative core or irrational belief. In this case one appropriate intervention is to ask what the consequence of giving up the belief would be. Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs and DiGiuseppe's (1991) concept of personal paradigms offer ways to conceptualize the problem and its solution.     

The Role of Trauma-Specific Irrational Beliefs and Sociodemographic Risk Factors in Posttraumatic Stress Responses

Posttraumatic stress responses have been linked to a range of social-cognitive and sociodemographic factors. Rational emotive behaviour therapy suggests that responding to a traumatic life event with a set of irrational beliefs should play a crucial role in predicting the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD: Ellis in Overcoming destructive beliefs, feelings, and behaviours: new directions for rational emotive behaviour therapy, Prometheus Books, Amherst, 2001). The current study assessed the role of trauma-specific irrational beliefs in the prediction of clinically relevant posttraumatic stress responses, while controlling for a range of important sociodemographic factors. A sample of 313 trauma-exposed military and law enforcement personnel took part in the current study and were divided into two groups according to the intensity of reported PTSD symptomology. Results of the binary logistic regression indicated that trauma-specific Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciation beliefs, respectively, significantly predicted belonging to the group reporting strong symptoms of PTSD compared to those reporting mild symptoms of PTSD. These results provide important evidence of the role of irrational beliefs in posttraumatic stress responses and highlight the importance of considering context-specific variants of each irrational belief process.     

Marital Adjustment and Irrational Beliefs

The present study was designed to determine which aspects of Ellis' irrational beliefs as well as emotional traits (anxiety, curiosity, anger) differentiate couples attending marriage counseling from couples couple not attending marriage counseling as well as levels of marital satisfaction in couples as measured by the Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test. Participants were 61 married couples, 18 of whom were attending marriage counseling and 43 who were not attending marriage counseling. Each partner completed a number of self-report questionnaires containing items measuring irrational /rational beliefs, anger, anxiety and curiosity, and communication skills. Correlational and multiple regression analyses indicate support for Albert Ellis' proposition concerning the importance of individual partner's emotional traits and accompanying irrational beliefs in marital adjustment and dissatisfaction. Self-downing and need for comfort were the dimensions of irrational thinking most strongly related to marital dysfunction. Anger, anxiety but neither curiosity nor communication skills distinguished individuals experiencing or not experiencing marital problems. Implications for relationship counseling are briefly discussed.     

Why am I unsatisfied? Adult attachment style, gendered irrational relationship beliefs, and young adult romantic relationship satisfaction

Are individual differences in adult attachment styles (secure, anxious-ambivalent, or avoidant) associated with differential adherence to relationship-specific irrational beliefs? Does endorsement of irrational relationship beliefs relate to actual relationship dissatisfaction? These questions were explored with a sample of 118 male and female college students. Results indicated that insecure individuals (anxious-ambivalent or avoidant) endorsed significantly more relationship-specific irrational beliefs than those with a secure adult attachment style. Gendered patterns of endorsement of specific irrational beliefs cluster were also observed. Further, both an insecure adult attachment style and stronger adherence to relationship-specific irrational beliefs were related to diminished relationship satisfaction.     

Irrational beliefs and the impact of stressful life events

The Ellis (1962) rational emotive therapy model would predict that individuals characterized by high levels of irrational beliefs would evaluate the impact of personally experienced life events as more negative (or less positive) than would individuals chartacterized by low levels of irrational beliefs. A sample of 155 undergraduate females provided data on irrational beliefs and a life experiences survey which included event impact ratings. The results provided general support for the hypothesis of a relationship between beliefs and perceived impact of stressful life events.     

Positive fantasies or negative contrasts: The effect of media body ideals on restrained eaters’ mood,weight satisfaction,and food intake

Although viewing media body ideals promotes body dissatisfaction and problematic eating among women (e.g., extreme restraint/overeating), some argue that women only report such negative effects because they think that they are meant to (i.e., demand characteristics). Because restrained eaters are trying to lose weight, they might be vulnerable to such media exposure. However, because of demand characteristics, evidence is mixed. Therefore, we minimized demand characteristics and explored whether media body ideals would trigger restrained eaters to report negative (negative mood, weight dissatisfaction) or positive (positive mood, weight satisfaction) effects. We also hypothesized that this change (negative or positive) would encourage food intake. Restrained and unrestrained eaters (n = 107) memorized media or control images. Restrained eaters exposed to media images reported decreased weight satisfaction and increased negative mood, but their food intake was not significantly affected. Perhaps paying advertent attention to the images caused goal-related negative affect, which triggered restraint.