IDEOLOGY AS BRAIN DISEASE

Abstract. The brain evolved not to think but to act, and ideology is an act of social affiliation which can be compared to kin affiliation, both satisfyingly emotional and expressing a perception about the nature of the real world central to the nature of being human. Males may affiliate to macrosocial ideologies more enthusiastically than females because of their relative lack of certainty of kin relationships. Exogamy was the necessary solution to kin-related strife in prehistory. Perhaps what the world needs is not only a moral equivalent to war but an ideological equivalent to exogamy to resolve social differences on a much larger scale.     

作为一种治疗的哲学

许多证据表明,哲学在其整个历史之中经常包含着一种治疗性的成分。举例而言,伊壁鸠鲁希望借助他的思想把人从三种恐惧中解放出来：对神的恐惧、对必然性的恐惧以及对死亡的恐惧。他说：“死亡与我们毫不相干：我们活着时,死亡尚未来临;死亡来临时,我们已经不在了。”这一论说至今仍然使我们印象深刻,并且在某种程度上可能真的有些抚慰作用。     

CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY AS SPIRITUAL PRACTICE

Although Descartes has in some ways become a symbol of academic isolation, we can dispel this misunderstanding by taking into consideration the holistic nature of Cartesian philosophy. Descartes understood the various branches of philosophy as constituting an organic totality of knowledge that, because of its dependence on imagination and sensation, remains irreducible to intellectual comprehension. Ethics holds a particularly significant place in Cartesian philosophy, and this essay both demonstrates the spiritual nature of Cartesian ethics and explains why Descartes saw ethics as “the ultimate degree of wisdom” so as to illustrate how we can interpret Cartesian philosophy as a spiritual practice. This takes place through a discussion of the distinctions and interconnections of Descartes’s three primary notions (soul, body, and the union of soul and body) and concludes by reflecting on the specific temporality of nobility as well as addressing several objections to Cartesian ethics.     

PHILOSOPHY AS EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF LIVING

This essay describes an approach to designing a course in philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) around a set of immersive “spiritual exercises” through which students might examine their desires, engaging students in a process of testing their own experience against philosophical theories and theories against their own experience. These are used to tie together the units of a course covering classical Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, and to supplement traditional philosophical analysis of texts and arguments with ways of exploring what it might be like to live as a Platonist, Stoic, or Confucian. The essay details several exercises, engages perspectives on PWOL from Pierre Hadot and John Cooper, and addresses the question of how to assess immersive exercises.     

PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE TODAY

This essay discusses the possibility, relevance, and pertinence of a reactivation of philosophy as a way of life today on the basis of Pierre Hadot’s account and recent scholarly approaches to the topic. In the wake of John Sellars, it regards philosophy as a way of life as a metaphilosophical option that can still be applied today. The essay starts by addressing John Cooper’s criticism of philosophy as a way of life in the contemporary philosophical landscape and shows that, against the background of the model defined by Hadot, Cooper’s objections do not apply. It then illustrates the clear expression of the model in contemporary philosophy through the particular case of Nietzsche. It concludes by outlining some of the considerations that, in the wake of Hadot, Sellars, Michael Chase, and others, might persuade researchers, teachers, and academics to embrace philosophy as a way of life in their work and lives.     

PHILOSOPHY AS TRAGEDY OR WHAT WORDS WON'T GIVE

This article examines Cavell's problematic understanding of scepticism and the knowledge of other minds with respect to his long preoccupation with tragedy. I point to the meta‐philosophical questions Cavell continually raises but fails to address such that a philosophy as tragedy is frequently announced. Taking the same meta‐philosophical questions raised by the inability of words to give us access to certain knowledge, I then rethink this problematic theologically. I show the way Cavell hints at a Christology and a doctrine of analogy neither of which he develops. In developing these two theologoumenon I make some observations on the relationship between theology, philosophy and the endemic potential of the tragic.