Gender differences in memory for objects and their locations: a study on automatic versus controlled encoding and retrieval contexts

Object-location memory is the only spatial task where female subjects have been shown to outperform males. This result is not consistent across all studies, and may be due to the combination of the multi-component structure of object location memory with the conditions under which different studies were done. Possible gender differences in object location memory and its component object identity memory were assessed in the present study. In order to disentangle these two components, an object location memory task (in which objects had to be relocated in daily environments), and a separate object identity recognition task were carried out. This study also focused on the conditions under which object locations were encoded and retrieved. Only half of the participants were aware of the fact that object locations had to be retrieved later on. Moreover, by applying the 'process dissociation procedure' to the object location memory assessments and the 'remember-know' paradigm to the object identity measure, the amount of explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) retrieval was estimated for each component. In general, females performed better than males on the object location memory task. However, when controlled for object identity memory, females no longer outperformed males, whereas they did not obtain a higher general object identity memory score, nor did they have more explicit or implicit recollection of the object identities. These complicated effects might stem from a difference between males and females, in the way locations or associations between objects and locations are retrieved. In general, participants had more explicit (conscious) recollection than implicit (unconscious) recollection. No effect of encoding context was found, nor any interaction effect of gender, encoding and retrieval context.     

Process dissociation procedure reveals age differences in unconscious influences on memory for possible and impossible objects

Abstract

Forty-eight younger and 48 older adults performed inclusion and exclusion tasks for line drawings of possible and impossible objects that were encoded semantically or globally. Participants' performance was transformed into estimates of conscious and unconscious influences on memory via the Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP). Five major findings were obtained. First, developmental differences were observed in the relative strength of conscious and unconscious influences on memory such that conscious influences were stronger for younger than older adults, whereas unconscious influences were stronger for older than younger adults. Second, unconscious influences on memory were demonstrated for possible and impossible objects. Third, unconscious influences on memory were obtained for objects that were encoded in both a global and a semantic fashion. Fourth, age-related differences in conscious and unconscious influences on memory were unaffected by object type. Fifth, estimates of conscious and unconscious influences on memory were unrelated to scores on psychometric measures of visual-spatial ability: Primary Mental Ability-Space (PMA-Space) and Benton Facial Recognition Task (BFRT). Collectively, these findings have implications for our understanding of the relative strength of conscious and unconscious memory processes in younger and older adults as well as the different types of unconscious memory processes that are recruited by the PDP in comparison to the traditional priming methodology.     

Conscious and unconscious influences of memory: temporal dynamics

Changes in the conscious and unconscious influences of memory over time were assessed in two experiments by using a variant of the process-dissociation procedure. In both experiments, performance on a stem-completion task was measured under both inclusion and exclusion instructions. Across the two experiments, there were four different retention intervals: 2 minutes, 2 days, 2 weeks, and 2 months. The results indicated that conscious influences decreased systematically across retention interval. In contrast, unconscious influences of memory in the absence of conscious influences increased between 2 minutes and 2 days, and then remained relatively stable from 2 days to 2 weeks to 2 months. These results stand in apparent contrast to those of McBride and Dosher (1999), which showed equal rates of forgetting for conscious and unconscious influences of memory on performance. The implications for models of the relation between conscious and unconscious influences of memory on performance are discussed.     

Conscious and unconscious processes: the effects of motivation

The process-dissociation procedure has been used in a variety of experimental contexts to assess the contributions of conscious and unconscious processes to task performance. To evaluate whether motivation affects estimates of conscious and unconscious processes, participants were given incentives to follow inclusion and exclusion instructions in a perception task and a memory task. Relative to a control condition in which no performance incentives were given, the results for the perception task indicated that incentives increased the participants' ability to exclude previously presented information, which in turn both increased the estimate of conscious processes and decreased the estimate of unconscious processes. However, the results also indicated that incentives did not influence estimates of conscious or unconscious processes in the memory task. The findings suggest that the process-dissociation procedure is relatively immune to influences of motivation when used with a memory task, but that caution should be exercised when the process-dissociation is used with a perception task.     

Adult Age Differences in Conscious and Unconscious Influences on Memory for Novel Associations

Forty-eight younger and 48 older adults generated sentences under self-paced conditions for semantically unrelated word pairs. Then they completed word + word stem pairs under inclusion and exclusion instructions for items that appeared in the same or different context relative to study. Performance on the inclusion and exclusion tasks was transformed into estimates of conscious and unconscious influences on memory by a series of equations as specified by Jacoby's (1991) Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP). Three notable findings were obtained. First, younger and older adults displayed a context effect when conscious, but not unconscious, influences on memory were considered. Second, age invariance in the strength of unconscious influences on memory was observed when data analysis was performed on the entire subject sample. In contrast, the estimated strength of unconscious contributions to memory was stronger for younger than older adults when data analysis was restricted to participants who made errors on the exclusion task. Third, conscious influences on memory were stronger for younger than older adults regardless of which method of data analysis was used. Taken together, these findings shed light on previous research which has examined the complex relationship between age, test awareness, and the implicit retention of novel verbal associations. They also highlight some of the methodological issues regarding the use of the PDP to measure age-related differences in the strength of unconscious memory processes.     

内隐记忆的证明逻辑与加工分离说（PDP）的修正模型

讨论了内隐记忆的证明逻辑和内隐与外显测验中的意识和无意识影响问题。间接证明内隐记忆的逻辑应用在功能分离实验中。它的前提假设是记忆测验都是＂纯净＂的。直接证明逻辑应用在匹配比较实验中。它认为测验中的意识和无意识影响是并存的,Ｊａｃｏｂｙ等人近期提出的加工分离说（ＰＤＰ）在匹配比较法的基础上,将测验中的意识和无意识影响进行了分离,并借用经典测验理论的公式计算这两种影响。作者认为,按照概率论关于两个随机独立事件之和与积的运算法则,必须把包含测验（ｉｎｃｌｕｓｉｏｎｔｅｓｔ）的公式修正为Ｉｎｃｌｕｓｉｏｎ＝Ｒ（１－ａ）＋Ａ（１－Ｒ）。修正过的ＰＤＰ由四个方程组成。它不仅考虑了原ＰＤＰ忽视的外显条件下的无意识缺失（１－ａ）,而且可以更加确切地估计回忆概率（Ｒ）。这在数学理论上已找到了证据。     

Memory for object location and route direction in virtual large-scale space

In everyday life people have to deal with tasks such as finding a novel path to a certain goal location, finding one's way back, finding a short cut, or making a detour. In all of these tasks people acquire route knowledge. For finding the same way back they have to remember locations of objects like buildings and additionally direction changes. In three experiments using recognition tasks as well as conscious and unconscious spatial priming paradigms memory processes underlying wayfinding behaviour were investigated. Participants learned a route through a virtual environment with objects either placed at intersections (i.e., decision points) where another route could be chosen or placed along the route (non-decision points). Analyses indicate first that objects placed at decision points are recognized faster than other objects. Second, they indicate that the direction in which a route is travelled is represented only at locations that are relevant for wayfinding (e.g., decision points). The results point out the efficient way in which memory for object location and memory for route direction interact.     

Memory for object location and route direction in virtual large-scale space

In everyday life people have to deal with tasks such as finding a novel path to a certain goal location, finding one's way back, finding a short cut, or making a detour. In all of these tasks people acquire route knowledge. For finding the same way back they have to remember locations of objects like buildings and additionally direction changes. In three experiments using recognition tasks as well as conscious and unconscious spatial priming paradigms memory processes underlying wayfinding behaviour were investigated. Participants learned a route through a virtual environment with objects either placed at intersections (i.e., decision points) where another route could be chosen or placed along the route (non-decision points). Analyses indicate first that objects placed at decision points are recognized faster than other objects. Second, they indicate that the direction in which a route is travelled is represented only at locations that are relevant for wayfinding (e.g., decision points). The results point out the efficient way in which memory for object location and memory for route direction interact.     

Unconscious priming of task sets: The role of spatial attention

Unconscious stimuli activate task sets, mental programs that orchestrate performance of complex tasks, but the role of attention in such effects has not been addressed. In previous studies, unconscious prime stimuli appeared at attended locations and were explicitly specified in the task instructions; spatial attention to the prime and/or a specific conscious attentional set may thus be required for such unconscious activation to arise. In the present experiments, a learning phase established associations between unconscious prime stimuli and performance of two tasks. These associations influenced task performance in a subsequent test phase, even though the primes were not specified in current task instructions. This is the first demonstration that unconscious stimuli can prime task sets independently of a current attentional set that specifies stimulus-task mappings. Such priming was not influenced by spatial attention cues, in contrast to clear attention influences in comparison trials that mimicked conditions employed by previous studies.     

Does opposition logic provide evidence for conscious and unconscious processes in artificial grammar learning?

The question of whether studies of human learning provide evidence for distinct conscious and unconscious influences remains as controversial today as ever. Much of this controversy arises from the use of the logic of dissociation. The controversy has prompted the use of an alternative approach that places conscious and unconscious influences on memory retrieval in opposition. Here we ask whether evidence acquired via the logic of opposition requires a dual-process account or whether it can be accommodated within a single similarity-based account. We report simulations using a simple neural network model of two artificial grammar learning experiments reported by that dissociated conscious and unconscious influences on classification. The simulations demonstrate that opposition logic is insufficient to distinguish between single- and multiple-system models.     

The impact of different directed forgetting instructions on implicit and explicit memory: New evidence from a modified process dissociation procedure

In contrast to previous research on directed forgetting, the present studies adopted a recent modification of the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991; Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995) to accommodate the cross-contamination of memory test performance by implicit and explicit memorial factors. In Experiment 1, 120 subjects were compared in global directed forgetting, item-by-item directed forgetting, and control conditions on estimates of voluntary conscious memory, involuntary conscious memory, and involuntary unconscious memory performance. In Experiment 2, 80 subjects were compared in specific directed forgetting and control conditions on estimates of voluntary conscious memory, involuntary conscious memory, and involuntary unconscious memory performance. Subjects showed significant decrements in voluntary and involuntary conscious memory performance following instructions for directed forgetting in all conditions. None of the directed forgetting conditions showed a decrement in involuntary unconscious memory performance. Results suggest that, regardless of instruction type, directed forgetting prevents the conscious expression of memorial information (both voluntary and involuntary) while leaving unconscious memory intact.     

焦虑情绪对图像信息意识提取和无意识提取影响的实验研究

采用加工分离程序,以不同性价图片为实验材料,考察了特质焦虑、启动焦虑和非焦虑三种焦虑类型对图片信息意识提取和无意识提取的影响,结果表明：（1）不同焦虑类型对图像信息的意识提取和无意识提取均有影响,其中特质焦虑对图像的无意识提取更敏感,非焦虑状态对意识提取更敏感;（2）特质焦虑明显促进了负性图片的意识和无意识提取且干扰了正性图片的提取,启动焦虑促进了对负性图片的意识提取。     

Integrated memory for objects, places, and temporal order: evidence for episodic-like memory in mice

Human episodic memory refers to the recollection of an unique past experience in terms of what happened, and where and when it happened. Factoring out the issue of conscious recollection, episodic memory, even at the behavioral level, has been difficult to demonstrate in non-human mammals. Although, it was previously shown that rodents can associate what and when or what and where information given on unique trials, it proved to be difficult to demonstrate memory for what, where, and when simultaneously in mammals, without using extensive training procedures, which might induce semantic rather than episodic memory recall. Towards the goal of an animal model of human episodic memory we designed an three-trial object exploration task in which different versions of the novelty-preference paradigm were combined to subsume (a) object recognition memory, (b) the memory for locations in which objects were explored, and (c) the temporal order memory for object presented at distinct time points. We found that mice spent more time exploring two "old familiar" objects relative to two "recent familiar" objects, reflecting memory for what and when and concomitantly directed more exploration at a spatially displaced "old familiar" object relative to a stationary "old familiar" object, reflecting memory for what and where. These results suggest that during a single test trial the mice were able to (a) recognize previously explored objects, (b) remember the location in which particular objects were previously encountered, and (c) to discriminate the relative recency in which different objects were presented. According to the currently discussed behavioral criteria for episodic-like memory in animals, our results suggest that mice are capable to form such higher order memories.     

Intuition in the context of object perception: intuitive gestalt judgments rest on the unconscious activation of semantic representations

Intuition denotes the ability to judge stimulus properties on the basis of information that is activated in memory, but not consciously retrieved. In three experiments we show that participants discriminated better than chance fragmented line drawings depicting meaningful objects (coherent fragments) from fragments consisting of randomly displaced line segments (incoherent fragments) or from fragments which were rotated by 180 degrees (inverted fragments), even if participants did not consciously recognize the objects. Unrecognized coherent, but not incoherent or inverted fragments produced reliable priming of correct object names in a lexical decision task, indicating that coherent fragments activated an unconscious semantic object representation. Priming effects were larger for coherent fragments judged as coherent compared to coherent fragments judged as incoherent. We conclude that intuitive gestalt judgments for coherent fragments rested on the activation of semantic object representations, which biased participants' intuitive impression of "gestalt-ness" even when the underlying object representations remained unconscious.     

The independence of size perception and distance perception

Research on distance perception has focused on environmental sources of information, which have been well documented; in contrast, size perception research has focused on familiarity or has relied on distance information. An analysis of these two parallel bodies of work reveals their lack of equivalence. Furthermore, definitions of familiarity need environmental grounding, specifically concerning the amount of size variation among different tokens of an object. To demonstrate the independence of size and distance perception, subjects in two experiments were asked to estimate the sizes of common objects from memory and then to estimate both the sizes and the distances of a subset of such objects displayed in front of them. The experiments found that token variation was a critical variable in the accuracy of size estimations, whether from memory or with vision, and that distance had no impact at all on size perception. Furthermore, when distance information was good, size had no effect on distance estimation; in contrast, at far distances, the distances to token variable or unknown objects were estimated with less accuracy. The results suggest that size perception has been misconceptualized, so that the relevant research to understand its properties has not been undertaken. The size-distance invariance hypothesis was shown to be inadequate for both areas of research.     

The independence of size perception and distance perception.

Research on distance perception has focused on environmental sources of information, which have been well documented; in contrast, size perception research has focused on familiarity or has relied on distance information. An analysis of these two parallel bodies of work reveals their lack of equivalence. Furthermore, definitions of familiarity need environmental grounding, specifically concerning the amount of size variation among different tokens of an object. To demonstrate the independence of size and distance perception, subjects in two experiments were asked to estimate the sizes of common objects from memory and then to estimate both the sizes and the distances of a subset of such objects displayed in front of them. The experiments found that token variation was a critical variable in the accuracy of size estimations, whether from memory or with vision, and that distance had no impact at all on size perception. Furthermore, when distance information was good, size had no effect on distance estimation; in contrast, at far distances, the distances to token variable or unknown objects were estimated with less accuracy. The results suggest that size perception has been misconceptualized, so that the relevant research to understand its properties has not been undertaken. The size-distance invariance hypothesis was shown to be inadequate for both areas of research.     

What’s the object of object working memory in infancy? Unraveling ‘what’ and ‘how many’

Infants have a bandwidth-limited object working memory (WM) that can both individuate and identify objects in a scene, (answering ‘how many?’ or ‘what?’, respectively). Studies of infants’ WM for objects have typically looked for limits on either ‘how many’ or ‘what’, yielding different estimates of infant capacity. Infants can keep track of about three individuals (regardless of identity), but appear to be much more limited in the number of specific identities they can recall. Why are the limits on ‘how many’ and ‘what’ different? Are the limits entirely separate, do they interact, or are they simply two different aspects of the same underlying limit?We sought to unravel these limits in a series of experiments which tested 9- and 12-month-olds’ WM for object identities under varying degrees of difficulty. In a violation-of-expectation looking-time task, we hid objects one at a time behind separate screens, and then probed infants’ WM for the shape identity of the penultimate object in the sequence. We manipulated the difficulty of the task by varying both the number of objects in hiding locations and the number of means by which infants could detect a shape change to the probed object. We found that 9-month-olds’ WM for identities was limited by the number of hiding locations: when the probed object was one of two objects hidden (one in each of two locations), 9-month-olds succeeded, and they did so even though they were given only one means to detect the change. However, when the probed object was one of three objects hidden (one in each of three locations), they failed, even when they were given two means to detect the shape change. Twelve-month-olds, by contrast, succeeded at the most difficult task level.Results show that WM for ‘how many’ and for ‘what’ are not entirely separate. Individuated objects are tracked relatively cheaply. Maintaining bindings between indexed objects and identifying featural information incurs a greater attentional/memory cost. This cost reduces with development. We conclude that infant WM supports a small number of featureless object representations that index the current locations of objects. These can have featural information bound to them, but only at substantial cost.     

Effects of rodent prefrontal lesions on object-based, visual scene memory

It has been suggested that certain prefrontal areas contribute to a neural circuit that mediates visual object memory. Using a successive go/no-go visual scene discrimination task, object-based long-term memory was assessed in two rodent prefrontal regions. Rewarded trials consisted of a standard scene of four toy objects placed over baited food wells. The objects and their locations composing the standard scene remained constant for the duration of the study. Trials in which one of the standard scene objects was replaced with a novel object were not rewarded. Following the establishment of a significant difference between latency to approach the rewarded standard scene compared to latency to approach non-rewarded scenes, quinolinic acid or control vehicle was infused into either the prelimbic and infralimbic cortices or the anterior cingulate cortex. Following a 1 week recovery period, subjects were retested. Animals with prelimbic/infralimbic cortex lesions displayed a profound and sustained deficit, whereas, animals with anterior cingulate cortex lesions showed a slight initial impairment but eventually recovered. Both lesion groups acquired a simple single object discrimination task as quickly as controls indicating that the deficits on the original scene discrimination task were not due to motivational, response inhibition, or perceptual problems.     

Perceptual organization influences visual working memory

Previous studies have demonstrated that top-down factors can bias the storage of information in visual working memory. However, relatively little is known about the role that bottom-up stimulus characteristics play in visual working memory storage. In the present study, subjects performed a change detection task in which the to-be-remembered objects were organized in accordance with Gestalt grouping principles. When an attention-capturing cue was presented at the location of one object, other objects that were perceptually grouped with the cued object were more likely to be stored in working memory than were objects that were not grouped with the cued object. Thus, objects that are grouped together tend to be stored together, indicating that bottom-up perceptual organization influences the storage of information in visual working memory.