Focusing effects in predecisional information acquisition

Legrenzi et al. [Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1993). Focusing in reasoning and decision making. Cognition, 49, 37-66] showed that when a single option is proposed for consideration the decision makers limit their information acquisition to this one option, failing to take into account potential alternatives. Unfortunately, the evidence supporting this focusing effect is weak and its determinants are largely unknown. In three experiments, we provided stronger support for the reality of the focusing effect and we identified two significant determinants of this phenomenon. The results show that both representational and value-related manipulations are able to reduce the effect. Results also suggest the need to distinguish between two different types of focusing: representational focusing and search-related focusing.     

Using dual-process theory and analogical transfer to explain facilitation on a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task

Using the analogical transfer paradigm, the present study investigated the competing explanations of Girotto and Legrenzi (Psychological Research 51: 129–135, 1993) and Griggs, Platt, Newstead, and Jackson (Thinking and Reasoning 4: 1–14, 1998) for facilitation on the SARS version of the THOG problem, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task. Girotto and Legrenzi argue that facilitation is based on logical analysis of the task [System 2 reasoning in Evans’s (Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7: 454–459, 2003) dual-process account of reasoning] while Griggs et al. maintain that facilitation is due to an attentional heuristic produced by the wording of the problem (System 1 reasoning). If Girotto and Legrenzi are correct, then System 2 reasoning, which is volitional and responsible for deductive reasoning, should be elicited, and participants should comprehend the solution principle of the THOG task and exhibit analogical transfer. However, if Griggs et al. are correct, then System 1 reasoning, which is responsible for heuristic problem solving strategies such as an attentional heuristic, should occur, and participants should not abstract the solution principle and transfer should not occur. Significant facilitation (68 and 82% correct) was only observed for the two SARS source problems, but significant analogical transfer did not occur. This lack of transfer suggests that System 1 reasoning was responsible for the facilitation observed in the SARS problem, supporting Griggs et al.’s attentional heuristic explanation. The present results also underscore the explanatory value of using analogical transfer rather than facilitation as the criterion for problem understanding.     

Explicit and motoric dependent measures of geographical slant are dissociable: A reassessment of the findings of Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, and Stigliani (2010)

Durgin et al. (2010) argued that the apparent accuracy of the palmboard measure of geographical slant is accidental and reflects limitations in wrist flexion that reduce palmboard adjustments by just the right amount given the perceptual overestimations upon which they are based. This account is inconsistent with findings that verbal reports and palmboard adjustments are dissociable. In addition to previous evidence found for such dissociation, Durgin et al. also found verbal/palmboard dissociations in Experiment 2. Experiments 1 and 3 of Durgin et al. lacked verbal reports and instead compared palmboard adjustments to free-hand estimates in the context of small wooden surfaces. These experiments are not relevant to the issue of verbal/palmboard dissociability. Across studies, the accuracy of Durgin et al.'s palmboard implementation is far less than that found by others (Feresin & Agostini, 2007). The design of Durgin et al.'s Experiment 5 misrepresented the experimental conditions of Creem and Proffitt (1998), and consequently, the findings of this study have no bearing on the issue at hand.     

A plea for virtue in ethics

Comments on the original article, "Nonrational processes in ethical decision making" by M. D. Rogerson et al (see record 2011-19198-001). The current authors suggest that Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, and Younggren (October 2011) presumed that the only ethical theories available for grounding decision-making models are of the rational, neoliberal variety. Rogerson et al stated, "Contextual, interpersonal, and intuitive factors are inextricably linked and inexorably influential in the process of ethical decision making. Ethical theory would benefit from encompassing these subtle yet powerful forces" (Rogerson et al., 2011, p. 616). They sought to augment these models with a cluster of contextual considerations, appending to them accounts of emotion, context, and intuition. First, notwithstanding the theories attributed to (the caricature of) Kant and his ilk, there are several ethical theories that include an account of what Rogerson et al. (2011) consider to be "nonrational" processes. From feminist theories to narrative ethics, sophisticated contextual theories have been developed and are readily available. Second, we question whether thick contextual considerations can simply be tacked on to extant models of decision making originally built upon a philosophical foundation that assumes a rational, autonomous agent who deliberates independently and logically.     

When good decisions have bad outcomes: The impact of affect on switching behavior

Four experiments test the hypothesis that an unfavorable outcome of a good decision leads individuals to switch away from that decision due to negative emotional responses to the outcome. Negative emotional reactions led many participants to abandon the option that they recalled as having been more successful overall in the past (Study 1) and which they expected to perform better in the future (Study 2). A prompt to consider the future success rates of the two alternatives did not eliminate switching (Study 2). An experimental manipulation in Study 3 indicated that individuals switch when they focus on their affective reactions rather than beliefs about the earlier disappointing outcome. In Study 4, individuals with a general tendency to focus on cognitions (i.e., those high in need for cognition) were less likely to switch away from the better option following a disappointing outcome. These results suggest that an emotional reaction to a negative outcome can lead people to switch away from the options that they believe are most likely to be successful on the next occasion.     

Time pressure and the application of decision rules: Choices and judgments among multiattribute alternatives

The effects of time pressure on decisions and judgments were studied and related to the use of different decision rules in a multiattribute decision task. The decision alternatives were students described by their high school grades in Swedish, Psychology and Natural Science. The subjects were asked to choose the student they thought would be most able to follow a university program and graduate as a school psychologist. On the basis of earlier findings using the same kind of decision task (Svenson et al., 1990) it was hypothesised that subjects under time pressure would prefer candidates having the maximum grade across all attributes to a greater extent than subjects under no time pressure. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that subjects under time pressure would also focus more on the most important attribute and choose the alternatives being best on that attribute. The results supported these hypotheses.     

An Approach to Multi‐Criteria Decision Problems Under Severe Uncertainty

Solving complex decision problems is a demanding task; it requires determining and evaluating the consequences of decision alternatives. To this end, uncertain factors that can only partly be influenced by the decision makers, and their interdependencies need to be considered. Scenarios focus on this part of the decision problem; they enable a systematic exploration of a multitude of possible future developments that are relevant for the decision including external events and decisions made. Scenarios are particularly useful when the problem is pervaded by severe uncertainties that cannot be quantified. For the evaluation of alternatives, multiple objectives and the potentially diverging preferences of the involved actors need to be respected. Multi‐criteria decision analysis aims at structuring the problem, evaluating the alternatives and supporting decision makers pursuing multiple goals. We propose an approach integrating scenarios and multi‐criteria decision analysis that focuses on the robustness of alternatives in complex, dynamic, uncertain and time‐bound situations. In this integrated framework, the scenarios provide the basis for evaluating a set of alternatives. Ideally, the set of scenarios considered captures all possible future developments. To appropriately explore this set, formal or analytical approaches to scenario construction generate a large number of scenarios. This challenges the decision makers' information‐processing capacity. To support them in managing the richness of information, a two‐fold approach that uses selection and aggregation is presented. By using a selection method, the scenarios that are deemed most relevant are identified, and their evaluations are presented in detail to decision makers. This approach is complemented by an aggregation of scenario evaluations on the basis of the decision makers' preferences. We present two approaches to facilitate the preference elicitation process. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reducing cognitive complexity in a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task

The confusion/non-consequential thinking explanation proposed by Newstead, Girotto, and Legrenzi (1995) for poor performance on Wason's THOG problem (a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task) was examined in three experiments with 300 participants. In general, as the cognitive complexity of the problem and the possibility of non-consequential thinking were reduced, correct performance increased. Significant but weak facilitation (33-40% correct) was found in Experiment 1 for THOG classification instructions that did not include the indeterminate response option. Substantial facilitation (up to 75% correct) was obtained in Experiment 2 with O'Brien et al.'s (1990) one-other-THOG classification instruction. In Experiment 3, a revised version of O'Brien et al.'s pre-test problem format also led to substantial facilitation, even with the use of the standard three-choice THOG classification instruction. These findings are discussed in terms of Newstead et al.'s theoretical proposal and possible attentional factors.     

A Structural Modeling Examination of the Executive Decline Hypothesis of Cognitive Aging Through Reanalysis of Crawford et al.'s (2000) Data

This study presents a new analysis of data previously published by Crawford, Bryan, Luszcz, Obansawin, and Stewart (2000) examining the role of executive function in age-related declines in general cognitive ability and memory. Although the original authors' question is relevant to understanding the role of executive function in aging, this paper argues that the methods used can be substantially improved to more accurately answer the question. Thus, Crawford et al.'s data are here analyzed using a more parsimonious methodological approach (structural equation modeling), and the results obtained depart from the authors' results but are in line with their original hypotheses. First, for younger individuals, age was differently associated with verbal measures of cognitive ability than with performance measures. Although the relation of age to executive function was stronger than the relation of age to verbal abilities, this difference was not apparent with regard to performance abilities. Second, across samples (i.e., younger and older individuals), memory was not accounted for by cognitive ability but was related to age and executive function. Finally, also across samples, executive function was strongly linked to recall and recognition measures, accounting for the largest variance in memory. These results are discussed in relation to previous findings as well as their theoretical significance for aging research.     

Reasoning and dyslexia: A spatial strategy may impede reasoning with visually rich information

Bacon, Handley and Newstead (2003, 2004) , have presented evidence for individual differences in reasoning strategies, with most people seeming to represent and manipulate problem information using either a verbal or a spatial strategy. There is also evidence that individuals with dyslexia are inclined to conceptualise information in a visuo‐spatial, rather than a verbal, way (e.g. von Károlyi et al., 2003 ). If so, we might expect a higher proportion of individuals with dyslexia to be spatial reasoners, compared with individuals who do not have dyslexia. The study reported here directly compared strategies reported by these two groups of participants on a syllogistic reasoning task. Moreover, problem content was manipulated so that reasoning across concrete and abstract materials could be compared. The findings suggest that whilst most individuals without dyslexia use a verbal strategy, reasoners with dyslexia do tend to adopt a spatial approach, though their performance is impaired with visually concrete materials. However, when reasoning with more abstract content, they perform comparably with non‐dyslexic controls. The paper discusses these results in the light of recent research which has suggested that visual images may impede reasoning, and considers how individuals with dyslexia may differ from other reasoners.     

Decision-making styles and vocational maturity: An alternative perspective

This study examined the relationship between decision-making styles and vocational maturity with a focus on the current discrepancy between research and theory regarding the utility of rational decision making. While rational decision making has been central to many theoretical formulations in career development, recent research findings have not unequivocally supported this proposition. Based on the assumption that rational decision making would be more important to those individuals who do not have access to many of the traditional sources of vocational maturity, this study attempted to account for the inconsistency between research and theory by systematically considering relevant population attributes. The results of this investigation were consistent across two independent samples of community college students, in that a reliance upon the rational style was the only significant decision-making style predictor of vocational maturity; the dependent and intuitive decision-making styles did not add significant increments to the regression equations. The discussion highlighted the advantages of viewing theory, research, and practice in career decision making from a perspective that explicitly incorporates relevant attributes of given populations.     

Child decision-making: On the burden of predecisional information search

In many decision situations, individuals must actively search information before they can make a satisfying choice. In such instances, individuals must be aware of the fact that not all information may be equally relevant for the choice at hand—thus, individuals should weight information by its respective relevance. We compared children’s and adult’s decision-making in a child-friendly decision game. For each decision, participants received information on the content of 3 piggy banks on an information-board. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the weight-structure by presenting decisions with similarly relevant or differently relevant information. Results suggested that 8- to 9-year-olds did not adapt their search to the weight-structure. In contrast, 10- to 12-year-olds did consider relevance weights. Still, 8- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 12-year-olds were unable to search for a good, adultlike information sample containing all relevant and no irrelevant information. Thus, children based their decisions on a biased information sample. In Experiment 2, we intensified the need to consider relevance weights by introducing a search constraint. In doing so, we replicated the deficits of 8- to 9-year-olds and found adultlike behavior in 11- to 12-year-olds. Our findings suggest that although children understand that relevance may vary, they are not immediately able to effectively consider relevance weights in their information search—which appears to be a skill that continues to develop throughout childhood. We discuss the resulting implications for understanding children as decision makers as well as the general ability to perform structured information search.     

The recall of stereotypes: the effects of incidentally activated directed forgetting instructions

Based on the automotive model (J. A. Bargh, 1990) and the directed forgetting paradigm, the present study investigated whether incidentally activated forget and remember cues can lead to similar effects as explicitly given instructions. To this end, the present paper attempted to replicate the findings of Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Ford (1997) employing their category primes (child abuser, neutral), study lists (List 1, List 2), and procedure. Using explicit directed forgetting instructions, Experiment 1 showed that the recall of the stereotypically relevant words (List 1) was higher when participants were given a remember than a forget instruction. This effect was found regardless of the prime conditions. Similarly, Experiment 2 showed that participants in the child abuser and neutral prime conditions recalled more stereotypically relevant words (List 1) when they were implicitly cued to remember than to forget these words. Experiment 3 showed that cognitively busy participants in the child-abuser, but not in the neutral prime condition, recalled more to-be-forgotten stereotypical words than nonbusy participants. These results are consistent with Macrae et al. s findings, and show that the effects of directed forgetting instructions are similar regardless of whether they were given explicitly or were activated incidentally. Results are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance.     

Multi-attribute decision support and complexity: An evaluation and process analysis of aided versus unaided decision making

The present study addresses the effectiveness of a computerized decision aid (DECAID, Pitz 1987) based on the Multi-Attribute Utility Model (MAU). The effectiveness of DECAID was investigated for personnel selection problems varying in complexity (number of alternatives and number of attributes). Results show that the decision aid was most successful for problems of medium complexity. DECAID significantly affected the thoroughness of the decision, preference formation, and the perceived difficulty of the decision problem for medium complex problems. This was not the case for highly complex problems. Next, a process analysis is presented of unaided decision making focusing on the selection and evaluation of information. This process analysis of verbal protocols was based on the same decision problems as the first study. Results indicate that problem complexity had a significant impact on the decision process. Increasing complexity resulted in a less thorough evaluation, and selective information processing. Subjects tended to focus on one or two most promising alternatives. Furthermore, evaluation strategies diverged from those used in DECAID in terms of standard of comparison. The paper concludes with implications for the design of decision aids.     

Implicit attitude generalization occurs immediately; explicit attitude generalization takes time

People are able to explicitly resist using knowledge about one person to evaluate another person from the same group. After learning about positive and negative behaviors performed by one individual from each of two different groups, participants were introduced briefly to new individuals from the groups. Implicit evaluations of the original individuals readily generalized to the new individuals; explicitly, participants resisted such generalization. Days later, both implicit and explicit evaluations of the original individuals generalized to the new individuals. The results suggest that associative links (e.g., shared group membership) are sufficient for implicit attitude generalization, but deliberative logic (e.g., individual group members are not necessarily the same) can reduce explicit generalization by association. When knowledge distinguishing who did what is unavailable, such as after forgetting, associative knowledge provides the basis of explicit evaluation. We conclude that a simple association linking one individual to another can produce implicit attitude generalization immediately and explicit attitude generalization eventually.     

Saying and doing: A commentary on a contingency-space analysis

This article addresses the contingency-space analysis (Matthews, Shimoff, & Catania, 1987) of the verbal regulation of behavior. From an applied perspective, the conceptualization of the relationship between saying and doing Matthews et al. present may be more complex than is necessary. The central issue in correspondence investigations is a simple one: does correspondence between what people say and what they do occur? The focus of this paper is on the applied and clinical importance of the relationship between verbalizations and relevant behavior and the implications for future research.     

Complexity-based Theories of Emergence: Criticisms and Constraints

In recent years, many philosophers of science have attempted to articulate a theory of non-epistemic emergence that is compatible with mechanistic explanation and incompatible with reductionism. The 2005 account of Fred C. Boogerd et al. has been particularly influential. They argued that a systemic property was emergent if it could not be predicted from the behaviour of less complex systems. Here, I argue that Boogerd et al.'s attempt to ground emergence in complexity guarantees that we will see emergence, but at the cost of rendering it either trivial or epistemic. There are three basic problems. First, neither the measures of complexity explicitly mentioned by Boogerd et al. nor the most popular measures in the literature can do the practical and theoretical work that they assign to complexity. Second, I argue that while the success of their view depends on restricting the base of information available to the reductionist, this cannot be done in a way that is metaphysically neutral with respect to emergence. Thus, their account renders emergence trivial. Third, I argue that grounding emergence in complexity can support only epistemic emergence. I conclude by considering the methodological import of their account.     

Context effects on group-based employee selection decisions

The decoy effect occurs when preferences between two alternatives reverse as a result of the manipulation of a third alternative (i.e., a decoy) such that it is dominated by only one of the two original alternatives. Previous research has demonstrated this effect in employee selection decisions, but only when decisions were made by individuals. The present investigation was designed to test the generalizability of the phenomenon to decisions made by groups, and to determine the influence of process and outcome accountability on the decoy effect. Results showed that the overall decoy effect held for both individual and group decisions. However, for both individuals and groups, the decoy effect held only when decision makers knew they would have to justify their decision processes.