On the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t ₁ what an agent S will do at t ₂ , is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom is undermined. These cases include those in which certain human actions are logically, rather than causally, foreclosed.     

Comparison of ranks of cross-product and covariance solutions in component analysis

SupposeD is a data matrix forN persons andn variables, and is the matrix obtained fromD by expressing the variables in deviation-score form. It is shown that ifD has rankr, will always have rank (r−1) ifr=N<n, otherwise it will generally have rankr. If has ranks,D will always have ranks ifs=n, but ifs<n it will generally have rank (s+1). Thus two cases can arise, Case A in whichD has rank one greater than , and Case B in whichD has rank equal to . Implications of this distinction for analysis of cross products versus analysis of covariances are briefly indicated.     

A puzzle about visualization

Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom. Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms (e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive, the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising.     

Models for measurement,precision, and the nondichotomization of graded responses

It is common in educational, psychological, and social measurement in general, to collect data in the form of graded responses and then to combine adjacent categories. It has been argued that because the division of the continuum into categories is arbitrary, any model used for analyzing graded responses should accommodate such action. Specifically, Jansen and Roskam (1986) enunciate ajoining assumption which specifies that if two categoriesj andk are combined to form categoryh, then the probability of a response inh should equal the sum of the probabilities of responses inj andk. As a result, they question the use of the Rasch model for graded responses which explicitly prohibits the combining of categories after the data are collected except in more or less degenerate cases. However, the Rasch model is derived from requirements of invariance of comparisons of entities with respect to different instruments, which might include different partitions of the continuum, and is consistent with fundamental measurement. Therefore, there is a strong case that the mathematical implication of the Rasch model should be studied further in order to understand how and why it conflicts with the joining assumption. This paper pursues the mathematics of the Rasch model and establishes, through a special case when the sizes of the categories are equal and when the model is expressed in the multiplicative metric, that its probability distribution reflects the precision with which the data are collected, and that if a pair of categories is collapsed after the data are collected, it no longer reflects the original precision. As a consequence, and not because of a qualitative change in the variable, the joining assumption is destroyed when categories are combined. Implications of the choice between a model which satisfies the joining assumption or one which reflects on the precision of the data collection considered are discussed.     

“Higher” and “lower”: Comparative and categorical interpretations by children

Three-, four-, and five-year-old children's categorical and comparative understanding of high and low were examined in two experiments. Categorical knowledge was assessed by presenting subjects with a single object at varying heights (from 0 to five feet above the ground), and asking if the object was high or low. Comparative understanding of the terms was assessed by showing children two objects at a time and asking which was higher or lower. We observed two patterns of performance in children's categorical treatments: younger children in particular defined disjoint categories for high and low such that they only labelled the extreme heights as high or low, and maintained that middle heights were neither high nor low. Older children defined either-or categories such that all heights were labelled either high or low. We also found that children who defined either-or categories made correct comparative judgments across the entire range of variation whereas children who defined disjoint categories could only judge which of two objects was higher if the objects were not low (at 0 and 1 feet) and which of the objects was lower if the objects were not high (at 4 and 5 feet). The results were interpreted as reflecting a lack of appreciation that the terms are interdefined as negations of each other, and were discussed in terms of the similar semantic-congruity effects found in adults.     

Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?

I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection, and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated. I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected, and that category (4) is protected speech.     

Reflections of a second-generation jungian analyst on the eve of the third millennium

Dr. F. David Peat is a theoretical physicist residing in Ottawa, Canada, whose recent book, Synchronicity: The Bridge between Matter and Mind (Bantam, 1987) generalizes Jung's views on the ultimately a causal foundation of physics and psychology. Peat is currently collaborating with David Bohm in utilizing quantum theory to update the mathematical-philosophical foundations of psychology in a series of books of which Science, Order and Creativity (Banram, 1987) is a lucid and broadly-based introduction for the general reader. Our editor recently spent a few days with Peat and Bohm discussing their evolving world view. This essay by Peat was written in response to our editor's queries concerning what is generally known by the physicist community about the collaboration between C.G. Jung and the early quantum physicists on the foundations of analytical psychology.     

A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons

Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic (David Lewis's system VC), conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for believing p in Dretske's sense, and if p logically implies q, and if p and q satisfy one additional condition, it follows that r is a conclusive reason for believing q. After introducing this additional condition, I explain its intuitive import and use the condition to shed new light on Dretske's response to scepticism, as well as on his distinction between the so-called ‘lightweight’ and ‘heavyweight’ implications of a piece of perceptual knowledge.     

Powers,Non‐Consent and Freedom

There are a number of dispositionalist solutions to the free will problem based on freedom consisting in the agent's exercise of a power. But if a subject a is free when they exercise their power P, there is an objection to be overcome from the possibility of power implantation. A brainwasher, rather than directly manipulating a subject's movements, can instead implant in them a desire, to be understood as a disposition to act, and allow the subject to exercise such a power. It seems that, according to the dispositionalist theory of freedom, such an agent would still count as acting freely. There is a strong non‐consent intuition that a is not free in such a case because they did not consent to having the power P—the desire in question. Filling out this intuition is not straightforward. But it can be done in terms of the exercise of P being regulated by higher‐order powers of self‐reflection. Such regulation is what allows an agent to either take ownership of a power or to reject it.     

Recommended effect size statistics for repeated measures designs

Investigators, who are increasingly implored to present and discuss effect size statistics, might comply more often if they understood more clearly what is required. When investigators wish to report effect sizes derived from analyses of variance that include repeated measures, past advice has been problematic. Only recently has a generally useful effect size statistic been proposed for such designs: generalized eta squared (η_G²; Olejnik & Algina, 2003). Here, we present this method, explain that η_G² is preferred to eta squared and partial eta squared because it provides comparability across between-subjects and within-subjects designs, show that it can easily be computed from information provided by standard statistical packages, and recommend that investigators provide it routinely in their research reports when appropriate.     

Instantaneous Motion

There is a longstanding definition of instantaneous velocity. It saysthat the velocity at t ₀ of an object moving along a coordinate line is r if and only if the value of the first derivative of the object's position function at t ₀ is r. The goal of this paper is to determine to what extent this definition successfully underpins a standard account of motion at an instant. Counterexamples proposed by Michael Tooley (1988) and also by John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1990) are reinforced and illuminated by considering the presence or absence of changes to the object's motion.     

Frege on Syntax,Ontology, and Truth's Pride of Place

Frege's strict alignment between his syntactic and ontological categories is not, as is commonly assumed, some kind of a philosophical thesis. There is no thesis that proper names refer only to objects, say, or that what refers to an object is a proper name. Rather, the alignment of categories is internal to Frege's conception of what syntax and ontology are. To understand this, we need to recognise the pride of place Frege assigns within his theorising to the notion of truth. For both language and the world, the Fregean categories are logical categories, categories, that is, of truth. The elaboration of this point makes clear the incoherence of supposing that they might not align.     

On more powerful tests of judge agreement with a known standard

To establish the existence of his abilities, a judge is given the task of classifying each ofN=rs subjects into one ofr known categories, each containings of the subjects. An incomplete design is proposed whereby the judge is presented withb groups, each one containingn=rs/b<r subjects. Then different categories corresponding to members of the group are known. Using the total number of correct classifications, this method of grouping is compared to that in which the group size is equal to the number of categories. The incomplete grouping is shown to yield a more powerful test for discriminating between the null hypothesis that the judge is guessing the classifications and the alternative hypothesis that he has some definite abilities. The incomplete design is found to be most effective (powerful) when the number of subjects in a group is limited to two or three.The author is grateful for the suggestions of the referees and the editor, which greatly improved the paper.     

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.     

Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Nonsense

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: “Skepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.” In this paper I show how Wittgenstein developed this insight in On Certainty. My principal aim is to show that this is a logical insight, that it is bound up with the distinction between saying and showing, and that one misses the point of On Certainty if one reads it, as some commentators have, in epistemological terms. Throughout all of this I pay special attention to why Wittgenstein thought that skepticism is nonsensical, and what it might mean to say that philosophy is a logical investigation.     

Locke’s arguments against the freedom to will

In sections 2.21.23–25 of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke considers and rejects two ways in which we might be ‘free to will’, which correspond to the Thomistic distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. In this paper, I examine Locke’s arguments in detail. In the first part, I argue for a non-developmental reading of Locke’s argument against freedom of exercise. Locke’s view throughout all five editions of the Essay is that we do not possess freedom of exercise (at least in most cases). In the second part, I argue that, when Locke asks whether we possess freedom of specification, his question is intentionally ambiguous between two readings, a first-order reading and a higher-order reading. Locke’s view is that, on either reading, we do not possess freedom of specification (at least in any interesting sense).     

Role of Effect Sizes in Contemporary Research in Counseling

Effect sizes (e.g., Cohen's d, Glass's Δ, η², adjusted R², ω²) quantify the extent to which sample results diverge from the expectations specified in the null hypothesis. The present article addresses 5 related questions. First, is the advocacy for reporting and interpreting effect sizes part of the controversy over statistical significance testing? Second, why cannot p values be used as effect sizes? Third, what are the various categories of effect sizes and some commonly used examples of each type? Fourth, how should effect sizes be interpreted? Fifth, what are some recommendations for further reading?     

Are Effect Sizes and Confidence Levels Problems For or Solutions To the Null Hypothesis Test?

Some have proposed that the null hypothesis significance test, as usually conducted using the t test of the difference between means, is an impediment to progress in psychology. To improve its prospects, using Neyman-Pearson confidence intervals and Cohen's standardized effect sizes, d, is recommended. The purpose of these approaches is to enable us to understand what can appropriately be said about the distances between the means and their reliability. Others have written extensively that these recommended strategies are highly interrelated and use identical information. This essay was written to remind us that the t test, based on the sample—not the true—standard deviation, does not apply solely to distance between means. The t test pertains to a much more ambiguous specification: the difference between samples, including sampling variations of the standard deviation.     

Black–White differences on the g-factor in South Africa: a “Jensen Effect” on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children — revised

A test is made to determine whether South African Black–White differences on various tests of cognitive performance are like the Black–White differences in the United States in being positively associated with a test's g loadings, where g is the general factor of intelligence. Data are analyzed from Skuy, Schutte, Fridjhon and O'Carroll [Skuy, M., Schutte, E., Fridjhon, P., & O'Carroll, S. (2001). Suitability of published neuropsychological test norms for urban African secondary school strudents in South Africa. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 1413–1425) of 154 13- to 15-year-old secondary school students in Soweto, Johannesburg, on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–Revised (WISC-R). The more highly correlated a sub-test was with g, the more it predicted the African–White difference (r =0.77, p=0.05). The effect remained even when the Vocabulary sub-test was excluded or when g was extracted from the Black rather than from the White standardization sample (r=0.60, P<0.05), as it did as well if Spearman's rho was used instead of Pearson's r (g from Whites=0.74, g from Blacks=0.74, P< 0.005). Understanding observed Black–White differences around the world requires new research on the nature and nurture of g.     

If Logic, Definitions and the Vicious Circle Principle

In a definition (∀x)((xєr)↔D[x]) of the set r, the definiens D[x] must not depend on the definiendum r. This implies that all quantifiers in D[x] are independent of r and of (∀x). This cannot be implemented in the traditional first-order logic, but can be expressed in IF logic. Violations of such independence requirements are what created the typical paradoxes of set theory. Poincaré’s Vicious Circle Principle was intended to bar such violations. Russell nevertheless misunderstood the principle; for him a set a can depend on another set b only if (bєa) or (b ⊆ a). Likewise, the truth of an ordinary first-order sentence with the G?del number of r is undefinable in Tarki’s sense because the quantifiers of the definiens depend unavoidably on r.