Misconduct in science: Controversy and progress

Conclusion It is clear that the concept of scientific misconduct continues to evolve. As always it is the goal of Science and Engineering Ethics to move the discussion forward, to encourage and facilitate discussion of the ethical issues and problems that practicing scientists and engineers encounter in the course of pursuing their professions. This collection of articles and commentaries provides a variety of perspectives that we expect will facilitate communication among and within the groups who must participate in this evolution. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Office of Research Integrity, the Department of Health and Human Services, or any other Federal agency.     

Paradigms,Metaphors, and Narratives

This paper addresses the issue of the status of developmental theories. It discusses the concepts of paradigm, metaphor, and narrative as these apply to developmental theories. The author argues that all developmental theories use metaphors as explanatory models. The type of metaphor a theory uses determines whether or not it has a narrative structure. Developmental theories that use a contextual metaphor as opposed to those that use mechanistic or organismic metaphors do not have narrative structure, although their applications to individual cases create narratives. By examining the type of metaphor developmental theories use it is possible to construct a theory that is both coherent and that corresponds to the events associated with development. This conclusion leads to the rejection of constructivist approaches to viewing development, and suggests that it is possible for a developmental theory to attain the status of a paradigm.     

Narratives,culture, and folk psychology

In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false belief tasks. Methodologically, I distinguish between two kinds of narrative practices: ‘mentalistic narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to another person’s mental states), and ‘behavioral-contextual narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to the (normative) behavior of another person in a specific socio-situational context). Whereas the former is more prevalent in Western cultures than in Eastern cultures, the latter is predominantly used by members of Eastern cultures. Mentalistic narrative practices correlate with cultural divergences in the development of false belief understanding throughout ontogeny but do not seem to play the key role. The analysis shows that (i) conceptual change and the acquisition of mental state terms is essential for passing the false belief task, and that (ii) theory is likely to be the cognitive mechanism involved here such as proposed by Theory Theory. However, Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis trumps over Theory Theory to account for the varieties and ambiguities people typically meet when understanding each other in everyday life.     

Some historical relationships between science and technology with implications for behavior analysis

The relationship between science and technology is examined in terms of some implications for behavior analysis. Problems result when this relationship is seen as one in which science generally begets technology in a one-way, or hierarchical, relationship. These problems are not found when the relationship between science and technology is seen as two-way, or symmetrical, within a larger context of relationships. Some historical examples are presented. Collectively, these and other examples in the references weaken the case for a prevailing one-way, hierarchical relationship and strengthen the case for a two-way, symmetrical relationship. In addition to being more accurate historically, the symmetrical relationship is also more consistent with the principles of behavior analysis.     

Narratives and References

In this article, I will argue that the presentation of Greek ontology as a dichotomy between the intelligible and the material is an oversimplification. Combined with a tendency to place too much stress on the distinction between creator and creation within Christian theology, this oversimplification seems to have led to a overestimation of the dichotomous relationship between Greek philosophy and Christian theology, whereby too much weight is placed on Christian theology as the driving force behind the development of a pessimistic and voluntaristic anthropology. To illustrate this point, I will compare the theology of Origen and Augustine and thereby hope to show the important role of the Roman rhetorical and legal tradition when it comes to the development of Christian theology in Western Europe.     

The Dialectics of Stigma,Silence, and Misunderstanding in Suicidality Survival Narratives

Modern suicidologists have noted a dearth of qualitative research on suicide. The first author conducted 20 in-depth interviews with formerly suicidal adults to understand how they accounted for their experiences contemplating or attempting suicide. According to participants, stigma necessitated impression management, which contributed to the production of silence and misunderstanding. Silence and misunderstanding reinforced stigma. This complex, dialectical, belief system about stigma yields insight into the interpretive culture of surviving suicidal ideation or a suicide attempt. These beliefs about suicide may serve as a barrier to individuals seeking help, recovering from suicidality, and larger social change regarding attitudes toward suicide.     

Engagement for progress: applied philosophy of science in context

Philosophy of science was once a much more socially engaged endeavor, and can be so again. After a look back at philosophy of science in the 1930s–1950s, I turn to discuss the current potential for returning to a more engaged philosophy of science. Although philosophers of science have much to offer scientists and the public, I am skeptical that much can be gained by philosophers importing off-the-shelf discussions from philosophy of science to science and society. Such efforts will likely look like efforts to do applied ethics by merely applying ethical theories to particular contexts and problems. While some insight can be gained by these kinds of endeavors, the most interesting and pressing problems for the actual practitioners and users of science are rarely addressed. Instead, I recommend that philosophers of science engage seriously and regularly with scientists and/or the users of science in order to gain an understanding of the conceptual issues on the ground. From such engagement, flaws in the traditional philosophical frameworks, and how such flaws can be remedied, become apparent. Serious engagement with the contexts of science thus provides the most fruit for philosophy of science per se and for the practitioners whom the philosophers aim to assist. And if one focuses on contexts where science has its most social relevance, these efforts can help to provide the thing that philosophy of science now lacks: a full-bodied philosophy of science in society.     

The pi mechanisms of W S Stiles: an historical review

The origins, development, and status of the pi mechanism theory are reviewed. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section Stiles's general ideas about 'color mechanisms' are examined, and it is concluded that foremost amongst these is a mathematical theory that specifies certain formal rules or laws that should govern a certain class of observations. In the case of pi mechanisms, the class of observations is that of two-color thresholds, and the defining laws are the two well-known displacement laws. Five other laws that two-color increment-threshold observations should obey, if the latter are governed by ideal pi mechanisms, are abstracted from Stiles's writings. In the second section literature pertinent to the testing of the seven Stilesian laws is reviewed, and it is asked whether or not the seven pi mechanisms of Stiles do in fact obey the laws. In the third section the relation of the pi mechanism concept to physiological concepts is examined, and its relation to the 'cone fundamental' is discussed; the evidence pertinent to the question: "Are any of the pi mechanisms of the single-fundamental type?" is then reviewed. The last section is devoted to the evolution of Stiles's ideas in the period after 1959 when Stiles's own investigations and those of others propelled him to reject the initial (1953) pi mechanism theory as an adequate characterization of the data of the two-color threshold.     

Sceptics,believers, and historical mistakes

Inattention to the historical antecedents of current philosophical views may impoverish our arguments in defense of those views. A case in point, examined here, concerns the difference that can be made for current strategies designed to defend religious belief by carefully reconsidering the position of historical sceptics.