观点采择因素对3～4岁儿童延迟满足决策的影响

通过采用延迟满足决策任务,要求儿童分别为自己和他人做出决策,本研究考察了观点采择因素对儿童情感决策发展的影响。实验一选取3岁和4岁儿童各40名,结果发现3岁儿童和4岁儿童在为自己选和为他人选两种条件下的表现均无显著差异,都倾向于做出延迟选择。实验二选取3岁和4岁儿童各60名,在为他人的选择中进一步区分了不同的观点提示条件,并增加了观点采择测验任务。结果发现,4岁儿童的观点采择能力得到了初步的发展,在不同的观点提示条件下为他人选择时分别表现出了与为自己选择不同的决策趋势;3岁儿童尚未获得观点采择能力,在各种不同观点提示条件下为自己和为他人做选择时差异均不显著。本研究结果表明,观点采择能力对儿童情感决策的影响是发展性的。随着观点采择能力的发展,儿童逐渐能够确立正确的延迟动机,为他人做出有效的决策。     

The development of prudence in the face of varying future rewards

The choice to delay gratification, opting for a greater reward later instead of a smaller reward now, has been used as a measure of preschoolers' ability to make future-oriented decisions. The present studies investigated to what extent these choice tasks reflect children's ability to make choices in favour of their future self. In Experiment 1, preschoolers were presented with choices between a smaller immediate reward of one sticker and larger delayed rewards varying in amount from two to five stickers. Whereas 3-year-olds showed no increased tendency to choose the delayed option as quantity increased from two to five, 4-year-olds' future-oriented choices reflected the value of the delayed reward. In Experiment 2, preschoolers chose between immediate and delayed rewards that were equal in amount and varied between one and four stickers. Three-year-olds reliably chose the immediate reward and showed no differentiation among rewards, whereas 4-year-olds chose in a manner that suggested they were trying to satisfy both immediate and future desires. Together these results support the notion that future-oriented prudence reflects growth in concern for the future self.     

The Effect of Symbolic Distancing on Delay Tolerance across the Preschool Period

ABSTRACT

We aimed to longitudinally examine how symbolic distancing affects preschool children’s delay tolerance in a delay choice task. We presented children with choices between a smaller immediate reward and a larger delayed reward in conditions with either symbolic stimuli or edible rewards. Overall, symbolic distancing modulated children’s delay tolerance. In particular, whereas in the first phase (T1: 3- and 4-year-olds) children presented with edible rewards chose the larger option more often than children presented with symbolic stimuli, in the second phase (T2: 5- and 6-year-olds), there was no significant difference between children presented with symbolic stimuli and those presented with edible rewards. These results are discussed by examining how children’s delay tolerance changes during the development and comparing children to adult humans in a similar task.     

Affective state and preference for immediate versus delayed reward

Fifty-two 9-year-olds were randomly assigned to success and failure treatment conditions involving acceptance or rejection of a drawing made for an art show. In a pilot study, this treatment was shown to influence significantly subjects' affective states. Just after treatment, subjects were presented with choices between pairs of small immediate and large delayed rewards. As predicted, subjects who had experienced success chose more often the large delayed reward than those who failed (p < .02). Prior expectancy for success and sex were not significantly related to choice behavior. The influence of affective state on various parameters of the choice paradigm was discussed, and other evidence was cited indicating that affective state is a major determinant of self-gratification behavior.     

Commitment, choice and self-control

When offered a choice (Choice Y) between a small immediate reward (2-sec exposure to grain) and a large reward (4-sec exposure to grain) delayed by 4 sec, pigeons invariably preferred the small, immediate reward. However, when offered a choice (Choice X) between a delay of T seconds followed by Choice Y and a delay of T seconds followed by restriction to the large delayed reward only, the pigeon's choice depended on T. When T was small, the pigeons chose the alternative leading to Choice Y (and then chose the small, immediate reward). When T was large, the pigeons chose the alternative leading to the large delayed reward only. The reversal of preference as T increases is predicted by several recent models for choice between various amounts and delays of reward. The preference for the large delayed alternative with long durations of T parallels everyday instances of advance commitment to a given course of action. Such commitment may be seen as a prototype for self-control.     

A Simple Measure of Interviewer and Interviewee Speech Durations

A hypothesis that peer pressure affects delay-of-gratification behavior was tested by comparing the private vs. public responses of Cree children to the offer of an immediate reward or a larger delayed reward. One group of children was twice tested in private. Another group was first tested in private and then in public. In both testings approximately 65% of the control group chose an immediate reward. The experimental group, however, although preferring an immediate reward in private, in public elected to go along with the choices of their classmates, many reversing themselves and choosing a delayed rather than immediate reward.     

DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARDS:

Abstract— In this study, children, young adults, and older adults chose between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards The amount of the delayed reward was held constant while its delay was varied All three age groups showed delay discounting, that is, the amount of an immediate reward judged to be of equal value to the delayed reward decreased as a function of delay The rate of discounting was highest for children and lowest for older adults, predicting a life-span developmental trend toward increased selfcontrol Discounting of delayed rewards by all three age groups was well described by a single function with agesensitive parameters (all R²s>94) Thus, even though there are quantitative age differences in delay discounting, the existence of an age-invanant form of discount function suggests that the process of choosing between rewards of different amounts and delays is qualitatively similar across the life span     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Age-related changes in children's use of external representations.

This study explored children's use of external representations. Experiment 1 focused on representations of self: Self-recognition was assessed by a mark test as a function of age (3 vs. 4 years), delay (5 s vs. 3 min), and media (photographs vs. drawings). Four-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds; children performed better with photographs than drawings; and there was no effect of delay. In Experiment 2, 3- and 4-year-olds used a delayed video image to locate a sticker on themselves (self task) or a stuffed animal (other task). The 2 tasks were positively correlated with age and vocabulary partialed out. Experiment 3 used a search task to assess whether children have particular difficulty using external representations that conflict with their expectations: 3- and 4-year-olds were informed of an object's location verbally or through video: on half of the trials, this information conflicted with children's initial belief. Three-year-olds performed worse than 4-year-olds on conflict trials, indicating that assessments of self and other understanding may reflect children's ability to reason about conflicting external representations.     

四种注意情境下幼儿自我延迟满足的实验研究

将120名中等自控能力的3～5岁幼儿随机分配到四种注意情境下:两种奖励物同时呈现、只呈现即时奖励物、只呈现延迟奖励物、两种奖励物都不呈现,以探索幼儿自我延迟满足的注意机制及发展特点。结果发现:(1)幼儿自我延迟满足在两种奖励物都不呈现情境下平均延迟时间最长,在呈现奖励物的三种情境下平均延迟时间较短,表现出跨年龄稳定性;(2)3～5岁幼儿自我延迟满足发展存在显著年龄差异,表现出随年龄增长而提高的趋势。     

The development of adaptive choice in a self-control paradigm

Sixteen girls (ages 4, 6, 9, and 12) performed on concurrent-chain schedules of reinforcement. The initial links were variable-interval 10-s schedules, and the terminal links offered a long delay (20, 30, 40, or 50 s) followed by two tokens or a short delay (10 s) followed by one token. Tokens were used to buy toys and sweets. The effect of increasing the delay to the large reward differed significantly across age groups. Whereas 6- and 9-year-olds maintained a strong preference for the larger, more delayed reward under all delay conditions, half of the 4-year-olds and all the 12-year-olds showed increasing preference for the small reward as the delay to the large reward increased. The results suggest a two-stage account of the development of self-control. In the first stage, behavior is increasingly controlled by reward size, as children learn how to wait for delayed rewards, and in the second phase behavior is increasingly controlled by reward rate, as children learn when it is in fact profitable to wait.     

Effects of inflation on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards

In the years prior to 1994, there were very high rates of inflation in Poland, and the zloty depreciated relative to the U.S. dollar. However, the new zloty, introduced in 1995, was associated with greatly decreased rates of inflation and provided a more stable currency. We report a series of three experiments that take advantage of these changes to examine the effects of inflation on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards. Subjects were Polish citizens familiar with both zlotys and dollars. The first two experiments, conducted in 1994, used dollars and old zlotys, and the third experiment, conducted in 1996, used dollars and new zlotys. In all three experiments, the dollar and zloty rewards were of equivalent worth, according to the then current exchange rates. In Experiment 1, subjects chose between immediate and delayed rewards and, in Experiment 2, chose between certain and probabilistic rewards. The subjective value of a delayed reward was greater when its amount was specified in dollars than when it was specified in old zlotys. In contrast, the currency in which a reward was specified had no effect on the subjective value of probabilistic rewards. The results of these two experiments suggest a selective effect of inflation on decisions involving delayed rewards. This was verified in the third experiment, in which, using new zlotys, no differences in discounting were observed between the two currencies with either probabilistic or delayed rewards. Importantly, in all three experiments, the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards was well described by the same simple mathematical model, suggesting that similar decision-making processes underlie both phenomena. However, the present results argue against a single-process theory in which the discounting of probabilistic rewards is derived from the discounting of delayed rewards.     

Social discounting of pain

Impatience can be formalized as a delay discount rate, describing how the subjective value of reward decreases as it is delayed. By analogy, selfishness can be formalized as a social discount rate, representing how the subjective value of rewarding another person decreases with increasing social distance. Delay and social discount rates for reward are correlated across individuals. However no previous work has examined whether this relationship also holds for aversive outcomes. Neither has previous work described a functional form for social discounting of pain in humans. This is a pertinent question, since preferences over aversive outcomes formally diverge from those for reward. We addressed this issue in an experiment in which healthy adult participants (N = 67) chose the timing and intensity of hypothetical pain for themselves and others. In keeping with previous studies, participants showed a strong preference for immediate over delayed pain. Participants showed greater concern for pain in close others than for their own pain, though this hyperaltruism was steeply discounted with increasing social distance. Impatience for pain and social discounting of pain were weakly correlated across individuals. Our results extend a link between impatience and selfishness to the aversive domain.     

Affect and delay of gratification

Three experiments investigated the influence of positive and negative affect manipulations on children's preferences for small immediate versus large delayed rewards. Positive and negative affect were induced via verbal instructions to imagine happy and sad experiences. Elementary school children were randomly assigned to a control condition or to one of several treatment conditions consisting of two affect manipulations: a positive followed by a negative, the reverse, and (in the third experiment) two positives or two negatives. In some conditions (in the second and third experiments) measurement of delayed reward preference followed the first and second affect inductions whereas in other conditions (in the second and third experiments) measurement followed only the second affect manipulation. As predicted, negative affect subjects chose fewer large delayed rewards than did positive affect subjects during the first assessment (p < .02). At the second assessment, comparison among treatment and control conditions revealed the influence of a prior commitment effect which negated the potential influence of a second affect manipulation on preference for delayed rewards.     

Thinking about others and the future: Neural correlates of perspective taking relate to preferences for delayed rewards

We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting.     

Foregoing the labor for the fruits: The effect of just world threat on the desire for immediate monetary rewards

Previous theorizing and research suggest that the need to believe in a just world develops when children begin to understand the benefits of foregoing their immediate gratifications for more desirable, long-term outcomes. Drawing on this previous work, we propose that an extant just world threat may induce a desire for smaller, immediate rewards at the expense of larger, delayed rewards. Participants were exposed to the suffering of an innocent or non-innocent victim and then, in a different context, completed a temporal discounting task that assessed, across six time delays, their preferences for smaller, immediate monetary rewards versus a constant, larger, delayed reward. Consistent with our reasoning, participants exposed to the suffering of an innocent versus non-innocent victim more steeply discounted the value of the delayed reward—that is, they were willing to accept smaller immediate rewards in place of the larger, delayed reward. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

Delay of gratification: impulsive choices and problem behaviors in early and late adolescence

High school students were offered a monetary incentive for participating in research. They were given a choice between a smaller fee immediately or a larger fee one week later. Compared to students who delayed gratification, those who chose the immediate fee showed more self-regulatory deficits. They showed greater involvement with cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana, had a poorer self-concept and underperformed academically. A replication study with middle-school students and different reward parameters yielded equivalent results. Younger adolescents who chose the immediate monetary incentive showed a similar pattern of problem behaviors as the high school students. The findings indicate that this simple choice-delay procedure yields an unobtrusive behavioral measure of self-regulation and offers a developmentally appropriate extension of the delay-of-gratification paradigm for use with older children and adolescents.     

Temporal discounting predicts student responsiveness to exchange delays in a classroom token system

Typical assessments of temporal discounting involve presenting choices between hypothetical monetary outcomes. Participants choose between smaller immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards to determine how the passage of time affects the subjective value of reinforcement. Few studies, however, have compared such discounting to actual manipulations of reward delay. The present study examined the predictive validity of a temporal discounting procedure developed for use with children. Forty-six sixth-grade students completed a brief discounting assessment and were then exposed to a classwide intervention that involved both immediate and delayed reinforcement in a multiple baseline design across classrooms. The parameters derived from two hyperbolic models of discounting correlated significantly with actual on-task behavior under conditions of immediate and delayed exchange. Implications of temporal discounting assessments for behavioral assessment and treatment are discussed.     

Self-enhancement or self-coherence? Why people shift visual perspective in mental images of the personal past and future

It is often assumed, by laypeople and researchers alike, that people shift visual perspective in mental images of life events to maintain a positive self-concept by claiming ownership of desirable events (first-person) and disowning undesirable events (third-person). The present research suggests that people shift perspective not according to the pictured event's desirability but according to whether they focus on the experience of the event (first-person) or on the event's coherence with the self-concept (third-person). This explains why self-change promotes third-person imagery of prechange selves (Studies 1 and 2). And, the same mechanism determines perspective apart from self-change, in both memory and imagination (Studies 3 and 4). By demonstrating that people shift perspective according to whether they focus on the experience of an event or its self-concept coherence, these results suggest how perspective may function more broadly in social cognition, and specifically in the construction and maintenance of the temporally extended self.