The uncertainty appraisal enhances the prominent deck B effect in the Iowa gambling task

The Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., Cognition 50:7–15, 1994) is designed to simulate a decision making problem under ambiguity, in which the degree of reliance on emotional cues arising from previous experiences contributes to perform advantageously. Recent studies based on the appraisal tendency framework demonstrated that emotional certainty (associated with intuitive strategies) leads to a more advantageous decision pattern, whereas emotional uncertainty (associated with deliberative strategies) impairs the performance in the IGT (Bagneux et al., Motivation and Emotion 37(4):818–827, 2013; Bollon and Bagneux, Cognition and Emotion 27(2):376–384, 2013). Due to the problems in the IGT (Dunn et al., Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 30:239–271, 2006; Steingroever et al., Psychological Assessment 25(1):180–193, 2013), however, it is an open question to what extent the disadvantageous IGT performance in the uncertainty conditions was based on risky decision making. Addressing the main criticisms on the IGT, the primary aim of the present study is to provide a further explanation for the underlying source of the IGT impairment led by uncertainty appraisals. In line with previous research, we found that participants in the certainty-associated emotion condition (disgust) outperformed those in uncertainty-associated conditions (fear, sadness) in the gambling game. Detailed four-deck format analyses on decision patterns and knowledge levels provided supporting evidence for our main hypothesis that the weak IGT scores in the uncertainty conditions can be summarized as a failure to anticipate the badness and the goodness of the most difficult decks, and a dominant preference for a risky option with high immediate gains and infrequent losses.     

Beyond risk and ambiguity: Deciding under ignorance

In this study, we examined the neural basis of decision making under different types of uncertainty that involve missing information: ambiguity (vague probabilities) and sample space ignorance (SSI; unknown outcomes). fMRI revealed that these two different types of uncertainty recruit distinct neural substrates: Ambiguity recruits the left insula, whereas SSI recruits the anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral inferior parietal cortex, and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex. The finding of unique activations for different types of uncertainty may not necessarily be predicted within the reductive approach of modern theories of decision making under uncertainty, because these theories purport that humans reduce more complicated uncertain environments to subjectively formed less complicated ones (i.e., SSI to ambiguity). The predictions of the reductive view held only for ambiguityaverse individuals and not for ambiguity-tolerant individuals. Consequently, theories of decision making under uncertainty should include individual tolerance for missing information and how these individual differences modulate the neural systems engaged during decision making. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Parental rearing behavior prospectively predicts adolescents’ risky decision‐making and feedback‐related electrical brain activity

The present study examined the role of parental rearing behavior in adolescents’ risky decision‐making and the brain's feedback processing mechanisms. Healthy adolescent participants (n = 110) completed the EMBU‐C, a self‐report questionnaire on perceived parental rearing behaviors between 2006 and 2008 (T1). Subsequently, after an average of 3.5 years, we assessed (a) risky decision‐making during performance of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART); (b) event‐related brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by positive (gain) and negative feedback (loss) during the BART; and (c) self‐reported substance use behavior (T2). Age‐corrected regression analyses showed that parental rejection at T1 accounted for a unique and significant proportion of the variance in risk‐taking during the BART; the more adolescents perceived their parents as rejecting, the more risky decisions were made. Higher levels of perceived emotional warmth predicted increased P300 amplitudes in response to positive feedback at T2. Moreover, these larger P300 amplitudes (gain) significantly predicted risky decision‐making during the BART. Parental rearing behaviors during childhood thus seem to be significant predictors of both behavioral and electrophysiological indices of risky decision‐making in adolescence several years later. This is in keeping with the notion that environmental factors such as parental rearing are important in explaining adolescents’ risk‐taking propensities.     

On undesirable consequences of thinking: framing effects as a function of substantive processing

Three studies investigate the impact of effortful constructive processing on framing effects. The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred this option when the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, framing effects were most pronounced when conditions allowed for an effortful constructive processing style (i.e., substantive processing). This impact of decision frames varied when decision time served as an indicator for the elaboration extent (Study 1), and also when processing motivation (accountability; Study 2) and processing ability (decision time; Study 3) were manipulated. Moreover, effortful processing did not increase framing effects when contextual cues reduced the necessity for constructive thinking (Study 1). We suggest that decision frames may take on very different roles as a function of the ambiguity of the decision problem, and the degree and style of processing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk taking under the influence: A fuzzy-trace theory of emotion in adolescence

Fuzzy-trace theory explains risky decision making in children, adolescents, and adults, incorporating social and cultural factors as well as differences in impulsivity. Here, we provide an overview of the theory, including support for counterintuitive predictions (e.g., when adolescents “rationally” weigh costs and benefits, risk taking increases, but it decreases when the core gist of a decision is processed). Then, we delineate how emotion shapes adolescent risk taking—from encoding of representations of options, to retrieval of values/principles, to application of those values/principles to representations of options. Our review indicates that: (i) gist representations often incorporate emotion including valence, arousal, feeling states, and discrete emotions; and (ii) emotion determines whether gist or verbatim representations are processed. We recommend interventions to reduce unhealthy risk taking that inculcate stable gist representations, enabling adolescents to identify quickly and automatically danger even when experiencing emotion, which differs sharply from traditional approaches emphasizing deliberation and precise analysis.     

Point of view in personal memories

A structural aspect of personal memories was examined in four studies. In some memories, one has the perspective of an observer, seeing oneself “from the outside.” In other memories, one sees the scene from one's own perspective; the field of view in such memories corresponds to that of the original situation. The existence of “observer” and “field” memories was confirmed in Study 1, using a recall questionnaire. In Study 2, the similarity structure of a specified set of eight to-be-recalled situations was established: the significant dimensions were “emotionality” and “self-awareness.” Study 3 related these dimensions to the observer-field distinction; situations involving a high degree of emotion and selfawareness were most likely to be recalled with an observer perspective. Recall set was varied in Study 4: a focus on feelings (as opposed to objective circumstances) produced relatively more field memories. Studies 3 and 4 also showed that events reported as more recent tend to be recalled in the field mode. Thus a qualitative characteristic of personal memories—the perspective from which they are experienced—is apparently related to characteristics of the original event, to the individual's purpose in recalling that event, and to the reported recall interval.     

Attribute Framing and Goal Framing Effects in Health Decisions

Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (LSG, 1998) have distinguished among three types of framing—risky choice, attribute, and goal framing—to reconcile conflicting findings in the literature. In the research reported here, we focus on attribute and goal framing. LSG propose that positive frames should be more effective than negative frames in the context of attribute framing, and negative frames should be more effective than positive frames in the context of goal framing. We test this framework by manipulating frame valence (positive vs negative) and frame type (attribute vs goal) in a unified context with common procedures. We also argue that the nature of effects in a goal-framing context may depend on the extent to which the research topic has “intrinsic self-relevance” to the population. In the context of medical decision making, we operationalize low intrinsic self-relevance by using student subjects and high intrinsic self-relevance by using patients. As expected, we find complete support for the LSG framework under low intrinsic self-relevance and modified support for the LSG framework under high intrinsic self-relevance. Overall, our research appears to confirm and extend the LSG framework.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Everyday risk taking as a function of regulatory focus

Uncertainty is an inherent aspect of everyday life. However, faced with uncertainty, some individuals take risks more eagerly than others. Regulatory focus theory may explain such differences because risky behavior may arise naturally from the eagerness of promotion focused individuals, while safe behavior may arise naturally from the vigilance of prevention focused individuals. A highly relevant real-life context for studying risk is mobility, as engaging in traffic inherently carries uncertainty about negative outcomes. We present two studies showing a direct link between regulatory focus and risky behavior going beyond traditional laboratory approaches. In both naturalistic speeding behavior (Study 1) and simulated risk taking (Study 2) promotion focus was positively, and prevention focus was negatively related to actual risky behavior.     

Regulatory Focus and Political Decision Making: When People Favor Reform Over the Status Quo

Two studies examined the impact of self‐reported use of promotion‐related (i.e., eagerness) and prevention‐related (i.e., vigilance) strategies when making “risky” or “conservative” decisions about economic reform under good, average, or poor economic conditions. Consistent with regulatory focus theory ( Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2000 ), in both studies strategic vigilance was associated with making a conservative choice, whereas strategic eagerness was associated with making a risky choice. In addition, along with perceptions of economic conditions, chronic strength of prevention focus (Study 1) or situationally induced prevention focus (Study 2) was associated with using strategic vigilance, whereas chronic strength of promotion focus (Study 1) or situationally induced promotion focus (Study 2) was associated with using strategic eagerness. Finally, regulatory focus and economic perceptions indirectly predicted economic reform decisions through their impact on strategy use. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that vigilant or eager strategy use is associated with “conservative” or “risky” political decisions.     

The Impact of Trait Anxiety on Self‐frame and Decision Making

The present study investigated how trait anxiety influenced the formation of a self‐frame and decision making. Participants (N = 1044) responded to the Trait Anxiety Inventory. Those with trait anxiety scores ±1 Z score from the sample mean (N = 328) were recalled to respond to the self‐frame questionnaire. The results suggested that trait anxiety differences could result in differences in the editing of decision‐making information, thereby influencing the risky choice. Compared with the low trait anxiety group, participants from the high trait anxiety group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame and tended to choose conservative plans. Self‐frame suppressed the influence of trait anxiety on decision making. These results further confirmed the hypothesis that individual differences in personality traits might influence the processing of information in a framed decision task. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Play it safe or go for the gold? A terror management perspective on self-enhancement and self-protective motives in risky decision making

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that bolstering self-esteem buffers mortality concerns; accordingly, in past research, heightening mortality salience (MS) increases self-enhancement. However, risky self-esteem-relevant decisions often present a choice between enhancing self-esteem by striving for excellence and protecting self-esteem by avoiding potential failure. Which strategy is preferred under MS? Combining TMT with insights from Steele, Spencer, and Lynch's (1993) resource model, the authors hypothesized and found that MS leads high, but not low, self-esteem participants faced with a risky decision to pursue opportunities for excellence despite substantial risk of failure (Studies 1 and 2); in Study 3, using a more impactful decision, this effect was replicated and it was furthermore found that mortality-salient low-self-esteem participants become more risk-averse. Furthermore, in Study 2, a self-affirmation prime, previously shown to reduce MS-induced defenses, eliminated the self-enhancement effect among high-self-esteem participants. Implications for understanding self-esteem, TMT, and risky decision making are briefly discussed.     

Group discussion and first advocacy effects in computer-mediated and face-to-face decision making groups

This study examines whether the first group member to advocate a position in the group publically has disproportionate influence on the group decision, and whether group discussion by computer mail or face-to-face determines the extent of the first advocate's influence. Possible explanations of first advocacy influence were tested in an experiment that allowed simultaneous observation of three independent variables: (1) assignment of first advocate (self-selected/randomly assigned), (2) early discussion before advocacy (discussion/no discussion), and (3) mode of communication (face-to-face/electronic mail). It was assumed that a first advocate effect exists if the group choice is closer to the first advocates' stated positions than to the group's average pregroup preferences. An “influence” hypothesis predicts that first advocates who self-select will be closer to the group decision than average pregroup preferences because these are first advocates most likely to persuade other members of the group. A “listening” hypothesis predicts that first advocates who hear an early group discussion will be closer to the group decision than average pregroup preferences because these first advocates are able to anticipate the group decision as a result of listening to what is communicated in group discussion. The results indicated strong support for the “listening” hypothesis. When groups held early discussions before someone advocated a position, the first advocate effect was observed; when groups did not hold early discussions but began their task by having someone advocate a position, there was no first advocate effect. The data suggest that the content and tone of electronic group discussions was qualitatively different from face-to-face group discussions, but the process of group decision making in both conditions was about the same. The implications of these results for group discussion and computer-mediated group decision making in organizations are discussed.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconsidering the Relation between Regret and Responsibility

Recently Connolly, Ordóñez, and Coughlan challenged the view that regret is partly determined by perceived responsibility for the regretted outcome [Connolly, T. Ordóñez, L. D., & Coughlan, R. (1997). Regret and responsibility in the evaluation of decision outcomes.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73–85]. In a series of experiments they manipulated whether actors arrived at an outcome through their own decision or through a “computer assignment” over which they had no influence. This decision agency manipulation did not affect their “regret measure.” We show in two experiments that this null-effect is due to the fact that regret was measured by means of a general happiness assessment. In the present research we replicated the basic design of their experiments and also found no effects of decision agency on the happiness assessment. However, the results showed the predicted effects of decision agency when regret was directly measured. Moreover, a measure of disappointment seemed to indicate the opposite effect: People are more disappointed when a negative outcome is caused by a computer assignment than when caused by their own choice. The role of regret and disappointment in decision making is discussed.     

Modeling the Dynamics of Risky Choice

Individuals make decisions under uncertainty every day. Decisions are based on incomplete information concerning the potential outcome or the predicted likelihood with which events occur. In addition, individuals' choices often deviate from the rational or mathematically objective solution. Accordingly, the dynamics of human decision making are difficult to capture using conventional, linear mathematical models. Here, we present data from a 2-choice task with variable risk between sure loss and risky loss to illustrate how a simple nonlinear dynamical system can be employed to capture the dynamics of human decision making under uncertainty (i.e., multistability, bifurcations). We test the feasibility of this model quantitatively and demonstrate how the model can account for up to 86% of the observed choice behavior. The implications of using dynamical models for explaining the nonlinear complexities of human decision making are discussed as well as the degree to which the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems might offer an alternative framework for understanding human decision making processes.     

The value of self-report measures as indicators of driving behaviors among young drivers

Although much of the knowledge in transportation psychology has been gained by means of self-report measures, there is still a dispute regarding the usefulness and validity of such instruments. This series of two studies employed multivariate statistical models to examine associations between self-report and objective measures in two samples of young drivers. Study 1 (n = 151) compared scores on the Multidimensional Driving Style Inventory (MDSI), a self-report questionnaire tapping four broad driving styles, with the naturalistic driving recorded by an in-vehicle data recorder (IVDR). Study 2 (n = 80) compared responses to the Reckless Driving Habits Scale, assessing the frequency with which drivers commit a set of risky behaviors, with driving measures collected by a simulator. This study also examined the personality trait of sensation seeking, as well as gender and driving experience. In Study 1, the analysis revealed positive associations between high scores on the risky and hostile driving styles measured by the MDSI and risky behaviors measured by the IVDR, as well as inverse correlations between the latter and high MDSI scores on the anxious and careful driving styles. Similarly, in Study 2 associations were found between the self-reported frequency of reckless driving habits and several risky behaviors measured by the driving simulator. In addition, risky behaviors correlated with the sociodemographic variables and sensation seeking. The two studies therefore show that self-report measures are reliable tools for assessing driving behaviors for purposes of research, evaluation, and intervention.     

模糊规避的形成机制：基于可评价性假设的视角

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会力图规避从主观上判断具有模糊概率的事件而偏好具有相同精确概率的事件。本研究使用同时评价、单独评价的研究范式从随机事件和自然事件两个领域来探讨模糊规避的形成机制。研究结果表明,当风险事件和模糊事件同时评价时,个体倾向于模糊规避;当风险事件和模糊事件单独评价时,模糊规避会消失。