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Psychonomic Bulletin & Review -  相似文献   

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《Synthese》1946,5(5-6):193-200
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《Synthese》1946,5(3-4):108-115
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P. H. Esser 《Synthese》1955,9(1):133-136
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Maya Angelou's performance of her poem On the Pulse of Morning at the inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton as 42nd President of the United States on January 20, 1993, was compared with other poetry and prose performances. Measurements of her pause frequency, pause location, pause duration, phrase length, speech rate, articulation rate, and percentage of pause time all uniquely characterized her performance. Printed versions of Angelou's inaugural poem were also analyzed. Inconsistencies in spelling, punctuation, spacing, and line and stanza breaks, along with additions, omissions, and sequence changes of words and phrases, were found. The poem performed possesses a richness unpredictable from either the extant literature on poetry readings or from Angelou's own printed pages.  相似文献   

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Abstract

This inaugural lecture was delivered at the Howard College Campus of UKZN on 2 April 2008. In it I do three things. First I sketch some arguments in favour of a naturalist conception of philosophy. The conclusions that I’m after are that philosophy is not an autonomous enterprise, so that it had better be continuous with scientific enquiry if it is to get anywhere. A supplementary claim I defend briefly is that the natural and social sciences should be viewed as more integrated than they usually are. Second, I offer some reasons for rejecting all identifiable forms of social constructivism about knowledge. Finally, I say something about what ‘African Scholarship’ might mean, given the preceding considerations. There I briefly defend the claim that there is no epistemically interesting sense in which there is such a thing as African knowledge.  相似文献   

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In this paper I introduce and critically examine a paradox about perceiving that is in some ways analogous to the paradox about meaning which Kripke puts forward in his exegesis of Wittgenstein's views on Rule-following.
When applied to vision, the paradox of perceiving raises a metaphysical scepticism about which object a person is seeing if he looks, for example, at an apple on a tree directly in front of him. Physical objects can be seen when their appearance is distorted in various ways by illusions. The question therefore arises as to how can we answer the sceptic who suggests the following: although the viewer appears to be seeing the green apple in front of him, he is actually suffering a bizarre illusion of a blue car situated somewhere behind him. The sceptic is not concerned with epistemic problems about how we know which object, if any, the subject is seeing; the sceptic is raising the more fundamental question: what fact of the matter underlies a person's perceptual relation to the physical world, in virtue of which that person may be justified in arriving at a perceptual belief about the environment?
Among the various different issues raised by the sceptic, I focus on the question: what determines the perceiving relation? I canvass a number of possible proposals in answer to it, concentrating mainly on two opposed accounts: the Disjunctive View and the Causal Theory of Perception. I argue in particular for the following two claims:
that the paradox highlights the fact that the Disjunctive View fails to provide a coherent positive account of what perceiving is.
that the problem of 'deviant causal chains', often thought to raise particular difficulties for the Causal theorist, can also be raised against other accounts of perception, including versions of the Disjunctive View.
I conclude that unless the Causal Theory of Perception can be upheld, there will be no way of answering the sceptic.  相似文献   

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Inaugural addresses require a complex interplay of literacy and orality. They are written to be performed, but oral performance is not explicable in terms of textual analyses alone. Texts of the 55 inaugurals of the 42 U.S. presidents and audio recordings of the 16 dating from F. D. Roosevelt were the corpus for this study. The general hypothesis was that changes in media technology and in Presidential governance have moved both text and performance of inaugurals in the twentieth century in the direction of conversational style. Textual response measures were frequency-of-occurrence ratios of words (per paragraph, sentence, punctuation, and discourse marker), of syllables (per paragraph, sentence, word, punctuation, and discourse marker), and of first-person pronominal forms. Performance response measures were speech and articulation rates, percentage of pause time, pause duration, and phrase length. Use of contractions was also analyzed. Textual analyses showed a shortening of units and a shift from singular to plural first-person pronominal forms in the course of 200 years. Performance of the inaugurals over the past 60 years showed no diachronic changes, but was dramatically slower than that of other speech genres. Use of contractions was limited to three recent inaugurals. Various published texts of Reagan's first inaugural and Bush's and Clinton's inaugurals were compared with one another and with the audio recordings and were found to differ from one another in text, punctuation, and format, and from the audio recordings in text. The notion of conversational style is critically discussed, particularly in terms of the boundaries imposed upon it by the norms of both literacy and orality.  相似文献   

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Philosophical zombies are exactly as physicalists suppose we are, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. (It is presupposed that all explicable physical events are explicable physically.) Are such things even logically possible? My aim is to contribute to showing not only that the answer is 'No', but why. (I concede that systems superficially like human beings might exist and lack consciousness.)
My strategy has two prongs: a fairly brisk argument which demolishes the zombie idea; followed by an attempt to throw light on how something can qualify as a conscious perceiver. The argument to show that zombies are impossible exploits the point that in order to be able to detect our own 'qualia' we should have to be somehow sensitive to them; which the zombie idea rules out. The attempt to make clear why my zombie twin must be conscious exploits the idea that we have a reasonably clear grasp of a 'Basic Package' of psychological concepts.  相似文献   

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Kant's claim that modality is a 'category' provides an approach to modality to be contrasted with Lewis's reductive analysis. Lewis's position is unsatisfactory, since it depends on an inherently modal conception of a world. This suggests that modality is 'primitive'; and the Kantian position is a prima facie plausible position of this kind, which is filled out by considering the relationship between modality and inference. This provides a context for comparing the Kantian position with Wright's non-cognitivist 'conventionalism'. Wright's position is vulnerable to the type of argument used against ethical non-cognitivism, and the Kantian position is further confirmed by Blackburn's acknowledgment that modality is 'antinaturalistic to its core'. The position is further elaborated to show that it can accommodate the famous Kripkean categories of the empirically necessary and the contingent a priori , and finally defended against the criticisms used by Quine against Carnap.  相似文献   

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Value themes were extracted from U.S. presidential inaugural addresses of the 19th and 20th centuries. The values most frequently extolled were liberty, belief in God, patriotism, justice, personal responsibility, and peace. More references to lowering taxes were made in the 19th compared with the 20th century and by Republicans compared with Democrats. Truth/honesty was more frequently mentioned in the 19th century than in the 20th century, but courage was more frequently mentioned in the 20th century. Implications are discussed.  相似文献   

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Some see the co-cognitive view of how we arrive at judgements about others' thoughts as a version of the analogy approach, where I reason from how I find things to be with me to how they will be for others. These thinkers think it a virtue of the view that it need not accept any linkage between thought and rationality. This paper will, however, defend the view that a co-cognitive view is a natural ally of theories which link thought and rationality. It will try to show that exclusive stress on analogy is unduly sceptical about our cognitive capacities and overestimates our similarity to each other.  相似文献   

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