On Sublimation

Although it encapsulates the Freudian theory of art, the theory of sublimation has become outmoded. What is more, since its inception there has always been something ill‐defined about it. Does it use sexualized or de‐sexualized drive energy? Is it a defence or an alternative to defence? Does it serve Eros or Thanatos? Is it useful in clinical work or is it unusable? The only, albeit uncertain, aid to a definition relies on the extrinsic criterion of concrete artistic realization. My aim here to revisit and possibly ‘reinvent’ sublimation in the light of certain principles of the pre‐Romantic aesthetics of the sublime. Both are theories of spiritual elevation, in other words, elevation that moves towards abstract thinking, and of man's ‘moral’ achievement; and both attempt to explain the mystery of aesthetic experience. On the one hand, the aesthetics of the sublime offers a modern myth that helps us articulate a series of factors occasionally referred to by various authors as constitutive of sublimation but which have not been incorporated into a single organic framework: loss and early mourning work; the earlier existence of a catastrophic factor – to be regarded, depending on the situation, as either traumatic or simply ‘negative’; the correspondence with a process of somatopsychic categorization which coincides with subjectivity. On the other hand, it also helps us grasp the experience of negative pleasure empathically, living it ‘from the inside’.     

The so‐called death drive,an indispensable force for any subjective life

The psychoanalytic movement has difficulty in overcoming the malaise bequeathed by what Freud wanted to call the ‘death drive’. This term remains doubly problematic: first because the indispensable antagonist of Eros‐binding cannot be reduced to a particular drive; and secondly because this Anteros plays a vital role in subjectivization. The Freudian idea of the ‘death drive’ has in addition the drawback of confusing dissociative thrust (unbinding) with the aggressive component of libidinal cathexis. Now it is precisely the lack of articulation between them that leads to deconstructing it. For it is constantly observed that in the psychic register aggression is much more fixing than unbinding. The essential role of Anteros/unbinding in the process of subjectivization can be illustrated through several key operations in subjective development: sublimatory activity and its renunciation of pleasure‐discharge, the work of mourning opposed to melancholic fixation, the intricating‐unbinding parental function, and finally the psychoanalytic treatment and its work of analysis. This means we should cease to anathematize the dynamic component of unbinding as ‘of death’ and seek to explain the concept of subjectivization better.     

Freud,Piaget and Macmurray: A theory of knowledge from the standpoint of personal relations

The following comparisons between Freud's and Piaget's concepts are proposed: eros drive = constructive assimilation = direction toward the object in the sense of love for newness and otherness; death drive = constrictive assimilation = direction away from or destruction of the object out of fear for self to preserve the system. Eros and assimilation drive combine in the developing object and symbol formation to transform personal relations and knowledge. These psychological theories are further confirmed by evolutionary considerations about human social relations and by Macmurray's philosophy of personal relations as the primary function of reason.     

Between Thanatos and Eros: Erich Fromm and the psychoanalysis of social networking technology use

Social networking technologies have become a ubiquitous framework for social interaction, serving to organise much of the individual’s social life. Such technological structuring affects not merely the individual’s psyche (as a psycho- technics), it also affects broader aspects of society (as a socio-technics). While social networking technologies may serve to transform society in positive ways, such technologies also have the potential to significantly encroach upon and (re) construct individual and cultural meaning in ways that must be investigated. Erich Fromm, who psychoanalytically describes humans as a product of their society and the economic systems within that society, may provide insight into the influence of social networking technologies in contemporary society. He sees the relationship between the individual and society as being in a constant state of dynamic change. Utilising Fromm’s psycho-societal insight, social networking technologies are shown to conflate and confuse the relation between Thanatos and Eros – the Thanatos of a lifeless and consumerist agenda-filled mechanisation, and the Eros associated with social engagement. Thanatos and Eros are tied together via social networking technologies. This results in, firstly, social networking technologies functioning predominantly to further capitalist agendas through the monetisation of these technologies – particularly in terms of linking commodity fetishism and the foundational social drive of the individual. Secondly, social networking technologies mechanise human action according to predictable behavioural paths through the use of these technologies, especially in terms of how socialisation is possible via these technologies (shaping how platonic and romantic relationships may take place in the contemporary world). Such a mechanisation of interpersonal engagement contrasts with Erich Fromm’s assertion that interpersonal relations (vis-à-vis love) are not “mere emotion”, but rather represent an interpersonal creative capacity and interplay. Fromm’s psycho-societal insights will show how contemporary individuals may take independent and responsible rational action to establish accountable and psychologically beneficial ways of engaging with others through social networking technologies.     

Hans Loewald: A radical conservative

Hans Loewald's work was relatively marginalized in its day and it is little known outside the United States. It is, however, assuming increasing importance in American psychoanalysis. Loewald's attractiveness as a theoretician is due, in no small part, to his rigor and synthetic reach. He is able to accomplish the difficult feat of remaining non-sectarian and systematic at the same time. Indeed, Loewald's work contains an integrative vision that is unusual in today's fragmented psychoanalytic world. This author tries to show how Loewald attempts to reconcile many of the rigid oppositions that often become reified in analytic controversies: structural theory versus relational psychoanalysis, traditionalism versus revisionism, oedipal versus pre-oedipal, modernist versus postmodernist and hermeneutical versus scientific. The article examines how Eros, understood in terms of the psyche's synthetic strivings, plays a major role in Loewald's theory. The author also situates Loewald's position within contemporary psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology. These discussions tend to criticize the objectivism of modern science-and analysis in so far as it models itself on science-and stress countertransference and the subjectivity of the analyst. Loewald's argument, however, runs in the opposite direction. Because of his concern with the autonomy and individuality of the patient, he is concerned with the clinical dangers rising from an overemphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst.     

The Symposium: Culture as Daimonic Conversation

The present essay focuses on the relation between conversation and culture. Through a reading of Plato's "Symposium," it highlights a conversation which reflects on culture while in its midst, combining critique with erotic ritual. Eros, the selected topic of the Symposium, is described by Socrates as a Daimon, a being between God and mortal, whose intermediary state reflects back on conversation itself as daimonic, and on culture as daimonic conversation. This notion of conversation serves as a basis for a cultural critique, on the one hand, of an anthropology that limits itself to an observation of culture as closed and defined forms and, on the other hand, of demonic rather than daimonic notions of conversation.     

Tanya and the Adaptive Dialectic of Romantic Passion and Secure Attachment

My analytic work with Tanya illustrated one unique, heightened, individual version of a pervasive human conflict: the way in which erotic passion can be experienced as inherently conflicting with other relational bonds and broader values. In virtually every culture throughout human history, we find expressions of this tension between passionate Eros and other forms of love.

My clinical approach entails an openness to multiple analytic perspectives, including Mitchell's posthumous views in Can Love Last. In addition, I make use of a sensibility informed by evolutionary biology as a vantage point for understanding the individual struggle of patients like Tanya, as well as illuminating some of the larger issues about Eros and attachment. I suggest that romantic aspects of Eros may have evolved as part of a complex psychological system designed to deal with specifically human existential vulnerabilities and anxieties, as well as a way of challenging the inherent human tendency to over-accommodate to the subjective world of the other.     

Improving Fitness to Drive: The Case for Hazard Perception Training

On one hand, individuals who are unfit to drive should not be allowed behind the wheel. On the other hand, being unable to drive can have significant negative consequences for some individuals, including an increased mortality risk. One potential solution to this dilemma is to use training interventions to improve fitness‐to‐drive. The problem is that, in general, post‐licensing driver training and education has a disappointing track record in terms of improving road safety. However, one type of intervention that may have the potential to buck this trend is hazard perception training. Hazard perception, which is the driver's ability to anticipate dangerous situations on the road ahead, has been found to predict both crash risk and on‐road driving performance, and can account for variance in both of these criteria that other key fitness‐to‐drive measures cannot. Crucially, there is evidence that hazard perception competence can be improved by brief computer‐based interventions, even for driver groups who are more likely to face fitness‐to‐drive challenges, such as individuals aged over 65 years or adults with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. This article puts the case for potentially using such interventions to help individuals with fitness‐to‐drive difficulties.     

Eros and wholeness

It is suggested that the direction for resolving the current normative confusion regarding the place of sexuality in our lives lies in understanding it as a manifestation of Eros. Eros is revealed to be the desire for wholeness. In order for Eros to achieve its aim, therefore, we must respect the whole fabric of life. This respect is manifest when the connections between Eros and six different facets of life are held intact and thereby enhanced. These six facets are (1) pleasure, (2) human relationship, (3) procreation, (4) family, (5) psychological growth, and (6) spiritual growth. The nature of each of these connections is briefly discussed.     

Autodestruction and nonexistence: two distinct aspects of the death drive

The concept of the death drive is more frequently employed by European than by American psychoanalysts, although it is not unanimously accepted even by the former. In recent years there have been attempts to disconnect the longstanding theoretical link between the drive and aggression, in keeping with the observations of various nondestructive components of the death drive. A hitherto unmentioned aspect of this drive is the yearning for nonexistence, a shadow-like counterpoise to life, expressed by two analysands. Both had childhood histories of life-threatening disease without sufficient compensatory maternal presence at the time. Both displayed massive dissociation from their own body and its vital functions, as well as from objects and their representations. The death drive could be viewed as a continuum with the autodestructive aspect, or the striving for death, at one end, and the component of nonbeing, or the yearning for nonexistence, at the other end.     

Narrative and discursive approaches to the analysis of subjectivity in psychotherapy

This paper reviews research that utilises language-based analyses (narrative analysis, discourse analysis and conversation analysis) to examine aspects of subjectivity in the context of psychotherapy. The studies reviewed fall broadly into two main groups. On the one hand, studies which share a view of subjectivity as the sum of internal 'voices' in dialogue adopt a narrative approach, examine subjectivity in terms of organisation, coherence and self-reflection, and consider psychotherapy a process of restoring an organised polyphony. On the other hand, studies which conceptualise subjectivity in terms of 'subject positions' adopt a discursive approach, emphasise the availability of subject positions and flexibility in adopting them and examine psychotherapy as a process of facilitating the flexible adoption by the client of a variety of subject positions. Theoretical, epistemological and methodological issues regarding each of the two approaches are discussed, along with representative studies. We finally examine the implications of these two approaches for understanding psychotherapeutic practice and for theorising and researching subjectivity.     

The inconstant "principle of constancy"

A review of the principle of constancy, as it appeared in Freud's writings, shows that it was inspired by his clinical observations, first with Breuer in the field of cathartic therapy and then through experiences in the early usage of psychoanalysis. The recognition that memories repressed in the unconscious created increasing tension, and that this was relieved with dischargelike phenomena when the unconscious was made conscious, was the basis for his claim to originality in this area. The two principles of "neuronic inertia" Freud expounded in the Project (1895), are found to offer the key to the ambiguous definition of the principle of constancy he was to offer in later years. The "original" principle, which sought the complete discharge of energy (or elimination of stimuli), became the forerunner of the death drive; the "extended" principle achieved balances that were relatively constant, but succumbed in the end to complete discharge. This was the predecessor of the life drives. The relation between the constancy and pleasure-unpleasure principles was maintained for twenty-five years largely on an empirical basis which invoked the concept of psychophysical parallelism between "quantity" and "quality." As the links between the two principles were weakened by clinical experiences attendant upon the growth of ego psychology, a revision of the principle of constancy was suggested, and it was renamed the Nirvana principle. Actually it was shifted from alignment with the "extended" principle of inertia to the original, so that "constancy" was incongruously identified with self-extinction. The former basis for the constancy principle, the extended principle of inertia, became identified with Eros. Only a few commentators seem aware of this radical transformation, which has been overlooked in the Standard Edition of Freud's writings. Physiological biases in the history and conception of the principle of constancy are noted in the Standard Edition. The historical antecedents of the principle of constancy, especially in relation to the teachings and influence of J. F. Herbart (1776-1841), do much to bridge the gap between psychological and neurophysiological aspects of Freud's ideas about constancy and its associated doctrine, psychic determinism. Freud's later teachings about the Nirvana principle and Eros suggest a continuum of "constancies" embodied in the structural and functional development of the mental apparatus as it evolves from primal unity with the environment (e.g., the mother-child unit) and differentiates in patterns that organize the inner and outer worlds in relation to each other.     

Therapeutic alliance and weight gain during cognitive behavioural therapy for anorexia nervosa

This study examined the relationship between therapeutic alliance and primary symptom change (weight gain) during CBT for anorexia nervosa. The aims were threefold: (1) to establish the strength of the therapeutic alliance across the treatment, (2) to determine whether early therapeutic alliance is associated with the completion of CBT for this client group, and (3) to determine the direction of the relationship between therapeutic alliance and weight gain. Adult outpatients (N = 65) with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa (or atypical anorexia nervosa) completed a measure of alliance at session six and at the end of treatment. Weight was recorded at the start of treatment, session six and at the end of treatment. The strength of the alliance was consistently high in the sample. However, early therapeutic alliance was not associated with either the likelihood of completing treatment or subsequent weight gain. In contrast, both early and later weight gain were associated with the strength of subsequent alliance. These findings indicate that it might be advisable to focus on techniques to drive weight gain rather than rely on the therapeutic alliance to bring about therapeutic change.     

A dilemma for Heideggerian cognitive science

‘Naturalizing phenomenology’ by limiting it to the ontology of the sciences is problematic on both metaphysical and phenomenological grounds. While most assessments of the prospects for a ‘naturalized phenomenology’ have focused on approaches based in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, problems also arise for non-reductive approaches based in Heideggerian existential phenomenology. ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’ faces a dilemma. On the one hand, (i) if it is directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, and this subjectivity is assumed to be ontologically irreducible to its physical enablers yet still metaphysically dependent on them, then Heideggerian cognitive science will either leave that metaphysical dependence an unexplained instance of supervenience, or ground it in speculation about brute metaphysical laws that have an unclear relationship to the ontology of the sciences. On the other hand, (ii) if Heideggerian cognitive science is not directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, but is instead merely aimed at the development of a Heideggerian phenomenological psychology, then it doesn’t fully address the ontological implications of phenomenology’s transcendental approach, and so, while it might succeed in explaining the realization of psychological phenomena scientifically, the existence of subjectivity will remain inexplicable based on the ontology of the sciences. Neither strategy succeeds in ‘naturalizing phenomenology’: (i) either rejects scientific naturalism, or makes its requirements trivial, while (ii) either rejects the transcendental dimension of phenomenology, or fails to address its ontological implications.     

Why aggression?2

On the basis of a formalised view of metapsychology, the author briefly considers the problems inherent in the Freudian notion of a death drive or aggressive drive and then goes on to develop a new theoretical conception of aggression. Aggression is understood as an affect, action or affective action and, in relation to these, as an expression of the intensity with which a drive'whether it be the sexual drive with its libidinal cathexes or the self‐preservative drive with its lethic cathexes'seeks to attain its object. In this context the author regards the regulation of closeness and distance with respect to the ‘psychogeometric locus’ of the relevant drive object as being of central importance. She contends that neurotic personalities suffer from specific distortions in the perception of the psychogeometric locus of their drive objects, which may give rise to an intensification of the drive tendencies prevailing in these individuals at any given time so that these tendencies take on an aggressive character. The author presents two clinical vignettes to show how her approach allows aggression and its occurrence to be conceptualised without resorting to the idea of a primary aggressive drive, and draws attention to the resulting technical consequences for interpretation.     

Recovering Identity from Anorexia Nervosa: Women's Constructions of Their Experiences of Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa Over 10 Years

There is little consensus about the meaning of recovery in anorexia nervosa with most studies focusing on researcher selected variables of weight gain and improvement in eating disorder symptomatology. There is also a paucity of research that focuses on how the experiencing person themselves define recovery and whether this term is useful to them to depict their journey of reclaiming their life and identity from anorexia nervosa. This article explores 21 Australian women's experiences of anorexia nervosa (AN) over 10 years and the ways they negotiated their identities in relation to the question of recovery. The research interviews sought to provide a context for these women to speak on their own terms, terms not confined to the medical discourse. The discursively constructed category of recovery was troublesome for the majority of these women, despite the researcher inadvertently taking up this category in lines of questioning, particularly in the earlier interviews. Most troubling for the women was the assumption that recovery erased their experiences with the expectation that they should return to a pre-illness state. On the other hand, speaking on their own terms—including the use of metaphor and (re)authoring their experiences as an identity journey—was significant in scaffolding the women toward narratives of reclaiming their lives and identities from AN and its effects. The women in this study refused to confine the terms of their speaking to a recovery discourse; instead, they honored the narratives of their experiences and histories as profound in their identity formation. The implications of this research are significant given that the majority of research and many treatments to date confine the terms of speaking to the “anorexia” discourse.     

BECOMING ANOREXIC: ON LOSS,DEATH AND IDENTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF ANOREXIA NERVOSA

This paper investigates the connections between death, pathological identifications and anorexia nervosa. Literature is reviewed concerning various psychodynamic models of causation of anorexia, and in particular transgenerational patterns in the evolution of this eating disorder, with reference to problems in the development of autonomy of the emerging self. The role of loss in the family is examined, and the development of pathological identifications is described. A case of an adolescent girl initially presenting with an unexplained seizure is described in which multiple identifications seem to be occurring while the patient develops anorexia, perhaps reflecting previous losses in the family and also in a kind of strange identification with, and mimesis of, the parents' unmourned dead. It is suggested that the development of these multiple identifications gives some aetiological clues to this puzzling illness and also indicates a therapeutic focus. It is argued that a psychodynamically‐informed child psychiatrist can bring an enriching approach to working with patients with this disorder.     

Jung's Erotic Phenomenology: I. A New Translation

In the introduction to The Psychology of the Transference (1946), Carl Jung sketched out a theory of “erotic phenomenology” which condenses his teaching about sexuality and romantic love into a very concise summary. But the meaning of this passage is obscured in the English translation given in the Collected Works of C. G. Jung. I propose here a new translation which makes Jung’s meaning clearer, along with a commentary which explains it in the context of Freudian drive theory and German 19^th century philosophy. Invoking the concepts of instinct, mind, and Eros (both the passion and the divine figure), Jung’s theory says that male sexual desire can be cultivated or repressed in four distinct ways, each associated with a female symbolic figure or anima image: Eve, Helen, Mary and Sophia.     

Subjectivity as an Unlimited Semiosis: Lacan and Peirce

The discussion on subjectivity isbased on the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan'sunderstanding of subjectivity as constructed inand through language, and the philosopherCharles Sanders Peirce's general ideas ofsignifying construction as an unlimitedsign-exchanging process – the idea of theunlimited semiosis. The article advocatescombining Lacanian subjectivity and Peirceansemiosis in a model of the formal structure ofthe semiosis of Lacanian subjectivity. In thelight of this model the article claims thatLacanian subjectivity opens to a process ofsubjectivization within the semiosis ofsubjectivity, whereby that which is other ismade our own. Two researchers' differentarguments on subjectivity, both of which referto Lacan's ideas on subjectivity, are used asdiscussion partners in the exploration of thesemiosis of Lacanian subjectivity. While theone researcher claims that subjectivity is anideological construction, the other maintainsthat subjectivity is a free play of signs. Thearticle claims that neither of these tworesearchers considers that there may be aprocess of subjectivization in the semiosis ofsubjectivity. Thus the one researcher can claimthat subjectivity `is constituted outside ofitself', and the other can maintain that `thesubject is doomed to perpetual exile fromitself' in the construction of her or hissubjectivity.     

On the reception of the concept of the death drive in Germany: expressing and resisting an ‘evil principle’?

With Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud attempted ‘to describe and to account for the facts of daily observation in our field of study’ (1920, p. 7), in particular concerning destructive clinical phenomena that confront us in the analytic situation: traumatic neuroses, melancholic states, negative‐therapeutic reactions, masochism, repetition compulsion and so on. The author demonstrates in the first section how Freud's own resistance – later self‐diagnosed – to recognizing these unwelcome facts was expressed in the terminological and conceptual ambiguities of the death drive hypothesis then introduced, ambiguities that to some extent continue to impede the reception of its clinical usefulness to this day. As soon as Freud had demonstrated the connection with clinical practice more directly in The Ego and the Id (1923), some contemporaries adopted it as a helpful clinical concept, while others believed that they could (and must) refute it. The second part outlines its reception in the 1920s and 1930s, which was part of an international discussion that was, of course, initially conducted mainly in German. The beginnings of an important further development of the death drive hypothesis are described in a separate section because it originated from Melanie Klein's earliest experiences in analysing children in Berlin in the early to mid‐1920s. She referred at that time to an ‘evil principle’, and in 1932 published her view of the death drive hypothesis, which was further developed in subsequent decades by her and her followers in London. In this period, conditions changed dramatically: in Germany Freud's books (among others) were burnt, crimes against humanity were instigated and psychoanalysis ceased to exist in this country. Almost all the analysts who published on the death drive had to emigrate. From then on, entirely different discourses took place in the various regions. In Germany, the death drive hypothesis was (largely) disregarded or rejected for decades after the Holocaust. Frank demonstrates how the uncritical recourse in relevant works to this day to an article by Brun in 1953 that considered the death drive to have been comprehensively refuted on the basis of (apparently) comprehensive literature research can be understood as a symptom. Pursuing some reflections by Beland (1988) and Cycon (1995), the author expounds her thesis that in Germany the clinical usefulness of the death drive hypothesis could not be considered as long as destructive impulses were still an immediate social reality. According to the author's observations, in stating that there had been a ‘definite reaction formation against death drive hypotheses’, Brun had unintentionally made an accurate diagnosis. It was not until the realization of inevitable perpetrator identifications (‘Hitler in us’) in this country became (more widely) possible that a concern with the death drive hypothesis could also resume. In the final section, the author takes up one line of this development and traces how some German analysts in the 1980s came into contact with Kleinian developments that had since occurred and how these found and find their way into their analytic working. She closes by asking whether it might be appropriate to consider Melanie Klein's concept of an evil principle – along with the pleasure and reality principles – as a less ambiguous one for the phenomena under consideration.