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1.
People who prefer larger, later gains over smaller, sooner gains when considering outcomes far in the future often reverse
their preference as the alternatives become closer in time. This finding, which is contrary to a normative economic account
of intertemporal choice, has been interpreted as support for hyperboloid discounting, but the results can also be explained
by steeper discounting of smaller amounts. The present study is the first to demonstrate that analogous preference reversals
occur with losses: People who preferred a smaller, sooner loss over a larger, later loss when the outcomes were far in the
future reversed their preference when these alternatives were closer in time. Because there was no magnitude effect (i.e.,
smaller losses were not discounted more steeply than larger losses), the present findings strongly support the proposition
that reversals in preference between delayed outcomes occur because of the hyperboloid shape of the discounting function. 相似文献
2.
Green L Myerson J Ostaszewski P 《Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition》1999,25(2):418-427
Previous research has shown that the value of large future rewards is discounted less steeply than is the value of small future rewards. These experiments extended this line of research to probabilistic rewards. Two experiments replicated the standard findings for delayed rewards but demonstrated that amount has an opposite effect on the discounting of probabilistic rewards. That is, large probabilistic amounts were discounted at the same or higher rates than small amounts. Although amount had opposite effects on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards, nevertheless, the same form of mathematical function accurately described discounting of both types of reward. The findings suggest that fundamentally similar, but not identical, processes are involved in decision making regarding delayed and probabilistic rewards. The implications of these findings for impulsivity and self-control are discussed. 相似文献
3.
Koji Jimura Joel Myerson Joseph Hilgard Todd S. Braver Leonard Green 《Psychonomic bulletin & review》2009,16(6):1071-1075
In previous studies, researchers have found that humans discount delayed rewards orders of magnitude less steeply than do
other animals. Humans also discount smaller delayed reward amounts more steeply than larger amounts, whereas animals apparently
do not. These differences between humans and animals might reflect differences in the types of rewards studied and/or the
fact that animals actually had to wait for their rewards. In the present article, we report the results of three experiments
in which people made choices involving liquid rewards delivered and consumed after actual delays, thereby bridging the gap
between animal and human studies. Under these circumstances, humans, like animals, discounted the value of rewards delayed
by seconds; however, unlike animals, they still showed an effect of reward amount. Human discounting was well described by
the same hyperboloid function that has previously been shown to describe animal discounting of delayed food and water rewards,
as well as human discounting of real and hypothetical monetary rewards. 相似文献
4.
Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses 下载免费PDF全文
Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
5.
Green L Myerson J Holt DD Slevin JR Estle SJ 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2004,81(1):39-50
Temporal discounting refers to the decrease in the present, subjective value of a reward as the time to its receipt increases. Results from humans have shown that a hyperbola-like function describes the form of the discounting function when choices involve hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition, magnitude effects have been reported in which smaller reward amounts are discounted more steeply than larger amounts. The present research examines the cross-species generality of these findings using real rewards, namely food pellets, with both pigeons and rats. As with humans, an adjusting amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of immediate reward judged equal in value to a delayed reward. Different amounts of delayed food rewards (ranging from 5 to 32 pellets in pigeons and from 5 to 20 pellets in rats) were studied at delays varying from 1 s to 32 s. A simple hyperbola, similar to the hyperbola-like mathematical function that describes the discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards in humans, described the discounting of food rewards in both pigeons and rats. These results extend the generality of the mathematical model of discounting. Rates of discounting delayed food rewards were higher for pigeons than for rats. Unlike humans, however, neither pigeons nor rats showed a reliable magnitude effect: Rate of discounting did not vary systematically as a function of the amount of the delayed reward. 相似文献
6.
Amy L. Odum Ryan J. Becker Jeremy M. Haynes Ann Galizio Charles C. J. Frye Haylee Downey Jonathan E. Friedel D. M. Perez 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2020,113(3):657-679
Steep delay discounting is characterized by a preference for small immediate outcomes relative to larger delayed outcomes and is predictive of drug abuse, risky sexual behaviors, and other maladaptive behaviors. Nancy M. Petry was a pioneer in delay discounting research who demonstrated that people discount delayed monetary gains less steeply than they discount substances with abuse liability. Subsequent research found steep discounting for not only drugs, but other nonmonetary outcomes such as food, sex, and health. In this systematic review, we evaluate the hypotheses proposed to explain differences in discounting as a function of the type of outcome and explore the trait- and state-like nature of delay discounting. We found overwhelming evidence for the state-like quality of delay discounting: Consistent with Petry and others' work, nonmonetary outcomes are discounted more steeply than monetary outcomes. We propose two hypotheses that together may account for this effect: Decreasing Future Preference and Decreasing Future Worth. We also found clear evidence that delay discounting has trait-like qualities: People who steeply discount monetary outcomes steeply discount nonmonetary outcomes as well. The implication is that changing delay discounting for one outcome could change discounting for other outcomes. 相似文献
7.
Discounting of monetary and directly consumable rewards 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We compared temporal and probability discounting of a nonconsumable reward (money) and three directly consumable rewards (candy, soda, and beer). When rewards were delayed, monetary rewards were discounted less steeply than directly consumable rewards, all three of which were discounted at equivalent rates. When rewards were probabilistic, however, there was no difference between the discounting of monetary and directly consumable rewards. It has been reported that substance abusers discount delayed drug rewards more steeply than delayed money, but this difference may reflect special characteristics of drugs or drug abusers, or it may reflect a general property of consumable rewards. The present findings suggest that abused substances (like beer) share the properties of other directly consumable rewards, whereas delayed monetary rewards are special because they are fungible, generalized (conditioned) reinforcers. 相似文献
8.
Travis D. Clark Kyle T. Kassman Adam Derenne Jeffrey N. Weatherly 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》2014,33(2):98-112
Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses. 相似文献
9.
It is important to better understand the decision‐making processes involved in student procrastination, in order to develop interventions that reduce this common problem. Students may procrastinate because studying produces delayed reinforcers; however, no task measuring delay discounting of academic outcomes currently exists. In Experiment 1, we developed and piloted a measure of academic discounting modeled on titrating‐amount tasks successfully used in the discounting literature. Participants made hypothetical choices between working for money (the smaller, sooner reinforcer) and working on an assignment that was due at various times (the larger, later reinforcer). Participants showed systematic decreases in the subjective value of the assignment as a function of delay, and the hyperbolic and hyperboloid models described the shape of this decrease in value well. In general, larger delayed rewards are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed rewards (the magnitude effect). In Experiment 2, we observed the magnitude effect in academic discounting: Participants discounted a “not important” assignment more steeply than an “important” assignment. In the hyperboloid model, this change was captured by an increase in the s parameter. Results provide support for the validity of the academic discounting task. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
10.
Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
11.
Subjects chose between pairs of hypothetical amounts of money available after different delays. When smaller, more immediate amounts were selected over larger, more delayed amounts, the addition of a constant delay to both outcomes resulted in reversals of preference, contrary to the standard discounted utility model of economics. The delays at which preference reversed were determined for three pairs of amounts ($20 vs. $50, $100 vs. $250, and $500 vs. $1,250). The relation between the delay to the larger amount and the delay to the smaller amount at preference reversal was well fit by both linear and quadratic functions. Intercepts increased with amount, strongly suggesting that rate of discounting decreases with amount. The presence of significant negative curvature in the data from the majority of individual subjects poses problems for exponential and hyperbolic models of temporal discounting in self-control, both of which predict a linear relation between the delays to the larger and smaller amounts. 相似文献
12.
Humans discount larger delayed rewards less steeply than smaller rewards, whereas no such magnitude effect has been observed in rats (and pigeons). It remains possible that rats' discounting is sensitive to differences in the quality of the delayed reinforcer even though it is not sensitive to amount. To evaluate this possibility, Experiment 1 examined discounting of qualitatively different food reinforcers: highly preferred versus nonpreferred food pellets. Similarly, Experiment 2 examined discounting of highly preferred versus nonpreferred liquid reinforcers. In both experiments, an adjusting-amount procedure was used to determine the amount of immediate reinforcer that was judged to be of equal subjective value to the delayed reinforcer. The amount and quality of the delayed reinforcer were varied across conditions. Discounting was well described by a hyperbolic function, but no systematic effects of the quantity or the quality of the delayed reinforcer were observed. 相似文献
13.
In everyday life, many probabilistic situations may be characterized as probabilistic waiting. A gambler, for example, bets repeatedly at the racetrack, the casino, or the card table. The gambler may not win on the first try, but if a gamble is repeated enough times, a win is almost certain to occur eventually. If repeated gambles are structured as strings of losses ending in a win (probabilistic waiting) and the amount won is discounted by the delay caused by the series of losses, then strings with many losses will be discounted more than those with fewer losses, thereby causing subjective value of the series of gambles as a whole to increase. The current study used the opposite effect that amount has on the degree of delay and probability discounting as a marker to determine whether people evaluate situations involving probabilistic waiting as they evaluate situations involving delayed outcomes or as situations involving probabilistic outcomes. We find that the more likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a gamble is repeated indefinitely until reward is obtained), the more that situation conforms to delay discounting; the less likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a fixed, small number of gambles), the more that situation conforms to probability discounting. We argue that the former situation is applicable to pathological gambling, and that people with steep delay discount functions would therefore be more likely to have gambling problems. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
14.
15.
Temporal discounting rates in humans generally decrease as the amount of reward increases, a phenomenon known as themagnitude effect. In the present study, we examined whether temporal discounting and the magnitude effect are related to segregation of choices
in terms of gains or losses for waiting for or expediting receipt of a reward. Subjects (N = 24) responded to a series of
hypothetical choices about amounts of money available either immediately or after a delay. The immediate and delayed amounts
either were presented as integrated amounts in the baseline condition or were segregated as differential gains or losses for
choosing delayed or expedited consumption (delay and speedup conditions, respectively). Temporal discounting rates decreased
in the segregated conditions, in accord with the standard discounted utility model but contrary to the hypothesis that the
subjects were choosing on the basis of reward differentials in the baseline condition. The size of the magnitude effect was
comparable in the baseline and the delay conditions but decreased in the speed-up condition. These results challenge explanations
of the magnitude effect in terms of an increasing proportional sensitivity property of the utility function (Loewenstein &
Prelec, 1992) and the hypothesis that subjects choose on the basis of differentials even when the rewards are presented as
integrated amounts. 相似文献
16.
Ahn WY Rass O Fridberg DJ Bishara AJ Forsyth JK Breier A Busemeyer JR Hetrick WP Bolbecker AR O'Donnell BF 《Journal of abnormal psychology》2011,120(4):911-921
Patients with bipolar disorder (BD) and schizophrenia (SZ) often show decision-making deficits in everyday circumstances. A failure to appropriately weigh immediate versus future consequences of choices may contribute to these deficits. We used the delay discounting task in individuals with BD or SZ to investigate their temporal decision making. Twenty-two individuals with BD, 21 individuals with SZ, and 30 healthy individuals completed the delay discounting task along with neuropsychological measures of working memory and cognitive function. Both BD and SZ groups discounted delayed rewards more steeply than did the healthy group even after controlling for current substance use, age, gender, and employment. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that discounting rate was associated with both diagnostic group and working memory or intelligence scores. In each group, working memory or intelligence scores negatively correlated with discounting rate. The results suggest that (a) both BD and SZ groups value smaller, immediate rewards more than larger, delayed rewards compared with the healthy group and (b) working memory or intelligence is related to temporal decision making in individuals with BD or SZ as well as in healthy individuals. 相似文献
17.
Adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks than their peers, which has been argued to reflect delay aversion. Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money. Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents) were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immediate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD. 相似文献
18.
Yu-Hua Yeh Joel Myerson Michael J Strube Leonard Green 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2020,113(3):609-625
A new probabilistic losses questionnaire as well as Kirby's delayed gains questionnaire and a previously developed delayed losses questionnaire were administered to a large online sample. Almost all participants showed the positive discounting choice pattern expected on the Kirby questionnaire, decreasing their choice of a delayed gain as time to its receipt increased. In contrast, approximately 15% of the participants showed negative discounting on the delayed losses questionnaire and/or the probabilistic losses questionnaire, decreasing their choice of an immediate loss as time to a delayed loss decreased and/or decreasing their choice of a certain loss as likelihood of the probabilistic loss increased. Mixture model analysis confirmed the existence of these negative discounting subgroups. The inconsistent findings observed in previous research involving delayed/probabilistic losses may be due to differences in the proportion of negative discounters who participated in previous studies. Further research is needed to determine how negative discounting of delayed and probabilistic losses manifests itself in everyday decisions. It should be noted that the presence of individuals who show atypical choice patterns when losses are involved may pose challenges for efforts to modify discounting in order to ameliorate behavioral problems, especially because many such problems concern choices that have negative consequences, often delayed and/or probabilistic. 相似文献
19.
Discounting of delayed rewards by pathological gamblers was compared to discounting of delayed rewards by matched control nongambling participants. All participants completed a hypothetical choice task in which they made repeated choices between dollars 1,000 available after a delay and an equal or lesser amount of money available immediately. The delay to the large amount of money was varied from 1 week to 10 years across conditions. Indifference points between immediate money and delayed money were identified at each delay condition by varying the amount of immediate money across choice trials. For the majority of participants, indifference points decreased monotonically across delays. Overall, gamblers discounted the delayed rewards more steeply than did control participants. 相似文献