Japanese children's development of false belief understanding

Two studies were conducted to examine the Japanese children's false belief understanding. Study 1, a small-scale meta-analysis that included 21 Japanese false belief studies yielding 60 data points, revealed that the Japanese children's false belief understanding develops with age (effect size = 2.48 in odds ratio for 1 year), the Japanese children's performance exceeds the chance level at the age of 64 months, and question type (think vs look-for) produced no statistically significant difference. An experiment (Study 2) employing a change-of-locations task was conducted to confirm these findings, manipulating question type as a within-participant factor. Participants were 43 Japanese kindergartners (24 boys and 19 girls; 3 yr. 4 mo. to 6 yr. 1 mo.). The results showed that Japanese children's false belief performance developed with age. Their performance level exceeded the chance level at the age of 5 years, and question type did not affect their performance.     

特定句法提示对3－4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响

通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解     

THOUGHT,LANGUAGE, AND THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPLICITNESS

Abstract: This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the “argument from explicitness”—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: (1) the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and (2) natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we should believe they are true. Finally, we argue that even though the argument from explicitness shows that natural language cannot be a vehicle of thought, there is a cognitive function for language.     

幼儿看图叙述中心理状态术语的使用与错误信念理解关系的短期跟踪研究

摘 要：为探明汉语儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语的应用及与错误信念理解能力的关系,并追踪二者相互作用的方向,本研究以101名3-5岁儿童为研究对象,纵向探查了前后相隔3个月的儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语使用情况和错误信念能力的发展状况,并从横向和纵向两个时间点分别探讨了心理状态术语的运用与错误信念理解的关系。结果表明：3-5岁儿童错误信念理解能力快速发展;儿童看图叙述中使用较多的愿望术语和情绪术语,信念术语应用相对较少,且认知词汇类型较少。控制了一般语言能力和年龄之后,仅在第一次测验上,情绪术语、信念术语仍然与同期及后期错误信念理解能力存在显著相关。     

The role of experience and discourse in children's developing understanding of pretend play actions

The present work investigated the development of an explicit understanding of pretend play actions. Study 1 revealed a long décalage between earlier implicit understanding of pretence as an intentional activity and a later more explicit understanding. Study 2 was a training study. It tested for two factors – systematic pretence experience and explicit pretence discourse – that may be important in development from early implicit to later explicit pretence understanding. Two training groups of 3.5‐year‐old children received the same pretence experiences involving systematic contrasts between pretending, really performing and trying to perform actions. In the ‘explicit’ group, these experiences were talked about with explicit ‘pretend to’ and ‘pretend that’ language. In the ‘implicit’ group no such discourse was used, but only implicit discourse in talking about pretence versus real actions. The two training groups were compared with a control group that received functional play experience. After training, only the explicit group showed improvement in their explicit pretence understanding. In none of the groups was there any transfer to tasks tapping mental state understanding, false belief (FB) and appearance‐reality, (A‐R). The findings are discussed in the context of current theories about the developmental relations between pretence, discourse, and mental state understanding.     

Implicit and explicit false belief development in preschool children

The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes underlying these tasks and their relation to later‐developing explicit false belief understanding, as well as to other cognitive abilities, are not yet understood. Here, we study a battery of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children, relating their performance to linguistic abilities and executive functions. The present data show a significant developmental change from failing explicit false belief tasks at 3 years of age to passing them at the age of 4, while both age groups pass implicit false belief tasks. This differential developmental trajectory is reflected by the finding that explicit and implicit false belief tasks do not correlate. Further, we demonstrate that explicit false belief tasks correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false belief tasks do not. The study thus indicates that the processes underlying implicit false belief tasks are different from later‐developing explicit false belief understanding. Moreover, our results speak for a critical role of syntactic and executive functions for passing standard explicit false belief tasks in contrast to implicit tasks.     

Symbols and Similarity: You Can Get Too Much of a Good Thing

A method for eliciting extended explanations was used to evaluate predictions from the “theory-theory” account of developing psychological reasoning. Children were repeatedly asked to explain the actions or emotions of story characters with false beliefs. Questioning elicited false belief attributions in half of 3-year-olds (Study 1, N = 16, age M = 3;6) and most 4-year-olds who failed belief prediction tasks (Study 2, N = 30, M = 4;5). In Study 3, 30 prediction failers (M = 5;1) gave significantly more false belief explanations for emotions than for actions. Across the studies, desire and emotion explanations emerged early and often, reflecting the primacy of these constructs in the children's understanding of psychological causality. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for developmental mechanism.     

Narratives,culture, and folk psychology

In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false belief tasks. Methodologically, I distinguish between two kinds of narrative practices: ‘mentalistic narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to another person’s mental states), and ‘behavioral-contextual narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to the (normative) behavior of another person in a specific socio-situational context). Whereas the former is more prevalent in Western cultures than in Eastern cultures, the latter is predominantly used by members of Eastern cultures. Mentalistic narrative practices correlate with cultural divergences in the development of false belief understanding throughout ontogeny but do not seem to play the key role. The analysis shows that (i) conceptual change and the acquisition of mental state terms is essential for passing the false belief task, and that (ii) theory is likely to be the cognitive mechanism involved here such as proposed by Theory Theory. However, Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis trumps over Theory Theory to account for the varieties and ambiguities people typically meet when understanding each other in everyday life.     

Implicit understanding of belief

Implicit understanding of false belief was investigated by monitoring where children look in anticipation of a protagonist reappearing, when the protagonist mistakenly thinks that his desired object is in a different place from the place where it really is. This implicit measure of understanding was contrasted with children's explicit answers to the experimenter's question about where the protagonist would look for the object. Children from 2 years 5 months to 2 years 10 months erroneously looked at the object's real location, which they gave for their answer. From 2 years 11 months to 4 years 5 months, about 90% of the children looked at the empty location where the protagonist thought the object was.In sharp contrast, only about 45% of the children in this age span gave that location as their explicit answer to the experimenter's question. These results are explained in terms of a distinction between representing a fact and making a judgment about that fact.     

Mirror,mirror on the wall,who’s the fairest of them all? Thinking that one is attractive increases the tendency to support inequality

Five studies tested the hypothesis that self-perceived attractiveness shapes people’s perceptions of their social class (subjective SES), which, in turn, shape how people respond to inequality and social hierarchies. Study 1 found that self-perceived attractiveness was associated with support for group-based dominance and belief in legitimizing ideologies, and that these relationships were mediated by subjective social class. Subsequent experiments showed that higher self-perceived attractiveness increased subjective SES, which in turn, increased SDO (Study 2 and Study 5); promoted stronger beliefs in dispositional causes of inequality (Study 3); and reduced donations to a movement advocating for social equality (Study 4). By contrast, lower self-perceived attractiveness decreased subjective SES, which in turn, led to a greater tendency to reject social hierarchies and to construe inequality in terms of contextual causes. These effects emerged even after controlling for power, status, and self-esteem, and were not simply driven by inducing people to see themselves positively on desirable traits (Study 4 and Study 5).     

Are belief‐based justifications associated with metalinguistic awareness? A cross‐sectional study in school‐age children

Previous research has consistently demonstrated that false‐belief (FB) understanding correlates with and predicts metalinguistic ability in preschoolers. Surprisingly, however, there is scant evidence on the question of whether this relation persists at later ages. The present cross‐sectional study sought to fill this gap by examining the association between FB understanding, belief‐based justifications and metalinguistic awareness. A sample of 150 children primary‐school children between 8 and 11 years of age were administered a test of receptive language, a second‐order theory‐of‐mind task and a comprehensive metalinguistic battery. The results of correlational and regression analyses showed that explicit metalinguistic awareness (in particular, performance in the Ambiguity and Phonemic Segmentation subtests) was significantly predicted by children's belief‐based responses to the justification question in the theory of mind task but only for children with small receptive vocabularies; in contrast, FB understanding made no independent contribution (either alone or in interaction with other measures). These findings complement and advance existing data by showing that, in school‐age children, the association between the 2 domains involves more mature, verbally explicit levels of FB understanding and metalinguistic awareness.

Highlights

• We examined the relation between metalinguistic awareness and theory‐of‐mind in primary‐school children.
• Metalinguistic awareness was associated to belief‐based justifications, but only for children with small vocabulary.
• In school‐age children the ability to provide verbal justifications plays a key role in the relation between theory‐of‐mind and metalinguistic awareness.

     

The Heart and the Head: On Choosing Experiences Intuitively and Possessions Deliberatively

An enduring question in the field of judgment and decision making is when people are likely to choose on the basis of intuition and when they are likely to pursue a more deliberative decision strategy. Here, we attempt to shed light on that question by examining whether people tend to weight intuition more heavily when making experiential purchases, and to weight deliberation more heavily when making material purchases. Results from seven studies indicate that they do. In Study 1 (and a replication), participants expressed an explicit preference for choosing experiential purchases intuitively and material purchases analytically. In Study 2 (and a replication), participants anticipated experiencing more regret after going against reason for material purchases and going against intuition for experiential purchases. Participants in Study 3 who were asked to think about an experiential purchase wanted to see the relevant information presented by alternative, which facilitates intuitive/holistic processing, more than did those who were asked to consider a material purchase. In two additional studies, participants who were induced to think intuitively chose experiential purchases more often (Study 4) and reported a higher willingness to pay for them (Study 5) compared with participants induced to think analytically. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding of speaker certainty and false‐belief reasoning: a comparison of Japanese and German preschoolers

It has been repeatedly shown that when asked to identify a protagonist's false belief on the basis of his false statement, English‐speaking 3‐year‐olds dismiss the statement and fail to attribute to him a false belief. In the present studies, we tested 3‐year‐old Japanese children in a similar task, using false statements accompanied by grammaticalized particles of speaker (un)certainty, as in everyday Japanese utterances. The Japanese children were directly compared with same‐aged German children, whose native language does not have grammaticalized epistemic concepts. Japanese children profited from the explicit statement of the protagonist's false belief when it was marked with the attitude of certainty in a way that German children did not – presumably because Japanese but not German children must process such marking routinely in their daily discourse. These results are discussed in the broader context of linguistic and theory of mind development.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Where to look first for children's knowledge of false beliefs

Recent research has shown that, although young children have a substantial knowledge of beliefs as internal mental states, they have considerable difficulty in understanding how a false belief can lead to an outcome which is in conflict with a desire. However, this evidence has come from tasks which assume that children follow an experimenter's "implicatures" in conversation and interpret the question "Where will a person (with the false belief) look for the object?" to mean "Where will the person look first?" rather than "Where will the person have to look (or go to look) to find the object?" In our investigation, even 3-year-olds often responded correctly when asked to predict the initial behavior of a story character with a false belief. We discuss these results in terms of the conversational worlds of children and adults.     

Effects of Socioeconomic Status (SES) Information on Cognitive Ability Inferences: When Low-SES Students Make Use of a Self-Threatening Stereotype

Two studies tested whether students' socioeconomic status (SES) and academic achievement level moderate their use of the SES stereotype (i.e., the belief that the low-SES individuals are intellectually inferior to their high-SES counterparts). In Study 1, low versus high achievers with a low versus a high SES were given social class information (derived from a pilot study) about several targets and were then asked to infer these targets' memory ability. In Study 2, participants were given memory performance information about several targets and were then asked to infer these targets' possessions and cultural activities (i.e., SES indicators). In both studies, only the low-SES students generated stereotype-consistent inferences.     

Children's attention to beliefs in interactive persuasion tasks

Whether and when children can apply their developing understanding of belief to persuasion was examined using interactive puppet tasks. Children selected 1 of 2 arguments to persuade a puppet to do something (e.g., pet a dog) after hearing the puppet's belief (e.g., "I think puppies bite"). Across 2 studies, 132 children (ages 3-7 years) engaged in these persuasion tasks and in false-belief reasoning tasks, presented in puppet and story formats. Belief-relevant argument selection increased with age, as did appropriate reasoning about false beliefs, and occurred more in puppet than story tasks. Results suggest that improvements in belief reasoning in early childhood may be reflected in social interactions such as persuasion.     

听障儿童错误信念理解与谎言理解的关系：情绪理解的调节作用

目的：本研究主要探讨听障儿童自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系,以及情绪理解在其中的调节作用。方法：实验一采用错误信念理解和谎言理解来探讨自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系。实验二增加了情绪理解任务,并探讨情绪理解在错误信念理解和谎言理解之间的背后机制。结果：(1)听障儿童他人错误信念理解、谎言意图理解的正确率显著不如典型发展儿童,且他人错误信念理解越好,越容易进行真假信息辨别和谎言意图理解;(2)典型发展儿童自我/他人错误信念理解越准确,谎言意图理解越好：(3)当听障儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我/他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断具有正向预测作用;(4)典型发展儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我错误信念对真假信息辨别有正向预测作用,他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断、真假信息辨别有正向预测作用。结论：这些研究结果不仅表明听障儿童他人错误信念理解对谎言理解具有解释作用,而且推动高情绪理解在谎言理解中的促进作用,以及表明高情绪理解对错误信念理解与谎言理解中的调节作用更加显著。     

The ontogeny of intent‐based normative judgments

When evaluating norm transgressions, children begin to show some sensitivity to the agent's intentionality around preschool age. However, the specific developmental trajectories of different forms of such intent‐based judgments and their cognitive underpinnings are still largely unclear. The current studies, therefore, systematically investigated the development of intent‐based normative judgments as a function of two crucial factors: (a) the type of the agent's mental state underlying a normative transgression, and (b) the type of norm transgressed (moral versus conventional). In Study 1, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children as well as adults were presented with vignettes in which an agent transgressed either a moral or a conventional norm. Crucially, she did so either intentionally, accidentally (not intentionally at all) or unknowingly (intentionally, yet based on a false belief regarding the outcome). The results revealed two asymmetries in children's intent‐based judgments. First, all age groups showed greater sensitivity to mental state information for moral compared to conventional transgressions. Second, children's (but not adults') normative judgments were more sensitive to the agent's intention than to her belief. Two subsequent studies investigated this asymmetry in children more closely and found evidence that it is based on performance factors: children are able in principle to take into account an agent's false belief in much the same way as her intentions, yet do not make belief‐based judgments in many existing tasks (like that of Study 1) due to their inferential complexity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a more systematic understanding of the development of intent‐based normative judgment.     

The developmental paradox of false belief understanding: a dual-system solution

We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belief understanding in terms of a single system, (ii) fail to provide psychological concepts that are sufficiently fine-grained to capture the cognitive requirements for the various manifestations of false belief understanding, and (iii) ignore questions about system interaction. Second, we present a dual-system solution to the developmental paradox of false belief understanding that combines a layered model of perspective taking with an inhibition-selection-representation mechanism that operates on different levels. We discuss recent experimental findings that shed light on the interaction between these two systems, and suggest a number of directions for future research.