REASONS AND REASON REVISITED: ANOTHER REPLY TO MORRISON

In a previous article, Katherine Morrison (1999) argued that in my book Back to Reality: A Critique of Postmodern Theory in Psychotherapy (Held, 1995) I failed to accept the "strictly epistemological" aim of the narrative therapy movement. In the present article she reiterates the same objections, and adds the new criticism that I perceive epistemological oscillations in the writings of narrative therapists where there are none. In my present response I summarize my prior response to Morrison's (1999) critique (Held, 1999a), and I then respond to her new objections by showing how the conflation between epistemology and ontology that she attributes to me reflects her own confusion rather than mine.     

RELIGIOUS REASONS AND PUBLIC POLICY

Most Liberals hold that public policies ought always be justifiable by reference to public reasons; that citizens should also refrain from advocacy in the absence of such reasons; and that exclusively religious reasons cannot be public reasons. This is challenged by Paul Weithman and Christopher Eberle. Both argue that basic liberal principles permit citizens in some circumstances to advance exclusively religious reasons, and in particular that Rawls's notions of reasonableness (Weithman) and the strains of commitment (Eberle) can be used in defence of this position. I argue that neither makes out his case, and that no plausible case has been made against the standard Liberal view.     

BASIC REASONS AND FIRST PHILOSOPHY: A COHERENTIST VIEW OF REASONS

This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by formulating and explaining the basic reasons dilemma. This dilemma reveals a wavering attitude that coherentists have had toward basic reasons. More importantly, the basic reasons dilemma focuses our attention on the central problems that afflict coherentist views of basic beliefs. By reflecting on the basic reasons dilemma, I formulate three desiderata that any viable coherentist account of basic beliefs must satisfy. I argue that the account on offer satisfies these desiderata.     

REALISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE: A PROBLEM FOR BURGE

Philosophical Studies -     

THE EXPERIENCE OF GOD AND THE WORLD: CHRISTIANITY'S REASONS FOR CONSIDERING PANENTHEISM A VIABLE OPTION

What reasons and resources can Christian theology find for developing a panentheist position that is also able to engage with contemporary science? By taking its point of departure in basic human experiences, Christian theology can, even in a Trinitarian fashion, be developed as a way to understand God's presence in the world as a presence where the actual occurrences point towards God's own work. This point is especially related to the experience of love. Furthermore, God's presence can be understood as sacramental in the Augustinian sense. Moreover, the contributions of the Danish philosopher of religion Knud E. Løgstrup on God's presence and transcendence, as well as Niels Henrik Gregersen's elaborations on deep incarnation. Prove to offer important reasons for considering panentheism a viable option for the articulation of Christian theology.     

KIERKEGAARD AND EVANS ON THE PROBLEM OF ABRAHAM

A significant challenge faces any ethic that endorses the view that divine commands are sufficient to impose moral obligations; in this paper, I focus on Kierkegaard's ethic, in particular. The challenge to be addressed is the “modernized” problem of Abraham, popularized especially by Fear and Trembling: the dilemma that an agent faces when a being claiming to be God issues a command to the agent that, by the agent's own lights, seems not to be the kind of command that a loving God would issue. Against a solution to this problem proposed by C. Stephen Evans in Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love, I argue that Kierkegaard regards this scenario as never actually resulting in a fully responsible agent's performance of some horrendous action on account of her non‐culpable misinterpretation of God's will and/or failure to discern correctly whether a perceived moral imperative truly is divine in origin.     

DIRECT AND COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF RESTRAINTS AND RESTRAINT FADING

Mechanical restraints are commonly used to reduce the risks associated with severe self-injurious behavior (SIB), but may result in movement restriction and adverse side effects (e.g., bone demineralization). Restraint fading may provide a method for decreasing SIB while increasing movement and reducing these side effects. In the current investigation, rigid arm sleeves and restraint fading (gradually reducing the rigidity of the sleeves) were used with 3 clients who engaged in hand-to-head SIB. Restraints and fading reduced the hand-to-head SIB of all clients. However, for 1 client, the addition of a water mist procedure further reduced SIB to near-zero levels. For a 2nd client, another form of SIB developed that was not prevented by the rigid sleeves. For a 3rd client, a topography of SIB that was not physically prevented by the rigid sleeves was also reduced when restraints and fading were introduced.