The ups and downs of thinking about a successful other: self‐construals and the consequences of social comparisons

We hypothesized that the consequences of upward social comparisons are mediated by independent versus interdependent content of self‐construals. Independent self‐construals emphasize personal uniqueness; thus comparison to an outstanding other should undermine one's sense of uniqueness and lower current self‐evaluations. Conversely, interdependent self‐construals focus on interpersonal connectedness. Hence, interdependent individuals should be able to bask in the reflected success of a personally relevant other in an upward comparison task, thus increasing self‐evaluations. In a study involving 66 US undergraduates the latter predictions were supported. The psychological dimension of interdependence predicted differential outcomes of upward social comparisons, but this was not the case for the dimension of independence. Also, differential consequences of social comparison were more pronounced for current self‐evaluations than for participants' possible selves. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From seeing to being: subliminal social comparisons affect implicit and explicit self-evaluations

The authors hypothesize that social comparisons can have automatic influences on self-perceptions. This was tested by determining whether subliminal exposure to comparison information influences implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Study 1 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information increased the accessibility of the self. Study 2 revealed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information resulted in a contrast effect on explicit self-evaluation. Study 3 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information affects self-evaluations more easily than it affects mood or evaluations of other people. Studies 4 and 5 replicated these self-evaluation effects and extended them to implicit measures. Study 6 showed that automatic comparisons are responsive to a person's perceptual needs, such that they only occur when people are uncertain about themselves. Implications for theories of social cognition, judgment, and comparison are discussed.     

Compartmentalization: A Window on the Defensive Self

Most people hold both positive and negative beliefs about themselves. The way individuals organize, or structure, these beliefs in their self‐concepts can facilitate realistic acceptance and confrontation of negative self‐beliefs (integration), or defensive avoidance and denial of negative self‐beliefs (compartmentalization). This article focuses on the distinction between individuals with a realistic, secure self and a defensive, fragile self. We present evidence that compartmentalization is associated with several indicators of a defensive, fragile self, such as contingent self‐esteem and unstable self‐evaluations. In addition, individuals with this structure are likely to engage in defensive processes that enhance or protect the self. This model of self‐organization can provide a window on the defensive self, allowing researchers to observe the process by which individuals think about and defensively avoid negative self‐beliefs.     

Evaluative contrast in social comparison: the role of distinct and shared features of the self and comparison others

Self‐other comparisons frequently evoke contrastive reactions, especially when the comparison dimension is relevant and when people strive to maintain or preserve a positive self‐evaluation. In three studies, normal‐weight women were asked to gauge satisfaction with their body weight. In Study 1, self‐evaluation was affected by accessible distinctive information either referring to the self or to comparison others. Studies 2 and 3 tested whether the evaluative contrast observed in Study 1 is reduced when shared features receive greater weight. Consistent with the proposition that perceived similarity between self and comparison others renders assimilative reactions more likely, evaluative contrast was markedly reduced when similarities were stressed prior to the comparison process, either by suggesting that one shares certain characteristics with others unrelated to the comparison dimension or by increasing the identification with the comparison other through an intergroup contrast.. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social and Temporal Comparisons Made by Individuals Living With HIV Disease: Relationships to Adherence Behavior1

When faced with the uncertainty of serious illness, individuals cope by comparing themselves to other people (social comparisons) and to other times in their lives (temporal comparisons). Participants were 44 individuals being treated for HIV who completed questionnaires measuring comparisons, adherence, and self‐efficacy; 34 also completed qualitative interviews that were coded for comparisons. High levels of comparison to worse‐off others, worse‐off past selves, and better‐off future selves were prevalent. Comparisons to worse‐off others resulting in positive affect were associated with greater medication adherence; comparisons to better‐off others resulting in negative affect were related to worse adherence. Self‐efficacy to adhere mediated the relationship between comparison and adherence. Individuals who are uncertain about treatment outcomes may engage in social comparison to gain specific knowledge about adherence.     

The effects of social context,source fairness,and perceived self‐source similarity on social influence: a self‐categorisation analysis

Based upon a self‐categorisation analysis of social influence (Turner, 1991), we predicted that individuals who self‐categorise with the source of a communication would align their own private attitudes more closely with the source when that source was distributively fair rather than unfair in an intragroup context. We expected this pattern to reverse in an intergroup context when the unfairness was ingroup favouring. These expectations were confirmed in a laboratory experiment (N=101). The data suggest that neither source similarity nor source fairness serve simply as persuasion cues to which individuals thoughtlessly conform. We argue, instead that, once self‐categorised, individuals: (1) actively attend to an ingroup member's behaviours and the context in which they occur, and (2) are influenced only by a source who provides some form of social identity enhancement, either by being fair in an intragroup context (Lind & Tyler, 1988) or ingroup favouring in an intergroup context (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Retracted:When different is better: performance following upward comparison

The attainability of upward social comparisons is known to affect self‐evaluative responses. The consequences for performance, however, are less well understood. We suggest that demoralizing upward comparisons with unattainable targets may lead to improved performance when the target and performance domains are mismatched. For example, comparison with a target that has been successful in an analytic domain should lead to better performance in a verbal domain. This improvement in performance occurs because increased performance in alternative domains provides an opportunity for self‐evaluation maintenance. In three studies, we demonstrate that upward comparisons to targets whose successes are perceived as threatening lead to improved performance when the task and performance domain do not match, but no improvements when the domains match. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do I get better looking each day? Changes in self‐perceptions of attractiveness as a function of temporal perspective

Do people perceive themselves as becoming more attractive across time? The present studies investigated whether individuals (a) judge their previous self as physically less attractive than their current self and (b) judge their future self to be physically more attractive than their current self. The studies also investigated when temporal biasing of attractiveness is most likely to occur. In Study 1, students rated their present and past attractiveness. The results revealed that participants' ratings of past attractiveness were lower than current ratings, but only among individuals for whom attractiveness was important to their self‐concept. In Study 2, participants rated their present attractiveness and their expected attractiveness in 5 years. The results revealed that ratings of future attractiveness were higher than current ratings, but only among individuals who frequently engage in social comparisons. The implications of the results are discussed with respect to self‐appraisals of attractiveness and psychological well‐being. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mnemic neglect is not an artifact of expectancy: The moderating role of defensive pessimism

Research supporting the mnemic neglect model finds that people more easily recall positive than negative personality feedback, even when only asked to imagine that the feedback is real. The same bias is not found when people are asked to recall information about other people. Despite evidence that these findings reflect self‐enhancement motives, more research is needed to rule out the possibility that they instead simply reflect expectancies. Results supported the mnemic neglect model, and revealed that expectancies predicted recall only for a subgroup of participants who did not demonstrate the self–other recall bias characteristic of mnemic neglect: defensive pessimists, who are more likely than other people to process social information by comparing it to their expectancies. These findings suggest that mnemic neglect is not an artifact of expectancies, and is not driven by other self‐evaluation motives (such as self‐verification or self‐assessment). Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wage comparisons with similar and dissimilar others

Considerable research has been completed on the link between social comparisons and employee satisfaction. Surprisingly, however, few of those studies contrast the effects of various comparisons with others on pay satisfaction. Based on social comparison theory, we expected that comparisons with similar others would be more important predictors of pay satisfaction than comparisons with dissimilar others. Across four studies, the degree of similarity of the comparison other was varied. In Studies 1 and 2, respondents made pay comparisons inside or outside the organization. In Studies 3 and 4, respondents made pay comparisons with referents in the same and different occupations. In all four studies we found that while similar others did provide employees with important information that affected their satisfaction, so did information about dissimilar others. We suggest that the importance of a job in our self‐definitions, with pay level being among the most overt markers, may account for our findings. Using pay as a yardstick may lead us all to widen our search for information about others, including ordinarily discrepant others. Alternative explanations and directions for research are discussed.     

IS THE SELF-CONCEPT A HABITUAL REFERENT IN JUDGMENTS OF SIMILARITY?

Abstract— People typically provide higher similarity ratings in response to the question "How similar is the typical preppie to you?" than to the question "How similar are you to the typical preppie?" Observed asymmetries in comparisons of the self and person prototypes have been offered as evidence that the self-concept acts as a habitual reference point in social judgment However, such a task does not test the habitual placement of a concept in the referent position of a comparison. In this study, participants judged the similarity between the self and person prototypes in response to linguistic (forced directional) queries or to spatial (nonforced) queries in which the self was positioned above or below the person concept Participants also rated pairs of familiar and unfamiliar countries in a similar manner, to replicate and extend the work of Tversky (1977) Expected asymmetries were observed in forced comparisons. The self and the familiar country were seen as more similar to other people and less familiar countries, respectively, when the former concepts served as the referent of a comparison than when they served as the subject Asymmetries were not observed in the nonforced conditions, and mean similarity in these conditions was of the same magnitude as in the forced condition in which the more familiar stimulus was the referent of the comparison. This result provides the first direct evidence that the self serves as a habitual referent in similarity judgments     

Paradoxical effects of praise and criticism: Social,dimensional and temporal comparisons

Background. When developing a domain‐specific academic self‐concept, students are not restricted to social comparisons; they may also make temporal or dimensional comparisons. Aims. The main purpose of this study was to examine whether these different types of comparison trigger paradoxical effects of praise and criticism in the sense described by Meyer (1992) . University students participated in Study 1 (N=120) and Study 4 (N=83). The Study 2 sample consisted of 180 seventh to ninth grade students, and Study 3 investigated paradoxical effects with a sample of 130 elementary school students. Methods. Participants were presented with vignettes describing the results of 2 students (social comparison condition) versus 1 student in 2 subjects (dimensional comparison) versus 1 student in 2 subsequent tests (temporal comparison). In all cases, the results were identical. Participants were then informed about a teacher's response to these results (praise vs. criticism vs. neutral response), and were asked to estimate the ability of the 2 stimulus persons. Results. Study 1 and Study 2 revealed that dimensional, as well as social, comparisons following praise and criticism elicit paradoxical effects of perceived ability, reflected in corresponding estimations of student effort and teacher expectancies. There were no paradoxical effects following temporal comparisons. Study 3 did not reveal any paradoxical effects, thereby supporting the assumption that the occurrence of such effects depends on the level of cognitive development. Study 4 showed that the paradoxical effects found in Study 1 and 2 occur even when the sanctioned and the neutral achievement are presented independently. Conclusions. Dimensional comparisons, which have been largely overlooked in the past, play a major role in ability inferences.     

Different selves have different effects: self-activation and defensive social comparison

Three studies show that different forms of self-activation have differential influences on the processing of social comparison information. Activating neutral self-conceptions results in defensive processing of threatening social comparison information (Study 1). Participants maintain favorable self-evaluations in the face of upward comparison and rate the upward target of comparison negatively. Activating positive self-conceptions results in non-defensive processing of threatening social comparison information (Study 2). Participants endorse negative self-evaluations following upward comparison and rate the upward target of comparison positively. Activating negative self-conceptions maximizes defensive processing of threatening social comparison information (Study 3). Participants maintain favorable self-evaluations in the face of upward comparison and rate both upward and downward targets of comparison negatively. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for strategies to maintain self-esteem in the face of threatening comparisons.     

Assimilation and contrast in social comparisons as a consequence of self‐construal activation

We extended existing research about self‐construal activation to the study of social comparisons, specifically to self–other similarity ratings. Independent self‐knowledge substantiates the notion of dissimilarity, whereas interdependent self‐knowledge implies similarity with others. Therefore, perceived self–other similarity was predicted to decrease after independent and increase after interdependent self‐knowledge priming. However, we expected such assimilation effects to occur only if the priming was subtle, but contrast effects if it was overt. In order to test this hypothesis, we developed a scrambled sentences test for priming the respective self‐knowledge. The unscrambled sentences described the self either in terms of independence or interdependence. The subtlety of this priming was manipulated by having participants write down either the full sentences (overt priming) or only the remaining word in each item (subtle priming). Results confirmed the predictions. Underlying cognitive processes of the effects are discussed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Misery Avoids Company: Selective Social Comparisons to Photographic Online Profiles

Social networking site usage may affect subjective well‐being. Two experiments examined how selective exposure to profiles of other users facilitated mood management via self‐enhancing social comparisons. In Study 1, when given detailed impression management cues, such as photographs and status updates, users in a negative mood sought upward rather than downward social comparisons. Study 2 found that relatively low levels of group identification with the social networking site community led to upward social comparisons by users in a negative mood. High group identifiers spent more time viewing upward comparisons, regardless of mood. Regarding exposure effects, upward social comparisons to profiles improved subsequent mood when the comparison involved career success. High group identifiers experienced greater positive mood following upward social comparisons.     

Categorizing at the group‐level in response to intragroup social comparisons: a self‐categorization theory integration of self‐evaluation and social identity motives

Two experiments examined how people respond to upward social comparisons in terms of the extent to which they categorize the self and the source of comparison within the same social group. Self‐evaluation maintenance theory (SEM) suggests that upward ingroup comparisons can lead to the rejection of a shared categorization, because shared categorization makes the comparison more meaningful and threatening. In contrast, social identity theory (SIT) suggests that upward ingroup comparisons can lead to the acceptance of shared categorization because a high‐performing ingroup member enhances the ingroup identity. We attempted to resolve these differing predictions using self‐categorization theory, arguing that SEM applies to contexts that make salient one's personal identity, and SIT applies to contexts that make collective identity salient. Consistent with this perspective, the level of identity activated in context moderated the effect of an upward ingroup comparison on the acceptance of shared social categorization. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Profit maximization versus disadvantageous inequality: the impact of self‐categorization

Choice behavior researchers (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992 ) have found that individuals tend to choose a more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal payoff (e.g., self—$600/other—$800) over a less profitable but equal one (e.g., self—$500/other—$500); greater profit trumps interpersonal social comparison concerns in the choice setting. We suggest, however, that self‐categorization (e.g., Hogg, 2000 ) can shift interpersonal social comparison concerns to the intergroup level and make trading disadvantageous inequality for greater profit more difficult. Studies 1–3 show that profit maximization diminishes when recipients belong to different social categories (e.g., genders, universities). Study 2 further implicates self‐categorization, as self‐categorized individuals tend to forgo profit whether making a choice for themselves or another ingroup member. Study 3, moreover, reveals that social categorization alone is not sufficient to diminish profit maximization; individuals must self‐categorize and identify with their categorization. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What Do People Infer from Social Comparisons? Bridges between Social Comparison and Person Perception

Human judgment is basically comparative, with self‐judgments in particular being based on social comparison. Not surprisingly, much research has focused on how self‐comparisons shape comparers’ self‐views on the specific comparison dimension. We argue that both comparers and observers may, and do, draw various other inferences and that they do so from both self‐comparisons and other‐comparisons. In both cases they may draw inferences from (a) the fact that social comparison has taken place, (b) the allocation of the target and referent roles, and (c) the stated relationship between the target and the referent. In order to show how exploring these inferences may lead social comparison research into new and exciting directions, we point out some unanswered questions about them.     

We can do it: the interplay of construal orientation and social comparisons under threat

The authors investigated how a collective self-construal orientation in combination with positive social comparisons "turns off" the negative effects of stereotype threat. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that stereotype threat led to increased accessibility of participants' collective self ("we"). Experiment 2 showed that this feeling of "we-ness" in the stereotype threat condition centered on the participants' stereotyped group membership and not on other important social groups (e.g., students). Experiment 3 indicated that in threat situations, when participants' collective self is accessible, positive social comparison information led to improved math test performance and less concern, whereas in nonthreat situations, when the collective self is less accessible, positive comparison information led to worse test performance and more concern. Our final experiment revealed that under stereotype threat, only those comparison targets who are competent in the relevant domain (math), rather than in domains unrelated to math (athletics), enhanced participants' math test performance.     

Accepting Threatening Information: Self–Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases

Why do people resist evidence that challenges the validity of long–held beliefs? And why do they persist in maladaptive behavior even when persuasive information or personal experience recommends change? We argue that such defensive tendencies are driven, in large part, by a fundamental motivation to protect the perceived worth and integrity of the self. Studies of social–political debate, health–risk assessment, and responses to team victory or defeat have shown that people respond to information in a less defensive and more open–minded manner when their self–worth is buttressed by an affirmation of an alternative source of identity. Self–affirmed individuals are more likely to accept information that they would otherwise view as threatening, and subsequently to change their beliefs and even their behavior in a desirable fashion. Defensive biases have an adaptive function for maintaining self–worth, but maladaptive consequences for promoting change and reducing social conflict.