Dissimilar effects of task‐relevant and interpersonal threat on independent–interdependent self‐construal in individuals with high self‐esteem

Previous research has indicated that individuals with high trait self‐esteem (HSEs) become more independent and less interdependent after experiencing a task‐relevant threat. However, these studies have not investigated other sources of ego threats, such as interpersonal threats. Therefore, the moderating effects of the degree of trait self‐esteem on task‐relevant and interpersonal ego threats were investigated in relation to independent, or interdependent self‐construal. It was predicted that in HSEs, the level of task‐relevant stress would be positively–negatively related to their independence–interdependence, whereas the level of interpersonal stress would be negatively–positively related to their independence–interdependence. In individuals with low trait self‐esteem (LSEs), the two types of stresses and independent–interdependent self‐construal may not have a significant relationship. We conducted a questionnaire survey with undergraduates. Correlational analysis of the results indicated that in HSEs, greater task‐relevant stress was related to heightened independence, whereas greater interpersonal stress had the opposite effect, indicating lower independence and heightened interdependence. However, these stresses were not related to the self‐construal of LSEs. These findings suggest that task‐relevant and interpersonal threat could have differential effects on independent and interdependent self‐construal for HSEs, but not in LSEs.     

Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory: self-esteem differences in the experience and anticipation of success

Successes--defined broadly as meeting important standards or receiving positive evaluations--are widely assumed to be enjoyed equally by people with high self-esteem (HSEs) and low self-esteem (LSEs). Three studies examined the contradictory hypothesis that HSEs react more favorably to success than do LSEs and that success brings about certain unfavorable consequences for LSEs. Undergraduate participants reacted to a laboratory-manipulated success (Studies 1 and 2) or imagined highly positive events in the future (Study 3). Self-esteem differences emerged in anxiety, thoughts about the self, and (in Study 3) thoughts about non-self-related aspects of the event. LSEs were more anxious than HSEs after succeeding, success improved HSEs' self-relevant thoughts but not LSEs', and LSEs focused more on success's negative aspects.     

When self-disclosure goes awry: Negative consequences of revealing personal failures for lower self-esteem individuals

Despite the potential benefits of self-disclosure, individuals with lower self-esteem (LSEs) tend to avoid self-revelations. The present study investigated the role of self-esteem in predicting detrimental responses to the disclosure of a personal failure. We employed a novel experimental design where all participants experienced a lab-induced stressor (failure feedback on a competence test) and half were randomly assigned to disclose this information to their dating partner. In contrast to LSEs who concealed the personal failure, LSEs who disclosed the failure reported several negative consequences that may further contribute to relationship-based distress. However, individuals higher in self-esteem (HSEs) benefitted from disclosing the personal failure in comparison to LSEs who disclosed and HSEs who concealed the failure. We discuss the consequences of disclosing personal failures to partners for HSEs and LSEs.     

Testing sociometer theory: Self-esteem and the importance of acceptance for social decision-making

The present study examined the sociometer’s role in guiding social behavior. The authors hypothesized that low self-esteem people (LSEs), but not high self-esteem people (HSEs), base their social decision-making on acceptance. Undergraduate participants were invited to join a social group and were led to believe that acceptance either was guaranteed, or was likely but not guaranteed. HSEs always were eager to join the group, whereas LSEs were keen to join the group only when acceptance was guaranteed. Furthermore, mediation analyses indicated that LSEs’ willingness to join the group was dependent on their anticipated social outcomes, which were contingent on acceptance from the group, whereas acceptance did not affect HSEs’ decision-making. These results support a sociometer account of social decision-making.     

Perceived regard explains self- esteem differences in expressivity

Baumeister, Tice, and Hutton proposed that individuals with low self-esteem (LSEs) adopt a more cautious, self-protective self-presentational style than individuals with high self-esteem (HSEs). The authors predicted that LSEs' self-protectiveness leads them to be less expressive-less revealing of their thoughts and feelings-with others than HSEs, and that this self-esteem difference is mediated by their perceptions of the interaction partner's regard for them. Two correlational studies supported these predictions (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, LSEs became more expressive when their perceived regard was experimentally heightened-when they imagined speaking to someone who was unconditionally accepting rather than judgmental (Study 3) and when their perceptions of regard were increased through Marigold, Holmes, and Ross's compliment-reframing task (Study 4). These findings suggest that LSEs' expressiveness can be heightened through interventions that reduce their concerns about social acceptance.     

More than words: reframing compliments from romantic partners fosters security in low self-esteem individuals

Although people with low self-esteem (LSEs) doubt their value to their romantic partners, they tend to resist positive feedback from their partners. This resistance undermines their relationships and has been difficult to overcome in past research. The authors investigated whether LSEs could be induced to take their partners' kind words to heart by manipulating how abstractly they described a recent compliment. In 3 studies, LSEs felt more positively about the compliments, about themselves, and about their relationships--as positively as people with high self-esteem (HSEs) felt--when they were encouraged to describe the meaning and significance of the compliments. The effects of this abstract meaning manipulation were still evident 2 weeks later. Thus, when prompted, LSEs can reframe affirmations from their partners to be as meaningful as HSEs generally believe them to be and, consequently, can feel just as secure and satisfied with their romantic relationships.     

Seeing failure in your life: Imagery perspective determines whether self-esteem shapes reactions to recalled and imagined failure

The present research reveals that when it comes to recalling and imagining failure in one's life, changing how one looks at the event can change its impact on well-being; however, the nature of the effect depends on an aspect of one's self-concept, namely, self-esteem. Five studies measured or manipulated the visual perspective (internal first-person vs. external third-person) individuals used to mentally image recalled or imagined personal failures. It has been proposed that imagery perspective determines whether people's reactions to an event are shaped bottom-up by concrete features of the event (first-person) or top-down by their self-concept (third-person; L. K. Libby & R. P. Eibach, 2011b). Evidence suggests that differences in the self-concepts of individuals with low and high self-esteem (LSEs and HSEs) are responsible for self-esteem differences in reaction to failure, leading LSEs to have more negative thoughts and feelings about themselves (e.g., M. H. Kernis, J. Brockner, & B. S. Frankel, 1989). Thus, the authors predicted, and found, that low self-esteem was associated with greater overgeneralization--operationalized as negativity in accessible self-knowledge and feelings of shame--only when participants had pictured failure from the third-person perspective and not from the first-person. Further, picturing failure from the third-person, rather than first-person, perspective, increased shame and the negativity of accessible knowledge among LSEs, whereas it decreased shame among HSEs. Results help to distinguish between different theoretical accounts of how imagery perspective functions and have implications for the study of top-down and bottom-up influences on self-judgment and emotion, as well as for the role of perspective and abstraction in coping.     

Adult attachment and feedback‐seeking patterns in relationships and work

Adults with different attachment orientations rely on different areas of life to maintain self‐views. This paper reports two studies that examine the link between attachment and feedback‐seeking patterns in interpersonal and competence‐related domains. Participants in Study 1 imagined receiving feedback from a friend. Participants in Study 2 completed dyadic tasks and were promised feedback from interpersonal‐ and competence‐relevant sources. Across both studies, secure individuals consistently chose the most positive feedback. Individuals high in attachment avoidance sought negative feedback over positive, although dismissing‐avoidant individuals sought positive hypothetical feedback about autonomy. Study 2 further suggested that highly avoidant individuals were more open to negative feedback than positive feedback and than were secure individuals. Moreover, individuals high in attachment anxiety failed to seek positive interpersonal feedback but pursued interpersonal over competence feedback. Results highlight the role of feedback‐seeking in maintenance of positive or negative self‐views for adults with different attachment orientations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reactions to acceptance and rejection: Effects of level and sequence of relational evaluation

Two experiments examined the effects of various levels and sequences of acceptance and rejection on emotion, ratings of self and others, and behavior. In Experiment 1, participants who differed in agreeableness received one of five levels of acceptance or rejection feedback, believing that they either would or would not interact with the person who accepted or rejected them. In Experiment 2, participants who differed in rejection sensitivity received one of four patterns of feedback over time, reflecting constant acceptance, increasing acceptance, increasing rejection, or constant rejection. In both studies, rejection elicited greater anger, sadness, and hurt feelings than acceptance, as well as an increased tendency to aggress toward the rejector. In general, more extreme rejection did not lead to stronger reactions than mild rejection, but increasing rejection evoked more negative reactions than constant rejection. Agreeableness and rejection-sensitivity scores predicted participants’ responses but did not moderate the effects of interpersonal acceptance and rejection.     

Threatened selves and differential prejudice expression by White and Black perceivers

Previous theorizing suggests that often-stigmatized individuals may be just as likely, if not more likely, than infrequently stigmatized individuals to protect self-regard by derogating members of low-status groups after receiving negative feedback from high-status others. Often-stigmatized individuals, however, can discount criticism from these high-status others as reflecting prejudice, thereby making outgroup derogation unnecessary as an esteem-protective strategy. Replicating past research, White participants in Experiment 1 expressed prejudices after receiving negative feedback from a White evaluator; as predicted, however, Black participants did not. In Experiment 2, participants instead received negative feedback from Black evaluators (evaluators more likely to threaten Black participants’ self-regard). Here, contrary to previous theorizing, Black participants expressed prejudices, not toward another low-status group, but toward high-status Whites. In all, findings reveal flaws in previous assumptions that frequently stigmatized individuals may be especially prone to devalue lower-status others after rejection or negative feedback from members of higher-status groups.     

Can expressions of anger enhance creativity? A test of the emotions as social information (EASI) model

We investigated whether expressions of anger can enhance creative performance. Building on the emotions as social information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009), we predicted that the interpersonal effects of anger expressions on creativity depend on the target's epistemic motivation (EM)—the desire to develop an accurate understanding of the situation (Kruglanski, 1989). Participants worked on an idea generation task in the role of “generator.” Then they received standardized feedback and tips from an “evaluator” (a trained actor) via a video setup. The feedback was delivered in an angry way or in a neutral way (via facial expressions, vocal intonation, and bodily postures). Participants with high EM exhibited greater fluency, originality, and flexibility after receiving angry rather than neutral feedback, whereas those with low EM were less creative after receiving angry feedback. These effects were mediated by task engagement and motivation, which anger increased (decreased) among high (low) EM participants.     

Trait Agreeableness and Social Status Moderate Behavioral Responsiveness to Communal Behavior

The present study examined the influence of trait Agreeableness and its interaction with social role status on interpersonal correspondence as reflected in the within‐person relation between a person's communal (agreeable‐quarrelsome) behavior and perceptions of the interaction partner's communal behavior. We used a sample of working adults (original data set: 113 participants and 12,303 interpersonal events; constrained data set in the work setting: 109 participants and 3,193 interpersonal events) and an event‐contingent recording procedure to assess behavior in naturalistic interpersonal events. The results of multilevel modeling indicated that interpersonal correspondence was lower for high trait Agreeableness persons than for low trait Agreeableness persons, apparently due to less responsiveness to more disagreeable behavior by the other person in an interaction. High Agreeableness persons manifest greater interpersonal correspondence when in a high‐status role than when in a low‐status role, apparently by increasing responsiveness to disagreeable behavior from others. The results imply that high social role status may influence the effortful control process of high trait Agreeableness persons over their behavioral reactions to others' disagreeable behavior during interpersonal interactions.     

Discrimination of a low‐status outgroup: the role of ingroup threat

In the present study it was predicted that a threat to the ingroup by a high‐status outgroup would lead its members to increase the level of derogation of a lower‐status outgroup. Two experimental groups of psychologists were informed about the opinions (positive or negative) allegedly held by medical doctors regarding clinical psychologists whereas participants in the control condition did not receive any feedback. Later, all participants were asked to judge psychologists, social workers (low‐status outgroup), and medical doctors along professional and personality dimensions. As predicted, compared to participants in the positive feedback and in the control conditions, negative feedback participants increased derogation toward social workers but not toward medical doctors along the professional traits relevant to the feedback. Results are interpreted in the context of Downward Comparison Theory (Wills, 1981 ). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Good,you identified the suspect…but please ignore this feedback’: can warnings eliminate the effects of post‐identification feedback?

The present experiments focus on whether the post‐identification feedback effect can be reduced by providing participants with warnings. Participants viewed a crime on video and identified a suspect from a target‐absent lineup (Experiment 1) or target‐present lineup (Experiment 2). Participants then received positive feedback, negative feedback or no feedback. Half of the participants received a warning saying their feedback was randomly generated by the computer, and the other half received no warning. Robust post‐identification feedback effects were observed in both experiments in the no warning condition. These effects were largely eliminated when participants received a warning. In Experiments 3 and 4, we failed to find an ameliorative effect of a forensically realistic warning. These results indicate that warnings can reduce the effect of post‐identification feedback in principle, but the application of warnings in practice may be more difficult. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceiving high social mindfulness during interpersonal interaction promotes cooperative behaviours

Social mindfulness refers to individual's respect and protection of others’ options in interpersonal interaction. The object‐choosing task is a traditional paradigm to assess social mindfulness. Individuals with high social mindfulness would choose the nonunique object so that others would have more options; on the contrary, individuals with low social mindfulness would choose the unique object, which limits others’ choices. No prior study has examined whether perceiving people with different levels of social mindfulness affects one's cooperation. Based on this background, two experiments were conducted to address this question. In both experiments, a confederate participant's (Player A's) social mindfulness was manipulated by setting the frequency that Player A chose the unique and the nonunique objects. Then, participants were asked to interact with Player A in the public goods game (Experiment 1) or in the centipede game (Experiment 2). Convergent results showed that compared to those interacting with a socially unmindful person, participants interacting with a person perceived as socially mindful contributed more resources in the public goods game and chose to pass on more rounds in the centipede game. These findings suggest that perception of others’ high social mindfulness enhances one's own cooperative behaviour.     

Compensatory biases after ingroup threat: ‘yeah,but we have a good personality’

It was hypothesized that participants who strongly identify with the ingroup and receive unfavorable feedback about their group in one domain would compensate on alternative dimensions. A group of emergency medical service volunteers received negative, positive or no feedback on their volunteer organization and were asked to rate the ingroup and an outgroup on dimensions alternative to the feedback. As predicted, high identifiers showed an increase in ingroup favoritism after negative feedback (i.e. compensation) and a decrease after positive feedback (i.e. modesty effect). In contrast, low identifiers distanced themselves from the ingroup after negative feedback and accentuated self‐ingroup similarity after positive feedback. Results are discussed in relation to a schema‐maintenance model through compensation (Seta & Seta, 1993 ) and social identity theory. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fixated on rejection: Attentional blindness following socially rejecting faces in people with defensive self-esteem

People with defensive self-esteem (high explicit and low implicit self-esteem) respond more negatively to ego threat than do those with secure (high explicit and implicit) self-esteem. We examined whether they would also be more attentive to a cue indicating the presence of such threat–namely, a face signaling social rejection. In a rapid serial visual presentation task, participants with defensive self-esteem made more errors than those with secure self-esteem following a picture of a rejecting face than following either an accepting face or a negative control image. Our findings suggest a possible relationship between defensive self-esteem and rejection sensitivity. Potential negative ramifications of this sensitivity to rejection cues are discussed.     

Mindless resistance to persuasion: Low self‐control fosters the use of resistance‐promoting heuristics

In our consumer society, people are confronted on a daily basis with unsolicited persuasion attempts. The present research challenges the prevailing view that resisting persuasion is more likely to fail when consumers have low self‐control. Four experiments tested the hypothesis that impaired self‐regulation may actually facilitate resistance to persuasion when the influence context contains resistance‐promoting heuristics. Indeed, participants with low self‐control were less likely to comply with a persuasive request (Experiments 1 and 3), reported a less favourable attitude towards an advertised product (Experiment 2), and generated more negative responses towards a persuasive message (Experiment 4) than participants with high self‐control, when they could rely on resistance‐promoting heuristics: a violation of the norm of reciprocity (Experiments 1 and 3), an advertisement disclaimer (Experiment 2), or negative social proof (Experiment 4). Together, these studies demonstrate that contextual cues can bolster resistance when one does not carefully scrutinize an influence attempt.     

人际合作与冲突影响博弈决策的结果评价

人际合作与冲突是人际互动的两种主要形式, 在人类社会的发展中有着重要作用。脑成像研究表明, 当个体和人类同伴进行博弈时, 选择合作与选择冲突激活脑区的强度有所不同。但目前尚不清楚, 人际合作与冲突如何影响决策选择之后的结果评价过程。本研究采用Chicken Game任务对此问题进行了探讨, 研究记录了22名健康成人被试与人类同伴进行Chicken Game任务时的脑电活动。结果表明, 反馈负波(FRN)和P300不仅受到结果效价的影响, 同时也受到人际合作与冲突的影响。相对于选择冲突, 个体选择合作时, 输钱和赢钱反馈引发的FRN以及P300波幅差异更大。相关分析表明, RA (被试和解对方进攻)反馈引发的FRN波幅与接受该反馈后下一个trials中和解的选择率(以及总的和解率)呈显著的负相关。上述结果表明, 在社会博弈中, 合作增加了个体对博弈结果的预期, 从而引发更大的FRN效应; 并且合作共赢的结果所具有的物质意义与社会意义, 使其诱发更大的P300波幅。     

The reinstatement of dissonance and psychological discomfort following failed affirmations

The research in this article examined the consequences of a failed attempt to reduce dissonance through a self‐affirmation strategy. It was hypothesized that disconfirming participants' affirmations would reinstate psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. In Experiment 1, high‐dissonance participants who affirmed on a self‐relevant value scale and received disconforming feedback about their affirmations expressed greater psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994) than either affirmation‐only participants or low‐dissonance/affirmation disconformed participants. In Experiment 2, disconfirmation of an affirmation resulted in increased attitude change. The results of both experiments suggested that a failed attempt to reduce dissonance reinstates psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. We discuss how the reduction of psychological discomfort may play a role in the success of affirmations in reducing dissonance‐produced attitude change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.