Concepts or metacognition – What is the issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousness”

The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not so much conceptual but rather metacognitive abilities.     

Chronic occupational stressors, self-focused attention, and well-being: testing a cybernetic model of stress

By using a cybernetic approach to occupational stress, it was hypothesized that the relationship between chronic work stressors and strain would be stronger among individuals high in private self-consciousness than among individuals low in private self-consciousness. Moderated regression analyses, using a sample of 135 blue-collar workers, revealed strong support for this hypothesis. This finding is antithetical to prior research showing that self-focused attention may buffer the effect of acute life events (Mullen & Suls, 1982; Suls & Fletcher, 1985). The results of the present study in conjunction with prior research suggest that the type of stressor (acute vs. chronic) examined may be a boundary condition influencing the direction of Stressor X Self-Focused Attention interactions. Implications for future research and stress management are discussed.     

The elusive importance effect: more failure for the Jamesian perspective on the importance of importance in shaping self-esteem

ABSTRACT Following William James (1890/1963) , many leading self‐esteem researchers continue to support the Individual‐importance hypothesis—that the relation between specific facets of self‐concept and global self‐esteem depends on the importance an individual places on each specific facet. However, empirical support for the hypothesis is surprisingly elusive, whether evaluated in terms of an importance‐weighted average model, a generalized multiple regression approach for testing self‐concept‐by‐importance interactions, or idiographic approaches. How can actual empirical support for such an intuitively appealing and widely cited psychological principle be so elusive? Hardy and Moriarty (2006) , acknowledging this previous failure of the Individual‐importance hypothesis, claim to have solved the conundrum, demonstrating an innovative idiographic approach that provides clear support for it. However, a critical evaluation of their new approach, coupled with a reanalysis of their data, undermines their claims. Indeed, their data provide compelling support against the Individual‐importance hypothesis, which remains as elusive as ever.     

Adolescent loneliness, self-disclosure, and private self-consciousness: a longitudinal investigation

This study builds on an earlier investigation of the causal relations that exist among loneliness, self-disclosure, and private self-consciousness (Franzoi & Davis, 1985). Using structural equation techniques and a longitudinal (Year 1-Year 2) design, the present investigation tested a theoretical model that links these variables. Participants were 406 high school students. As in the previous study, results generally indicated a good fit between the theoretical model and the observed relations. In particular, however, this investigation provided new evidence concerning two alternative interpretations of the original Franzoi and Davis study. First, this study supports the original hypothesis that private self-consciousness leads to greater self-disclosure to peers, but it offers no support for the alternative view that such disclosure in turn increases private self-consciousness. Second, this investigation is somewhat equivocal with respect to the original hypothesis that greater self-disclosure reduces loneliness. Both this hypothesis and the alternative view that greater loneliness reduces self-disclosure, receive some support from the data in this study. Finally, the difficulty in obtaining significant longitudinal paths (from Year 1 to Year 2) suggests that the time lags in the variables' effects on one another are relatively short rather than long.     

Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?

As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self-consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self-consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.     

Shyness and PublicSelf-Consciousness: Additive orInteractive Relation withSocial Interaction?

Shy people are characterized as engaging in self-derogatory thinking leading to anxiousness and inhibition, while people who are publicly self-conscious are focused on the impression they create on others. In addition, public self-consciousness has been described as an antecedent of shyness. In the present research, we tested additive versus interactive hypotheses about the association of shyness and public self-consciousness with dysfunctional social interaction. Undergraduate men varying in shyness and public self-consciousness engaged in a conversation with an unfamiliar woman confederate. Following the conversation, subjects completed self-report measures focusing on their responses during the conversation. Only main effects for shyness and public self-consciousness were found, supporting an additive hypothesis. Shyness was related to all dependent variables reflecting a negative self-bias, while public self-consciousness was not. In particular, shyness was inversely related to the balance of subjects' positive and negative thoughts and to reported use of protective as well as avoidance of acquisitive self-presentation responses. Public self-consciousness was positively related to use of protective self-presentation responses but unrelated to acquisitive responses.     

Divergent influences of private and public self-consciousness in a compliance paradigm

A study was conducted to test the reasoning that two types of dispositional self-consciousness would be associated with two different influences on compliance behavior. The study utilized a paradigm in which subjects are induced to make incorrect responses on a perceptual task by means of simulated group pressure. Based upon results of previous research, the following predictions were made: that private self-consciousness—the disposition to be conscious of one's thoughts, feeling, and covert self-aspects—would be inversely correlated with compliance; and that public self-consciousness—the disposition to be conscious of one's social self-aspects—would be positively correlated with compliance. The data from the study provided support for both of these predictions. Discussion centers on the theoretical implications of these findings.     

Decoupling between physiological,self-reported,and expressed emotional responses in alexithymia

Alexithymia is characterized by difficulties identifying, describing, and expressing emotions and is associated with mental health problems involving emotion dysregulation. To understand the relationship between alexithymia and health, researchers have predominately examined group differences in physiological arousal and self-reported experience. The present study extends this research by examining differences in physiological arousal, self-reported experience, and observed expression. In addition to this between-subjects approach the present study examined within-person difference scores to better understand individual differences in decoupling between all three emotional response domains. Participants (N = 106; M = 18.00 years), classified as alexithymic (males = 17, females = 34) or non-alexithymic (males = 23, females = 32), gave an impromptu 3-min speech while measures of heart rate and galvanic skin response were continuously recorded. Participants completed self-report measures of self-conscious affect and their behavior was later coded for self-conscious affect. Alexithymic participants: (1) had significantly higher heart rate during baseline however physiological responses were indistinguishable during arousal and recovery, (2) experienced greater self-consciousness collapsing across the tasks, and (3) expressed more self-consciousness as a result of the speech. In addition, findings support the decoupling hypothesis. Alexithymic males experienced and expressed greater self-consciousness compared to their physiological arousal. Results are discussed in terms of the underlying mechanisms of alexithymia.     

同伴友谊质量与留守儿童社会适应性的关系：有调节的中介模型

以生态系统理论为主要理论基础,对1440名农村留守儿童进行调查研究,建立农村留守儿童社会适应性的影响因素结构模型。研究发现,师生关系、友谊质量和自我意识直接影响社会适应性;亲子沟通、社会支持分别通过影响师生关系、友谊质量和自我意识而间接地影响社会适应性。应格外重视留守儿童的友谊质量及自我意识,同时加强亲子沟通,完善社会支持系统,形成学校、家庭、社会教育合力,切实提高农村留守儿童社会适应性。     

Self-consciousness,self-determination,and imagination in Kant

I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one relates to the employment of already formed concepts, the other to the structures of imaginative apprehension that help to constitute (empirical) concepts from the start. We need to see that (1) so far as objects are only conceptualized appearances, the material through which we apprehend them must be reflected in that apprehension itself; (2) the corresponding material consists of a manifold of pre-conceptually active anticipations and retentions concerning the course of one's own experience. The resultant structure imposes an orientation on the world of appearances that does not derive from a concept of oneself as an individual in it, but that nevertheless provides the only possible basis for such a concept. One's self-concept, at least as empirical subject, is simply that ofwhatever subject is indicated, in an appropriate way, by that orientation.     

Self-representation: searching for a neural signature of self-consciousness

Human self-consciousness operates at different levels of complexity and at least comprises five different levels of representational processes. These five levels are nonconceptual representation, conceptual representation, sentential representation, meta-representation, and iterative meta-representation. These different levels of representation can be operationalized by taking a first-person-perspective that is involved in representational processes on different levels of complexity. We refer to experiments that operationalize a first-person-perspective on the level of conceptual and meta-representational self-consciousness. Interestingly, these experiments show converging evidence for a recruitment of medial cortical and parietal regions during taking a first-person-perspective, even when operating on different degrees of complexity. These data lend support for the speculative hypothesis, that there exist a neural signature for human self-consciousness that is recruited independent from the degree of representational complexity to be performed.     

The effect of knowledge and context in the elicitation of inferences in class-inclusion reasoning

Abstract

Two experiments were carried out with adult subjects to investigate the conditions of production of inferences in a problem-solving task involving reasoning about class inclusion. We tested the hypothesis that the production of appropriate inferences is facilitated whenever pieces of information are stored in memory that can be matched at least in part with the conclusion resulting from the inference. In Experiment 1, problems involving the same inferential pattern but belonging to three different domains were compared. The inclusion relations were of the type “is a kind of” (semantic domain), “more than” (being 8 years old is being more than 7 years old: logico-mathematical domain) or “what I have received on a given day is a part of what I have in the evening” (possession domain). In the semantic domain, the critical inference may be facilitated by the semantic network of concepts stored in memory. In the logico-mathematical domain, there is no information that corresponds to the critical inference, so that inferences have to be elaborated merely by use of general knowledge about the meaning of the relation. The possession domain is an intermediate case, since the inference corresponds to knowledge about relations in the possession domain. The results clearly support a memory-cueing hypothesis: There is a marked order of difficulty ranging from the logico-mathematical domain (most difficult) to the semantic domain (least difficult). In Experiment 2, equivalent problems using the same conceptual information were compared: The critical inference involved scanning a series of numbers either in direct order (more than 7 is 8, 9, 10) or in reverse order (8, 9, 10 is more than 7). The number of correct solutions was higher and the response latency much shorter for those problems in which the critical inference was of the type “more than 7 is 8, 9 or 10″.     

Differential relations between two dimensions of self‐esteem and the Big Five?

Recent research has suggested the possibility that self-esteem (SE) may be viewed as a two-dimensional concept consisting of: (a) self-liking, the subjective evaluation of oneself as a social being; and (b) self-competence, the internal conceptions of success and failure in performing tasks (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). Establishing differential relations between these two dimensions of SE and an important psychological concept like the Big Five, would support the notion of two-dimensional SE. To test this hypothesis the self-liking/self-competence scale (SLCS) and the Big Five Inventory (BFI) were administered to 128 Norwegian college students. The results show a differential relationship between the two dimensions of SE and the personality dimensions of the BFI.     

Self And Body: Gallen Strawson

What are the grounds of self-consciousness? I consider 29 proposals and reject 22, including a number of proposals that experience of body (or bodies) is necessary for self-consciousness. A popular strategy in debates of this sort is to argue that one cannot be said to have some concept C (e.g. the concept ONESELF, necessary for self-consciousness) unless one has a need or a use for C given the character of one's experience considered independently of the character that it has given that one possesses C. I suggest that such arguments are invalid.     

The association between self-deception and moral self-concept as functions of self-consciousness

Regulated by self-consciousness, self-deception is a part of the self-system that suppresses negative aspects of the self and maintains a positive moral self-concept. We tested this evolutionary hypothesis on 166 college students by measuring self-deception using both a questionnaire and a series of hypothetical helping scenarios. The results showed a positive correlation between self-deception and moral self-concept, which was moderated by private self-consciousness. Among participants with high, but not low, self-consciousness, high moral self-concept individuals were more willing to help when potential self-benefits were present than low moral self-concept individuals, whereas there was no difference between the two groups concerning helping without self-benefit. These results support the evolutionary view that self-deception serves to maintain optimal moral self-concept, especially for individuals with high self-consciousness.     

Extending the activity restriction model of depressed affect: evidence from a sample of breast cancer patients.

Survey data from 95 women with Stage 1 (n = 36), Stage 2 (n = 49), or Stage 3 (n = 10) breast cancer both confirm and extend prior research indicating that restriction of normal activities is an important factor in depressed affect. Illness severity was directly related to more restricted routine activities, and more activity restriction was associated with higher public self-consciousness and less social support. Beyond the effects of age, self-consciousness, illness severity, and social support, activity restriction explained significant additional variance in symptoms of depression. Moreover, activity restriction mediated the impact of pain, public self-consciousness, and social support on depressed affect, which implies that these factors foster symptoms of depression by disrupting normal activities.     

The Psychological Consequences of Fame: Three Tests of the Self-Consciousness Hypothesis

ABSTRACT Three investigations tested the hypothesis, that the attainment of fame leads to chronic self-consciousness. One of these studies also examined the relationship of self-consciousness with self-destructive behavior. Analyses of Kurt Cobain's and Cole Porter's song lyrics indicated increased use of first-person singular pronouns after each songwriter attained celebrity. An analysis of John Cheever's short stories indicated greater use of the first-person narrative voice following his first brush with fame. Other analyses revealed that variations in Cheever's fame were positively correlated with use of first-person singular pronouns in his private letters and journals. These measures of self-consciousness were also positively correlated with Cheever's self-reported alcohol use. Together, these, three studies offer the first empirical support for a self-consciousness hypothesis linking celebrity to self-destructive Behavior.

In the urge to find a better, more perfect self, the possibility of uncovering a worse, more misshapen one hangs like a threatening cloud. Lurking behind every chance to be made whole by fame is the axman of further dismemberment.

(Braudy, 1986, p. 8)     

Thought and language

Abstract

This article defends the view that nonlinguistic animals could be capable of thought (in the sense in which the mere possession of beliefs and desires is sufficient for thought). It is easy to identify flaws in Davidson’s arguments for the thesis that thought depends upon language if one is open to the idea that some nonlinguistic animals have beliefs. It is, however, necessary to do more than this if one wishes to engage with the deeper challenge underlying Davidson’s reasoning, viz., that of providing a principled account of what it takes for a representer to qualify as a thinker. Heil attempts to construct a Davidsonian account on the basis of the hypothesis that the semantic opacity essential to thought is rooted in second-order representation (which Davidson ties to language), but it can be shown that second-order representation is neither necessary nor sufficient for opacity. A reasonable non-Davidsonian account of thought in terms of which sufficiently sophisticated nonlinguistic animals qualify as thinkers is, however, possible.     

Visual Exploration When Surrounded by Affordances: Frequency of Head Movements Is Predictive of Response Speed

Little is known about the actions supporting exploration and their relation to subsequent actions in situations when participants are surrounded by opportunities for action. Here, the movements that support visual exploration were related to performance in an enveloping football (soccer) passing task. Head movements of experienced football players were quantified with inertial measurement units. In a simulated football scenario, participants completed a receiving–passing task that required them to indicate pass direction to one of four surrounding targets, as quickly as they could after they gained simulated ball possession. The frequency of head movements before and after gaining ball possession and the pass response times were recorded. We controlled exploration time—the time before gaining simulated ball possession—to be 1, 2, or 3?seconds. Exploration time significantly influenced the frequency of head movements, and a higher frequency of head turns before gaining ball possession resulted in faster pass responses. Exploratory action influenced subsequent performatory action. That is, higher frequencies of head movements resulted in faster decisions. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Eye color Predicts Disagreeableness in North Europeans: Support in Favor of Frost (2006)

The current study investigates whether eye color provides a marker of Agreeableness in North Europeans. Extrapolating from Frost’s (2006) research uncovering an unusually diverse range of hair and eye color in northern Europe, we tested the hypothesis that light eyed individuals of North European descent would be less agreeable (a personality marker for competitiveness) when compared to their dark eyed counterparts, whereas there would be no such effect for people of European descent in general. The hypothesis was tested in Australia to provide consistent environmental conditions for both groups of people. Results support the hypothesis. Implications and conclusions are discussed.