Social emotions and social cognition in the development of social anxiety disorder

ABSTRACT

Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is one of the most prevalent mental disorders with serious individual impairments and societal costs. Little is known about the mechanisms involved in SAD development. Here, I propose that dysregulated social emotions (social fear and shyness) are crucial for SAD development and that these dysregulated social emotions originate in the disturbances in socio-cognitive abilities. The research from our lab confirmed this. It showed that behavioural and physiological indices of social fear contribute to the development of SAD in toddlerhood and early childhood. Later in childhood, between ages 4.5 and 7.5, we found a new risk factor for SAD―dysregulated shyness. Specifically, we found that negative shy expressions and prolonged physiological blushing (temperature increase) contribute to SAD development. Whereas elevated fear may be rooted in deficits in socio-cognitive skills, dysregulated shyness may be rooted in advanced socio-cognitive abilities. These findings imply that dysregulated social emotions play an important role in SAD and should be explicitly targeted in clinical treatments of SAD.     

Ability, breadth, and parsimony in computational models of higher-order cognition

Computational models will play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. How can a model's contribution to this goal be evaluated? This article argues that three important aspects of a model of higher‐order cognition to evaluate are (a) its ability to reason, solve problems, converse, and learn as well as people do; (b) the breadth of situations in which it can do so; and (c) the parsimony of the mechanisms it posits. This article argues that fits of models to quantitative experimental data, although valuable for other reasons, do not address these criteria. Further, using analogies with other sciences, the history of cognitive science, and examples from modern‐day research programs, this article identifies five activities that have been demonstrated to play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. These include modeling within a cognitive architecture, conducting artificial intelligence research, measuring and expanding a model's ability, finding mappings between the structure of different domains, and attempting to explain multiple phenomena within a single model.     

Ongoing development of social cognition in adolescence

Age differences in social cognition between adolescents and young adults were investigated. Two large groups of adolescents and young adults were given tasks of theory of mind and emotion recognition. In addition, to control for possibly related basic cognitive development, working memory, speed of processing, and verbal ability were assessed. A strong age effect was revealed across both measures of social cognition. Adolescents performed with a lower accuracy than adults. Further analyses indicated that those age differences remained significant even after controlling for basic cognitive abilities. Exploratory analyses indicated no influence of pubertal phase on social cognition. Results suggest ongoing development of social cognition across adolescence, independent of individual differences in more basic cognitive abilities.     

Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: studies in the attribution of moral responsibility

In three experiments we studied lay observers' attributions of responsibility for an antisocial act (homicide). We systematically varied both the degree to which the action was coerced by external circumstances and the degree to which the actor endorsed and accepted ownership of the act, a psychological state that philosophers have termed "identification." Our findings with respect to identification were highly consistent. The more an actor was identified with an action, the more likely observers were to assign responsibility to the actor, even when the action was performed under constraints so powerful that no other behavioral option was available. Our findings indicate that social cognition involving assignment of responsibility for an action is a more complex process than previous research has indicated. It would appear that laypersons' judgments of moral responsibility may, in some circumstances, accord with philosophical views in which freedom and determinism are regarded to be compatible.     

The molecules of social recognition memory: implications for social cognition, extended mind, and neuroethics

Social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroethics have reached a synthesis of late, but some troubling features are present. The neuroscience that currently dominates the study of social cognition is exclusively cognitive neuroscience, as contrasted with the cellular and increasingly molecular emphasis that has gripped mainstream neuroscience over the past three decades. Furthermore, the recent field of molecular and cellular cognition has begun to unravel some molecular mechanisms involved in social cognition, especially pertaining to the consolidation of memories of particular conspecific organisms. Some new experimental techniques for positive interventions into these hypothesized mechanisms offer opportunities for establishing direct causal linkages between intra-neuronal molecular events and the behaviors used to measure social cognitive phenomena. Predicted results from an experiment described below also cast doubt on the application of the “extended mind” approach from recent cognitive science to ground the neuroscience of social cognition. Since neuroethics relies heavily on our best neuroscience of social cognition, that field may soon need to extend its attention beyond cognitive neuroscience, and into neuroscience’s cellular and molecular mainstream.     

Sentence comprehension affects the dynamics of bimanual coordination: Implications for embodied cognition

Recent work in embodied cognition has demonstrated that language comprehension involves the motor system (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Such findings are often attributed to mechanisms involving simulations of linguistically described events (Barsalou, 1999; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). We propose that research paradigms in which simulation is the central focus need to be augmented with paradigms that probe the organization of the motor system during language comprehension. The use of well-studied motor tasks may be appropriate to this endeavour. To this end, we present a study in which participants perform a bimanual rhythmic task (Kugler & Turvey, 1987) while judging the plausibility of sentences. We show that the dynamics of the bimanual task differ when participants judge sentences describing performable actions as opposed to sentences describing events that are not performable. We discuss the general implications of our results for accounts of embodied cognition.     

An integrative review of process dissociation and related models in social cognition

This chapter reviews the use of formal dual process models in social psychology, with a focus on the process dissociation model and related multinomial models. The utility of the models is illustrated using studies of social and affective influences on memory, judgement and decision making, and social attitudes and stereotypes. We then compare and contrast the process dissociation model with other approaches, including implicit and explicit tests, signal detection theory, and multinomial models. Finally we show how several recently proposed multinomial models can be integrated into a single family of models, of which process dissociation is a specific instance. We describe how these process models can be used as both theoretical and measurement tools to answer questions about the role of automatic and controlled processes in social behaviour.     

Conversation on mental states at nursery: Promoting social cognition in early childhood

Despite growing evidence that conversation on inner states fosters gains in children’s social cognition, this mechanism has yet to be tested with toddlers. To address this gap, we examined whether an intervention based on conversing about mental states with small groups of 2-year-old children at nursery had a significant effect on toddlers’ theory of mind (ToM) and emotion understanding (EU). Participants were 68 children (M_age at pre-test: 29.9 months) who were assigned to either an experimental or a control condition. Measures of verbal ability, ToM and EU were administered at pre-test, post-test and follow-up stages. Over a one-month intervention, all children were read a series of brief illustrated stories. After listening to the stories, the experimental group (n = 34) was involved in conversations on mental states, whereas the control group (n = 34) was engaged in conversation regarding the material entities and actions featured in the storybook. The experimental group significantly outperformed the control group on measures of both ToM and EU, independently of gains in verbal ability. Furthermore, these positive effects remained stable over time. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Conventional minds: An interactivist perspective on social cognition and its enculturation

We argue that the traditional theory of mind models of social cognition face in-principle problems in accounting for enculturation of social cognition, and offer an alternative model advanced within the interactivist framework. In the critical section, we argue that theory of mind accounts’ encodingist model of mental representation renders them unable to account for enculturation. We focus on the three problems: (1) the copy problem and impossibility of internalization; (2) foundationalism and the impossibility of acquisition of culturally specific content; and (3) the frame problems and the inadequacy of mental-state attribution as a way of coordinating social interaction among (encultured) individuals. The positive section begins with a brief sketch of the theoretical basics of interactivism, followed by a more focused presentation of the interactivist model of social cognition, and concludes with a discussion of a number of issues most widely debated in the social cognition literature.     

Enactive social cognition: Diachronic constitution & coupled anticipation

This paper targets the constitutive basis of social cognition. It begins by describing the traditional and still dominant cognitivist view. Cognitivism assumes internalism about the realisers of social cognition; thus, the embodied and embedded elements of intersubjective engagement are ruled out from playing anything but a basic causal role in an account of social cognition. It then goes on to advance and clarify an alternative to the cognitivist view; namely, an enactive account of social cognition. It does so first by articulating a diachronic constitutive account for how embodied engagement can play a constitutive role in social cognition. It then proceeds to consider an objection; the causal-constitutive fallacy (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Block, 2005) against enactive social cognition. The paper proceeds to deflate this objection by establishing that the distinction between constitution and causation is not co-extensive with the distinction between internal constitutive elements and external causal elements. It is then shown that there is a different reason for thinking that an enactive account of social cognition is problematic. We call this objection the ‘poverty of the interactional stimulus argument’. This objection turns on the role and characteristics of anticipation in enactive social cognition. It argues that anticipatory processes are mediated by an internally realised model or tacit theory (Carruthers, 2015; Seth, 2015). The final part of this paper dissolves this objection by arguing that it is possible to cast anticipatory processes as orchestrated as well as maintained by sensorimotor couplings between individuals in face-to-face interaction.     

From human to artificial cognition and back: New perspectives on cognitively inspired AI systems

We overview the main historical and technological elements characterising the rise, the fall and the recent renaissance of the cognitive approaches to Artificial Intelligence and provide some insights and suggestions about the future directions and challenges that, in our opinion, this discipline needs to face in the next years.     

Extended cognition and the space of social interaction

The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of “we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) drive basic processes of interpersonal understanding and thus do genuine social-cognitive work. Social interaction is a kind of extended social cognition, driven and at least partially constituted by environmental (non-neural) scaffolding. Challenging the Theory of Mind paradigm, I draw upon research from gesture studies, developmental psychology, and work on Moebius Syndrome to support this thesis.     

Anhedonia in prolonged schizophrenia spectrum patients with relatively lower vs. higher levels of depression disorders: Associations with deficits in social cognition and metacognition

This study has sought to explore whether there are at least two subtypes of anhedonia in schizophrenia: one closely linked with depression and another that occurs in the absence of depression which is related to a general paucity of internal experience. Participants were 163 adults with schizophrenia who completed assessments of depression, anhedonia, executive functioning, positive and negative symptoms, social cognition and metacognition. A cluster analysis based on participants’ depression and anhedonia symptom scores produced three groups: High Depression/High Anhedonia (n = 52), Low Depression/Low Anhedonia (n = 52), and Low Depression/High Anhedonia (n = 59). An ANCOVA and post hoc comparisons controlling for positive and negative symptoms found that the Low Depression/High Anhedonia group had poorer metacognition and social cognition than other groups. These findings point to the possibility of a subtype of anhedonia in schizophrenia, one occurring in the relative lesser levels of depression, and tied to deficits in the ability to think about oneself and others.     

Reflections on dynamics,adaptation and control: A cognitive architecture for mental models

In this paper, an overview of the wide variety of occurrences of mental models in the literature is discussed. They are classified according to two dimensions obtaining four categories of them: static-dynamic and world-mental, where static refers to mental models for static world states or for static mental states and dynamic refers to mental models for world processes or for mental processes. In addition, distinctions are made for what can be done by mental models: they can, for example, be (1) used for internal simulation, they can be (2) adapted, and these processes can be (3) controlled. This leads to a global three-level cognitive architecture covering these three ways of handling mental models. It is discussed that in this cognitive architecture reflection principles play an important role to define the interactions between the different levels.     

The cognitive miser's perspective: Social comparison as a heuristic in self-judgements

The metaphor of the cognitive miser is a milestone in the development of social cognitive research. It highlights the limited cognitive resources of the social thinker and the demand for fast and efficient processing of information. In marked contrast to the impact of this metaphor on social cognition research in general, it has so far been mostly overlooked in research on social comparison. In this article we want to lay out the potential of social comparison research if one takes on the perspective of a cognitive miser. Specifically, we consider social comparison as a heuristic for evaluating the self. First, we look for evidence for the ease of comparative self-evaluations. Second, we analyse the standard selection process and identify routine standards that facilitate the comparison process. Third, we investigate the cognitive mechanisms in social comparisons and suggest that comparison mechanisms leading to assimilation are more efficient than mechanisms leading to contrast effects.     

Anti-equality: Social comparison in young children

Young children dislike getting less than others, which might suggest a general preference for equal outcomes. However, young children are typically not averse to others receiving less than themselves. These results are consistent with two alternatives: young children might not have any preferences about others receiving less than themselves, or they might have preferences for others receiving less than themselves. We test these alternatives with 5- to 10-year-old children. We replicate previous findings that children will take a cost to avoid being at a relative disadvantage, but also find that 5- and 6-year-olds will spitefully take a cost to ensure that another’s welfare falls below their own. This result suggests that the development of fairness includes overcoming an initial social comparison preference for others to get less relative to oneself.     

At the interface of social cognition and psychometrics: Manipulating the sex of the reference class modulates sex differences in personality traits

Psychometric surveys suggest that sex differences in personality are minimal. Herein, we argue that (a) the mind is likely biased toward assessing oneself relative to same-sex others, and (b) this bias may affect the measurement of sex differences in personality. In support of this, an experiment demonstrates modulation of sex differences on the HEXACO facets by manipulating the sex of the “reference class”—the group of people subjects compare themselves to when making self-assessments on survey items. Although patterns varied across traits, sex differences were relatively small in the “unspecified” and “same-sex” reference class conditions—but substantially larger in the “opposite-sex” condition. These findings point to a same-sex comparison bias that may impact the measurement of sex differences in personality.     

“凭感觉”的热情与能力：社会认知内容的生理线索

热情与能力是解析社会认知的普适性框架,同现实情境中诸多要素存在着关联。与众多明显带有社会属性的要素相比,源自面孔或者颜色的视觉、声音的听觉、身体姿态的动觉、温度变化的肤觉等生理线索,也可以跟热情与能力的社会知觉产生关联,这个过程可能基于生理–社会的知觉联结假设或者知觉启动假设而发生。以生理–社会的知觉关系为切入点,热情与能力更能发挥解析具体情境的灵活性。侧重典型生理线索的挖掘、建立生理线索同热情与能力的组态关系,以及这种关系对社会性偏向的影响,将有助于推进热情与能力融入更为广泛的社会应用之中。     

The ideomotor approach to imitative learning (IMAIL) in infancy: Challenges and future perspectives

The article presents the ideomotor approach to imitative learning (IMAIL). According to IMAIL, imitation rests on the acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations through the observations of others’ actions and their sensory consequences. The article first outlines the challenges and demands that motivated the development of the theory. Then, it describes the theory in greater detail and presents empirical evidence supporting IMAIL. Finally, it concludes by discussing challenges and avenues for further research.