I Think,Therefore I Persist

Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2?+?2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2?+?2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal and the screen in front of you is blank. Then at some point an image of a peach is flashed on the screen. The image isn't up there for long. In fact, it's only on the screen for what seems like an instant—just long enough for you to see it. These two scenarios are a bit mundane. But, as I will show, reflection on them can yield significant results concerning the nature of persons and their persistence through time. First I will show that thought and perception have temporal constraints whereby your thinking or perceiving in the above scenarios implies that you exist through a temporally extended interval. Then I will argue that this allows us to rule out several prominent theories of personal identity.     

I OUGHT,THEREFORE I CAN

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.     

Emotions,Me, Myself and I

We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they are about an object and evaluate it – this means that the relation between emotions and the self may take different shapes. My discussion focuses on three different claims about this relation. According to the first claim, all emotions are about the subject who undergoes them. The second claim appeals to a more moderate form of reflexivity and affirms that emotions always feature a representation of other psychological states of the subject. The third understands the relation between emotions and the self in evaluative terms: emotions are said to evaluate relationally, one of the terms of this relation being the subject who undergoes it. I argue that all three claims apply, at best, only to a limited subset of emotions and that they must sometimes give way to claims that do not presuppose any intentional connection between emotions and the self.     

I, zombie

Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori identification of qualia with physical properties, a reasoned choice can be made between the two types of theories which ultimately favors materialism and rejects zombies.     

I Matter to My Friend,Therefore I am Happy: Friendship,Mattering, and Happiness

Decades of empirical research have shown that friendship experiences are an essential predictor of happiness. However, what might account for the relationship between friendship and happiness? Two studies investigated perceived mattering (Marshall, J Adolesc 24:473–490, 2001) as a mediator of the association between friendship quality and happiness. Study 1 showed that perceived mattering to one’s best friend mediated the relationship between friendship and happiness. Study 2 replicated the findings of the first study and showed that mattering in friendships accounts for the role of friendship quality in happiness across the three closest friendships of the individual. The results are discussed in terms of the theoretical importance of understanding how friendship is related to happiness.     

I think,therefore I am? Examining conceptions of the self,soul, and mind

In order to delineate among conceptions of the self, soul, and mind, participants reported where they believe these entities are located in the body and provided definitions of each entity. Results indicated that most people consider the self, soul, and mind localized in specific regions in the body. In contrast to previous research, however, some participants reported that the self is not centralized in one location. Participants tended to locate the self and mind in the head and the soul in the chest. The self and mind were commonly defined in mental terms and the soul as one’s essence. These results suggest that people tend to distinguish the soul from the mind, both in how they define each entity and where they locate them in the body. Although some people locate the soul in the same region as the self, most people more closely align the mind with the self.     

The good I will,I do not

For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do-Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. (Romans 7:19–20)A sermon delivered on November 16, 1958, in James Memorial Chapel. Reprinted by permission from Union Seminary Quarterly Review.     

I Ought to Reply,So I Can

Philosophia - I have elsewhere given three arguments for the claim that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action only if this person can perform this action. Henne, Semler, Chituc,...     

"I could see, and yet, mon, I could na' see": William Macewen, the agnosias, and brain surgery

Two little noticed cases in which William Macewen used symptoms of visual agnosia to plan brain surgery on the angular gyrus are reviewed and evaluated. Following a head injury, Macewen's first patient had an immediate and severe visual object agnosia that lasted for about 2 weeks. After that he gradually became homicidal and depressed and it was for those symptoms that Macewen first saw him, some 11 months after the accident. From his examination, Macewen concluded that the agnosia clearly indicated a lesion in "the posterior portion of the operculum or in the angular gyrus." When he removed parts of the internal table that had penetrated those structures the homicidal impulses disappeared. Macewen's second patient was seen for a chronic middle ear infection and, although neither aphasic nor deaf, was 'word deaf.' Slightly later he became 'psychically blind' as well. Macewen suspected a cerebral abscess pressing on both the angular gyrus and the first temporal convolution. A large subdural abscess was found there and the symptoms disappeared after it was treated. The patients are discussed and Macewen's positive results analysed in the historical context of the dispute over the proposed role of the angular gyrus as the visual centre.     

Do as I say, not as I do

The degree of agreement between responses to attitude questionnaires and responses in situations in which the content of the questionnaires is relevant is examined for the study of attitudes in general and for the study of environmental attitudes in particular. The observed low positive correlations of attitude and behaviour suggest that the notion that it is first necessary to change attitudes before one can change behaviour must be reevaluated. A review of the recent say-do correspondence literature is followed by a comparison of attitude-behaviour studies with say-do correspondence studies. A more empirical approach is urged for the future of environmental research which offers a unique arena for the study of attitude-behaviour congruence.     

“Yes,I Can,I Feel Good,and I Just Do It!” On Gain Cycles and Spirals of Efficacy Beliefs,Affect, and Engagement

Taking Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory as our starting point, we tested how efficacy beliefs (self‐efficacy and perceived collective efficacy) reciprocally influence activity engagement (vigor, dedication, and absorption) indirectly through their impact on positive affect (enthusiasm, satisfaction, and comfort) over time. We conducted two longitudinal studies using independent samples. Study 1 is a two‐wave longitudinal field study that examines gain cycles regarding the dynamic relationships among self‐efficacy, positive affect, and work engagement in 274 secondary school teachers. Study 2 is a three‐wave longitudinal laboratory study about gain spirals in the dynamic relationships among collective efficacy beliefs, positive affect, and task engagement in 100 university students working in groups. Our findings show that: (1) efficacy beliefs reciprocally influence activity engagement indirectly through their impact on positive affect over time; (2) enthusiasm is the positive affect with the strongest effect on activity engagement; and (3) a gain spiral exists whereby efficacy beliefs increase over time due to engagement and positive affect (most notably enthusiasm). Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications in terms of Social Cognitive Theory.     

I think I can, I think I can: Examining the within-person coupling of control beliefs and cognition in older adults

We examined short-term intraindividual variability in control beliefs (competence and locus of control) and cognitive performance and the extent to which the constructs travel together over time. Thirty-six older adults (M = 74 years, SD = 5.51) completed questionnaires and cognitive tests twice each day for 60 consecutive days. Results indicated that control beliefs fluctuate within people across time. Multilevel models revealed that control and competence are coupled with concurrent and subsequent performance, but the benefit of occasion-level increases in control depends on individuals' average control. These findings underscore the importance of examining constructs using a within-person approach to identify dynamic processes in cognitive aging. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

I am ... , I have ... , I suffer from ... : A Linguist Reflects on the Language of Illness and Disease

Part personal documentary, part exercise in medical semantics, this essay brings the analytical tools of a linguist and the human perspective of a patient receiving treatment in the American health care system to bear on the language we use—for the most part unconsciously—to talk about illness and disease. Topics to be explored include linguistic ramifications of the illness/disease distinction; referring expressions for health disorders; the “linguistic construction” of disease (what's in a name?); the “translation” of biomedical information from the specialists' dialect into everyday idiom; and the metaphoric/symbolic dimension of body-parts and their afflictions.