从实体正义到程序正义:卢梭与罗尔斯契约正义观之比较

卢梭的契约正义观与罗尔斯的契约正义观在形式上有其相似之处。但由于他们各自所处的时代背景不同,其正义观的价值内核、论证方式及其实现途径都存在着重大的差别。从卢梭的契约正义观到罗尔斯的契约正义观的嬗变代表了西方正义论从实体正义向程序正义的转变,把握这一转变的趋向及其内在精神实质,对于丰富和完善当代中国和谐社会建设的理论和实践是大有裨益的。     

正义的给予和正义的维护:两种不同的国家观——以罗尔斯和诺齐克为例

<正>一个国家(或政府)得以存在的基本理由是与对社会正义的追求分不开的。但是,国家应当是作为正义的维护者还是作为正义的给予者,对此在人类思想史上有着不同的认识,形成了两种不同的国家观。本文以罗尔斯与诺齐克为例,尝试对这两种国家观加以梳理。1.正义的给予:罗尔斯的正义观与国家观罗尔斯以对正义的考察和对社会制度的正义性考     

罗尔斯代际正义思想及其意蕴

罗尔斯的代际正义思想作为他的正义理论的重要组成部分,体现了对传统正义观的超越与发展,为人类可持续发展所进行的国际合作和国内法律、政策的制定提供了有力的理论支撑和评价标准。     

“伦理正义”的解释力 ——马克思正义观研究的思想背景和可能视角

"伦理正义"是马克思正义观研究的思想背景和可能视角。所谓"伦理正义",是肇始于古典政治哲学的一种正义理解。与"法权正义"基于个体权利追问平等优先还是自由优先的理论争执不同,"伦理正义"以个体德行与公共善的一致为前提,主张个体自由与共同体自由的实践统一。黑格尔对于市民社会和国家关系的思辨把握,揭示了"法权正义"的个体与共同体分裂的二元结构及其困境,探索了以"伦理正义"超越"法权正义"的国家哲学路径。马克思的政治经济学批判指认了"法权正义"与资本主义生产方式的耦合关系,阐释了从异化劳动向自由劳动复归的人类解放逻辑。政治经济学批判是对"法权正义"的根本批判,回答了在现代社会重构"伦理正义"何以可能的问题。     

大卫·哈维的空间正义思想

近年来,"空间正义"研究开始成为学界的一个研究热点。作为当代新马克思主义空间理论的领军人物之一,大卫.哈维(David Harvey)开创性地将"社会正义"纳入其空间分析视阈,将"空间正义"作为"反资本主义斗争能够坚持的最好的评价地形"[1],并以此为起点对空间正义进行了辩证的多维阐释,这些阐释对于我们审视当代人类空间实践具有重要的理论借鉴意义。在本文中,笔者尝试对哈维的空间正义观进行梳理和探讨。     

论正义的形态和功能

<正>义是在人类的现实处境下,处理现实利益关系的政治智慧,其实质是人类运用认知理性、实践理性和自由意志的主体能力,以自由和平等为价值目标,在现实的利益协调和分配关系中所把握的一个"度"。由此可见,"正义"形式的背后是我们的社会生活和现实的利益关系,抽象的正义理念需要通过把握其在社会生活中的现实形态来予以揭示。我们把正义的现实形态区分为普遍正义、具体正义和程序正义。普遍正义是社会合作的伦理基础,具体正义通过"求同存异"维护公共利益,保护个体利益,程序正义则是追求社会治理工程中的价值。     

人的脆弱性、依赖性与“正义的慷慨” ——麦金太尔正义思想的新维度

人的脆弱性和依赖性是人的一生无法逃避的命运,因此社会性和共同体是每个人的必然的基础本体,正义理论必须处理这个问题。麦金太尔把人的脆弱性和依赖性作为正义的起点,提出"正义的慷慨"的正义理论,这是他原先的社群主义和德性正义观的进一步发展,开辟了关于正义的新论域和新议题。在此基础上,当代西方道德哲学家也越来越关注人的脆弱性和依赖性问题。森和纳斯鲍姆关注那些具有严重能力缺陷的人,并进而提出能力进路的正义理论。     

西方社群主义的正义观及其对和谐社会的启示

正义是和谐社会的核心价值.在建设社会主义和谐社会的过程中,西方的各种政治学说可以为我们批判地借鉴,当代西方的社群主义正义观就可以在尊重个人合法权利、培养公民美德、弘扬集体价值观等方面,为我们提供一些启示.     

经济正义:当代伦理学面临的重大课题

正义是一个历史范畴。人类对正义的追求经历了一个由个人正义到社会正义、由政治正义到经济正义的过程。随着经济关系成为支配社会发展的主要力量,经济发展的单向度价值取向的危害日益严重,社会不公正现象在经济领域中日益凸现,经济正义已成为当代社会正义理论中最重要、最具有社会意义的内容和形式。     

论西方马克思主义对罗尔斯正义论的批判

作为当代西方自由主义正义理论的典型代表的罗尔斯的正义论 ,自其在 2 0世纪 70年代提出后就遭到了来自西方马克思主义思想阵营的尖锐批判。西方马克思主义者指认罗尔斯的正义论有十大错误 ,包括脱离社会生产来抽象谈论分配正义、陷入了资产阶级个人主义、不加批判地假定了社会阶级存在的永恒性 ,等等 ,同时 ,罗尔斯提出的两个正义原则也存在内在矛盾 ,是乌托邦主义的。本文即是对西方马克思主义对罗尔斯正义论的批判的一个批判性考察     

普遍的正义如何可能——柏拉图正义论及发微

柏拉图试图解决正义是什么、正义如何可能和正义是何种价值这样一些根本问题 ,其提问题的方式、解决路径都是柏拉图式的。有借鉴意义的是正义植根于心灵深处的土壤以及社会供给正义的途径。实现正义是一个艰难且复杂的社会历史过程 ,推进民主进程、使正义理念扎根于民众的日常生活深处 ,相对正义的社会才会被建立起来 ,基于此种理念之上的用以保证、体现和实现正义的制度才会被设计出来。     

From Bodo Ethics to Distributive Justice

Concern with material equality as the central form of distributive justice is a very modern idea. Distributive justice for Aristotle and many other writers for millennia after him was a matter of distributing what each ought to get from merit or desert in some sense. Many, such as Hume, thought material equality a pernicious idea. In the medieval village life of Bodo, villagers knew enough about each other to govern relations through norms, including, when necessary, a norm of charity. In more complex modern societies, economic destitution cannot so well be handled by individual charity, but now it can be handled by states. Hence, we begin to conceive of the idea of distributive justice as driven essentially by concern for material equality. The difference in state capacities is largely epistemological: states today can know much more about their citizens.     

What We Deserve, and how We Reciprocate

Samuel Scheffler says, “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” To the extent that this is true, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism are mistaken. In particular, there is an aspect of what we do to make ourselves deserving that, although it has not been discussed in the literature, plays a central role in everyday moral life, and for good reason. As with desert, reciprocity inspires skepticism. What Allen Buchanan calls justice as reciprocity implies that duties of justice obtain only among those who can do each other favors. So characterized, justice as reciprocity is at best only a part of justice – a part that is silent on duties between people who have no favors to offer each other. Still, the more modest root idea of reciprocity – the idea that returning favors is at very least a good thing – remains compelling. What can we say on behalf of this root idea? This article is part of a larger work on the elements of justice. Both parts of it begin with and build on James Rachels’ seminal paper “What People Deserve.”     

A Theory of Providence for Distributive Justice

Distributive justice assumes a morally critical judgment of nature, which typically contradicts providential conceptions. Hence, simple conceptions of divine Providence cannot support distributive justice. This essay analyzes and develops a complex strand of theorizing about Providence within Jewish philosophy that is compatible with distributive justice. According to this conception, the actions of divine Providence express different and mutually exclusive considerations of justice. Therefore, the moral value of outcomes is intransitive between the situations of different people. And while each providential action is justified from an ethical perspective, the total outcome is distinct from God's ultimate desire. Human ethics responds to this disparity by redistribution. This conception of Providence also contributes to the additional issue of intergenerational justice through the concomitant idea of life missions. The classical rendering of missions creates problems, however, for distributive justice. I conclude by formulating a conception of life missions that is compatible with both distributive and intergenerational justice.     

Desecularizing Secularism

Animated by a profound sense of complacency about history, rights and law, secularism has reached a dead end of political despair today. Thinking about this dead end will demand giving up certain cherished historicist claims to law and justice. The task of desecularizing secularism is one of dehistoricizing history. To relieve secularism of its appeal to the innocence of history, we need a conceptualization of time that folds the Nietzschean idea of active forgetfulness of history into the Derridian notion of the spectral present that is ‘out of joint with itself’. Such a notion of time/history may help us do the im-possible1 ?1. Throughout this paper I will use the words possibility and im-possibility interchangeably. Thus, when I say the possibility of non-juridical justice or active forgetting of history I also mean its im-possibility, because such a practice is not simply present out there, as an example or a case, under a sign. I am simply trying to imagine such an im-possibility. As will be clear, for Derrida the word im-possibility, as he wrote it, is irreducible to possibility or impossibility. work of thinking of inheriting the futures of democracy and justice irreducible to law and rights. The futures of the irreducible political, where we can neither forget our pasts nor remain bound to them, haunted by their ghosts, cannot be dictated by the apparatuses of the state or the politics of some non-state community. The futures are made possible by the very the non-contemporaneity of our living present, where historical disconnections defy ‘explanation’, opening up new political spaces of becoming.     

组织公正研究:回顾与展望

文章主要回顾了组织公正40多年来的研究成果与进展,包括组织公正的概念和理论发展。并从组织公正概念的整合、机会公正、第三方公正、群体公正、跨文化研究、方法论等几个方面提出了进一步研究的思考和展望。     

论医学公正

通过对公正的理论考量,揭示公正作为卫生经济伦理学的核心理念,在医学实践中具有重要的价值评判作用.同时指出中国的卫生经济发展的指导性方针应该是:公平优先,兼顾效率.     

The relationship between justice and attitudes: An examination of justice effects on event and system-related attitudes

Research in organizational justice has always been interested in the relationship between justice and attitudes. This research often examines how different types of justice affect different attitudes, with distributive justice predicted to affect attitudes about specific events (e.g., performance evaluation) and procedural justice predicted to affect attitudes about organizations (e.g., organizational commitment). However, there is mixed support for these predictions. Moreover, this approach generally ignores the relationship between attitudes about the specific event and attitudes toward the organization. In this study we identify three alternative models of justice and attitudes. We use customer responses to complaint handling to test these alternative conceptualizations. Results generally support a mediated model, wherein event attitudes mediate the effect of justice perceptions on system-related attitudes. The implication of these findings for organizations and justice researchers are discussed.     

Why global justice matters

Why does global justice as a philosophical inquiry matter? We know that the world is plainly unjust in many ways and we know that something ought to be done about this without, it seems, the need of a theory of global justice. Accordingly, philosophical inquiry into global justice comes across to some as an intellectual luxury that seems disconnected from the real world. I want to suggest, however, that philosophical inquiry into global justice is necessary if we want to address the problems of humanity. First, in some cases, a theory of global justice is needed for identifying what counts as legitimate problems of justice. Second, even in obvious cases of injustices, such as the fact of preventable extreme poverty to which we know we have an obligation to respond, we cannot know the content and the limits of these obligations and who the primary bearers of these obligations are without some theoretical guidance. However, I acknowledge that philosophical inquiry on global justice risks becoming a philosophical parlor game if it loses sight of the real-world problems that motivate the inquiry in the first place. If global justice is to provide the tools for addressing the problems of humanity, it must remain a problems-driven enterprise.     

Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice

Philosophical attention to problems about global justice is flourishing in a way it has not in any time in memory. This paper considers some reasons for the rise of interest in the subject and reflects on some dilemmas about the meaning of the idea of the cosmopolitan in reasoning about social institutions, concentrating on the two principal dimensions of global justice, the economic and the political.Opening address of the Mini-Conference on Global Justice, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, 2004 Annual Meeting, Pasadena, California, March 27, 2004. I am grateful for comments to Darrel Moellendorf and to my copanelists Michael Blake, Kristen Hessler, Jon Mandle, Mathias Risse and Leif Wenar.