When is a Schema Not a Schema? On a Remark by Suszko

Studia Logica - A 1971 paper by Roman Suszko, ‘Identity Connective and Modality’, claimed that a certain identity-free schema expressed the condition that there are at most two objects...     

What is a family? a contemporary view

In the light of two cases that held the attention of the United States in mid-1993, family therapists as well as other professionals need to consider- or re-consider-what it is that constitutes a family. Is the family based on biological ties? On psychological bonds? On legal definitions? When a conflict arises as to the family with which a child should reside, what factors need to be considered? Contested adoption cases are rare but not unique; the legal “divorce” from biological parents in favor of psychological ties is a much newer phenomenon. These cases are central to the discussion of this contemporary view of what constitutes a family.     

Is Xunzi a utilitarian? Revisiting a disagreement

ABSTRACT

In Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts (e.g. Fung Yu-lan, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan). This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies.     

Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?

I clarify a widely accepted form of contemporary naturalism and argue that supervenient physicalism should not be considered an option for those who embrace this version of naturalism. Among other things, my thesis implies that if there are insuperable difficulties for strict physicalism, then the move toward supervenience views of the mind/body problem amounts to an abandonment of this version of naturalism and not a minor adjustment of it. More precisely, my argument is this: strict physicalism excludes both substance and property or event dualism. But the supervenience thesis entails some form of property or event dualism. So strict physicalism excludes the supervenience thesis. Moreover, given the nature of a widely accepted contemporary understanding of naturalism, it is best construed along strict physicalist lines and naturalists of this persuasion should not be supervenient physicalists. To make my case, I offer a characterization of a ubiquitous version of contemporary naturalism followed by an analysis of the most plausible version of supervenient physicalism consistent with this form of naturalism. I then try to show why this version of supervenient physicalism should not be an option for a naturalist of a certain persuasion.     

Self-analysis: a fool for a patient?

In this paper I first reviewed the scanty publications on the subject of self-analysis. Although it was recommended by Freud as early as 1910 for every analyst, self-analysis turns out to have many pitfalls and to be quite a complicated and controversial procedure. There is no agreement on the proper technique of self-analysis in the literature, nor is there any discussion of the determinants of the particular choice of technique of self-analysis that is employed, nor even of the reasons why some analysts do not engage in it at all. Using clinical data gathered from written material of many years of self-analysis following the termination of a successful training psychoanalysis, I have attempted to elucidate some of the problems posed by this procedure. These problems are in some ways similar to formal psychoanalysis, but are in some ways contingent on the fact that it is basically a different technique. It is a solitary occupation and therefore suffers from the dangers of disintegration into autism, narcissism, and obsessional rumination. There is no living presence of an analyst to serve either as a transference figure or to make interpretations and stimulate the production of material. The identification with the analyst's analyzing function is far from simple in self-analysis because of the complex nature of the various internalizations of the analyst that take place over years of a formal training analysis. Thus, Ticho (1967) is correct when she claimed that self-analysis is a skill that the analysand has to acquire by himself or herself. An important phase of the beginning of self-analysis involves the working through of the separation from the psychoanalyst and the re-evaluation of the analyst and the analytic process. This results in a heightened sense of independence and autonomy, increased cohesion of the self, and maturation--which is manifested by greater autonomous ego functioning, a more mature sense of identity, and continued transformations of narcissism which highly valuable goals, on the basis of the data I have presented, can be approached through the process of self-analysis. Above all this stands the most important goal of self-analysis, the understanding of one's countertransference reactions. This is especially important in the treatment of seriously disturbed patients who become disruptive, and thus get labeled borderline, often as a response to unconscious countertransference manifestations from the analyst which are then experienced in the self-object transference as failures in empathy.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Can a Robot Be a Good Colleague?

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper discusses the robotization of the workplace, and particularly the question of whether robots can be good colleagues. This might appear to be a strange...     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

How does a word become a message? An illustration on a developmental time-scale

Recent changes in views on cognition underscore its embodied, situated and distributed character. These changes are compatible with the conceptual framework of ecological psychology. However for ecological psychology to propose explanations for a broad range of cognitive phenomena, including language, it needs an account of how to link the dynamics of coupling between the organism and the environment with the apparent symbolicity of informational structures. In this paper it is proposed that a theory of information in biological systems, advocated by Howard Pattee, may help forge this link. By treating informational structures as constraints on dynamics this approach helps to identify which processes, in which systems and on what time-scales are needed for structures to ‘become messages’. I will illustrate how these processes might work on developmental time-scale in the domain of language, building on the work by Edward Reed (1995, 1996) and extending it using the view of linguistic structures as constraints.     

A failure of dialogue? a critical reflection on a discussion between a teacher trainer and a pre-service second-language teacher

Reflective practice in teacher education often involves dialogic communication between teacher educators and teachers. This essay asks what constitutes authentic dialogic engagement in discussions between a pre-service second-language (SL) teacher and her university supervisor. Written as a self-critical reflection, the paper first describes the author’s thoughts and feelings about a post-teaching session he conducted with one of his supervisees and identifies possible disconnections existing between them. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s of genuine dialogue, this paper reflects on the dispositions that foster a dialogic relationship between teacher educators and pre-service and in-service teachers.     

Once a boring task always a boring task? Interest as a self-regulatory mechanism.

A process was proposed through which individuals regulate their motivation to perform necessary but uninteresting activities over time. If committed to continuing, individuals may engage in interest-enhancing strategies that can change the activity into something more positive to perform. In Study 1 Ss performed novel tasks and generated strategies to make regular performance interesting. In Study 2 Ss actually used these strategies primarily in conditions indicating a self-regulatory attempt: The task was currently boring, there was a perceived reason to continue (alleged health benefit), and a relevant strategy was available. Strategy use was associated with a change in activity definition and greater likelihood of subsequently performing the activity. In Study 3 Ss beliefs about how to maintain motivation to perform more everyday activities emphasized the importance of regulating interest relative to other self-regulatory strategies.     

Should a school honor a student's DNR order?

Physicians first present the case of a sixteen-year-old cardiac patient who has refused a heart transplant and cardiac resuscitation. Her family and physicians accept the decision. The family has asked the school system to honor her do not resuscitate order if she goes into cardiac arrest in school The school system has refused to do so. Following the case presentation, a lawyer, a physician/ethicist, and an educator consider the important issues raised by this ongoing case.     

Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?

True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: (i) the orthodox definition given in terms of interpretations or models, (ii) a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and (iii) a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference.     

Selecting a patient or initiating a psychoanalytic process?

The defences provoked in the analyst by the anxieties associated with the difficult tasks of ‘assessment’ and ‘selection’ for psychoanalysis can result in a tendency to think in terms of ‘hurdles to be cleared’ by potential psychoanalytic patients, rather than ‘opening the gates’. This can result in a diminution of the analyst's capacity to enlist and sustain a psychoanalytic stance. Only within a psychoanalytic frame can a meaningful psychoanalytic process unfold, at all stages of a potential patient's movement from their first contact through to, possibly, entering into an analysis. The author illustrates the value of this thinking by describing the work of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis where there has been a shift of emphasis in psychoanalytic consultation towards working with individuals on their potential to initiate a psychoanalytic process, and away from the sole aim of ‘selection of a suitable patient’. In this paper, the author notes that when institutional culture and practice supports psychoanalytic identity, this makes it more possible to recognize and articulate the anxieties provoked by the ‘emotional storm’ inevitable in psychoanalytic consultation, and the draw towards unhelpful enactment that may otherwise obscure the initiation of a psychoanalytic process that may or may not result in analytic treatment. Illustrative case material from the Clinic is presented.     

What can a perception-memory expert tell a jury?

Witnesses to crimes and other forensically relevant events sometimes describe memories in which they express confidence that, on the basis of research in perception and memory, may be inappropriately high, given the circumstances of the case. The most effective way of conveying this observation and the reasons for it to a jury is via an expert in perception and memory. In any given case, a mosaic of factors having to do with perception and memory are relevant. I briefly sketch the most common of these factors and categorize them as to the degree to which they may be unambiguously and/or quantitatively applied to a specific case. I discuss one such factor, witness-object distance, in some detail, showing how an expert might describe distance effects on perception and providing examples from actual cases.     

Angels: a bridge to a spiritual pedagogy?

This article is the result of an Early Childhood Care and Education undergraduate pilot project through a university on the West Coast of Canada. It weaves together poststructural interpretations and a hermeneutic phenomenological recounting of an experience of inquiring about angels with young children. The angel inquiry became a point of entry into a holistic spiritual pedagogy that attends to the whole of a matter, while also paying attention to the significance of each part. Contributing to the interpretations made in this study is Ted Aoki’s philosophy of the space between where the planned curriculum and the lived curriculum (or lived experiences) meet in a third and overlapping tensional space; Max van Manen’s emphasis on lived experiences as ‘breathing meaning’ also contribute to the choices and interpretations made. Blended through the study are the understandings of Tobin Hart and Kate Adams from their investigations of children’s lived experiences with mystical unseen worlds. The area of invisible mystery proves to be more delicate to negotiate than the world of physical embodiments and the world of complete fantasy of the mind; this is the area of the spiritual – the meeting of body and mind with a third and overlapping space. This space goes by many names and many definitions, but ultimately remains indefinable and intangible. But during the pilot project, meaning did come through the inquiring and through the themes that emerged of ‘who we are’ in relation to angels; race, gender and the role of nurturer; and familial angel ownership. Children yearn for allowing spaces to safely express these ideas about, and experiences with, mystery worlds. It is the connection with the inner life through small moments and engagements with the big life questions that the entangling of the physical, the mental and the spiritual creates the intuitive, integrated heart space of a holistic spiritual pedagogy.