Beyond Just Justice – Creating Space for a Future‐Care Ethic

Distributive justice relies on metaphors about spatial distribution. Modelling cross‐temporal relations on cross‐spatial relations in this way obscures how earlier groups become the later ones. Procedural justice metaphors rely on metaphors of (contemporaneous) contract and thereby on impartial reasoning. Their dominance is already problematic in the case of contemporary relations, but is even more so in the case of relations across time, where the conditions for later parties are controlled and created by earlier ones. Future generations should not be thought of as a distinct group living at a different temporal “location,” but as who we will become. Thus, the frame of “justice” is much less appropriate for our relations to them than the frame of “care”.     

Are Metaphors Elliptical Similes?

What is the relation between metaphors and similes? Aristotle's “comparison theory” holds that metaphors are elliptical similes: “Sam is a pig” is simply a short form of “Sam is like a pig.” In contrast, it has been suggested that metaphors cannot be elliptical similes because metaphors are “stronger” than similes. We know metaphors are stronger, it is argued, because of examples involving corrections, such as “Peter is not just like a rock, he is a rock.” The argument from corrections can be challenged on logical and empirical grounds. The ability to correct a simile with a metaphor does not entail that metaphors are stronger than similes when used on their own, which is likely to be the most frequent case. Although four experiments indicate that when corrections are involved, metaphors are indeed stronger than similes in several respects, alas a further four experiments indicate that these differences are largely eliminated when metaphors and similes are used on their own. We note that this pattern of results is consistent with the comparison theory, and we offer an explanation of the effects of corrections.     

“The Label Mental Illness” or “It's Showing Its Ugly Head…”: Mothers’ Conceptualizations of Mental Illness in Their Children

This grounded theory study examined the metaphors mothers used for mental illness when they had children who were. Two metaphor types were found: static and dynamic. Static metaphors for mental illness emphasized their unchanging qualities and problem-solving or learning strategies were highlighted as ways to approach them. Dynamic metaphors for mental illness highlighted how they were changeable. Positioning the diseases in a storyline, in which one could “try again tomorrow,” was one of the primary ways participants described approaching them. Clinical implications of this research may increase family engagement with treatment.     

“Putin,You Suck”: Affective Sticking Points in the Czech Narrative on “Russian Hybrid Warfare”

Using the case of the Czech narrative on “Russian hybrid warfare” (RHW), this article contributes to the broader question of why narratives succeed. Building on Lacanian psychoanalysis, narrative scholarship, and affect/emotions research in International Relations, we suggest that narrative success is facilitated also by two interrelated factors: embedding in broader cultural contexts and the ability to incorporate and reproduce collectively circulating affects. We develop a methodological framework for encircling unobservable affects within discourse via “sticking points”—linguistic phenomena infused with affective investment. We outline three categories of sticking points—valued signifiers, fantasies, and biographical narratives. Utilizing the approach in our case study, we focus on a narrative based around the notion that Russia waged a “hybrid war” against “the West” and that this should be faced with quasi‐military measures, which was successful in changing the language of Czech national security. We show that this narrative incorporated a range of sticking points, which contributed to its relative success. It utilized valued signifiers, such as “the West,” “the Kremlin,” “agents,” and “occupation,” weaved them together into a fantasy of a threat to the nation's “Western” identity, and intertwined this with the biographical narratives of history as a lens for world politics and East/West geopolitics.     

The “Good” Psychologist, “Good” Torture,and “Good” Reputation—Response to O’Donohue,Snipes, Dalto,Soto, Maragakis,and Im (2014) “The Ethics of Enhanced Interrogations and Torture”

O’Donohue et al. (2014) sought to derive, from classical ethical theories, the ethical obligation of psychologists to assist “enhanced interrogations and torture” (EIT) in national defense scenarios under strict EIT criteria. They asked the American Psychological Association to adopt an ethics code obligating psychologists to assist such EIT and to uphold the reputation of EIT psychologists. We contest the authors’ ethical analyses as supports for psychologists’ forays into torture interrogation when (if ever) the EIT criteria obtain. We also contend that the authors’ application of these ethical analyses violates the Geneva Conventions, contravenes military doctrine and operations, and undermines psychology as a profession. We conclude that “good” public reputation is not owed to, or expected by, “good” intelligence professionals, and collaborating operational psychologists must share their providence.     

Towards a literary account of mental health from James' Principles of Psychology

The field of mental health tends to treat its literary metaphors as literal realities with the concomitant loss of vague “feelings of tendency” in “unusual experiences”. I develop this argument through the prism of William James’ (1890) “The Principles of Psychology”. In the first part of the paper, I reflect upon the relevance of James' “The Psychologist's Fallacy” to a literary account of mental health. In the second part of the paper, I develop the argument that “connotations” and “feelings of tendency” are central to resolving some of the more difficult challenges of this fallacy. I proceed to do this in James' spirit of generating imaginative metaphors to understand experience. Curiously, however, mental health presents a strange paradox in William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology. He constructs an elaborate conception of the “empirical self” and “stream of thought” but chooses not to use these to understand unusual experiences – largely relying instead on the concept of a “secondary self.” In this article, I attempt to make more use of James' central division between the “stream of thought” and the “empirical self” to understand unusual experiences. I suggest that they can be usefully understood using the loose metaphor of a “binary star” where the “secondary self” can be seen as an “accretion disk” around one of the stars. Understood as literary rather the literal, this metaphor is quite different to more unitary models of self-breakdown in mental health, particularly in its separation of “self” from “the stream of thought” and I suggest it has the potential to start a re-imagination of the academic discourse around mental health.     

《周易》对探索潜意识启示

隐喻是一种语言现象,也是一种认知方式。《周易》是一套复杂的隐喻认知系统,“象”与“理”都是认识事物的思维方式。潜意识通过心理表征以隐喻的方式呈现,精神分析师借助隐喻方法来分析潜意识。将潜意识的呈现形式(如梦、口误等)理解为某种“象”,把“象”作为表征潜意识的符号与工具,通过“观象、取象、辨象、立象、尽意”这个认知过程,实现对“理”(潜意识)的理解。通过“象思维”来探索潜意识对中国人来说具有文化上亲和性,克服精神分析中的“无结构性”与“语言的限制”。     

Metaphors and creativity: Direct,moderating, and mediating effects

Through five experiments, this research advances knowledge about the influence of metaphors on creative cognition by showing that perceiving images that carry metaphoric meaning can alter consumers' creativity. While the results of Experiment 1 reveal that positive metaphors representing ideas like “Thinking outside the box” increase creative output, Experiment 2 uncovers that a negative metaphor conveying “I am burnt out” decreases it. Experiment 3 shows that the metaphor–creativity link is moderated by analogical reasoning skills, and Experiments 4a and 4b reveal the mediating role of creative intent. In addition to implying that marketers can use metaphors to enhance consumers' creative feedback in areas like new product development, this research also makes important theoretical contributions by showing (1) that metaphors that are visually conveyed (in addition to tangible objects or physical exercises) can not only raise but also lower creative output, (2) that a unique cognitive skill alters the metaphor–creativity link, and (3) that consumers' creative intent contributes to that relationship.     

Software informed consent: Docete emptorem, not caveat emptor

Should software be sold “as is”, totally guaranteed, or something else? This paper suggests that “informed consent”, used extensively in medical ethics, is an appropriate way to envision the buyer/developer relationship when software is sold. We review why the technical difficulties preclude delivering perfect software, but allow statistical predictions about reliability. Then we borrow principles refined by medical ethics and apply them to computer professionals.     

SCIENCE AND RELIGION AS LANGUAGES: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE–RELIGION RELATIONSHIP USING METAPHORS,ANALOGIES, AND MODELS

Many scholars often use the terms “metaphors,” “analogies,” and “models” interchangeably and inadvertently overlook the uniqueness of each word. According to recent cognitive studies, the three terms involve distinct cognitive processes using features from a familiar concept and applying them to an abstract, complicated concept. In the field of science and religion, there have been various objects or ideas used as metaphors, analogies, or models to describe the science–religion relationship. Although these heuristic tools provided some understanding of the complex interaction, they failed to address the broad nature of science and religion as well as the multifarious relationship between the two in a sociocultural context. Unlike the previous candidates, the concept of language, including the notions of linguistic worldview, linguistic identity, dialects, power, and bilingualism, offers a unique and comprehensive window through which science, religion, and the relationship between the two are seen with clarity.     

“You are our only hope”: Trading metaphorical “magic bullets” for stem cell “superheroes”

In the wake of two recent developments in stem cell research, it is a fitting time to reassess the claim that stem cells will radically transform the concept and function of medicine. The first is the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s decision in January 2009 to approve Geron Corporation’s Phase I clinical trial using human embryonic stem cells for patients with spinal cord injuries. The second is the National Institutes of Health’s decision to permit federal funding of research using donated IVF human embryos in their July 2009 Guidelines on Human Stem Cell Research. We are now poised to see whether stem cell research can deliver on what it promises. However, what exactly does it promise and how? Moreover, who is doing the promising? Turning to the use of metaphor can help us to answer these questions and enable us to develop a better appreciation of the unique features of promised stem cell therapies. Indeed, metaphors have exerted profound influence in medicine, and it is fitting that we seek new metaphors for new therapies where appropriate. In this case, other metaphors such as magic bullets or the Holy Grail cannot capture what is unique about stem cells. Accordingly, I propose a new metaphor: the stem cell superhero. Stem cell superheroes are characterized by the following traits: they are seemingly capable of fighting the evil of virtually all disease (unlike “magic bullets”) and they seem to be our only hope of doing so, although to summon them we must make difficult moral choices. In the course of assessing the merits of three recent yet covert references to the superhero metaphor, I conclude that this powerful new paradigm employs a problematic logic (i.e., we cannot know that something is “our only hope”), but that the aspiration as such is a good one.     

Aptness predicts preference for metaphors or similes, as well as recall bias

Why might we sometimes prefer a metaphor such as “genes are blueprints” to a simile such as “genes are like blueprints”? One possibility is that metaphors are preferred when the comparison between a tenor (e.g., genes) and a vehicle (e.g., blueprints) seems especially apt. That is, metaphors might be used when the comparison captures many salient features of the tenor in question. The present experiments examined the relation between the aptness of comparisons and people’s preferences for expressing those comparisons as metaphors or as similes. In Experiment 1, it was found that there is consensus on how to express particular comparisons. In Experiment 2, it was found that this preference can be predicted from the aptness of a comparison. It was also found that aptness can predict errors in the recall of comparisons. These findings have implications for theories of metaphor.     

Metaphors We Teach By: The Language of “Learning Outcomes”

This article employs George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's work on metaphor (1980) to examine the current use of the term “learning outcomes” within higher education. It argues that “learning outcomes” is an ontological metaphor (education becomes focused on results that one can understand and measure) that resonates with contemporary academic capitalism. Yet because metaphors highlight some things and conceal others, thinking about teaching and disciplines using “learning outcomes” hides other dimensions of academic capitalism and obscures unquantifiable and highly complex aspects of education. Finally, the article explores ways in which an emphasis upon outcomes has consequences for the field of Religious Studies.     

Theology,Anti-Theology and Atheology: From Christian Passions to Secular Emotions

The nineteenth-century transition from talk of passions and affections of the soul to talk of “emotions” in English-language psychological thought is taken as a case-study in the secularisation of psychology. This transition is used as an occasion to re-evaluate the methodologies of John Milbank and Richard Webster, who interpret certain secular scientific accounts as forms of theology or anti-theology “in disguise”. It is suggested, in the light of the study of the emergence of the secular concept of ‘emotions’, that the category of “atheology” be used to supplement their methodology. “Atheological” texts are not merely theology or anti-theology in disguise but are a novel form of discourse, which is alienated from the assumptions and metaphors of traditional theologies (and which replaces them with physiological evolutionary narratives) but which is not necessarily atheistic or anti-theological.     

Serving God and Country? Religious Involvement and Military Service Among Young Adult Men

Despite important connections between religion and military action throughout world history, scholars have seldom explored the association between religiosity and military enlistment. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), we used a person‐oriented analysis to categorize young men according to patterns of adolescent religious involvement. Youth indentified as “highly religious evangelical” are more likely to enlist in the military compared to their “highly religious nonevangelical” and “nonreligious” counterparts; however, these findings hold only for those young men without college experience. These findings are discussed along with study limitations and promising directions for future research.     

Generalizations,Cultural Essentialism,and Metaphorical Gulfs

An ongoing debate in comparative research is about whether we should see cultural diversities as manifestations of essential differences or as superficial variations on a universal blueprint. Edward Slingerland has pointed to cognitive science and the use of embodied metaphors to emphasize the universality of concept formation and cognition across cultures. He suggests that this should quiet the “cultural essentialists” who take fundamental differences in Eastern and Western thinking as their starting points. Michael Puett has also leveled a critique of cultural essentialism in support of a presuppositionless approach, and Slingerland’s conclusions seem to offer him support. However, I will argue that even if all modern humans are broadly similar in metaphor use and cognitive processes, research in the humanities must continue to account for the differences implied by the particular metaphors employed and emphasized in diverse traditions. I contend that responsible hermeneutic practice does this through provisional, yet indispensable, generalizations.     

Learning as Leaving Home: Fear,Empathy, and Hospitality in the Theology and Religion Classroom

The article is a response to this journal's call for papers on metaphors for teaching, and also draws from a previous publication in which Kent Eilers developed a methodology for teaching global theologies. In this methodology, the ultimate goal was the development of “hermeneutical dispositions of empathy, hospitality, and receptivity toward culturally diverse voices” (2014, 165). This article considers the goals of Eilers' methodology, and others like his, and how it is that the metaphors of “leaving home” and “communal imagination” highlight the importance of the ambient and interpersonal features of a classroom and their effect on the attainment of the above goals. In so doing, it extends the conversation beyond content and methodology in teaching theology and religion into the realms of philosophy of education, as well as the fields of moral and values education. It is contended that the metaphors informed by these areas of study facilitate the attainment of such goals, and similar ones, by demonstrating that the cultivation of an ambience of care, trust, and compassion within the classroom constitutes an essential foundation for learning in which students “leave home” and cultivate “communal imagination.” The article finishes with practical suggestions for educators in theology and religion.     

On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.