Actions That We Ought,But Can't

It is commonly assumed that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that is, that if we ought to do something, then it must be the case that we can do it. It is a frequent quip about this thesis that any account must specify three things: what is meant by the ‘ought’, what is meant by the ‘implies’, and what is meant by the ‘can’. ¹ Something is missed, though, when we state the thesis in its shortened, three‐word form. We overlook what it means to do something. It is, I think, not mere coincidence that nobody has discussed this issue: It is very difficult to specify what it means to do something in the relevant sense. This paper is devoted to fleshing out one way of doing something that is a problem for the thesis.     

Student Evaluations and Gendered Expectations: What We Can't Count Can Hurt Us

Does teacher's gender impact students' evaluations? We critically evaluated the research literature and concluded that the form gender bias takes may not be easily detectible by quantitative scales. To explore this possibility, we did a qualitative analysis of the words that 288 college students at two campuses used to describe their best- and worst-ever teachers. Although we found considerable overlap in the ways that students talked about their male and female teachers, we also saw indications that students hold teachers accountable to certain gendered expectations. These expectations place burdens on all teachers, but the burdens on women are more labor-intensive. We also saw signs of much greater hostility toward women than toward men who do not meet students' gendered expectations.     

Faculty Development in the 1990s: What It Is and Why We Can't Wait

Faculty development efforts are vitally needed in higher education today. Changes in expectations about the quality and assessment of undergraduate education, societal needs, technology, the student populations, and paradigms about teaching and learning argue for viable, credible, and creative programs. The author explores the nature and need for faculty development, discusses some faculty development options, and provides a selected number of resources.     

‘We Can't Whistle It Either’: Legend and Reality

Abstract: There is a famous quip of F.P. Ramsey's, which is my second epigraph. According to a widespread legend, the quip is a criticism of Wittgenstein's treatment in the Tractatus of what cannot be said. The remark is indeed Ramsey's, but he didn't mean what he is taken to mean in the legend. His quip, looked at in context, means something quite different. The legend is sometimes taken to provide support for a reading of the Tractatus according to which the nonsensical propositions of the book were intended to convey what cannot be said. But, since the legend has no basis in reality, it provides no evidence in favor of any such reading of the Tractatus. The quip has great interest if it is read in the context of Ramsey's discussion of generality; it is closely related to issues of importance in the development of Wittgenstein's thought.     

The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology (Book)

The growth of religious psychology with specific reference to the Malay people as the majority culture is discussed. This article describes attitudes of the Malays toward religion, and reviews related programs and developments in Malaysian universities and institutes. It covers contents of major seminars and conferences held in recent years; the application of religious psychology in the general Malay population and an analysis of some problems and prospects relevant to the general psychology of religion area. The article concludes that, although psychology of religion does not exist here in the Western sense, immense opportunities exist for psychological research on religion. Suggestions for improving the psychology-religion interface are given.     

We Value What Values Us: The Appeal of Identity-Affirming Science

Members of the public (Study 1; n =  184) and university students (Study 2; n =  101) evaluated a piece of research and indicated their support for its continuation. The research findings were held constant, but the methods that revealed those findings were attributed to either neuroscience or social science, and the conclusions based on those findings were biased either in favor of men or in favor of women. Study 1 revealed that participants were more positive about research that affirmed their gender identity and that was based on neuroscience rather than social science. Study 2 found this pattern to be apparent in more specialist samples. Indeed, participants with some scientific training were more influenced by research that affirmed the reader's gender identity. Participants with less scientific training, in comparison, were more influenced by the type of science described when making judgments about the value of the research. Contrary to popular claims, this suggests that scientific knowledge alone is no protection against the effects of bias on research evaluation. Implications for the practice and popularization of science are discussed.     

为何信赖科学(论纲)

本文是英国布里斯托尔大学退休物理学教授齐曼提交给清华大学、北京师范大学和中国自然辩证法研究会于 2 0 0 2年 11月共同举办的“科学技术”中的哲学问题学术研讨会”的报告 ,原文“BelivinginScience”。该报告以纲要的形式论述了其科学哲学的框架 ,涉及科学哲学的诸多理论问题该报告在大会宣读颇受好评 ,现征得作者同意 ,翻译发表 ,以飨读者。     

You Can't Be Serious!

Abstract

Jim Cotter frames this paper in the form of a one-sided conversation with Michael Vasey about two particular phrases that Vasey was responsible for in the current Anglican liturgy. The first comes from the baptismal rite and talks of the candidate submitting themselves to Christ as Lord. By reference to marriage and other liturgical contexts, Cotter asks whether this is an appropriate image for the twenty-first century, especially in the light of the debate about sexual abuse. The second phrase is taken from the Easter liturgy and talks of light invading the darkness. Once again Cotter challenges the military implications of this language and the negative associations that such a phrase gives to ‘darkness’ Cotter makes a call for far more careful reflection on the use of language in worship and offers a number of alternative suggestions of his own.     

Why We Walk the Way We Do

By using inverse dynamics and forceplate recordings, this study established the principle of oscillating systems and the influence of gravity and body parameters on the programming of the gait parameters, step frequency and length. Calculation of the ratio of the amplitude of the center of mass (CM) and the center of foot pressure (CP) oscillations yielded an equation and established a biomechanical constant, the natural body frequency (NBF). NBF appears to be an absolute invariant parameter, specific to human standing posture and gait in terrestrial gravity, which influences the relative positions of CM and CP and whose value separates the frequency bands of standing posture from those for gait. This equation was tested by using the experimental paradigm of stepping in place and then used in calculating the magnitude of CM oscillations during gait. The biomechanical analysis of the experimental observations allows one to establish the relationships between body parameters and gravity and the central programming of locomotor parameters.     

What New Wave Materialists Can't Say

Most phenomenal concept strategists, or concept dualists, trace the explanatory gap to “thin” phenomenal concepts that fail to represent phenomenal properties as physical entities. New Wave Materialists, a subgroup of concept dualists, claim that our physical and phenomenal concepts each represent experience completely and accurately, but nevertheless so differently that a priori links don't (and can't) hold between them. This paper argues that you can't have two distinct but nevertheless complete and accurate representations of the same thing. One (or both) of the representations must misrepresent, or the two representations must represent different things. The paper then puts its arguments in a wider context. It notes that our phenomenal concepts must be transparent, translucent, mildly opaque, or radically opaque (in senses reviewed in the paper). It canvasses arguments that a posteriori physicalists can't consider our phenomenal concepts opaque. Then it shows how its own arguments against New Wave Materialism have the result that a posteriori physicalists can't consider phenomenal concepts transparent or translucent. The paper thus advances its arguments as part of a broad‐based case against a posteriori physicalism.