Prospect Theory Predictions When Escalation Is Not the Only Chance to Recover Sunk Costs

Two experiments tested the effect of risk of alternative investment opportunities on decision behavior in an escalation context. In the first experiment (n = 170), the risk of the reinvestment option, which had been unsuccessful and incurred a sunk cost, was held equal to that of an alternative investment project. Responsibility for the previous decision was manipulated between these subjects. Subjects were required to choose between the reinvestment option and the alternative. Responsible subjects demonstrated classic reinvestment (escalation) tendencies, and nonresponsible subjects exhibited a significant tendency to avoid reinvestment. Subjects in the second experiment (n = 195) completed the same decision task and were also assigned to high and low responsibility conditions. In this experiment the risk of investing further in a previously chosen project, relative to the risk of the alternative project, was manipulated. Those subjects who were responsible for the first decision (a) demonstrated no preference for or against continued pursuit of the initial project (i.e., there was no escalation tendency) and (b) preferred the less risky of the second investments, regardless of whether it was or was not the initially chosen project. Nonresponsible subjects showed no risk preference or proclivity for reinvestment. The results of these experiments suggest that salient information concerning relative risk dominates the effect of prior performance information when alternative investments are considered. We discuss the implications of these findings for decision theory and for methodology in commitment escalation research.     

When a Mother Is Depressed

Abstract

The literature related to mother-child interaction when a mother is depressed and a framework for addressing mother-child co-occupations for mothers with depression and their young children is provided. An in-depth case example that spans mother-infant occupation- based intervention during a short-term psychiatric hospitalization through home-based occupation-based intervention is provided.     

When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live

I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here's a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize it, you have to be able to neutralize it to know P; so you don’t know P. But the skeptical hypotheses I plug into it are “real, live” scientific‐philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, unlike any of the outrageous traditional skeptical hypotheses (e.g., ‘You’re a brain in a vat’). So I call the resulting skepticism Live Skepticism. Notably, the Live Skeptic's argument goes through even if we adopt the clever anti‐skeptical fixes thought up in recent years such as reliabilism, relevant alternatives theory, contextualism, and the rejection of epistemic closure. Furthermore, the scope of Live Skepticism is bizarre: although we don’t know the simple facts noted above, many of us do know that there are black holes and other amazing facts.     

When the Diagnosis Is Vaginismus

No abstract available for this article.     

Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough

Abstract

I argue that the traditional problem of evil mislocates the problem which confronts the theist. The real problem arises not from the evil in the world, but from the non-perfection of the world. Given that a perfect God could create only a perfect world, and given that the world is not in fact perfect, I construct an argument for atheism. I show that the argument is not open to the objections which theists standardly bring against the traditional objection from evil.     

Smiling in a Job Interview: When Less Is More

Two studies examined the effect of applicants’ smiling on hireability. In a pre-test study, participants were asked to rate the expected behavior for four types of applicants. Newspaper reporter applicants were expected to be more serious than applicants for other jobs. In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to be an applicant or interviewer for a newspaper reporting job. Smiling was negatively related to hiring, and smiling mediated the relation between applicants’ motivation to make a good impression and hiring. Hiring was maximized when applicants smiled less in the middle of the interview relative to the start and end. In Study 2, participants watched Study 1 clips and were randomly assigned to believe the applicants were applying to one of four jobs. Participants rated more suitability when applicants smiled less, especially for jobs associated with a serious demeanor. This research shows that job type is an important moderator of the impact of smiling on hiring.     

Motor Programming Is Not the Only Process Which Can Influence RT

The current status of research on the memory drum theory is evaluated with emphasis on the issues raised by Marteniuk and MacKenzie (1981). A general theme emerging from this review is that response programming is not the only process which can influence RT and that distinguishing programming from non-programming effects clarifies rather than “clouds? the issues.     

Backward Sensory Preconditioning When Reinforcement Is Delayed

In two experiments rats received an initial phase of training in which two neutral stimuli were presented as a serial compound (A-X). In a second phase, Awas established as a signal for a shock reinforcer, the shock being presented immediately after the termination of A (the immediate condition) or after a 5-sec interval (the trace condition). A final test phase showed that not only A but also X was capable of evoking conditioned suppression (a backward sensory preconditioning effect). The degree of suppression evoked by X was not correlated with that evoked by A. In both experiments the A trained with immediate reinforcement was more suppressive than that trained with the trace procedure, but in Experiment 1 the trace and immediate groups did not differ in the response they showed to X, and in Experiment 2 (which allowed a within-subject comparison) the trace procedure resulted in more suppression to X than did immediate conditioning of A. These results disconfirm the suggestion that the backward sensory preconditioning effect depends on the formation of an associative chain: X-A-shock. They are consistent with the proposal that the associatively activated representation of X is able to form a direct association with the reinforcer during A-shock training.     

Novel Labels Increase Category Coherence,But Only When People Have the Goal to Coordinate

From infancy, we recognize that labels denote category membership and help us to identify the critical features that objects within a category share. Labels not only reflect how we categorize, but also allow us to communicate and share categories with others. Given the special status of labels as markers of category membership, do novel labels (i.e., non‐words) affect the way in which adults select dimensions for categorization in unsupervised settings? Additionally, is the purpose of this effect primarily coordinative (i.e., do labels promote shared understanding of how we categorize objects)? To address this, we conducted two experiments in which participants individually categorized images of mountains with or without novel labels, and with or without a goal of coordination, within a non‐communicative paradigm. People who sorted items with novel labels had more similar categories than people who sorted without labels only when they were told that their categories should make sense to other people, and not otherwise. We argue that sorters' goals determine whether novel labels promote the development of socially coherent categories.