Science as instrumental reason: Heidegger,Habermas, Heisenberg

In modern continental thought, natural science is widely portrayed as an exclusively instrumental mode of reason. The breadth of this consensus has partly preempted the question of how it came to persuade. The process of persuasion, as it played out in Germany, can be explored by reconstructing the intellectual exchanges among three twentieth-century theorists of science, Heidegger, Habermas, and Werner Heisenberg. Taking an iconic Heisenberg as a kind of limiting case of “the scientist,” Heidegger and Habermas each found themselves driven to place new constraints on their previously more capacious assessments of science, especially its capacity to reflect on its method. Tracing how that happened, through archival and historical contextualization and close readings of their texts, lets us make visible Heidegger and Habermas’s intellectual affinities and argumentative parallels, which derived not only from their shared grounding in earlier reactions against positivism, but also from confrontation with contemporary events. The latter included, for Heidegger, the rise of a technically powerful science exemplified by nuclear physics, and for Habermas, post-World War II controversies over science, technology, and their socially critical possibilities.     

Defending the Content Approach to Aesthetic Experience

This article defends the content approach to aesthetic experience. It begins by sketching this approach to aesthetic experience. It then rehearses certain recent criticisms of the view by Alan Goldman and attempts to rebut them. One of those criticisms raises a long‐standing concern about the author's account that has recently been called the “qua” problem. The article concludes by putting this issue to rest.     

Reactivation-dependent amnesia in Pavlovian approach and instrumental transfer

The theory of memory reconsolidation relates to the hypothesized restabilisation process that occurs following the reactivation of a memory through retrieval. Thus the demonstration of reactivation-dependent amnesia for a previously acquired memory is a prerequisite for showing that such a memory undergoes reconsolidation. Here we show that the appetitive Pavlovian representations that underlie Pavlovian approach and Pavlovian-instrumental transfer are destabilized following their retrieval. This reactivation-dependent amnesia demonstrates that the general motivational or incentive properties of appetitive conditioned stimuli, as well as their conditioned reinforcing properties, can be reduced by blocking memory reconsolidation.     

In search of the Human: The trauma of modernity and the “instrumental reason” of the persecutors

Abstract

This article takes the clinical notion of trauma as a historiographic criterion for understanding modernity and its mythologies. If the rewriting of the term trauma – at the intersection of psychoanalysis and neurobiology, cultural anthropology and philosophy of the mind – is the hallmark of contemporaneity, it is quite acceptable to see the Shoah as a radical historical and epistemological watershed. Never before had such a highly productive bureaucratic-industrial system been designed and implemented for the devastation of the very idea of humanity. Auschwitz was, in the most radical ways, the liminal space between Human and Inhuman. It lay right at the cutting edge of the abyss that the executioner shares with his victim – the annihilation of humanity. This essay crosses a question that has always characterized the social construction of subjectivity: the perimeter of the Human, and the interrelationships between identity, alterity, and recognition.     

Defending Particularism

In this brief response I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong has underestimated the complexities that moral principles will have to circumvent if they are to survive particularist criticism. I also argue that we cannot yet accept Gert's accounts of moral relevance and of how a sound moral rule can survive exceptions.     

A reason to be rational

This essay argues that in spite of the powerful arguments by Kolodny and Broome there is a reason to be rational. The suggested reason to be rational is that if an agent complies with rational requirements the people around him, as well as he himself, will be able to explain and predict his attitudes. Rationality allows us to make sense of an agent’s attitudes in terms of his other attitudes. This form of explainability is valuable, because it provides us with greater comprehension as regards an agent’s attitudes. Thus, I argue that there is an instrumental reason to be rational.     

Defending the Possibility of Knowledge

In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means. Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true.     

The behavioral specificity of stimulation: A systems approach to procedural distinctions of classical and instrumental conditioning

This paper presents a new methodological approach to classical Pavlovian investigations. Using a yoked group for stimulus pairing trial pacing, behavioral occurrence frequencies, sequential behavior patterns, and behavioral change dynamics are analyzed for rats in both a non-discriminative and a general setting discrimination paradigm. Theoretical issues addressed by a variety of new dependent measures are discussed, and a special emphasis is placed on comparing instrumental and classical procedures as viewed from the behavioral perspective of the subject.     

How to modify the strength of a reason

Philosophical Studies - Kearns and Star have previously recommended that we measure the degree to which a reason supports a conclusion, either about how to act or what to believe, as the...     

Defending the self against identity misclassification

When people perform role-violating behaviors that are diagnostic of membership in a stigmatized group, they risk identity misclassification—i.e., being mistaken for a member of that group. Because false stigmatization raises the possibility of interpersonal punishment, role violators who wish to avoid it must communicate their non-stigmatized status to others. Conversely, self-protective strategies such as self-affirmations (Steele, 1988 Steele, C. M. 1988. “The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self”. In Advances in experimental social psychology, Edited by: Berkowitz, L. Vol. 21, 261–302. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) that do not communicate non-stigmatized status should fail to reduce role violators' discomfort. Consistent with this assumption, heterosexual men who publicly violated a gender role norm—and thereby risked misclassification as gay—reported heightened discomfort and diminished implicit self-evaluation, unless they directly or indirectly communicated their heterosexual status to their ostensible audience. Moreover, a standard self-affirmation task failed to protect heterosexual role violators from discomfort. Discussion highlights the implications of these findings for research on social role adherence, stigmatization, and self-affirmation.     

Variations in the sensitivity of instrumental responding to reinforcer devaluation

In five experiments hungry rats were trained to make a lever press response for a sucrose reinforcer. That sucrose was subsequently devalued by conditioning a food-aversion to it, and the ability of the rats to integrate knowledge about the instrumental contingency with that gained from aversion training was assessed in an extinction test. Experiment I showed successful integration following limited but not extended instrumental training. Experiment II suggested that the crucial factor was the spacing of training; successful integration was seen after massed but not distributed training. The third experiment implicated distributed experience with the reinforcer, rather than distributed response practice, in failures of integration. Experiment IV showed that if the distribution of food-aversion learning was dissimilar to that of instrumental training then a failure of integration could result; this finding was able to account for the distribution of training effects seen in previous studies, but not the effect of extended training. Experiment V replicated the extended training effect seen in Experiment I, and provided evidence that this may reflect the degree of exposure to the reinforcer rather than the extent of response practice.