Is computer simulation changing the face of experimentation?

Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore counts as a measurement. I agree with her premises but reject the inference. The epistemological payoff of a traditional experiment is greater (or less) confidence in the fit between a model and a target system. The source of this payoff is the existence of a causal interaction with the target system. A computer experiment, which does not go beyond the simulation system itself, lacks any such interaction. So computer experiments cannot confer any additional confidence in the fit (or lack thereof) between the simulation model and the target system.     

Is the human mind a Turing machine?

In this paper I discuss the topics of mechanism and algorithmicity. I emphasise that a characterisation of algorithmicity such as the Turing machine is iterative; and I argue that if the human mind can solve problems that no Turing machine can, the mind must depend on some non-iterative principle — in fact, Cantor's second principle of generation, a principle of the actual infinite rather than the potential infinite of Turing machines. But as there has been theorisation that all physical systems can be represented by Turing machines, I investigate claims that seem to contradict this: specifically, claims that there are noncomputable phenomena. One conclusion I reach is that if it is believed that the human mind is more than a Turing machine, a belief in a kind of Cartesian dualist gulf between the mental and the physical is concomitant.     

Where is the randomness for the human computer?

Psychologists traditionally have employed both statistical and process assumptions in models of human learning and performance. The corresponding tradition in the field of artificial intelligence is to minimize or eliminate the use of statistical assumptions. This article reviews some stochastic and nonntochastic models of human memory, probability learning, medical diagnosis, and concept identification. Some stochastic models are found to have a larger deterministic component than was previously realized; deterministic models applicable with random selection of stimuli can be represented in stochastic form. A policy of methodological determinism is recommended in which the model builder originally assumes that no random processes take place within the organism. If necessary, and as a last resort, such processes can be appended to an otherwise deterministic model for predictive convenience.     

Where Is the Information for Affordances?

Two questions have priority for a perception psychologist: What is perceived, and what is the information for it? What we perceive are the affordances of the world. Because perception is prospective and goes on over time, the information for affordances is in events, both external and within the perceiver. Hence, we must study perception of events if we would understand how affordances are perceived.     

What can law do for the development of bio-economy?

Bio-technology has become a new impeller to the development of the world economy since the 1970's. The development of bio-economy has two sides for mankind which calls for intervention by law. During the legislation of bioeconomy, some special principles should be esteemed and observed by legislators. It is necessary for the healthy development of bio-economy.     

Is there something quantum-like about the human mental lexicon?

Following an early claim by Nelson and McEvoy suggesting that word associations can display ‘spooky action at a distance behaviour’, a serious investigation of the potentially quantum nature of such associations is currently underway. In this paper quantum theory is proposed as a framework suitable for modelling the human mental lexicon, specifically the results obtained from both intralist and extralist word association experiments. Some initial models exploring this hypothesis are discussed, and experiments capable of testing these models proposed.     

Is the traditional role bad for women?

A sample of 112 women, tested first as college seniors in the late 1950s, were classified according to the traditionality of their life stories at age 43. This classification based on demographic criteria was supported by low to high scores on the socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). Traditionality of role at age 43 was related to CPI well-being and effective functioning at age 21. However, the traditional role was associated with several adverse changes in psychological and physical health by age 43. Both homemakers and women low in traditionality may have suffered from being less in synchrony with the social clock than they had been in college. Except for low energy, traditional women in the labor force (neo-traditionals) seemed to be role-juggling with success.     

A general mechanism for decision-making in the human brain?

A new fMRI study by Heekeren and colleagues suggests that left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) contains a region that integrates sensory evidence supporting perceptual decisions. DLPFC meets two criteria posited by Heekeren et al. for such a region: (1) its activity is correlated in time with the output of sensory areas of the visual cortex measured simultaneously, and (2) as expected of an integrator, its activity is greater on trials for which the sensory evidence is substantial than on trials for which the sensory evidence is weak. Complementary experiments in humans and monkeys now offer a realistic hope of elucidating decision-making networks in the primate brain.     

Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist?

Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one to avoid positing strange ‘negative’ entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago’s dilemma.     

Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?

This article discusses the question of poverty and wealth in light of several theses put forward by Larry Temkin. The claim that there is a sort of cosmic injustice involved when great disparities of ability or of wealth are found. He is concerned especially about disparities that are undeserved. It is agreed that this is unfortunate, but not agreed that they are unjust in a sense that supports the imposition of rectification on anyone else. Nor is poverty typically undeserved in the only really relevant sense: the poor simply do not produce enough to earn them high incomes, and probably correct incomes they derive are indeed what such efforts are worth in the circumstances. That persons with very low incomes may merit our sympathy is accepted, but sympathy leads to charity, rather than to the involuntary exploitation of the better off. The essay concludes with further observations about the relevance of free markets, and points to the iniquities of the restrictions on commerce that are the most potent source of perpetuated poverty today.     

Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?

This article discusses the question of poverty and wealth in light of several theses put forward by Larry Temkin. The claim that there is a sort of cosmic injustice involved when great disparities of ability or of wealth are found. He is concerned especially about disparities that are undeserved. It is agreed that this is unfortunate, but not agreed that they are unjust in a sense that supports the imposition of rectification on anyone else. Nor is poverty typically “undeserved” in the only really relevant sense: the poor simply do not produce enough to earn them high incomes, and probably correct incomes they derive are indeed what such efforts are worth in the circumstances. That persons with very low incomes may merit our sympathy is accepted, but sympathy leads to charity, rather than to the involuntary exploitation of the better off. The essay concludes with further observations about the relevance of free markets, and points to the iniquities of the restrictions on commerce that are the most potent source of perpetuated poverty today.     

Is Love Seen as Different for the Obese?1

In order to assess how actual obesity and stereotypes of obesity affect perceptions of love, 222 college students completed an anonymous questionnaire concerning their experiences with love, including the Love Attitudes Scale (LAS) of Hendrick and Hendrick (1986). They then saw a photograph of a male or female who appeared fat or normal weight and responded to an identical questionnaire as they thought the pictured person would. Subjects' obesity was unrelated to dating or marital experience, self-esteem, or LAS subscales. However, fatter stimulus persons were judged to be less attractive, lower in self-esteem, less likely to be dating, less Erotic, less Ludic, and more Manic on the LAS, and to deserve a fatter, uglier love partner. Gender differences were similar to those found in previous studies, with gender stereotypes generally reflecting an exaggeration of actual sex differences. These findings were consistent with the theory that obese people are stereotyped as having fewer resources to contribute to a relationship.     

Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?

Philosophical Studies - Two striking claims are advanced on behalf of the free energy principle (FEP) in cognitive science and philosophy: (i) that it identifies a condition of the possibility of...