The sense of entitlement in romantic relationships: ethnic and religious aspects

One’s sense of entitlement is activated and influences one’s interactions and attitudes in a wide range of contexts, but it rather seems especially relevant in the context of the romantic relationship, as this particular type of relationship serves as a unique meeting point between needs, wishes, and expectations. While a number of studies have indicated that both exaggerated and restricted forms of sense of entitlement in couple relationships seem to be maladaptive and put people at risk for emotional problems, the core question of the current study dealt with the possible contribution of ethnic and religious aspects. As expected, ethnicity was shown to be a predictor of relational entitlement. Israeli Arabs were higher on inflated and restricted senses of entitlement than Israeli Jews were. Findings also indicated that among the Jewish sector, young religious Jews were higher on restricted sense of entitlement and lower on assertive sense of entitlement than were young secular Jews. Findings were discussed in terms of the unique situation of the Arab minority in Israel as well as the role of religious values in shaping the sense of relational entitlement in couple relationships.     

The value of confession and forgiveness according to Jung

This article represents a broad survey of the views of C. G. Jung regarding confession and for giveness. Man, a naturally religious being, has a need to confess his wrong and to gain forgiveness of one sanctioned to absolve. The curative effect of confession has been known for centuries. Without confession, man remains in moral isolation. Priests, ministers, and rabbis, as well as psychotherapists, attest to the universality of this human phenomenon. Confession is located in that place where psychology and religion meet-guilt. Jung's views on confession bridge the chasm between psychology and religion.     

The psychophysiology of confession: linking inhibitory and psychosomatic processes

A theory of inhibition and psychosomatic disease suggests that the failure to confide traumatic events is stressful and associated with long-term health problems. We investigated the short-term autonomic correlates of disclosing personal and traumatic experiences among two samples of healthy undergraduates. In Experiment 1, subjects talked into a tape recorder about extremely stressful events that had occurred in their lives, as well as what they planned to do following the experiment. Skin conductance, blood pressure, and heart rate were continuously measured. Based on judges' ratings of subjects' depth of disclosure, subjects were classified as high or low disclosers. Talking about traumatic events was associated with decreased behavioral inhibition, as measured by lower skin conductance levels among high disclosers. Disclosing traumatic material was also associated with increased cardiovascular activity. In Experiment 2, subjects both talked aloud and thought about a traumatic event and about plans for the day. Half of the subjects were alone in an experimental cubicle and talked into a tape recorder; the remaining subjects talked to a silent "confessor" who sat behind a curtain. Among high disclosers, both talking and thinking about traumatic events produced lower skin conductance levels than did thinking or talking about plans for the day. The presence of a confessor inhibited subjects' talking. Implications for understanding the nature of confession and the development of an inhibitory model for psychosomatic processes are discussed.     

Authoritarianism and religious identification: Response to threats on religious beliefs

The present study illustrates the impact of threat and authoritarianism on individuals and their respective belief systems within a Christian framework. Participants completed Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale, the Religious Fundamentalism Scale, the Questions and Doubts about Religion Scale, and the Behavioral and Faith Scale. Participants also read a threat- or non-threat-inducing article concerning the crisis of the Catholic Church. Results showed that individuals with high RWA scores demonstrated a greater support for religious fundamentalist ideals, reported less doubts regarding their religious beliefs, and identified more strongly with their religion than did those with low RWA scores. Furthermore, participants who were exposed to threat, regardless of individual level of authoritarianism, scored higher on a measure of religious fundamentalist ideals and identified more strongly with their respective religions than those who were not exposed to a threat. Most importantly, individuals high in authoritarianism who were exposed to threat demonstrated greater support for religious fundamentalist ideals, reported fewer doubts, and more strongly identified with their religion than those individuals with high levels of authoritarianism who were in the non-threatening article condition.     

Wittgenstein and religious dogma

It is well understood that Wittgenstein defends religious faith against positivistic criticisms on the grounds of its logical independence. But exactly how are we to understand the nature of that independence? Most scholars take Wittgenstein to equate language-games with belief-systems, and thus to assert that religions are logical schemes founded on their own basic beliefs and principles of inference. By contrast, I argue that on Wittgenstein’s view, to have religious faith is to hold fast to a certain picture of the world according to which one orients one’s actions and attitudes, possibly even in dogmatic defiance of contrary evidence. Commitment to such a picture is grounded in passion, not intellection, and systematic coherence is largely irrelevant.     

Uncertainty and religious belief

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Reasons and religious belief

This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and ‘(good) reasons’ for such belief. Consideration of the typical sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive sense of ‘reasonable’, with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable.