Lineup administrator influences on eyewitness identification and eyewitness confidence

Lineup administrators were trained to respond to witnesses in such a way as to redirect them from making non-identifications or foil identification responses toward making identifications of the suspect. Compared to a no-influence control condition, suspect identification rates in the influence condition increased substantially and proportionally for guilty and innocent suspects. Administrators steered witnesses more specifically toward the suspect when the suspect was guilty than when the suspect was innocent. Post-identification confidence for correct identifications of the guilty suspect did not differ significantly across the influence and no-influence groups. However, post-identification confidence for false identifications of the innocent suspect was significantly lower for the influence group than for the no-influence group because witnesses who were influenced to make false identifications tended to be those who were less confident prior to the lineup, and also because those witnesses became less confident from pre- to post-identification.     

Confidence and accuracy of lineup selections and rejections: Postdicting rejection accuracy with confidence

Correlation and calibration approaches show meaningful, positive confidence-accuracy relations for witnesses making selections from lineups, but rarely for rejections (Brewer and Wells, 2006, Sauerland and Sporer, 2009). This disparity may reflect the difference between selecting a single photo versus rejecting a set of photos. Participants (N = 101) in two experiments made selections from and rejections of lineups in situations requiring either a single confidence rating about a single face (typical of “choosers”) or a single confidence rating about multiple faces (typical of “nonchoosers”). Mean confidence ratings were significantly higher for accurate versus inaccurate decisions for both selections and rejections when decisions were based on single faces. Single decisions about multiple faces produced no significant difference in confidence between correct and incorrect rejections but a significant difference for selections.     

The effect of biased lineup instructions on eyewitness identification confidence

Although it is well‐known that biased lineup instructions (i.e., those that do not inform witnesses the perpetrator may not be in the lineup) inflate false identifications, their effects on witness confidence are less well understood due to methodological limitations of past studies. We report two studies that use novel methodologies to obviate these limitations. Study 1 (N = 177) demonstrated that biased lineup instructions increased witnesses' average estimates of the likelihood that a lineup member is guilty. Study 2 (N = 137) introduces a novel debiasing paradigm that allows a parsing of choosers into those who made an identification only because of the biased instructions (induced choosers), and those who would have chosen despite the instructions (inherent choosers). Biased lineup instructions inflated confidence only among induced choosers, but not among inherent choosers. Contrary to legal reasoning, witness confidence is an insufficient metric to determine the suggestiveness of biased instructions.     

Exposure duration: Effects on eyewitness accuracy and confidence

The current study examined the relationship between the length of exposure to a face in an eyewitness setting and identification accuracy and confidence. A sample of 164 young (ages 17–25) and older (ages 59–81) adults viewed a simulated crime in which they saw the culprit's face for a short (12 s) or long (45 s) duration. They were then tested with a target absent (a line‐up not containing the culprit) or target present line‐up. Identification accuracy rates for both young and older participants were significantly higher under the long exposure condition. In the short exposure condition, witnesses who had made a correct identification of the target were more confident than incorrect witnesses. In the long exposure condition the confidence ratings of accurate and inaccurate witnesses did not differ. Discussion focuses on the extent to which extended exposure may inflate confidence judgments and variables that may moderate the relationship between exposure duration and face recognition accuracy.     

Mood effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influences on susceptibility to misinformation

Does mood influence the accuracy of eyewitness recollections, and people’s susceptibility to misleading information in particular? Based on recent affect-cognition theories and research on eyewitness memory, three experiments predicted and found that positive affect promoted, and negative affect inhibited the incorporation of misleading information into eyewitness memories. This effect was obtained for both positive and negative events (Experiment 1), and for recorded as well as real-life incidents (Experiment 2). Participants had no meta-cognitive awareness of these mood effects, and affect-control instructions were ineffective in preventing them (Experiment 3). The cognitive mechanisms responsible for mood effects on eyewitness memories are discussed, and the implications of these findings for everyday memories, forensic practice and for current affect/cognition theorizing are considered.     

The effects of confederate influence and confidence on the accuracy of crime judgements

Building on recent work which has investigated social influences on memory and remembering, the present experiment examined the effects of social pressure and confederate confidence on the accuracy and confidence of eyewitnesses. Sixty undergraduate participants watched a video of a staged mugging and then answered questions about the video out loud in the presence of either one or three confederates who had also watched the film with them. Unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always gave incorrect responses to four out of the eight questions. Participants and confederates were also asked to give confidence scores out loud for each of their answers. Again, unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always expressed either high or low confidence scores for the incorrect information, depending on condition. Participants gave fewer correct answers, and were less confident, in the presence of three, as opposed to one, confederates. Participants were also more confident, yet no more accurate, when the confederate(s) gave high, as opposed to low, confidence scores. Thus the presumed independence of evidence given by multiple witnesses cannot be safely assumed.     

Children's metacognitive judgments in an eyewitness identification task

Two experiments examined children's metacognitive monitoring of recognition judgments within an eyewitness identification paradigm. A confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration approach was used to examine patterns of calibration, over-/underconfidence, and resolution. In Experiment 1, children (n=619, mean age=11 years 10 months) and adults (n=600) viewed a simulated crime and attempted two separate identifications from 8-person target-present or target-absent lineups given lineup instructions that manipulated witnesses choosing patterns by varying the degree of social pressure. For choosers, but not nonchoosers, meaningful CA relations were observed for adults but not for children. Experiment 2 tested a guided hypothesis disconfirmation manipulation designed to improve the realism of children's metacognitive judgments. Children (N=796, mean age=11 years 11 months) in experimental and control conditions viewed a crime and attempted two separate identifications. The manipulation had minimal impact on the CA relation for choosers and nonchoosers. In contrast to adults, children's identification confidence provides no useful guide for investigators about the likely guilt or innocence of a suspect. These experiments revealed limitations in children's metacognitive monitoring processes that have not been apparent in previous research on recall and recognition with younger children.     

ROC analyses in eyewitness identification research

There has been a recent surge of interest in analyzing the results of eyewitness identification experiments using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. Proponents of this approach have argued not only that ROC analyses are useful but that more traditional approaches are deficient and should not be used. Three arguments might be made for why researchers would prefer ROC approaches over other techniques. The first is that ROC analyses can provide an index of underlying memory discriminability. The second is that ROC analyses provide useful information about the practical utility of identification procedures. The third is that ROC analyses are useful for testing theory. In this article, I critically examine each of these arguments and conclude that recent claims that ROC methods provide the only justifiable method of comparing identification procedures are overstated.     

Some experimental influences of lawyers' complicated questions on eyewitness confidence and accuracy

Eyewitness evidence and the confidence the eyewitness expresses in such evidence are crucial in many criminal trials. The present study is an examination of the influence of confusing questions often used by attorneys to examine witnesses in court. Participants viewed a videotaped incident and were questioned about the incident 1 week later. Half the participants were asked questions framed in a confusing form; the remaining half were asked the same questions in straightforward language. Confusing questions reduced the participant witnesses' accuracy and suppressed the confidence-accuracy relationships compared with the condition in which simple questions were asked. However, the number of absolutely sure responses was the same in both conditions, although these responses were almost always accurate in the simplified condition, whereas in the confusing question condition, accuracy was comparatively poor. This experiment demonstrates the importance of ensuring that lawyers ask witnesses simple, clear questions.     

Age differences in the effects of social influence on children's eyewitness performance and their metacognitive monitoring

The current work investigated the effects of social influence on children's recall accuracy and metacognitive monitoring. Two studies were conducted in which 8- and 10-year-olds were confronted with postevent information in an interview situation. An interviewer (Study 1) or a confederate (Study 2) provided postevent information with two levels of assertiveness, inducing (a) a variation of conformity pressure and (b) a variation of information credibility. Afterwards, children's confidence judgments were assessed. The results revealed significant age differences in children's ability to adequately cope with variations of social influence. Although conformity pressure was especially important for the 8-year-olds, effects of informative social influence were independent of age. However, 10-year-olds were also able to act appropriately on low credibility, thereby demonstrating a more sophisticated consideration of social influence sources. Moreover, varying assertiveness also affected the quality of children's confidence judgments by improving their metacognitive differentiation skills.     

Reminiscence and hypermnesia in children's eyewitness memory

Three experiments examined reminiscence and hypermnesia in 5- and 6-year-olds' memory for an event across repeated interviews that occurred either immediately afterward (Experiment 1) or after a 6-month delay (Experiments 2 and 3). Reminiscence (recall of new information) was reliably obtained in all of the experiments, although the numbers of new items recalled were fewer after a delay than when the interviews occurred immediately afterward. Hypermnesia (increasing total recall over repeated recall attempts) was obtained only in Experiment 1 when interviews occurred immediately and 24 h after the event.     

An analogue study of the effects of Psychological Debriefing on eyewitness memory

Sixty-one participants from the community participated in a randomised controlled trial of group debriefing to assess the effect of this intervention upon memory for a stressful event. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three groups: debriefing; debriefing with an experimenter confederate present (who supplied three pieces of misinformation to the group regarding the stressful event); and a no-treatment control. All groups were shown a very stressful video and were again reviewed after 1 month. Members of the debriefing group where a confederate provided misinformation were more likely to recall this misinformation as fact than members of the other two groups. The debriefing group was also more accurate in their recall of peripheral content than the confederate group. Across all groups, participants were found to be more accurate at central rather than peripheral recall yet more confident for incorrect memories of the video than correct memories.     

Fact learning: How information accuracy,delay, and repeated testing change retention and retrieval experience

Previous classroom studies have shown that the phenomenology of studied facts changes over time. However, pedagogical needs preclude both the study of errors and the separation of the effects that delay and repeated testing have on retention and retrieval experience. We addressed these issues together in an experiment where participants read stories containing correct and misleading information and provided Remember, Just Know, and Familiar judgements on immediate and delayed general knowledge tests. After 2 days, information learned from the stories shifted from Remembered to Just Known, but repeated testing attenuated this shift. Interestingly, similar patterns of retrieval and phenomenology were observed for correct and misleading information with one important difference—the shift over time to Just Knowing was significantly greater for correct than for misleading information. Together, these findings show the roles of information accuracy, delay, and testing in determining both retention and the subjective experience of retrieval.