共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Kevin Falvey 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):297-312
Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as
guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer
an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some
work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs in memory, in
an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an
account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of
the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart’s work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive
defense of the reality of tense. 相似文献
2.
Natalja Deng 《Philosophia》2010,38(4):741-753
This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived
because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition,
by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are
inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus
B debate. 相似文献
3.
Bart Streumer 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):79-86
Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long
as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples
fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person
will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is
consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim. 相似文献
4.
Jeffrey W. Roland 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):179-193
C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist:
realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge
crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special
about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects
for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of
Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension
is unlikely. 相似文献
5.
Matt Stichter 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(1):73-86
According to Rosalind Hursthouse’s virtue based account of right action, an act is right if it is what a fully virtuous person
would do in that situation. Robert Johnson has criticized the account on the grounds that the actions a non-virtuous person
should take are often uncharacteristic of the virtuous person, and thus Hursthouse’s account of right action is too narrow.
The non-virtuous need to take steps to improve themselves morally, and the fully virtuous person need not take these steps.
So Johnson argues that any virtue based account of right action will have to find a way to ground a moral obligation to improve
oneself. This paper argues that there is an account of virtue that can offer a partial solution to Johnson’s challenge, an
account where virtue is a type of practical skill and in which the virtuous person is seen as having expertise. The paper
references the account of skill acquisition developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Their research demonstrates that novices
in a skill have to employ different strategies to act well than the strategies used by the experts, and so the ‘virtue as
skill’ thesis provides support for Johnson’s claim that the actions of the non-virtuous will differ from the virtuous. On
the other hand, their research suggests that there is no separating the commitment to improve yourself from the possession
of expertise, and so the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis has the resources for grounding the obligation to improve oneself in an
account of virtue. 相似文献
6.
Henry S. Richardson 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(4):419-462
Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining
to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to
deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for
the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view,
one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue.
Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device
for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation
that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets
of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a
kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues,
but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles.
This extension to Rawls’s device clearly departs to some extent from his intentions; but the paper argues that the ideal of
reciprocity, which might be thought to pose the biggest obstacle to applying his social-contract device to issues pertaining
to the severely disabled (those who are not capable of being cooperative members of society), is not an independently essential
commitment of his mature social-contract view, central though it was to Rawls’s thought in the 1950s. 相似文献
7.
Joshua Gert 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(1):1-23
Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral
philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored
by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear
that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with
his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least
some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the
normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational
permissibility that Smith wants to capture.
Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to
make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf. 相似文献
8.
Mitchell O. Stokes 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):439-453
In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in
a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means
to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability
argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s
conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however,
that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is
a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way
except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s
presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet
this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought
into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His
list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.
相似文献
Mitchell O. StokesEmail: |
9.
Knut Olav Skarsaune 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):229-243
This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal,
2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first
horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that
the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries. 相似文献
10.
Jürgen Schröder 《Synthese》2006,151(3):537-545
The aim of this paper is to determine the plausibility of Robert Kirk’s strict implication thesis as an explication of physicalism and its relation to Jackson and Chalmer’s notion of application conditionals, to the notion of global supervenience and to a posteriori identities. It is argued that the strict implication thesis is subject to the same objection that affects the notion of global supervenience. Furthermore, reference to an idealised physics in the formulation of strict implication threatens to make the thesis vacuous. Third, Kirk’s claim that the strict implication thesis does not entail reduction of the mental to the physical (excluding phenomenal properties) is untenable if a functional model of reduction is preferred over Nagel’s classical model. Finally, Kirk’s claim that the physical facts entail in an a priori way the fact that certain brain states feel somehow seems to be unfounded. 相似文献
11.
Franz Huber 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(5):511-538
This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel,
1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming
at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of
confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have
Hempel’s cake and eat it too — in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the
two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, α is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if α is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability
relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap’s positive relevance account, thereby shedding
new light on Carnap’s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory.
A precursor of this paper has appeared as “The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment” in L. Běhounek & M. Bílková (eds.),
The Logica Yearbook 2004, Prague: Filosofia, 2005, 161–176. 相似文献
12.
Michael Robinson 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):589-594
In a series of recent papers, Saul Smilansky has argued that compatibilists have no principled way of resisting the view that
prepunishment is at least sometimes appropriate, thus revealing compatibilism to be a radical position, out of keeping with
our ordinary moral judgments. Recent attempts to resist this conclusion seem to have overlooked the biggest problem with Smilansky’s
argument, which is this: Smilanksy argues that the most obvious objection to prepunishment—namely, that it is inappropriate
because it involves punishing the innocent for crimes they have not committed—is unavailable to compatibilists. If compatibilism
is true, he says, then if it is causally determined that someone is going to commit a crime, the fact that one has not yet
done so is a mere temporal matter bearing no moral significance. I argue that there is no reason for compatibilists to accept
this point. Compatibilists can (and should) resist Smilansky's claim that one’s not yet having committed a crime is morally
insignificant and so resist the temptation to prepunish. 相似文献
13.
J.L. Schellenberg’s Argument from Divine Hiddenness maintains that if a perfectly loving God exists, then there is no non-resistant
non-belief. Given that such nonbelief exists, however, it follows that there is no perfectly loving God. To support the conditional
claim, Schellenberg presents conceptual and analogical considerations, which we subject to critical scrutiny. We also evaluate
Schellenberg’s claim that the belief that God exists is logically necessary for entering into a relationship with the Divine. Finally, we turn to possible variants
of Schellenberg’s case, and argue that the modifications necessary to accommodate our criticismas leave those variants with
much less of a sting than originally suggested by his provocative formulation. 相似文献
14.
Diego Marconi 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):301-318
The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent
entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled
out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true
in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of
w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w
and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who
hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A”
as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. 相似文献
15.
Hossein Ghaffari 《Sophia》2011,50(3):391-411
Everybody acknowledges the importance of Socrates’ role and influence on the history of philosophy, as well as on the culture
of humanity. He is also considered to be the first martyr of virtue and wisdom in human history. In spite of this, even though
most Western commentators recognize the elevated meanings and high level of Socratic wisdom, they refuse to consider it to
have a supra-human source and to be divine prophecy. In this article and through the analysis of Socrates’ words and speeches,
which can be found in authentic sources such as some of Plato’s writings, the author aims to prove the truth of Socrates’
claim according to which he had the gift of prophecy. By putting together rational proofs and historical clues from his life,
we will underline the veracity of such a claim. A part of the article will be dedicated to underlining the fact that our reasoning
is based on authentic and historical references of Socrates’ speeches, which are mainly mentioned in Plato’s Apology. By quoting the main and most important commentators’ views in this field, we will therefore endeavor to show that there
is a sort of general consensus among most commentators to consider this treatise to be an historical document. The importance
as well as main outcome of this article is that if we accept this theory, the general outlook of the history of philosophy
will change radically. In addition, the claim that wisdom has a divine source, which is mentioned repeatedly in the content
of divine wise men’s words and in some Islamic traditions, will be confirmed. Moreover, the link between spiritual truths
and human reasoning will be corroborated and underlined. 相似文献
16.
Mikel Burley 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(2):81-94
This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch.
These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death
vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness
appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some others, requires
no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. 相似文献
17.
Mirja Helena Hartimo 《Synthese》2008,162(2):225-233
Richard Tieszen [Tieszen, R. (2005). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXX(1), 153–173.] has argued that the group-theoretical approach to modern geometry can be seen as a realization of Edmund Husserl’s
view of eidetic intuition. In support of Tieszen’s claim, the present article discusses Husserl’s approach to geometry in
1886–1902. Husserl’s first detailed discussion of the concept of group and invariants under transformations takes place in
his notes on Hilbert’s Memoir Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie that Hilbert wrote during the winter 1901–1902. Husserl’s interest in the Memoir is a continuation of his long-standing concern
about analytic geometry and in particular Riemann and Helmholtz’s approach to geometry. Husserl favored a non-metrical approach
to geometry; thus the topological nature of Hilbert’s Memoir must have been intriguing to him. The task of phenomenology is
to describe the givenness of this logos, hence Husserl needed to develop the notion of eidetic intuition.
The author wishes to thank Academy of Finland for financial assistance that enabled her to work on this article. 相似文献
18.
John MacFarlane 《Synthese》2009,170(3):443-456
19.
John B. Brough 《Husserl Studies》2011,27(1):27-40
I argue in this essay that Edmund Husserl distinguishes three levels within time-consciousness: an absolute time-constituting
flow of consciousness, the immanent acts of consciousness the flow constitutes, and the transcendent objects the acts intend.
The immediate occasion for this claim is Neal DeRoo’s discussion of Dan Zahavi’s reservations about the notion of an absolute
flow and DeRoo’s own efforts to mediate between Zahavi’s view and the position Robert Sokolowski and I have advanced. I argue
that the flow and the tripartite distinction it introduces into consciousness is firmly grounded in Husserl’s texts and is
philosophically defensible. The absolute flow is distinct but inseparable from what it constitutes. It is intentional in
a nonobjectivating way, and accounts for the awareness I have of my individual acts of consciousness and of the unity and
continuity of my conscious life. In its absence, consciousness would become an incoherent stream of episodic acts. There
is nothing mysterious about the flow. What would be mysterious is consciousness without the flow. 相似文献
20.
Simon Dierig 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(1):73-92
The first explicit argument for the incompatibility of externalism in the philosophy of mind and a priori self-knowledge is
Boghossian’s discrimination argument. In this essay, I oppose the third premise of this argument, trying to show by means
of a thought experiment that possessing the “twater thought” is not an alternative, a fortiori not a relevant alternative,
to having the “water thought.” I then examine a modified version of Boghossian’s argument. The attempt is made to substantiate
the claim that the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable. Furthermore, a third Boghossian-style
argument is rejected on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested by incompatibilists
or its third premise is mistaken because having the “twater thought” instead of the “water thought” is not relevant. Finally,
it is argued that the discrimination argument cannot be saved by invoking closure. The upshot of my discussion is that a compatibilist
can dismiss Boghossian-style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal with fundamental issues concerning self-knowledge
and the nature of slow switching. 相似文献