共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Indrek Reiland 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2020,100(1):136-159
Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections. 相似文献
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Karen Bennett 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2017,94(2):466-473
Thomas Hofweber's Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics is ambitious, thought‐provoking, and a good read. It expands upon a project he's developed in several previous papers—a project that seamlessly weaves together both metaphysics and metametaphysics. The book is as much about methodology as it is about the substantive conclusions he draws about what there is. As a consequence, it is a long book that covers a lot of ground. Since I cannot do justice to all of it, I hope my fellow symposiasts will take up parts of the book that I neglect. There is a lot of good stuff in there. 相似文献
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Philosophia - On a widespread reading, the Carnap-Quine debate about ontology concerns the objectivity and non-triviality of ontological claims. I argue that this view mischaracterizes... 相似文献
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Andreas Blank 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2013,34(2):211-213
WALTER BURLEIGH, Von der Reinheit der Kunst der Logik. Erster Traktat: Von den Eigenschaften der Termini. Übersetzt und mit Einfuhrung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Peter Kunze. Lateinisch-deutsch. (Philosophische Bibliothek, Nr. 401 .) Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988. xlvii + 269 pp. 64 DM. 相似文献
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Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first
exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined.
It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies
a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive
consequence: it groups together distributed connectionist systems with look-up tables. To avoid this consequence, a modified
construal of causal systematicity is proposed and Davies' argument for the causal systematicity of thought is shown to be
question-begging. It is briefly sketched how the modified construal links up with multiple dispositions of the same categorical
base. Finally, the question of the causal efficacy of single rules is distinguished from the question of their psychological
reality: implicit rules might be psychologically real without being causally efficacious.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Daniel Z. Korman 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2015,49(2):298-321
Nihilism is the thesis that no composite objects exist. Some ontologists have advocated abandoning nihilism in favor of deep nihilism, the thesis that composites do not existO, where to existO is to be in the domain of the most fundamental quantifier. By shifting from an existential to an existentialO thesis, the deep nihilist seems to secure all the benefits of a composite‐free ontology without running afoul of ordinary belief in the existence of composites. I argue that, while there are well‐known reasons for accepting nihilism, there appears to be no reason at all to accept deep nihilism. In particular, deep nihilism draws no support either from the usual arguments for nihilism or from considerations of parsimony. 相似文献
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In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti‐Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's “translate‐and‐deflate” methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think that questions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti‐Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one. 相似文献
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Gary H. Merrill 《Topoi》2011,30(1):71-83
Philosophers frequently struggle with the relation of metaphysics to the everyday world, with its practical value, and with
its relation to empirical science. This paper distinguishes several different models of the relation between philosophical
ontology and applied (scientific) ontology that have been advanced in the history of philosopy. Adoption of a strong participation model for the philosophical ontologist in science is urged, and requirements and consequences of the participation model are explored.
This approach provides both a principled view and justification of the role of the philosophical ontologist in contemporary
empirical science as well as guidelines for integrating philosophers and philosophical contributions into the practice of
science. 相似文献
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James E. Tomberlin 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》1998,32(S12):489-498
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Evandro Agazzi 《Studia Logica》2011,97(1):7-29
After a brief survey of the different meanings of consistency, the study is restricted to consistency understood as non-contradiction
of sets of sentences. The philosophical reasons for this requirement are discussed, both in relation to the problem of sense
and the problem of truth (also with historical references). The issue of mathematical truth is then addressed, and the different
conceptions of it are put in relation with consistency. The formal treatment of consistency and truth in mathematical logic
is then considered, with particular attention paid to the relation between syntactic and semantic properties of sets and calculi.
After the crisis of mathematical intuition and the dominance of the formalistic view, it seemed that consistency could totally
replace the requirement of truth in mathematics, also in the sense that the existence of “objects” of axiomatic systems could
be granted by their consistency. A rejection of this claim is presented, whose central point is a detailed analysis of the
theorem that any consistent set S of sentences of first order logic has a model. A critical scrutiny shows that this model is very peculiar, being offered
by the elements of the same language that is being interpreted, and the satisfiability conditions for any sentence being constituted
by the mere fact of belonging to S. Though not being insignificant from a metatheoretical point of view, this theorem fails to endow consistency (even in this
privileged case) with an “ontological creativity”, that is, with the capability of providing a model ontologically distinct
from the language itself (which is the precondition for the classical notion of truth that is also preserved in the Tarskian
semantics and model theory). A final discussion regarding the different “ontological regions” and the referential nature of
truth clarifies the different aspects of the whole issue discussed. 相似文献
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“Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception
of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.
相似文献
Michel BitbolEmail: |
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Hayden Kee 《Human Studies》2018,41(3):415-435
This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between speaking and spoken speech, and the relation between the two, in his Phenomenology of Perception. Against a common interpretation, I argue on exegetical and philosophical grounds that the distinction should not be understood as one between two kinds of speech, but rather between two internally related dimensions present in all speech. This suggests an interdependence between speaking and spoken aspects of speech, and some commentators have critiqued Merleau-Ponty for claiming a priority of speaking over spoken speech. However, there is a sense in which Merleau-Ponty is right to emphasize the priority, namely, in terms of the ontological priority of the speaking subject with respect to language understood as a constituted cultural ideality. The latter only maintains its ontological status insofar as it is taken up by a language community. I favorably contrast Merleau-Ponty’s views on this question to those of the late Heidegger and de Saussure, and suggest potential applications of this clarified position for contemporary discussions in philosophy of language. 相似文献
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WESLEY D. CRAY 《美学与艺术评论杂志》2014,72(3):235-245
Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens have recently articulated the Idea Idea, the thesis that “in conceptual art, there is no physical medium: the medium is the idea.” But what is an idea, and in the case of works such as Duchamp's Fountain, how does the idea relate to the urinal? In answering these questions, it becomes apparent that the Idea Idea should be rejected. After showing this, I offer a new ontology of conceptual art, according to which such artworks are not ideas but artifacts imbued with ideas. After defending this view from objections, I briefly discuss some implications it has for the ontology of art in general. 相似文献