Perceptions of adolescent bullying: Attributions of blame and responsibility in cases of cyber‐bullying

Cyber‐bullying (where victims are targeted via online social networking or other electronic means) has gained increased attention in research and the broadcast media, but previous research has not investigated attribution of blame in such cyber‐bullying events. This experiment hypothesized that participants would assign higher ratings of blame to bullying perpetrators when the bullying situations were depicted as having highly foreseeable outcomes (vs. unforeseeable outcomes), and as occurring in school (vs. online). In addition, a significant interaction was predicted between outcome foreseeability and bullying situation, with highly foreseeable in‐school events being rated as the most predictable and attributable to the bully's actions. One‐hundred sixty‐three participants completed surveys containing demographic items, items regarding their past experiences of victimization, and one of four randomly‐assigned vignettes detailing a bullying situation (which participants rated). While hypotheses regarding outcome foreseeability were supported, no cyber‐bullying vs. in‐school main effects (or corresponding interaction effects) were detected. Implications for future research and practice, as well as study limitations, are discussed.     

Controllability and hindsight components: Understanding opposite hindsight biases for self-relevant negative event outcomes

There is an anomaly in the hindsight bias literature with respect to hindsight effects obtained after self-relevant negative event outcomes: Whereas some studies have reported reduced hindsight bias, others have shown increases. This article contrasts two explanations for the anomaly. The first points to an influence of perceived control over the event outcome: In hindsight, people decrease foreseeability (and hence, responsibility and blame) for controllable events, but they increase the perceived inevitability of uncontrollable events for coping reasons. The second explanation, derived from a reconception of hindsight bias in terms of separate components (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), traces the anomaly to differences in the observed hindsight components: Hindsight decreases are to be expected for foreseeability, whereas increases are restricted to the inevitability component. Our experiment (N=210) manipulated controllability and the hindsight component orthogonally and showed strong support for the component explanation, but also some influence of perceived control.     

Moral judgment and the development of causal schemes

The present study investigated (i) the relationship between blame and perceived causality; (ii) the effect of the nature of causes on causal inference. Seventy-two persons from three age groups (5, 9 years and adults) responded to behavioural events which varied in outcome intensity, the nature of the cause (internal/external) and its presence (present/absent). The latter two factors had a marked effect on attributed blame and inferred causes as an age × nature × presence of cause interaction was found in both cases. However, inferred causes were not systematically related to attributed blame. Outcome severity led to more extreme blame ratings in all groups but only affected the causal scheme used by adults. The results are discussed in terms of over-attribution to persons and a more precise criterion for the use of the multiple sufficient cause scheme is evaluated.     

Responsiveness of Western adults to pitch-distributional information in melodic sequences

Responsiveness of musically trained and untrained adults to pitch-distributional information in melodic contexts was assessed. In Experiment 1, melodic contexts were pure-tone sequences, generated from either a diatonic or one of four nondiatonic tonesets, in which pitch-distributional information was manipulated by variation of the relative frequency of occurrence of tones from the toneset. Both the assignment of relative frequency of occurrence to tones and the construction of the (fixed) temporal order of tones within the sequences contravened the conventions of western tonal music. A probe-tone technique was employed. Each presentation of a sequence was followed by a probe tone, one of the 12 chromatic notes within the octave. Listeners rated the goodness of musical fit of the probe tone to the sequence. Probe-tone ratings were significantly related to frequency of occurrence of the probe tone in the sequence for both trained and untrained listeners. In addition, probe-tone ratings decreased as the pitch distance between the probe tone and the final tone of the sequence increased. For musically trained listeners, probe-tone ratings for diatonic sequences tended also to reflect the influence of an internalized tonal schema. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the temporal location of tones in the sequences could not alone account for the effect of frequency of occurrence in Experiment 1. Experiment 3 tested musically untrained listeners under the conditions of Experiment 1, with the exception that the temporal order of tones in each sequence was randomized across trials. The effect of frequency of occurrence found in Experiment 1 was replicated and strengthened.     

Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.     

Infants' Perception of Causal Chains

Three experiments examined infants' and adults' perception of causal sequences of events. In a causal-chain sequence, the first action causes a second action that then causes a final outcome; in a temporal-chain sequence, the first two actions are independent and the second action causes a final outcome. Infants and adults were shown the same event sequences; infants were tested using a visual habituation paradigm, whereas adults were given a questionnaire. Experiment 1 indicated that 15-month-old infants perceive the primary cause of the final outcome to be the first action in a causal chain but the second action in a temporal chain. Experiment 2 showed that adults interpret the causal sequences in a manner similar to that of 15-month-olds. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that 10-month-old infants do not yet perceive causal sequences in the same manner as 15-month-olds and adults. These results are interpreted in terms of both infants' developing knowledge of causal events and adults' attributions of causality in complex events.     

Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.     

Effect of a signalled delay between an action and outcome on human judgement of causality

Three experiments examined the influence of a stimulus inserted between an action (pressing the space bar of a computer) and an associated delayed outcome (a triangle lighting up on the screen) on ratings of the causal effectiveness of that action. In Experiment 1, subjects rated an action that produced an outcome immediately as more causally effective than an action that produced a delayed outcome. The rating of the causal effectiveness of an action that produced a delayed outcome in which the delay was filled by a stimulus was higher than the rating of actions that produced the outcome after an unsignalled delay. In Experiment 2, the effect of a stimulus presented uncorrelated with the action or the outcome was examined and found not to enhance the rating of causal effectiveness of an action that produced a delayed outcome. In Experiment 3, the degree of correlation between the stimulus and the consequence was examined. Ratings of the causal effectiveness of the action were greater the higher percentage of delay intervals that were signalled.     

Causal Induction in the Presence of a Perfect Negative Cue: Contrasting Predictions from Associative and Statistical Models

Two experiments on human causal induction with multiple candidate causes are reported. Experiment 1 investigated the influence of a perfect preventive cause on the ratings of a less contingent cause. Whereas the Rescorla-Wagner model (RWM) and Cheng's probabilistic contrast model predict that the less contingent cause should be completely discounted, the Pearce model predicts, in most cases, an enhancement of that cause's perceived importance. Results corresponded more closely tothe predictions of the Pearce model.The predictions of both the RWM and the Pearce model rely on a constant context cue acquiring associative strength, yet no such cue was explicitly identified in the task scenario employed in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 replicated a number of key conditions of Experiment 1 with a task scenario that afforded ratings of the causal importance of the context in which the effectiveness of the discrete candidate causes was evaluated. In addition, the number of trials was increased to test the possibility that the ratings in Experiment 1 were the product of incomplete learning. The results of the first experiment were replicated and the ratings of the effectiveness of the context cue were anticipated by both the RWM and the Pearce model. Overall, the Pearce model offers a more comprehensive account of the causal inferences recorded in this study.     

Fabrication inflation increases as source monitoring ability decreases

The current research looked at the effects of lying about a false childhood event on the liar's memory for the event. Participants attempted to convince researchers that false events had actually happened to them. In Experiment 1, participants showed a Fabrication Inflation Effect in that they were more likely to increase their beliefs in the lied-about events than control events. Individual differences such as scores on the Dissociative Experience Scale, frequency of lying, and self-reported feelings of discomfort while lying were related to rates of fabrication inflation. In Experiment 2, participants also showed fabrication inflation and were more likely to inflate their likelihood ratings when the lie was created during a separate session from the posttest. Results from both studies support the idea that Source Monitoring failures may cause participants to increase their likelihood ratings of lied-about events. These results suggest that intentional lying may lead some participants to increase their beliefs in their own fabrications. Applications to the legal field are discussed.     

Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are not (e.g., luckily hitting a bull’s-eye). The present five studies offer an alternative account of these provocative findings. We suggest that people see the morally significant action examined in previous studies (killing) as accomplished by a basic action (pressing the trigger) for which an unskilled agent still has sufficient skill. Studies 1 through 3 show that when this basic action is performed unskillfully or is absent, people are far less likely to view the killing as intentional, demonstrating that intentionality judgments, even about immoral actions, are guided by skill information. Studies 4 and 5 further show that a neutral action such as hitting the bull’s-eye is more difficult than killing and that difficult actions are less often judged intentional. When difficulty is held constant, people’s intentionality judgments are fully responsive to skill information regardless of moral valence. The present studies thus speak against the hypothesis of a moral evaluation bias in intentionality judgments and instead document people’s sensitivity to subtle features of human action.     

Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt

It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally to deserve to feel guilty. Being blamed by someone else is not necessarily harmful to the wrongdoer. The blame might not be expressed, or the wrongdoer might not care. But to blame oneself necessarily involves suffering. This conception of blameworthiness explains why the control condition should obtain: We are morally blameworthy for A only if A was (directly or indirectly) under our control because (a) to be blameworthy is to deserve to feel guilty, (b) to feel guilty is to suffer, and (c) one deserves to suffer for A only if A was under one’s control.     

Cue interaction and judgments of causality: Contributions of causal and associative processes

In four experiments, the predictions made by causal model theory and the Rescorla-Wagner model were tested by using a cue interaction paradigm that measures the relative response to a given event based on the influence or salience of an alternative event. Experiments 1 and 2 uncorrelated two variables that have typically been confounded in the literature (causal order and the number of cues and outcomes) and demonstrated that overall contingency judgments are influenced by the causal structure of the events. Experiment 3 showed that trial-by-trial prediction responses, a second measure of causal assessment, were not influenced by the causal structure of the described events. Experiment 4 revealed that participants became less sensitive to the influence of the causal structure in both their ratings and their predictions as trials progressed. Thus, two experiments provided evidence for high-level (causal reasoning) processes, and two experiments provided evidence for low-level (associative) processes. We argue that both factors influence causal assessment, depending on what is being asked about the events and participants' experience with those events.     

Causal attributions and blame: associations with mothers' adjustment to the birth of a child with Down syndrome

The main purpose of this study is to explore the associations between causal attributions to others, blaming others and mothers' adjustment to the birth of a child with Down syndrome (DS). Participants (n?=?214) rated causal attributions to others and blaming others, and completed five measures of adjustment: anger, anxiety, depression, parenting stress, and attitudes towards the child. The adjustment of three groups of mothers was compared: (i) those who made no attributions to others (ii) those who made causal attributions but did not blame, and (iii) those who blamed others. Four years after the births of their children with DS, 16% of mothers blamed others and 17% made causal attributions but did not blame others for this outcome. Those who blamed others had higher levels of anger, anxiety, depression, parenting stress and more negative attitudes towards their children with DS than did those who made causal attributions but did not blame, and those who made who made no attributions to others. The adjustment of the latter two groups did not differ. Investigating blame rather than causal attributions may be a more fruitful area for future research aimed at understanding and facilitating adjustment to illness and other negative life events.     

A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness*

In this paper I sketch an account of moral blame and blameworthiness. I begin by clarifying what I take blame to be and explaining how blameworthiness is to be analyzed in terms of it. I then consider different accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness and, in the end, settle on one according to which a person is blameworthy for φ‐ing just in case, in φ‐ing, she violates one of a particular class of moral requirements governing the attitudes we bear, and our mental orientation, toward people and other objects of significant moral worth. These requirements embody the moral stricture that we accord to these others a sufficient level of respect, one that their moral worth demands. This is a familiar theme which has its roots in P. F. Strawson’s pioneering views on moral responsibility. My development of it leads me to the conclusion that acting wrongly is not a condition of blameworthiness: violating a moral requirement to perform, or refrain from performing, an action is neither necessary nor sufficient for being blameworthy. All we are ever blameworthy for, I will argue, are certain aspects of our mental bearing toward others. We can be said to be blameworthy for our actions only derivatively, in the sense that those actions are the natural manifestations of the things for which we are strictly speaking blameworthy.     

Culpable Control and Causal Deviance

Actions that are intended to produce harmful consequences can fail to achieve their desired effects in numerous ways. We refer to action sequences in which harmful intentions are thwarted as deviant causal chains. The culpable control model of blame (CCM) is a useful tool for predicting and explaining the attributions that observers make of the actors whose harmful intentions go awry. In this paper, we describe six types of deviant causal chains; those in which: an actor’s attempt is obviated by the intervention of another person or the environment; the intended effects could not have been produced regardless of the actor’s behavior; other causes diminish the actor’s causal role; the actor brings about foreseen but undesired consequences as a result of pursuing his or her focal goal; the focal action produces a chain of increasingly remote causal events; and the actor derives unforeseen benefits from his or her nefarious actions. A basic assumption of the CCM in these cases is that attributions for the participants’ actions will depend on positive and negative evaluations of their intentions and behaviors. We describe empirical findings that are consistent with this assumption, and predict other findings for causal deviance phenomena that have not yet been investigated empirically.     

Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality

Two experiments investigated Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects appears to evoke an immediate perception that the first motion caused the second, as in a collision. Launching was embedded in event sequences where a third event (a colour change of the second object) was established as a competing predictor of the second motion, in an attempt to see whether subjects' learning of alternative predictive relationships would influence their causal impressions of launch events. In Experiment 1 subjects saw launch events in which temporal contiguity at the point of impact was varied so that an impact was varied so that an impact itself did not reliably predict when the second object would move. Half of these scenes, however, contained a colour change of the second object which did reliably predict when it would move. In accordance with Michotte's theory, subjects' ratings of the degree of perceived causality were not affected by the colour change. In Experiment 2 subjects saw scenes that contained launch events with or without temporal contiguity and a colour change. These were interspersed with events in which a colour change alone did or did not precede the second motion. Thus, movement of the second object was either contingent on or independent of the impact. Subjects repeatedly (a) rated perceived causality in single launch events and (b) judged the necessity of collisions for movement in the overall set of events. These responses dissociated, in that ratings type (a) showed only a substantial contiguity effect, whereas judgements of type (b) showed both a contingency and a much smaller contiguity effect. These results appear to support a distinction between judged and perceived causality and are discussed with respect to Michotte's theory of direct causal perception.