On the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research

In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves.You will find a more extensive version of the first sections of this paper in Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton, Gina Zavota (eds), in press. Husserl: Critical Assessments (5 vol.). London: Routledge.     

Husserl’s transcendental philosophy and the critique of naturalism

Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’. This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché.

What is the Question to Which Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation is the Answer?

Interpreters generally agree that the Fifth Cartesian Meditation fails to achieve its task, but they do not agree on what that task is. In my essay, I attempt to formulate the question to which the Fifth Cartesian Meditation gives the answer. While it is usually assumed that the text poses a rather ambitious question, I suggest that the text asks, “How is the Other given to me on the most basic level?” The answer would be that the Other is given as accessible in the mode of inaccessibility. Husserl’s failure to convey this question clearly seems rooted in ambiguities concerning the concepts of solipsism and the sphere of ownness.     

Husserl’s appropriation of the psychological concepts of apperception and attention

In the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl thematizes the surplus (Überschuß) of the perceptual intention whereby the intending goes beyond the partial givenness of a perceptual object to the object as a whole. This surplus is an apperceptive surplus that transcends the purely perceptual substance (Gehalt) or sensed content (empfundene Inhalt) available to a perceiver at any one time. This surplus can be described on the one hand as a synthetic link to future, possible, active experience; to intend an object is to intend it as it would appear if we were to have an exhaustively synthetic explication of it. This perceptual apperceptive surplus is, on the other hand, distinguished from the surplus that categorial form represents over the perceptual sense data. In this paper I show how the apperceptive surplus can also be understood as a synthetic link to past experience that is passively operative in any present perception. The synthetic link to both past and possible experience is a link to non-actual perceptions. Links to non-actual experience are despite their non-actuality nevertheless genuinely intentional in that they enter into the sense of any actively constituted object understood as a unity of sense. Key to this interpretation is an explanation of how Husserl appropriated the key concepts of attention and apperception from psychologists of his day, such as Stumpf and Wundt.     

Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self: A transcendental apologetic?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

What is an organ? Heidegger and the phenomenology of organ transplantation

This paper investigates the question of what an organ is from a phenomenological perspective. Proceeding from the phenomenology of being-in-the-world developed by Heidegger in Being and Time and subsequent works, it compares the being of the organ with the being of the tool. It attempts to display similarities and differences between the embodied nature of the organs and the way tools of the world are handled. It explicates the way tools belong to the totalities of things of the world that are ready to use and the way organs belong to the totality of a bodily being able to be in this very world. In so doing, the paper argues that while the organ is in some respects similar to a bodily tool, this tool is nonetheless different from the tools of the world in being tied to the organism as a whole, which offers the founding ground of the being of the person. However, from a phenomenological point of view, the line between organs and tools cannot simply be drawn by determining what is inside and outside the physiological borders of the organism. We have, from the beginning of history, integrated technological devices (tools) in our being-in-the-world in ways that make them parts of ourselves rather than parts of the world (more organ- than tool-like), and also, more recently, have started to make our organs more tool-like by visualising, moving, manipulating, and controlling them through medical technology. In this paper, Heidegger’s analysis of organ, tool, and world-making is confronted with this development brought about by contemporary medical technology. It is argued that this development has, to a large extent, changed the phenomenology of the organ in making our bodies more similar to machines with parts that have certain functions and that can be exchanged. This development harbours the threat of instrumentalising our bodily being but also the possibility of curing or alleviating suffering brought about by diseases which disturb and destroy the normal functioning of our organs.     

Supporting the attentional momentum view of IOR: is attention biased to go right?

Inhibition of return (IOR) refers to the finding that individuals are slower to respond to a target presented at a previously attended location than they are to respond to a target presented at a novel location (Posner & Cohen, 1984). The attentional momentum theory is a recent view of how attention moves around the environment, and it provides an account for the IOR effect that does not rely on an inhibitory mechanism (Pratt, Spalek, & Bradshaw, 1999). The present paper supports the attentional momentum viewpoint in two ways: first, by replicating the finding that reaction times to targets at the uncued locations are not all the same (Pratt et al., 1999) and second, by showing that responses made to all locations on the cued side of fixation, and not just to the locations that attention had previously traversed, are slower than are responses made to locations on the opposite side of fixation. We also demonstrate that there is a directional bias to the IOR effect that results in the effect's being larger when attention moves in a left-to-right manner.     

Is that what I wanted to do? Cued vocalizations influence the phenomenology of controlling a moving object

The phenomenology of controlled action depends on comparisons between predicted and actually perceived sensory feedback called action-effects. We investigated if intervening task-irrelevant but semantically related information influences monitoring processes that give rise to a sense of control. Participants judged whether a moving box "obeyed" or "disobeyed" their own arrow keystrokes (Experiments 1 and 2) or visual cues representing the computer's choices (Experiment 3). During 1s delays between keystrokes/cues and box movements, participants vocalized directions ("up", "down", "left", or "right") cued by letters inside the box. Congruency of cued vocalizations was manipulated relative to previously selected keystrokes and upcoming box movements. In Experiment 1, reported obey moves and feelings of control reflected the true frequency of obey moves, but were also modulated by vocalizations. Incongruent vocalizations reduced reported obey moves, whereas congruent vocalizations increased them. In Experiment 2, vocalizations had stronger effects when their congruence with primary-task box movement was consistent for several consecutive moves before congruence changed. In Experiment 3, analogous impacts of vocalizations occurred when the computer selected the directions and participants judged whether the computer had control of the box. We conclude that predicted and perceived action-effects associated with semantically related but separate and ostensibly irrelevant actions can be conflated with one another. This interference is not restricted to actions performed with the same effector or within the same modality, or even by the same actor. Thus in estimating degrees of control, the mind integrates across ongoing action systems, whether or not they are logically task-relevant.     

Where in the brain is the self?

Localizing the self in the brain has been the goal of consciousness research for centuries. Recently, there has been an increase in attention to the localization of the self. Here we present data from patients suffering from a loss of self in an attempt to understand the neural correlates of consciousness. Focusing on delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), we find that frontal regions, as well as the right hemisphere appear to play a significant role in DMS and DMS related disorders. These data are placed in the context of neuroimaging findings.     

Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl’s phenomenology

The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl’s position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory.     

What is the answer? And come to that, what are the questions?

In recent years, the topic of car-following has become of increased importance in traffic engineering and safety research. Models of this phenomenon, which describe the interaction between (typically) adjacent vehicles in the same lane, now form the cornerstone for many important areas of research including (a) simulation modelling, where the car-following model (amongst others) controls the motion of the vehicles in the network, and (b) the functional definition of advanced vehicle control and safety systems (AVCSS), which are being introduced as a driver safety aid in an effort to mimic driver behaviour but remove human error. Despite the importance of this area however, no overview of the models availability and validity exists. It is the intent of this paper therefore to briefly assess the range of options available in the choice of car-following model, and assess just how far work has proceeded in our understanding of what, at times, would appear to be a simple process.     

Aging of attention: Does the ability to divide decline?

Previous research has yielded conflicting results regarding the relationship between adult age and the ability to divide attention between two concurrent tasks. At least some of the inconsistency is probably attributable to methodological variations, such as the manner in which divided-attention ability has been assessed, how single-task performance has been considered, and the degree of control over relative emphasis placed on each task. Two experiments employing procedures sensitive to these concerns were conducted in which a speeded decision task was performed during the retention interval of a letter-memory task. The results of both experiments indicated that there were relatively few age-related influences on dual-task performance vis-à-vis those on single-task performance.     

Do the eyes have it? Cues to the direction of social attention

The face communicates an impressive amount of visual information. We use it to identify its owner, how they are feeling and to help us understand what they are saying. Models of face processing have considered how we extract such meaning from the face but have ignored another important signal - eye gaze. In this article we begin by reviewing evidence from recent neurophysiological studies that suggests that the eyes constitute a special stimulus in at least two senses. First, the structure of the eyes is such that it provides us with a particularly powerful signal to the direction of another person's gaze, and second, we may have evolved neural mechanisms devoted to gaze processing. As a result, gaze direction is analysed rapidly and automatically, and is able to trigger reflexive shifts of an observer's visual attention. However, understanding where another individual is directing their attention involves more than simply analysing their gaze direction. We go on to describe research with adult participants, children and non-human primates that suggests that other cues such as head orientation and pointing gestures make significant contributions to the computation of another's direction of attention.     

Is “Inhibition of Return” due to the inhibition of the return of attention?

Inhibition of Return (IOR) is usually explained in terms of orienting–reorienting of attention, emphasizing an underlying mechanism that inhibits the return of attention to previously selected locations. Recent data challenge this explanation to the extent that the IOR effect is observed at the location where attention is oriented to, where no reorienting of attention is needed. To date, these studies have involved endogenous attentional selection of attention and thus indicate a dissociation between the voluntary attention of spatial attention and the IOR effect. The present work demonstrates a dissociation between the involuntary orienting of spatial attention and the IOR effect. We combined nonpredictive peripheral cues with nonpredictive central orienting cues (either arrows or gaze). The IOR effect was observed to operate independent of involuntary spatial orienting. These data speak against the “reorienting hypothesis” of IOR. We suggest an alternative explanation whereby the IOR effect reflects a cost in detecting a new event (the target) at the location where another event (a cue) was coded before.     

Where is the randomness for the human computer?

Psychologists traditionally have employed both statistical and process assumptions in models of human learning and performance. The corresponding tradition in the field of artificial intelligence is to minimize or eliminate the use of statistical assumptions. This article reviews some stochastic and nonntochastic models of human memory, probability learning, medical diagnosis, and concept identification. Some stochastic models are found to have a larger deterministic component than was previously realized; deterministic models applicable with random selection of stimuli can be represented in stochastic form. A policy of methodological determinism is recommended in which the model builder originally assumes that no random processes take place within the organism. If necessary, and as a last resort, such processes can be appended to an otherwise deterministic model for predictive convenience.     

Where is the gender in gendered language?

The purpose of these studies was to examine how women and men react and accommodate to gender-preferential language in e-mail messages. In Experiment 1, participants wrote messages to two assigned 'netpals.' These netpals were actually one of the experimenters. For each participant, one netpal used female-preferential language and the other used male-preferential language. Analyses revealed that the netpals' language style, and not the participants' gender, predicted the language used by participants in their e-mail replies. Female and male participants used the gender-preferential language that matched the language used by their netpals. In Experiment 2, the gender labels and language styles of netpals were independently manipulated. As before, linguistic style had the greatest impact on participants' language use. These results have implications for how people think about gendered behavior, and highlight how gendered language is constructed in social interaction.